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“Whosoever reads the Qur’an but does not know its meaning, he is illiterate.” 
Man qara’ al-Qur’ān fa lam ya‘lam ta’wīlah fa huwa fīhi ummī. 
 
Muqātil ibn Sulaymān (d. 150/767), al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr, 1/27. 
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MUQĀTIL IBN SULAYMĀN: A NEGLECTED FIGURE 
 
IN THE EARLY HISTORY OF QUR’ĀNIC COMMENTARY 
ACHMAD TOHE 
Boston University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 2015 
Major Professor: Kecia Ali, PhD, Associate Professor of Religion 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study investigates Muqātil ibn Sulaymān’s (d. 150/767) hermeneutics in his 
three extant Qur’an commentaries: al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr, Tafsīr al-Khams Mi’at Āyah min 
al-Qur’ān, and al-Wujūh wa al-Naẓā’ir fī al-Qur’ān al-‛Aẓīm. It explains Muqātil’s 
understanding of the Qur’an, his exegetical approaches, and the theological concerns 
undergirding his endeavors. Despite his early importance, Muqātil is an understudied 
figure because of stigma attached to his views and methods. Later Muslim tradition 
accused Muqātil of anthropomorphism, inattention to transmission chains, fabrication of 
ḥadīth (prophetic traditions), and overreliance on biblical narratives, thus rendering his 
work theologically and methodologically suspect. Two of these accusations are 
unfounded, and two are only partially correct but misleading as well as anachronistic. 
Existing modern scholarship on Muqātil and his commentaries has either focused on 
these accusations or on uncovering his views on specific topics. None has addressed 
Muqātil’s hermeneutics, the focus of this study. 
Substantively, Muqātil maintains that the Qur’an consists of divine commands, 
prohibitions, promises, threats, and narratives of the past. Linguistically, the Qur’an is a 
complex structure containing utterances of different kinds, which he presents in a series 
  ix 
of binaries: general-particular, clear-vague, equivocal-unequivocal, explicit-implicit, and 
so forth. Consequently, a proper understanding of the Qur’an necessitates interpretation. 
Muqātil uses three major exegetical methods, namely paraphrasing, crossreferencing, and 
narrative, and three techniques, namely fragmentation, specification, and completion.  
Muqātil’s commentaries persistently focus on theological concerns revolving 
around the propagation of belief (īmān), in opposition to disbelief (kufr), with regard to 
the oneness of God (tawḥīd) and the validity of Muhammad’s prophethood (taṣdīq). He 
uses theological criteria to evaluate non-Muslim communities as well as Muslims who 
had shown distrust of or rebellious acts against the Prophet Muhammad.  
Though theologically uncompromising, Muqātil is legally a pragmatist with 
regard to interreligious coexistence, especially in his conception of muḥkamāt al-Qur’ān 
as the perennially unchanging elements of revelation, which serves as the “Islamic 
Decalogue,” laying a common ground for interreligious relations. Furthermore, Muqātil 
is ethically pacifist in advancing his uncompromising theology, including in propagating 
tawḥīd and taṣdīq and in understanding jihad not merely as an armed fight but also as 
civilized acts undertaken for God’s cause.  
  x 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Statement of the Problem 
This dissertation studies a second/eighth century commentator on the Qur’an 
(mufassir), Muqātil ibn Sulaymān (d. 150/767), and his three extant commentaries, al-
Tafsīr al-Kabīr,1 Tafsīr al-Khams Mi’at Āyah fī al-Qur’ān,2 and al-Wujūh wa al-Naẓā’ir 
fī al-Qur’ān al-‘Aẓīm.3 Muqātil’s early life and intellectual activities took place in 
Khurāsān. He was born in the city of Balkh, and later moved to Merv where he seems to 
have written his commentaries.4 The grand Mosque of Merv appears to be the locus of 
much of Muqātil’s teaching activities and a place where, as many reports maintain, he 
                                                        
1 There are two published versions of this commentary. The first is the edition of ‘Abd Allāh Maḥmūd 
Shiḥātah entitled Tafsīr Muqātil ibn Sulaymān (Beirut, Lebanon: Mu’assasat al-Tārīkh al-‘Arabī, 2002), 
and consists of five volumes. The second is the edition of Aḥmad Farīd, with the same title as Shiḥātah’s, 
which consists of three volumes and was published by Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah in Beirut, Lebanon in 
2003. In this study, I use Shiḥātah’s edition, simply because I have had access to it much earlier than I do to 
Farīd’s. In fact, I do not use Farīd’s edition of Muqātil’s Tafsīr for this study, except in the interpretation of 
Q5:82 missing in Shiḥātah’s edition but found in Farīd’s. 
2 There is only one edition of this commentary by Isaiah Goldfeld, Kitāb Tafsīr al-Khams Mi’at Āyah min 
al-Qur’ān ‘an Muqātil ibn Sulaymān (Israel: Maṭba‘ah Dār al-Mashriq Shafā ‘Amr, 1980). 
3 There are two published versions of the commentary. The first is the edition of Shiḥātah, who also edited 
Muqātil’s al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr, entitled al-Ashbāh wa-al-Naẓāʼir fī al-Qurʼān al-Karīm (Cairo: al-Hayʼah al-
Miṣrīyah al-ʻĀmmah lil-Kitāb, 1975). However, Ḥātim Ṣālih al-Ḍāmin argues that the one Shiḥātah edited 
was actually the work of Abū Naṣr al-Miṣrī (d. 271/884) who transmitted it from ‘Abd Allāh ibn Hārūn. In 
fact, al-Ḍāmin himself had edited the work in 1988. Therefore, al-Ḍāmin edited another version and 
published it, entitled al-Wujūh wa al-Naẓā’ir fī al-Qur’ān al-Karīm (Dubai: Markaz Jum‘ah al-Mājid li al-
Thaqāfah wa al-Turāth, 2006), p. 8-9. In this study, I am using al-Dāmin’s edition of Muqātil’s Wujūh. 
4 There was a report that Muqātil was married to a widow in Merv, and that he, afraid of forgetting his 
knowledge, dictated his tafsīr to his step son, Abū ‘Iṣmah ibn Abī Maryam (d. 173/789), until the latter 
finished the whole commentary. Abū al-Qāsim ‛Alī ibn al-Ḥasan ibn Hibat Allāh ibn ‛Abd Allāh al-Shāfi‛ī 
(Ibn ‛Asākir), Tārīkh Madīnat Dimashq, ed. Muḥibb al-Dīn Abū Su‛ūd ‛Umar ibn Ghulāsah al-‛Amrī (n. p. 
Dār al-Fikr, n. y.), 60/115. Furthermore, there are reports that other Khurāsānī scholars had seen Muqātil’s 
commentary. See Jamāl al-Dīn Abū al-Ḥajjāj Yūsuf al-Mizzī, Tahdḥīb al-Kamāl fī Asmā’ al-Rijāl, ed. 
Bashār ‛Awwād Ma‛rūf (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-Risālah, 1983), 28/450. Abū Aḥmad ‘Abd Allāh ibn ‘Adī al-
Jurjānī, al-Kāmil fī Ḍu‘afā’ al-Rijāl, ed. ‘Ādil Aḥmad ‘Abd al-Mawjūd and ‘Alī Muḥammad Mu‘awwaḍ, 
(Beirūt: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, n.y.), 8/187-92. Ibn ‘Asākir also mentioned that one of the transmitters 
of Tafsīr al-Khams Mi’at Āyah, Abū Nuṣayr Manṣūr ibn ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd al-Bārūdī, studied the commentary 
and lived with Muqātil when he was in Merv. See Ibn ‛Asākir, Tārīkh Madīnat Dimashq, 60/115. 
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was involved in an intense theological debate with Jahm ibn Ṣafwān (d. 128/746) about 
divine attributes, after which Muqātil was notoriously accused of anthropomorphism.5  
The second half of Muqātil’s life was spent generally in Iraq, first in Baghdād and later in 
Basrah until he died. There are reports that suggest Muqātil’s having sojourned in 
Yemen, Beirut and Mecca, where he taught in their mosques.6 
Muqātil is a controversial figure who defies an easy description. Both his life and 
works appear to have taken a path of tension, while searching for a middle ground, a third 
space that offers alternatives. His opponents came from both rationalist and traditionalist 
camps, the two of which had usually been in opposition to one another. The rationalists 
had accused him of crude anthropomorphism in understanding divine attributes, as 
commonly represented by literal understanding of the traditionalists. Yet the 
traditionalists had accused him of unreliability that Muqātil was not credible to 
participate in religious knowledge transmission, especially ḥadīth. Muqātil’s use of extra-
Islamic reports, known pejoratively from the tenth century as isrā’iliyyāt, in his 
commentary has also scandalized his exegetical endeavors, which accordingly leads, 
albeit misleadingly, to the accusation that he undermines the sanctity of Islamic teaching 
and prophet.7 Muqātil was accused of worst things possible that a sincere Muslim scholar 
                                                        
5 Shams al-Din Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Dhahabī, Mīzan al-I‛tidāl fī Naqd al-Rijāl, ed. ‛Alī Muḥammad 
Mu‛awwaḍ and ‛Ādil Aḥmad ‛Abd al-Mawjūd (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‛Ilmiyyah, 1995), 6/505. Some 
suggest that the problem between Muqātil and Jahm was not only theological, but also political. For while 
Muqātil represented the governemnt of Khurāsān, Jahm represented the rebel, al-Hārith b. Suraij 
(d.120/738). See Mun’im Sirry, “Muqātil b. Sulaymān and Anthropomorphism,” Studia Islamica, nouvelle 
édition/new series, 3, 2012, 35-66.   
6 al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Tārīkh Baghdād wa Akhbār Muḥaddithīhā wa Dhikr Quṭṭānihā al-‛Ulamā min 
Ghayr Ahlihā wa Wāridīhā (Tārīkh Baghdād), ed. Bashār ‛Awwād Ma‛rūf (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 
2001), 15/215. 
7 For a general overview of isrā’iliyyāt and its scholarly study in western academia, see Roberto Tottoli, 
“Origin and Use of the Term Isra’iliyyat in Muslim Literature,” Arabica, Vol. 46, No. 2 (1999): 193-210, 
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could bear: “Muqātil used to take from Jews and Christians the knowledge of the Qur’an 
that agreed with their books, equate God with creation, and forge ḥadīth.”8 The 
consequence is almost expected: Muqātil has been condemned and accordingly 
marginalized from Muslim scholarship. While perpetuation of his condemnation 
continues, very rarely have people bothered to look at his works in order to evaluate 
Muqātil based on what he himself had written than what others had said about him. In 
short, Muslims and non-Muslims alike have taken Muqātil for granted and only a few 
have given him the benefit of the doubt. 
In the meantime, Muqātil’s three extant commentaries are the first commentaries 
of their kind. The second/eighth century was the beginning of literary period in which the 
codification of a variety of Islamic sciences took place. The first of this activity was 
related to the compilation of ḥadīth under the auspices of the Caliph ‛Umar ibn ‛Abd al-
‛Azīz (r. 99/717). The first scholar who responded to the Caliph’s instruction on the 
compilation and codification of ḥadīth was Ibn Shihāb al-Zuhrī (d. 124/741), and was 
followed by other scholars, one generation younger than al-Zuhrī. During this period, 
tafsīr was part of ḥadīth compilation and codification.9 Therefore, the commentary on the 
Qur’an at the time commonly contained only parts of the Qur’an, such as that of Mujāhid 
and Sufyān al-Thawrī.10 Shortly following al-Zuhrī’s time, however, tafsīr had become 
                                                        
and Michael Pregill, “Isrā’iliyyāt, myth, and pseudepigraphy: Wahb b. Munabbih and the early Islamic 
versions of the fall of Adam and Eve,” in Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 34 (2008): 215-284. 
8 This statement of Ibn Ḥibbān (d. 354/965) best reflects the whole range of accusations that scholars have 
leveled against Muqātil. See Ibn Ḥibbān, Kitāb al-Majrūḥīn min al-Muḥaddithīn, ed. Ḥamdī ‛Abd al-Majīd 
al-Salafī (Saudi Arabia: Dār al-Ṣuma‛ī li al-Nashr wa al-Tawzī‛, 2000), 2/348. 
9 Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Dhahabī, al-Tafsīr wa al-Mufassirūn (Cairo: Maktabah Wahbah, 2000), 1/104. 
10 ‘Alī Aḥmad al-Sālūs, Ma‛a al-Ithnay ‛Ashariyyah fī al-Uṣūl wa al-Furū‛ (Egypt: Maktabah Dār al-
Qur’ān, n.y.), 397. 
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an independent discipline of its own, containing the reported exegetical views of early 
Muslims, especially the Prophet, and personal exegetical views of the Qur’an’s 
commentators.  As a result, the commentary on the Qur’an started to address the whole 
Qur’an, as Muqātil’s al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr.11 Muqātil’s commentary was the first complete 
commentary on the Qur’an that reaches us. There might be other complete commentaries 
of the Qur’an from that same period, such as al-Kalbī’s commentary that is said to be 
similar to that of Muqātil, but did not survive.12 Shihātah argues that Muqātil might have 
been the first person who wrote a complete commentary on the Qur’an.13   
Muqātil’s Tafsīr al-Khams mi’at Āyah is the first legal commentary as much as it 
is the first thematic commentary on the Qur’an.14 The organization of this commentary is 
made on how the jurists arranged their books, and is probably written within the Zaydī 
School of law.15 Muqātil is said to be the first person who isolated five hundred Qur’anic 
verses (khams mi’at āyah, as the title shows) pertaining to legal matters, and the first who 
wrote a book on qur’anic legal commentary. The term “five hundred verses” (khams 
mi’at āyah) in the title of Muqātil’s legal commentary, however, “does not point to the 
exact number, but merely an expression of approximate number” (wa innamā arāda al-
                                                        
11 al-Dhahabī, Tafsīr, 1/113; al-Sālūs, Ithnay ‛Ashariyyah, 397. 
12 Shihātah, Tafsīr, 5/62. 
13 Ibn Jurayj, Muqātil’s contemporary, was often mentioned as the first who wrote tafsīr. However, since he 
started to write his commentary late in his life, Muqātil should have been earlier than him in writing his 
commentary since the latter seemed to begin the writing in his youth. Shihātah, 5/68. 
14 Aḥmad ibn ‘Abd Allāh al-Zahrānī, al-Tafsīr al-Mawḍū’ī ‛an al-Qur’ān li al-Karīm wa Namādhij minhu 
(al-Maktabah al-Shāmilah), 14. 
15 Fahd ibn ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Sulaymān al-Rūmī, Ittijāhāt al-Tafsīr fī al-Qarn al-Rābi‛ ‛Ashara (Beirut: 
Mu’assasat al-Risālah, 1997), 43. Muqātil was said to be one of the prominent scholars of the Zaydiyyah. 
See Māni‘ ibn Ḥammād al-Juhanī, al-Mawsū‘ah al-Muyassarah fī al-Adyān wa al-Madhāhib wa al-Aḥzāb 
al-Mu‘āṣirah (Riyāḍ: Dār al-Nadwah al-‘Ālimiyyah li al-Ṭibā‘ah wa al-Nashr wa al-Tawzī‘, 1999),  1/77. I 
do not, however, study further the allegedly Zaydī orientation of Muqātil’s legal thought in this 
dissertation. Independent studies on this matter therefore still need to be conducted. 
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ẓāhirah lā al-ḥaṣra).16 For scholars were of different views in terms of the number of 
Qur’anic verses which address legal matters due to their different opinion whether these 
legal verses are those who explicitly talk about law or whether they also include those 
which only implicitly address legal questions.17 The last of Muqātil’s commentaries that I 
will study here, al-Wujūh wa al-Naẓā’ir, is the first that addresses the phenomenon of 
polysemy in the Qur’an. This commentary becomes the standard upon which later 
authors, who write the same subject matter, model their own works.18 
Despite an overwhelmingly great amount of criticism toward Muqātil, the 
majority of Muslim scholars almost unanimously acknowledged his expertise in tafsīr, 
while they rejected his credentials as a transmitter of ḥadīth (muḥaddith).19 Some 
prominent scholars, such as al-Shāfi‘ī (d. 204/820) and Ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241/855), who 
represent orthodoxy, have been cited to have approved of Muqātil’s reputation as a 
commentator on the Qur’an.20 Furthermore, as mentioned in the introductory part of his 
                                                        
16 See al-Taqrīr wa al-Taḥbīr ‛alā Taḥrīr al-Kamāl, 3/292; Irshād al-Fuḥūl ilā Taḥqīq al-Ḥaqq min ‛Ilm al-
Uṣūl, 2/207. 
17 Abū al-Mundhir Maḥmūd ibn Muḥammad ibn Muṣṭafā al-Minyāwī, Al-Mu‛taṣār min Sharḥ Mukhtaṣar 
al-Uṣūl min ‛Ilm al-Uṣūl (al-Maktabah al-Shāmilah, 2010), 1/242. 
18 al-Ḍāmin, Wujūh, 8.  
19 Al-Naẓẓām (d. between 220/835 and 230/845), the Mu‛tazilī, was perhaps the first who criticized 
Muqātil in his capacity as a mufassir, along with a number of other commentators of the Qur’an, such as 
‛Ikrimah, al-Kalbī, al-Suddī, al-Ḍaḥḥāk, and Abū Bakr al-‛Aṣamm, due to what al-Naẓẓām thought naïve 
and groundless interpretation. See Abū ‛Uthmān ‛Amr ibn Baḥr al-Jāḥiẓ, Kitāb al-Ḥayawān, ed. ‛Abd al-
Salām Muḥammad Hārūn (Egypt: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalbī wa Awlāduh, 1965), 1/343. As the earliest 
work in which an account of Muqātil was found, Ibn Sa‛d (d. 230/844) Kitāb al-Ṭabaqāt al-Kabīr runs, 
“Muqātil ibn Sulaymān al-Balkhī, the author of tafsīr, transmitting from al-Ḍaḥḥāk and ‛Aṭā’, but the 
scholars of ḥadīth were cautious about his ḥadīth and rejected it.” See Muḥammad ibn Sa‛d ibn Manī‛ al-
Zuhrī, Kitāb al-Ṭabaqāt al-Kabīr, ed. ‛Alī Muḥammad ‛Umar (Cairo: Matabat al-Khānjī, n. y.), 9/377. 
20 Abū al-Ma‛āṭī al-Nūrī et al, Mawsū‛at Aqwāl al-Imām Aḥmad ibn Hanbāl fi Rijāl al-Ḥadīth wa ‘Ilalih 
(Dār al-Nashr: ‛Ālam al-Kutub, 1997), 3/392; al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Tārīkh, 13/161, 15/207-08; Burhān 
al-Dīn Ibrāhīm ibn Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd Allāh ibn Muḥammad ibn Mufliḥ, al-Maqṣad al-Arshad fī Dhikr 
Aṣḥāb al-Imām Aḥmad, ed. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Sulaymān al-‘Uthaimīn (Riyāḍ: Matkatabat al-Rushd, 
1990), 1/162. 
  
6 
al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr, Muqātil had received his knowledge of the Qur’an and its 
interpretation from thirty scholars; twelve of these were Sucessors (al-tābi‘ūn) and the 
rest were Successors of Successors (tābī‘ al-tābi‘īn). Although Muqātil certainly does not 
seem to position himself as a compiler of exegetical views, such as al-Ṭabarī, by 
consistenly adopting a monovalent approach in his interpretation of the Qur’an, his 
commentary must have preserved some early ideas of tafsīr.21 In fact, it is Muqātil’s 
ingenious use of his personal views that makes his commentaries so valuable, as much as 
his learning from his predecessors and contemporary scholars. Considering his 
pioneering works on tafsīr, in at least three different genres, the significance of the period 
within which Muqātil lived and produced his works, and certainly his ingenuity in tafsīr, 
the marginalization of Muqātil and his works from scholarship has caused a major gap in 
our understanding of early development of tafsīr and of early exegetical and religious 
ideas within Muslim tradition.  
Structure of the Dissertation 
As this study is an attempt to fill the knowledge gap with regard to early history 
of tafsīr and the dynamics of exegetical and religious ideas by studying Muqātil’s extant 
commentaries, I will structure this dissertation as following. In the introduction, I will 
first investigate the perception and reception of Muqātil in both traditional Muslim 
                                                        
21 By “monovalent approach” I mean an approach in which a commentator only offers his chosen views 
with regard to the interpretation of qur’anic verses without providing a plethora of differing opinions 
among scholars with regard to these verses. The approach by which a Qur’an’s commentator describes 
scholarly differences in terms of the interpretation of qur’anic verses before he finally chooses his own 
views is the method called polyvalent. As an example, Muqatil adopts the first approach, and al-Ṭabarī 
adopts the second.  
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scholarship and Western academia in order to understand the circumstances that have led 
to his marginalization and the later development of scholarly studies of Muqātil and his 
commentaries. The questions I ask to lead this particular investigation are as follows: (1) 
How has Muqātil been received by modern scholarship, Muslim and Western? (2) What 
are the factors that have shaped such receptions? (3) How have such receptions 
developed through times? (4) What is the state of existing scholarship on Muqātil and his 
commentaries? In general, in traditional Muslim scholarship, Muqātil has been tainted 
with a number of accusations—theological, methodological, substantive, and personal—
the majority of which proves to be unfounded in his extant commentaries. Some of the 
accusations that are partially justified do not, however, accurately portray Muqātil as 
doing what he is doing. While early Western scholars had neglected Muqatil, following 
their counterparts in the Muslim world, later scholars have, however, began to pay more 
attention to him, especially because of his early period and his marginalized status, in the 
hope that he might offer an alternative view with regard to Islam’s history.  
After examining Muqātil’s reception, I will investigate Muqātil’s hermeneutics 
and exegetical ideas by closely reading his three commentaries. This close reading of 
Muqātil’s commentaries will become the subject of three different chapters, each 
focusing on one commentary of the three. Thus, chapter one will discuss Muqātil’s al-
Tafsīr al-Kabīr (or Tafsīr Muqātil ibn Sulaymān, by which the published version has been 
entitled), chapter two his Tafsīr al-Khams Mi’at Āyah min al-Qur’ān, and chapter three 
his al-Wujūh wa al-Naẓā’ir fī al-Qur’ān al-‘Aẓīm. For this close reading, I ask a number 
of leading questions as follows: (1) What is Muqātil’s understanding of the Qur’an? (2) 
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How does Muqātil understand his exegetical endeavor with regard to the Qur’an? (3) 
What approaches does he use to interpret the Qur’an, (4) what hermeneutic strategies 
does he apply to support his approaches to the Qur’an, and (5) What primary concerns, if 
any, are there that he has that undergird his interpretation of the Qur’an in his three 
commentaries.  
In chapter one, in which I read closely al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr, I shall argue that 
Muqātil’s exegetical thrust revolves around the propagation of belief (īmān), by 
upholding the notion of the oneness of God (tawḥīd) and accepting the validity of 
Muhammad’s prophethood (taṣdīq), and the condemnation of disbelief (kufr), in the form 
of associating God with creation in worship (shirk) and rejecting Muhammad’s 
prophethood (takdhīb). As such, Muqātil’s exegetical orientation is highly theological. 
Muqātil uses his theological framework to argue that Islam is the primordially true 
religion, propagated by all prophets including Muhammad. As the primordial religion, 
Islam according to Muqātil has always advocated the same fundamentals that now serve 
as his exegetical thrust: the propagation of īmān, especially with regard to tawḥīd and 
taṣdīq, and the condemnation of kufr, especially with regard to shirk and takdhīb. 
Consequently, Muqātil employs his theology to evaluate not only other religious 
communities and traditions but also those who called themselves Muslims, about whom 
he has atrong views. Subsequently, Muqātil’s evaluation leads to his formulation of 
different scenarios of interrelations that these religious communities may have with each 
other, in addition to intra-Muslim relations. Given the theological character of Muqātil’s 
exegetical thrust, I have decided to explore Muqātil’s views of interreligious subject 
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matters concerning the Jews, Christians, polytheists—who in the Qur’an are depicted as 
inimical to Muslims—and also the dynamic of self-definition by addressing the question 
of hypocrisy and hypocrites. In this commentary, Muqātil makes a great use of narrative 
traditions, be they ḥadīths or isrā’iliyyāt, to illuminate his interpretation of the Qur’an. So 
great is the presence of such narrative reports that this al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr may be called as 
a narrative commentary on the Qur’an.22  
In chapter two, in which I study closely Muqātil’s Tafsīr al-Khams Mi’at Āyah, I 
shall argue that Muqātil’s theology that has served as his exegetical thrust has also largely 
governed his attempts to derive legal rulings from the Qur’an. In this commentary, 
Muqātil’s makes it clear that the correct theology takes precedence over anything else, 
including law. Another difference that Muqātil makes in this commentary is that here he 
offers more nuanced explanations to those topics that he has discussed in the major 
commentary by using a different type of ḥadīths that provide him with more practical 
guidance as to how he shapes the legal pronouncement of the Qur’an.23 Provided the 
theological coloring of this legal commentary, in order to measure the consistency of 
Muqātil’s views, I have decided to study similar cases with regard to interreligious subject 
matters, such as food sharing and intermarriage, in addition to the intra-Muslim relation 
with regard to hypocrites. In this respect, I will demonstrate that despite his 
                                                        
22 The presence of a great amount of narrative reports in Muqātil’s major commentary suggests that it is 
work that combines interpretation of the Qur’an and sīrah, another field of work with regard to the 
biography of the Prophet Muhammad. John Wansbrough took notice of the similarity of Muqātil’s major 
commentary with Ibn Ishāq’s Sīrāh. See Quranic Studies: Sources and Methods of Scriptural 
Interpretation (Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 2004), 127. 
23 As I have stated earlier, the majority of ḥadīths or reports that Muqātil uses in al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr are 
narratives that set up the circumstances within which revelation occurred or within which it should be 
understood. As such, such narratives are not merely descriptive but also discursive. 
  
10 
uncompromising theology and his fierce criticism of non-Islamic religious communities, 
Muqātil embraces a legal pragmatism that will enable his vision for admittedly limited 
interreligious coexistence. Muqātil has however made a great effort to find a common 
ground for interreligious relations by inventing the so-called “Islamic Decalogue” in his 
conception of Muḥkamāt al-Qur’ān as the perennial fundamentals of religion shared by at 
least three religious traditions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Furthermore, Muqātil 
offers a highly ethical approach in his promotion of what constitutes his exegetical and 
theological concerns, namely the propagation of īmān, through tawḥīd and taṣdīq, and the 
condemnation of kufr, in the form of shirk and takdhīb. In this respect, he advocates a 
pacifist and non-volent approach in, for instance, carrying out the doctrine “commanding 
right and forbidding wrong” by promoting an accessible education for every individual to 
know what right and wrong are, and to live accordingly. 
In chapter three, in which I investigate closely Muqātil’s lexical commentary al-
Wujūh wa al-Naẓā’ir, which addresses the issue of polysemy in the Qur’an, I shall argue 
that the role that Muqātil’s theology has played in the other two commentaries remains 
persistent, especially in his selection of the entries, other than the fact that they are selected 
because they are, in Muqātil’s view, polysemic.24 The majority of Muqātil’s entries are 
theologically charged, and many of these communicate further his exegetical and 
theological concerns with regard to opposition of īmān and kufr, tawḥīd and shirk, and, 
finally, taṣdīq and takdhīb. In fact, this commentary also highlights Muqātil’s 
                                                        
24 While Muqātil’s theology may have also partially governed the organization of his entries, it is less 
obvious and inconsistent for it is far from being systematic. 
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uncompromising theology but also his highly ethical approach in promoting it reflected, 
for instance, in his understanding of jihād as not pointing merely to physical fighting but 
more importantly to civilized acts, verbal or otherwise, as long as they are undertaken for 
God’s cause. 
Finally, to end this study, I conclude with my major findings and recommend 
further studies that can be undertaken in the future, for instance, in terms of the working of 
discursivity in orthodoxy making, the relation between Muqātil’s works with the socio-
political and cultural background in which they are produced, Muqātil’s Isrā’iliyyāt and 
ḥadīth, sīrah in Muqātil’s commentary, etc. 
Muqātil’s perception and reception in traditional Muslim scholarship 
In the Muslim sources, Muqātil’s scholarly reputation has been marred with 
tainting accusations. Of these, some are theological, methodological, subtanstantive, and 
yet others are personal. Two types of accusations, theological and substantive, pertain to 
Muqātil’s activity as a commentator on the Qur’an, while the other two, methodological 
and personal, are related primarily to his activity in terms of ḥadīth transmission. As long 
as the traditional Muslim sources are concerned, three of these accusations—theological, 
methodological, and personal—seem to be contemporary, and only one accusation—
substantive— that seems to be anachronistic.25  
                                                        
25 The theological charge of anthropomorphism is commonly ascribed in the sources to the Hanafites, 
especially the eponym founder of this legal madhhab, Abū Ḥanīfah (d. 150/767). The methodological 
charge of the neglect of isnād, which in this case refers more to the institutionalized ways of knowledge 
acquisition and transmission through oral delivery and face-to-face learning than a formal enumeration of 
authorities in one’s work, is generally attributed to ‘Abd Allāh ibn al-Mubārak (d. 797). The personal 
charge of being unreliable or untrustworthy is first attributed to Wakī‛ ibn al-Jarrāḥ (d. 197/812). As such, 
these accusations are contemporary to Muqātil. The only charge that seems anachronistic is related to 
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 Theologically, Muqātil has been condemned for his allegedly anthropomorphist 
approach in understanding divine attributes in the Qur’an by applying tashbīh and 
tajsīm.26 Tashbīh is usually associated with the Qur’an’s description of bodily parts 
attributed to God, such as wajh Allāh (God’s face), yad Allāh (God’s hand), and so forth; 
tajsīm is associated with the idea of God as a corporeal entity which needs to accupy a 
space, such as istiwā’, kursī, ‛arsh, yamīn Allāh, sāq and so forth.27 But underlying both 
tashbīh and tajsīm is an understanding or treatment that equates God with creation. So 
convinced were the sources of Muqātil’s extreme anthropomorphism that they invented 
the term “Muqātiliyyah” to name a group of people who, supposedly following in the 
footsepts of Muqātil, viewed God as a corporeal entity possessing bodily parts such as 
flesh, blood, hair, bones, and so forth, and, more importantly, to designate them as 
Muqātil’s companions.28 In this respect, theological accusation of anthropomorphism 
against Muqātil is often associated with his opposition to Jahm ibn Ṣafwān (d. 128/746) 
who was a negationist dismissing altogether the possibility of divine attributes and to 
whom the term “Jahmiyyah”—the very opposite of “Muqātiliyyah—was attributed.29  
Substantatively, Muqātil has been criticized for the content of his commentary in 
which he makes a great use of non-Islamic materials, known since the tenth century as 
                                                        
Muqātil’s use of non-Islamic material borrowed from Jewish and Christian sources, which was first made 
by a tenth century Ibn Ḥibbān al-Bustī (d. 354/965), two centuries after Muqātil’s own period. The 
extension of this substantive charge is perhaps the charge with regard to Muqātil’s style of preaching, 
reflected in his tafsīr, namely storytelling (qiṣṣah, pl. qaṣaṣ). The earliest person who made such a charge 
was an eleventh century scholar, al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī (d. 463/1070).   
26 Sirry, “Muqātil,” 35-66. 
27 Shiḥātah, Tafsīr, 5/94-7. 
28 Shiḥātah, Tafsīr, 5/80. 
29 See Ibn Ḥajar al-‛Asqalānī, Tahdhīb al-Tahdḥib, ed. Ibrāhīm al-Zaybaq and ‛Ādil Murshid (Beirut: 
Mu’assasat al-Risālah, 1995), 4/143-46. 
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the isrā’iliyyāt, the majority of which he borrowed from the People of Scripture, Jews and 
Christians.30 Ibn Ḥibbān (d. 354/965) best summed up all accusations against Muqātil 
when he said: “Muqātil used to take from Jews and Christians the knowledge of the 
Qur’an that agreed with their books, equate God with creation, and forge ḥadīth.”31 
Methodologically, Muslim scholars have strongly objected Muqātil’s inattention 
to chains of transmission (isnād) for any reports that he uses in his commentary.32 The 
question is what did the term isnād likely mean during the second/eighth century? In the 
sources, Ibn al-Mubārak (d. 797) was generally mentioned as the first who expressed 
concerned with respect to Muqatil’s problem with isnād.  When he was shown of 
Muqātil’s tafsīr, Ibn al-Mubārak said, “What a fine knowledge, if he had isnād.”33 In 
another report, Ibn al-Mubārak was said to have said: “What a fine knowledge, if he were 
reliable.”34 In short, while the content of Muqātil’s commentary is fine, according to Ibn 
al-Mubārak, Muqātil himself as the author has a problem with regard to isnād and 
reliability. Ibn al-Mubārak’s two statements are identical, in which isnād seems to be 
                                                        
30 See Ibn Ḥibbān, Majrūḥīn, 2/348. Claude Gilliot calls al-isrā’iliyyāt “the Judaica” as the two terms 
correspond lexically. See his “A Schoolmaster, Storyteller, Exegete and Warrior at Work in Khurāsān: al-
Ḍaḥḥāk b. Muzāḥim al-Hilālī (d. 106/724), “ in Karen Bauer (ed), Aims, Methods, and Contexts of 
Qur’anic Exegesis (2nd/8th – 9th/15th C.) (London: Oxford University Press in association with the 
Institute of Ismaili Studies, 2013): 311-92, 350-1. 
31 Ibn Ḥibbān, Majrūḥīn, 2/348. 
32 al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Tārīkh, 15/209. 
33 Ibn Ḥajar al-‘Asqalānī, Tahdhīb, 4/143. 
34 Ibn Ḥajar al-‘Asqalānī, Tahdhīb, 4/143. Ibn al-Mubārak’s statements also suggest that since the 
second/eighth century scholars have done both isnād and matn criticism, which scrutinize not only the 
transmitters of knowledge but also the content of that knowledge. In this respect, the content of Muqātil’s 
commentary is acceptable, although Muqātil’s credibility as an author or a knowledge transmitter does not 
pass the test. Furthermore, this fact suggests that while Muqātil did not religiously participate in the 
instutionalized way of knowledge acquisition through oral delivery and face-to-face learning, instead 
chosing to use the written records that other people make with regard to the interpretaion of the Qur’an, his 
chosen views in his commentary prove to be of fine quality. As such, it also suggests that Muqātil is a fine 
scholar despite his violation of the scholarly social convention in knowledge transmission. 
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interchangeable with reliability. As such, isnād seems to suggest the interconnection of 
knolwegde genealogy and trustworthiness. The sources generally described Muqātil as 
being confused as to the scholars from whom he actually received his ḥadiṭh, deliberately 
fabricating sources (tadlīs) to imbue his reports with weight of authority, and relying on 
written records (ṣuḥuf) that people made with regard to interpretation of the Qur’an rather 
than gaining his knowledge of tafsīr through samā‛ (oral delivery or face-to-face 
learning).35 Muqātil’s confusion with regard to which authorities said what might have 
been because of his weak memory, or because he did not acquire his knowledge by 
attending lecture sessions in which it was taught or by gaining it through face-to-face 
learning from authorities. Consequently, Muqatil had to embellish his reports with 
authorities to gain acceptance by the people, although he never heard such reports from 
or never met with those authorities, and hence the accusation of tadlīs.36 In actuality, 
what Muqatil did was simply to collect people’s tafsīr and work it out further, without 
ever hearing from them directly (wa lam yasma‘ Muqātilu min Mujāḥidin shay’an wa 
lam yalqahu, wa innamā jama‘a tafsīr al-nās wa fassara ‘alayhi min ghayr samā‘).37 In 
this respect, isnād seems to suggest a social convention in knowledge acquisition and 
transmission, namely oral delivery and face-to-face learning. Muqatil’s alleged violation 
of this institutionalized way of learning might have caused his lack of precision with 
regard to who-said-what when he transmitted reports at his disposal. Even worse, he did 
                                                        
35 Ibn ‛Asākir, Tārīkh, 60/121. Shiḥātah, Tafsīr, 5/46; Musṭafā Zayd, al-Naskh fi al-Qur’an al-Karim (n.c.: 
n.p., n.y.), 1/290; al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī,  Tārīkh, 13/167-8; Ibn Ḥajar al-‘Asqalānī, Tahdhīb, 4/143-4. 
36 Muqātil is, for instance, described in the sources as transmitting reports from Mujāhid and al-Kalbī while 
he never met (in the case of Mujāhid) or heard (in the case of al-Kalbī) from either of them.  
37 Zayd, Naskh, 290-1; Ibn Ḥajar al-‘Asqalānī, Tahdhīb, 4/143-4. 
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not know who-said-what with some of the reports that he had, and he therefore had to 
name certain authorities for certain reports to achieve a level of social acceptance. Thus, 
it is possible that in the second/eighth century the accusation of isnād against Muqātil is 
not because he does not formally mention his authorities, but more because he did not 
follow the social convention and instutionalized way in knowledge transmission through 
oral delivery and face-to-face learning.38 While the use of written records was not a 
liability in itself, the absence of oral delivery and face-to-face learning is a serious 
violation of scholarly conduct of the time.39 This violation was further excacerbated by 
Muqātil’s confusion in naming and fabricating the authorities of his reports. What had 
initially been the problem of method had now become a problem of morality: he lied and 
thus untrustworthy. This constitutes the last of four accusations against Muqatil: his 
personality. 
In the sources, Muqātil is often described as inclined to lie in order to forge a 
ḥadīth, so much so that people called him kadhdhāb (a constant liar) or even dajjāl dasūr 
(an epic liar).40 While there are only a few instances of hadith that the sources are able to 
mention as Muqatil’s fabrication, the majority of cases in which Muqātil’s alleged habit 
of lying are reports about his confused naming of authorities, his false attribution of 
                                                        
38 Nabia Abbott, Studies in Arabic Literary Papyri: II Qur’ānic Commentary and Tradition (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1967), 104. 
39 Abbott maintains that the way by which Muqātil responded to people’s doubt of his using some 
authorities whom he never met or heard from is “evasive, leaving room for the argument that direct 
personal contact with one’s authorities was not necessary.” See Studies, 97. 
40 Jamāl al-Dīn Abū al-Faraj ‛Abd al-Raḥmān ibn ‛Alī ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Jawzī al-Baghdādī, Kitāb al-
Ḍu‛afā’ wa al-Matrūkīn, ed. Abū al-Fidā’ ‛Abd Allāh al-Qāḍī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‛Ilmiyyah, 1986), 
3/136-37. In some sources, Muqātil’s alleged reputation for lying is opposed to Muqātil ibn Ḥayyān who is 
regarded as reliable and his transmitted ḥadīths are therefore accepted. See Abū al-Ḥasan ‛Alī ibn ‛Umar al-
Dāruquṭnī al-Baghdādī, al-Ḍu‛afā’ wa al-Matrūkūn, ed.Muwaffaq ibn ‛Abd Allāh ibn ‛Abd al-Qādir 
(Riyāḍ: Maktabat al-Ma‛ārif, 1984), 371. 
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certain reports to certain authorities, and his attempts to offer the ruling princes reports to 
their advantage. This charge of lying against Muqatil is also closely connected to his 
activity as a storyteller (qāṣṣ), especially in his use of non-Islamic material in his 
preaching. While many of early Muslims were also storytellers other than their being 
commentators on the Qur’an, scholars of ḥadīth, of law, and so forth, storytelling gained 
a pejorative connotation in later period, especially since the 11th century.41 Al-Khaṭīb al-
Baghdādī (d. 463/1070) was perhaps the earliest scholar who brought about many reports 
that indicated Muqātil’s activity as a storyteller. The most formulaic reports indicating his 
story-telling present Muqātil as sitting, usually in a mosque, saying, “Ask me anything 
under the sky, I will tell you” (salūnī ‛ammā dunā al-‛arsh or lā tas’alūnī ‛an shay’in mā 
dūna al-‛arsh illā anba’tukum ‛anhu).42 The ensuing questions were always about exotic 
stories such as who shaved Adam’s hair when he was performing pilgrimage, what the 
color of the dog of aṣḥāb al-kahf was, where the ant’s stomach is, and so forth.43 But it 
was Ibn ‛Asākir (d. 571/1175) who first explicitly mentioned Muqātil as a story-teller 
(qāṣṣ),44 to be followed by al-Dhahabī (d. 748/1347), stating that Muqātil performed 
story-telling (yaquṣṣu) in the Mosque of Merv.45 It was the combination of these 
                                                        
41 To follow the nuanced development of storytelling see Lyall Richard Armstrong, “The Quṣṣāṣ of Early 
Islam” (PhD Diss., University of Chicago, 2013). In the beginning, Wansbrough argued, the Islamic qāṣṣ 
was a transformation of the pre-Islamic khaṭīb suggesting some skilled eloquence (faṣāḥat al-jāhiliyyah). In 
its new circumstance, a qāṣṣ is pictured as a popular preacher who had irresponsibly purveyed fables. 
However, rather than suggesting that the designation qāṣṣ became an epithet of abuse as a result of such a 
popular preacher remaining on the periphery of the religious establishment, as Wansbrough did, I would 
argue that the contrary is true: the designation qāṣṣ had caused such a preacher to be pushed to the 
periphery. See Wansbrough, Quranic Studies, 141. 
42 al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Tārīkh, 15/214. 
43 al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Tārīkh, 15/211, 214, 215. 
44 Ibn ‛Asākir, Tārīkh, 60/133, 123, 126, 127, 128, 129. 
45 al-Dhahabī, Mīzān, 6/505. 
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accusations that finally led people to regard Muqātil as the one whose ḥadīth was 
abandoned and rejected (matrūk al-ḥadīth, majhūr al-qawl, la shay’a al-battata, and so 
forth).46 So serious was Muqātil’s heresy to some scholars that they even contemplated 
killing him if situation allowed them to do so.47 
By chronologically scrutinizing a number of biographical dictionaries and books 
on rijāl al-ḥadīth (ḥadīth transmitters), it can be concluded that in the second part of the 
tenth century, all accusations against Muqātil—theological, methodological, substantive, 
and personal—had been well formulated, best represented by Ibn Ḥibbān’s account of 
Muqātil above. Similar accusations have since been repeated and reiterated by later 
scholars in their works by presenting more or less the same reports to support their views 
of Muqātil.48  The exception applies to Ibn al-Nadīm’s (d. 995) al-Fihrist which, for one 
reason or another, mentioned only positive things about Muqātil, especially the latter’s 
works, including the three commentaries being studied here.49 If attention is paid to the 
                                                        
46 Abū Zakariyyā Muḥy al-Dīn ibn Sharaf al-Nawawī, Tahdhīb al-Asmā’ wa al-Lughāt (Beirut: Dār al-
Kutub al-‛Ilmiyyah), 2/111; Abū al-‛Abbās Shams al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Abī Bakr ibn 
Khallikān, Wafayāt al-A‛yān wa Anbā’ Abnā al-Zamān, ed. Iḥsān ‛Abbās (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, n. y.), 5/256-
7. 
47 Sources mentioned that Khārijah ibn Muṣ‛ab was so outraged by Muqātil’s alleged heresy that he would 
kill him had he had a chance to do it. See, for instance, Ibn Ḥibbān, Majrūḥīn, 2/349; al-Khaṭīb al-
Baghdādī, Tārīkh, 15/212. 
48 See al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Tārīkh, 15/207-19; Ibn ‛Asākīr, Tārīkh, 60/109-34; Ibn al-Jawzī, Ḍu‛afā’, 
3/136-37; al-Nawawī, Tahdhīb, 2/111; Ibn Khallikān, Wafayāt, 5/255-57; al-Mizzī, Tahdḥib, 28/434-451; 
al-Dhahabī, Mīzan, 6/505-7; Al-Dhahabī, Siyar A‛lām al-Nubalā’ (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-Risālah, 1996), 
7/201-2; Al-Dhahabī, Tadhkirat al-Ḥuffāẓ (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‛Ilmiyyah, n. y.), 1/174; Al-Dhahabī, 
al-Mughnī fī al-Ḍu‛afā’, ed. Nūr al-Dīn ‛Itr (Qatar: Idārat Iḥyā’ al-Turāth al-Islāmī, n. y.), 2/321; Ibn Ḥajar 
al-‛Asqalānī, Tahdhīb, 4/143-46; Ibn Ḥajar al-‛Asqalānī, Taqrīb al-Tahdḥib, ed. Abū al-Ashbāl Ṣaghīr 
Aḥmad Shāghif al-Bākistānī (n. p.: Dār al-‛Āṣimah, n. y.), 968, and Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ‛Alī ibn 
Aḥmad al-Dāwūdī, Ṭabaqāt al-Mufassirīn (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‛Ilmiyyah, n. y.), 2/330-31. 
49 It is possible that a theological proximity between Ibn al-Nadīm and Muqātil as fellow Shī‘īs, despite 
different demoninations: one imāmī and another zaydī, created some sort of alliance that shaped the 
former’s account of the latter. See Ibn al-Nadīm, Kitāb al-Fihrist, ed. Riḍā-Tajaddud (n. p.: n. p., n. y.), 
227. 
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individual scholars whom the authors of these biographical dictionaries cited, it appears 
that theological accusation came first, usually attributed to Abū Ḥanīfah (d. 767), then 
came methodological accusation in terms of isnād, raised initially by ‛Abd Allāh ibn al-
Mubārak (d. 797), then personal accusation as a liar, raised for the first time by Wakī‛ ibn 
al-Jarrāḥ (d. 197/812), and finally, substantive accusation in relation to his prolific use of 
non-Islamic material (isrā’iliyyāt), first mentioned by Ibn Ḥibbān (d. 354/965).  
Most sources I use here, however, mentioned both positive and negative traits that 
scholars had attributed to Muqātil, except al-Jāḥiẓ’s (d. 868) Kitāb al-Ḥayawān, which 
raised only al-Naẓẓām’s criticism of Muqātil as a commentator on the Qur’an,50 and three 
works on rijāl al-ḥadīth by Ibn Ḥibbān (354/965), al-Dāraquṭnī (d. 385/995), and Ibn al-
Jawzī (d. 597/1201), which mentioned only Muqātil’s weaknesses so that he was not 
justified in transmitting ḥadīth.51 Nonetheless, the majority of sources that mentioned 
both positive and negative traits of Muqātil had not emerged until the eleventh century 
onward, starting with the account by al-Khaṭīb al-Bagdādī (d. 463/1070). Prior to that, the 
accounts of Muqātil were either negative (al-Jāḥiẓ’s, Ibn Ḥibbān’s, and al-Dāraquṭnī’s) or 
positive (Ibn al-Nadīm’s). 
 The earliest source that mentioned Muqātil is Ibn Sa‛d (d. 230/844)’s Kitāb al-
Ṭabaqāt al-Kabīr. In it, Ibn Sa‛d mentioned Muqātil ibn Sulaymān al-Balkhī, the author 
of tafsīr, transmitting from al-Ḍaḥḥāk and ‛Aṭā’, but stated that the scholars of ḥādīth 
                                                        
50 al-Jāḥīẓ, Hayawān, 1/343. 
51 See Ibn ḤIbbān, Majrūḥīn, 2/347-9; al-Dāruquṭnī, Ḍu‛afā’, 371; and Ibn al-Jawzī, Ḍu‛afā’, 3/136-7. 
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were cautious about his ḥadīth and rejected it.52 Ibn Sa‛d himself acknowledged 
Muqātil’s reputation in tafsīr but dismissed him as a scholar of ḥadīth.  
In his Kitāb al-Ḥayawān, al-Jāḥiẓ (d. 868) criticized Muqātil as a mufassir, citing 
his teacher al-Naẓẓām’s view. In it, al-Jāḥiẓ mentioned al-Naẓẓām’s view of a group of 
commentators of the Qur’an and their allegedly unwarranted interpretation. Al-Jaḥīẓ 
maintained that al-Naẓẓām used to warn people to restrain themselves from consulting 
many commentators of the Qur’an who, despite their dedication to the community by 
answering any questions, issued unfounded opinions. Furthermore, these commentators, 
according to al-Naẓẓām, were fond of odd things: the stranger the interpretation, the more 
they liked it. The commentators that al-Jāḥiẓ mentioned are ‛Ikrimah, al-Kalbī, al-Suddī, 
al-Ḍaḥḥāk, Muqātil ibn Sulaymān, and Abū Bakr al-Aṣamm. These commentators are all 
alike (fī sabīl wāhidah).53  
Ibn Ḥibbān’s (d. 354/965) Kitāb al-Majrūḥīn min al-Muḥaddithīn offers a much 
longer description of Muqātil than Ibn Sa‛d’s and al-Jāḥiẓ’s accounts did. Ibn Ḥibbān 
first mentioned a brief biography of Muqātil, and threw a very compact, yet the most 
complete, accusation against Muqātil, that is, Muqātil used to take from the Jews and 
Christians knowledge of the Qur’an that agreed with their books; he was a mushabbih 
who equated God with creation, and he, in addition, fabricated ḥadīth.54 As such, Ibn 
Ḥibbān viewed Muqātil in an entirely negative way. Furthermore, unlike his predecessors 
who only briefly described Muqātil, Ibn Ḥibbān was the first who mentioned people’s 
                                                        
52 Ibn Sa‛d, Ṭabaqāt, 9/377. 
53 al-Jāḥīẓ, Hayawān, 1/343. 
54 Ibn Ḥibbān, Majrūḥīn, 2/348. 
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views of Muqātil. He mentioned Sufyān Ibn ‛Uyaynah’s (d. 198/814) suspicion of 
Muqātil’s lie for having met with al-Ḍaḥḥāk (d. 102/721), Abū Ḥanīfah’s (d. 150/767) 
warning Abū Yūsuf (d. 182/798) of two groups of people from Khurāsān, namely the 
Jahmiyyah and the Muqātiliyyah, Wakī‛’s view of Muqātil as a liar, Khārijah ibn 
Muṣ‛ab’s (d. 168/785) rage of Muqātil that he contemplated to kill the latter had the 
chance allowed him to do so, and many other views of Muqātil which are generally 
negative.55 
Al-Dāraquṭnī’s (d. 385/995) al-Ḍu‛afā’ wa al-Matrūkūn only focused, if briefly, 
on Muqātil in relation to ḥadīth transmission in which he described the latter as a 
Khurāsānī who lied [in terms of ḥadīth], as opposed to Muqātil ibn Ḥayyān whose ḥadīth 
was fine.56 
Unlike the negative portrayal of Muqātil in al-Jāḥīz’s, Ibn Ḥibbān’s, and al-
Dāraquṭnī’s accounts, Ibn al-Nadīm’s (d. 995) al-Fihrist describes Muqātil briefly in a 
neutral, if not positive, way. This is due probably to the theological proximity of its 
author as a fellow Shi‛ī, though the two differed in denominations, with Ibn al-Nadīm as 
an Imāmī and Muqātil, as sources have it, as a Zaydī. Ibn al-Nadīm mentioned Muqātil as 
a member of Zaydiyyah and his scholarly credentials as a muḥaddith and qāri’, followed 
by a number of works that Muqātil had written. Muqātil works that Ibn al-Nadīm 
mentioned include al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr, al-Nāsikh wa al-Mansūkh, Tafsīr al-Khams Mi’at 
Āyah, al-Qirā’āt, Mutashābih al-Qur’ān, Nawādir al-Tafsīr, al-Wujūh wa al-Naẓā’ir, al-
                                                        
55 Ibn Ḥibbān, Majrūḥīn, 2/348-49. 
56 al-Dāraquṭnī, Ḍu‛afā’, 371. 
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Jawābāt fī al-Qur’ān, al-Radd ‛alā al-Qadariyyah, al-Aqsām wa al-Lughāt, al-Taqdīm 
wa al-Ta’khīr, and  al-Āyāt wa al-Mutashābihāt. 57  
Starting with al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī’s (d. 463/1070) Tārīkh Baghdād, the account 
of Muqātil had become more extensive and more balanced, taking both positive and 
negative traits into discussion.58 Al-Baghdādi’s description of Muqātil is much longer 
than any of his predecessors, running about twelve pages. In it, al-Baghdādī first 
mentioned a short biography of Muqātil, his teachers and students, and his compact 
judgment about him as possessing knowledge of tafsīr, but not of ḥadīth.59 Afterward, al-
Baghdādi enumerated positive qualities that Muqātil possessed, such as his impartiality in 
his interpretation despite being a Zaydī, by respecting the majority of the Companions, 
unlike other Shī’īs who deplored almost anyone except ‛Alī, his family, and people who 
were allied with him.60 Al-Baghdādi also mentioned Muqātil’s alleged courage to give 
                                                        
57 Ibn al-Nadīm, Fihrist, 227. 
58 al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Tārīkh, 14/207-219. 
59 al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Tārīkh, 15/207.  
60 Zaydiyyah was a group of people who are the followers of Zayd ibn ‘Alī ibn al-Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alī ibn Abī 
Ṭālib (d. 122/740). Although Zayd ibn ‘Alī recognized the superiority of ‘Ali, he remained respectful to 
other Companions, especially Abū Bakr and ‘Umar. Therefore, when Zayd found out that some of his 
followers condemned Abū Bakr and ‘Umar, he refuted them, or he told them, “You refuted me!” 
(rafaḍtumūnī), hence the name Rāfiḍah. See Abū al-Ḥasan ‘Alī ibn Ismā‘īl al-‘Ash‘arī, Maqālat al-
Islāmiyyīn wa Ikhtilāf al-Muṣallīn, ed. Muḥammad Muhy al-Dīn ibn ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd (Beirut: al-Maktabah 
al-‘Aṣriyyah, 1990), 1/136-7. Najam Haider argues that there were two orientations in the early Zaidism, 
Batrī and Jārūdī. “The earliest layers of Zaydī literature are almost exclusively Batrī, which upheld the 
legitimacy of Abu Bakr and ‘Umar based on ‘Alı’s apparent refusal to lead an armed uprising against their 
rule. Jārūdī texts only emerge in the middle of the 2nd⁄8th and early 3rd⁄9th century.  Zaidism became 
Jārūdī as a result of outside political pressures (e.g. a series of failed revolts) or internal theological 
developments (e.g. a slow move towards Imāmī Twelver attitudes of the Companions). The Jārūdīs argued 
that the Prophet had chosen ‘Alī as his successor on a number of public occasions including (most 
famously) the sermon at Ghadīr Khumm during his final pilgrimage. This evidence was so clear and 
unambiguous that a denial of ‘Alī’s rights was tantamount to disbelief (kufr). Consequently, the Jārūdīs 
excommunicated a majority of the Companions, judging them unreliable as legal authorities or transmitters 
of religious knowledge.” See Najam Haider, “Zaydism: A Theological and Political Survey,” in Religion 
Compass 4⁄7 (2010): 436–442, 437. In this respect, it is possible that Muqātil was part of Batrī Zaydism, 
which later became part of proto-Sunnism. See Najam Haider, The Origins of the Shi‛a: Identity, Ritual, 
and Sacred Space in Eighth-Century Kufah (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 3-23. 
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advice to the ruler, such as the Abbasid prince, Abū Ja‘far al-Manṣūr. Moreover, al-
Baghdādī discussed some positive remarks that people made about to Muqātil, such as a 
certain Shu‛bah who always said something good about Muqātil when people asked him; 
Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, who respected Muqātil’s knowledge of the Qur’an despite some 
controversy around the latter; and al-Shāfi‛ī, who said that people were forever indebted 
to Muqātil in relation to tafsīr.61 
Slowly, following these positive qualities, al-Baghdādī began to shift mentioning 
a rather negative and even harsh criticism of Muqātil. For instance, al-Baghdādi 
mentioned people’s doubting Muqātil’s reliability because of his inattention to isnād; or 
their half-hearted reception of Muqātil acknowledging the breadth and value of his 
knowledge, yet reluctant to take benefit of it because of its doubtful transmission; or that 
people’s hatred of him was due to jealousy.62 Likewise, al-Baghdādi mentioned Muqātil’s 
activity as qāṣṣ (story-telling preacher), sitting in a mosque challenging people to ask him 
anything under the sky. As a result, people asked him fantastic questions, and Muqātil 
was depicted as unable to answer. Muqatil’s inability to answer such questions, according 
to Sufyān ibn ‛Uyaynah, was a punishment for his overconfidence or his interest in exotic 
stories.63 If al-Baghdādī was perhaps the earliest scholar who brought about many reports 
that indicated Muqātil’s activity as a story-teller (yaquṣṣu), it was Ibn ‛Asākir who first 
explicitly mentioned Muqātil as a story-teller (qāṣṣ), to be followed by al-Dhahabī who 
mentioned Muqātil was performing story-telling (yaquṣṣu) in the Mosque of Merv. Thus, 
                                                        
61 al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Tārīkh, 15/207-08. 
62 al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Tārīkh, 15/209-11. 
63 al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Tārīkh, 15/214-15. 
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until the eleventh century, no explicit accusation of storytelling was leveled against 
Muqātil.  
Finally, al-Baghdādī mentioned a number of criticisms, from soft to harsh, that 
people leveled against Muqātil, such as his lie that he met and heard from al-Ḍaḥḥāk or 
Mujāhid in person, while he merely collected their tafsīr and worked it out further.64 
Furthermore, there were accusations that Muqātil had fabricated ḥadīth and that his 
ḥadith must therefore be abandoned.65 Or accusations that Muqātil was a mushabbih in 
opposition of Jahm who was a mu‛aṭṭil, which had outraged some people to the extent 
that they would kill Muqātil had they had chance to do so; something that they would 
never do to the dhimmīs, be they Jews or Christians.66 In the end, Muqātil’s alleged 
fabrication of ḥadīth and his anthropomorphism had accorded him a label as an epic liar 
whose ḥadīth was to be abandoned (kadhdhāb matrūk al-ḥadīth).67 
Ibn ‛Asākir’s (d. 571/1175) account of Muqātil in his Tārīkh Dimashq is twice as 
long as al- al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī’s, running about twenty five pages.68 It suggests that as 
time progressed there was a growing material on Muqātil, although the added material 
may not have brought new insights so much as emphasize what had been said in early 
sources. Unlike al-Baghdādī who arranged his material from positive to negative traits of 
Muqātil, Ibn ‛Asākir did not systematically organize his reports on Muqātil; rather, he 
mixed up between those expressing positive views of Muqātil and those of negative 
                                                        
64 al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Tārīkh, 15/211. 
65 al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Tārīkh, 15/211-12. 
66 al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Tārīkh, 15/212. The rage of Khārijah ibn Muṣ‛ab was also mentioned in Ibn 
Ḥibbān’s Du‛afā’. 
67 al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Tārīkh, 15/215-19. 
68 Ibn ‛Asākir, Tārīkh, 60/109-134. 
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views.69 The number of negative views is, however, larger than that of the positive views, 
and since he ended his exposition of Muqātil with the negative traits, he may have shaped 
his readers’ mind to do the same when they think of Muqātil. 
The first description of Muqātil that Ibn ‛Asākir mentioned is that he was a 
scholar or author of qur’anic commentary (ṣāḥib al-tafsīr).70 After mentioning his 
teachers, from whom Muqātil transmitted knowledge, and his students, who transmitted 
from him, Ibn ‛Asākir mentioned some examples of ḥadīṭh in which Muqātil is part of the 
transmission chain.71 Ibn ‛Asākir also mentioned Muqātill’s alleged qaṣaṣ (story-telling) 
related activity in the Beirut’s mosque.72 It was only then that Ibn ‛Asākir enumerated 
people’s opinions of Muqātil: people abandoned him, and he was nothing at all (al-
Bukhārī);73 he was the author of tafsīr whose reports are rejected (Ibn Abī Ḥātim); he was 
a ḥāfiẓ in tafsīr, but did not pay a careful attention to isnād (Abū al-‛Abbās ibn 
Muṣ‛ab);74 his commentary would have been fine had he been trustworthy (‛Abd Allāh 
ibn al-Mubārak);75 Muqātil was an epic liar (Wakī‛ ibn al-Jarrāḥ),76 and so forth. Among 
the new material that had never been mentioned in earlier sources is a report that Muqātil 
asked Abū ‛Iṣmah, his stepson, to write down his commentary as he feared that he would 
forget his knowledge. Muqātil began dictating his commentary one page after another at 
                                                        
69 Ibn ‛Asākir also took some of his material on Muqātil from al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī. See Ibn ‛Asākir, 
Tārīkh, 60/111. 
70 Ibn ‛Asākir, Tārīkh, 60/109. 
71 Ibn ‛Asākir, Tārīkh, 60/109-10. 
72 Ibn ‛Asākir, Tārīkh, 60/110-111. 
73 Ibn ‛Asākir, Tārīkh, 60/111. 
74 Ibn ‛Asākir, Tārīkh, 60/112. 
75 Ibn ‛Asākir, Tārīkh, 60/119. 
76 Ibn ‛Asākir, Tārīkh, 60/121. 
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night until it was finished. The commentary was then transmitted by Abū Nuṣayr who, 
during his study of the commentary with Muqātil, impregnated the latter’s slave (jāriyah) 
whom Muqātil later freed.77 There is also a report in which Muqātil defended himself 
against the accusation of tashbīh before the ‛Abbāsid Prince. When the Prince asked him 
whether he practiced tashbīh, Muqātil’s answer was reciting to him Q112,78 and 
emphasized that anything else people said about him is a lie.79 Ibn ‛Asākir also brought 
more material in relation to Muqātil’s overconfidence in his knowledge (demonstrated by 
his challenging people to ask him any questions) and his interest in fantastic stories that 
usually came from non-Islamic sources.80 Furthermore, it was Ibn ‛Asākir who first 
explicitly brought about the accusation that Muqātil was a story-teller whose ḥadīth was 
abandoned, by citing, in this regard, Ibn al-Ḥakam ibn Bashīr.81  
Ibn al-Jawzī’s (d. 597/1201) Kitāb al-Du‛afā’ wa al-Matrūkīn mentions Muqātil 
with a wholly negative perspective. In a relatively short exposition, Ibn al-Jawzī simply 
enumerated the views of some prominent scholars of ḥadīth on Muqātil, which are all 
negative. Muqātil was a liar (kadhdhāb, Wakī‛ ibn al-Jarrāḥ, 197/812), whose ḥadīth was 
nothing (Yaḥyā ibn Ma‛īn, d. 233/848); a big liar (dajjāl dasūr, al-Sa‛dī), whose ḥadīth 
people abandoned (Abū Dāwud); whose ḥadīth was rejected and about whom people 
were silent, and nothing at all (al-Bukhārī); a liar and whose ḥadīth was abandoned 
(Zakariyyā al-Sājī and al-Rāzī); one of four whom people known for fabricating ḥadīth in 
                                                        
77 Ibn ‛Asākir, Tārīkh, 60/115. 
78 (1) “Say, ‘He is God the One, (2) God the eternal. (3) He begot no one nor was He begotten. (4) No one 
is comparable to Him.’” 
79 Ibn ‛Asākir, Tārīkh, 60/121. 
80 Ibn ‛Asākir, Tārīkh, 60/127-28. 
81 Ibn ‛Asākir, Tārīkh, 60/133. 
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the name of the Prophet (al-Nasā’ī), and one who took from the Jews and Christians 
knowledge of the Qur’an that agreed with their books, treating God the same as creation 
(mushabbih), and lying in terms of ḥadīth (Abū Ḥātim ibn Ḥibbān).82 In short, there is 
nothing new in Ibn al-Jawzī’s description of Muqātil that focused only on the latter’s 
disreputation in the field of ḥadīth. Ibn al-Jawzī mentioned nothing at all about Muqātil’s 
merit in the field of tafsīr and other good traits that people had praised about him, as 
mentioned in the earlier sources. 
While Al-Nawawī’s account of Muqātil in (d. 676/1277) Tahdḥib al-Asmā’ wa al-
Lughāt is based on the views of scholars of ḥadīth, like Ibn al-Jawzī’s before him, it is 
relatively balanced. In general, al-Nawawī admitted Muqātil’s expertise in tafsīr while 
dismissing him as a scholar of ḥadīth. Nothing is really new in al-Nawawī’s exposition of 
Muqātil, except that one of the reports he used shows that Muqātil was a contemporary of 
al-Awzā‛ī, a Syrian legal scholar, some of whose views Muqātil mentioned in his legal 
commentary.83 
In a quite different spirit, the account of Muqātil in Ibn Khallikān’s (d. 681/1282) 
Wafayāt al-A‛yān is the most objective of all. In general, Ibn al-Khallikān was aware of 
the controversy that surrounded Muqātil, and his biographical exposition of Muqātil was 
meant to show just that: divided views of Muqātil among people.84 There were people 
who accepted Muqātil, but there were others who rejected him.85 Therefore, Ibn 
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Khallikān did not hesitate to recognize Muqātil’s reputation as a commentator on the 
Qur’an whose commentary was well known (wa kāna mashhūran bi tafsīr kitāb Allāh al-
‛azīz, wa lahū al-tafsīr al-mashhūr).86 In this respect, Ibn Khallikān mentioned al-
Shāfi‛ī’s view that people were indebted to Muqātil with regard to knowledge of tafsīr. In 
addition, Ibn Khallikān also highlighted Muqātil’s nerve to give admonition to the 
political ruler, as in the case of the ‛Abbasid Prince, Abū Ja‛far al-Manṣūr. On the other 
hand, Ibn Khallikān mentioned negative comments that people had made about Muqātil. 
Similar to any assessments given to Muqātil in other sources, Ibn Khallikān related the 
negative views about Muqātil as someone whose ḥadīth was abandoned (‛Abd Allāh ibn 
al-Mubārak); who spoke about divine attributes in a way that is not to be transmitted 
(Aḥmad ibn Sayyār); a big liar (Ibrāhīm ibn Ya‛qūb al-Jawjazānī); one of four people 
well known for fabricating ḥadīth in the name of the Prophet (Abū ‛Abd al-Raḥmān al-
Nasā’ī); and, in the most encompassing accusation, one who took from the Jews and 
Christians knowledge of the Qur’an that agreed with their books, treated God as similar 
to creation (mushabbih), and fabricated ḥadiṭh (Abū Ḥātim Muḥammad ibn Ḥibbān al-
Bustī).87 In short, all views about Muqātil that Ibn Khallikān mentioned had been 
mentioned in other sources. What specifically distinguishes Ibn Khallikān’s account of 
Muqātil from others is his explicit statement that there are opposing views on Muqātil, 
and he intended to show such opposition. Thus, although Ibn Khallikān’s organization of 
the material with regard to Muqātil’s account is similar to that of other sources before 
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him, in which positive traits of Muqātil were put before the negative ones, Ibn Khallikān 
clearly did not mean to override the positive with the negative, as could be perceived in 
other accounts of Muqātil in other sources. His intention was from the beginning to show 
the controvery around Muqātil and that people were divided in terms of the latter’s 
reputation. 
Al-Mizzī’s (d. 742/1341) account of Muqātil in his Tahdhīb al-Kamāl is basically 
a collection of views mentioned earlier in other sources, both positive and negative.88 In 
terms of the negative assessment of Muqātil, al-Mizzī mentioned everything that scholars 
had expressed about him, including the most complete one issued by Abū Ḥātim ibn 
Ḥibbān.89 In addition to Muqātil’s three major and devastating weaknesses that Ibn 
Ḥibbān mentioned, which best summed up the whole range of accusations made against 
him, al-Mizzī also mentioned the view of ‛Abd Allāh ibn al-Mubārak who said, after 
someone showed him part of Muqātil’s commentary, that it would have been a valuable 
knowledge had it been accompanied by isnād or had Muqātil been trustworthy.90 If there 
is something new in al-Mizzī’s account of Muqātil, it is his inclusion of a statement by 
Abū Aḥmad ibn ‛Adī (d. 365/976) that although the majority of Muqātil’s ḥadīth was not 
accepted, there were many trustworthy and famous scholars who transmitted from him 
and wrote his ḥadīth.91 
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Another account of Muqātil was by al-Mizzī’s contemporary, Shams al-Dīn 
Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Dhahabī (d. 748/1347) in his Mīzān al-I‛tidāl.92 In this short 
account, al-Dhahabī mentioned a number of scholars who provided negative views on 
Muqātil such as Abū Ḥanīfah, Wakī‛ ibn al-Jarrāḥ, al-Bukhārī, Yaḥyā ibn Ma‛īn, al-
Nasā’ī, al-Jawjazānī, and Khārijah ibn Muṣ‛ab.93 But he also mentioned those who 
offered Muqātil their positive assessment, such as al-Shāfi‛ī.94 When mentioning some 
examples of (the alleged fabricated) ḥadīth transmitted from Muqātil, al-Dhahabī argued 
that one of them might be made, not by Muqātil, but by one of his companions or 
someone called al-Qādisī.95 Al-Dhahabī also mentioned Muqātil’s legal commentary, 
Tafsīr al-Khams Mi’ah, transmitted by Abū Nuṣayr Manṣūr ibn ‛Abd al-Ḥamīd al-
Bārūdī, in which there are many ḥadīths, which despite their weak status remain 
transmitted by Muqātil’s students.96 Likewise, Ibn ‛Adī also argued that other than these 
weak ḥadīths, there are fine ḥadīths transmitted from Muqātil. Therefore, argues Ibn ‛Adī, 
despite the fact that the majority of his ḥadīth was not accepted, there were many famous 
and trustworthy people who kept transmitting from Muqātil and wrote his ḥadiṭh.97 As 
seems customary, al-Dhahabī mentioned the statement of Ibn Ḥibbān that summed up 
accusations against Muqātil in relation to what was later known as isrā’iliyyāt, tashbīh, 
and ḥadīth fabrication, just as other scholars before him did.98 This is in addition to the 
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accusation of Muqātil’s carelessness of isnād (lā yaḍbiṭ al-isnād), as stated by al-‛Abbās 
ibn Muṣ‛ab.99 Furthermore, al-Dhahabī was the second person, after Ibn ‛Asākir, who 
explicitly mentioned Muqātil’s activity as a story-teller in the mosque of Merv (kāna 
yaquṣṣu fi al-Jāmi‛ bi Marw), as stated by al-‛Abbās ibn Muṣ‛ab in his Tārīkh Marw.100 
Al-Dhahabī also made an account of Muqātil in his other works, such as Siyar A‛lām an-
Nubalā’,101 and Tārīkh al-Islām wa Wafayāt al-Mashāhīr wa al-A‛lām.102 In his 
Tadhkirat al-Ḥuffāẓ, al-Dhahabī briefly mentioned Muqātil at the end of his account of 
Muqātil ibn Ḥayyān (who was considered trustworthy), as a commentator on the Qur’an 
whose ḥadīth had been abandoned and had also been accused of tajsīm despite the fact 
that he was one of the very knowledgeable in terms of tafsīr.103 A similar short 
description of Muqātil was also found in al-Dhahabī’s other work, al-Mughnī fi al-
Ḍu‛afā’: a commentator on the Qur’an, disgraced (hālik) and rejected by Wakī‛ and al-
Nasā’ī.104 
Ibn Ḥajar al-‛Asqalānī’s (d. 852/1448) Tahdhīb al-Tahdhīb105 and al-Mizzī’s 
Tahdhīb al-Kamāl are considered as the two most authoritative (ṣaḥīḥayn) 
autobiographical dictionaries, comparable to the two most authoritative collections of 
ḥadīth by al-Bukhārī and Muslim.106 The two works are so comprehensive that almost no 
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other work may add anything to what they have to offer. The likelihood is that these two 
works would engender shortened versions of them. This was exactly what al-‛Asqalānī 
himself did with his book Taqrīb al-Tahdhīb that squeezed his four huge volume Tahdhīb 
al-Tahdhīb into only one volume, though it remains huge. So, if al-‛Asqalānī’s 
description of Muqātil in Taqrīb is extremely compact, running only one line, in Tahdhīb 
the same account runs in four pages. In Taqrīb, Muqātil was mentioned briefly as a 
person whom scholars rejected and abandoned and against whom the accusation of tajsīm 
was made.107 Thus, in this short line of description, Muqātil was straightforwardly 
depicted as an outcast without any merit. However, in his Tahdhīb, al-‛Asqalānī, like 
most of his predecessors, first enumerated positive traits attributed to Muqātil, such as his 
breadth of knowledge, especially of the Qur’an, and his great contribution to tafsīr. 
Gradually, al-‛Asqalānī introduced the negative traits that people attributed to Muqātil in 
terms of his credentials in ḥadīth (his carelessness in terms of isnād, his alleged habit of 
lying, and even his intentional fabrication of ḥadīth), in theology (his alleged tashbīh and 
tajsīm in terms of divine attributes, resulting from his opposition to Jahm ibn Ṣafwān’s 
ta‘ṭīl), and in tafsīr, through his borrowing from non-Muslims in interpreting the 
Qur’an.108 
In al-Dāwūdī’s (d. 945/1538) Tabaqāt al-Mufassirīn, Muqātil was pictured as one 
of the prominent scholars of tafsīr, as acknowledged by al-Shāfi‛ī and al-Dhahabī in the 
latter’s Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥuffāẓ. Al-Dāwūdī also admitted, however, the fact that Muqātil was 
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also a scholar whose ḥadiṭh was rejected and against whom the accusation of tajsīm was 
leveled,109 similar to al-Dhahabī’s statement in his Tadhkirat al-Ḥuffāẓ in which he said: 
“While Muqātil ibn Sulaymān at this time was a person whose ḥadīth was abandoned, 
and was accused of tajsīm, he was among the most knowleagble with regard to tafsīr.”110 
Furthermore, al-Dāwūdī also mentioned a number of Muqātil’s works, such as al-Tafsīr 
al-Kabīr, Tafsīr al-Khams Mi’at Āyah, al-Wujūh wa al-Naẓā’ir, and many other which 
were also mentioned in Ibn al-Nadīm’s al-Fihrist.111 Al-Dawūdī’s account of Muqātil 
emphasizes that, as far as the Qur’an and its interpretation is concerned, Muqātil is likely 
to be well-received and respected, at least until the sixteenth century. In fact, respect and 
recognition of Muqātil had occurred much earlier, as shown by oft-quoted statement by 
al-Shāfi‛ī. In a collection of al-Shāfi‛ī interpretations of legal verses in the Qur’an, called 
Tafsīr al-Imām al-Shāfi‛ī, there was a statement by al-Shāfi‛ī that he had taken advantage 
of Muqātil’s commentary in understanding some parts of the Qur’an that had baffled him 
for some time.112  
Accounts of Muqātil in other works: on theology, tafsīr, and ḥadīth  
Apart from the biographical dictionaries and books on rijāl al-ḥadīth, accounts of 
Muqātil can also be found in works on theological sects, in tafsīrs, and works on ḥadīth. 
In works on theology, theologians generally focused their criticism of Muqātil on his 
alleged anthropomorphism. According to Ibn Rajab, the early scholars (al-salaf) rejected 
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111al-Dāwūdī, Ṭabaqāt, 2/330-31. 
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Muqātil’s views when he repudiated Jahm’s views using his reason. These scholars, 
however, went too far in refuting him (wa balaghū fī al-ṭa‛n ‛alayh), so much so that 
some of them, such as Makkī ibn Ibrāhim, the teacher of al-Bukhārī, even allowed for 
Muqātil to be killed.113 The key to the controversy surrounding anthropomorphism was 
over the meaning of the Qur’anic phrase laysa kamilthlihi shay’ (“There is nothing like 
Him”), which propagates the uniqueness of God in relation to His creation. The people of 
Sunnah wa al-Jamā‛ah agreed that nothing resembles God in terms of His Dhāt 
(essense), Ṣifāt (attributes), and Af‛āl (acts). A group of Muslims, known as the 
Karramite, or the followers of Muḥammad ibn Karrām al-Sijistānī, was said to have 
treated God as similar to His creation (shabbahū Allāh bi khalqihi). Al-Ash‛arī (d. 
330/941) called such people al-mujassimah, those who physicalized God.114  Muqātil was 
said to have followed the same path.115 Al-Ash‛arī, for instance, mentions that Muqātil 
ibn Sulaymān, along with Dāwud al-Jawāribī, said that God is a body and possesses an 
image like a human being with a flesh, blood, hair, bones, and physical organs such as 
hand, leg, head, and eyes, although God, with all of these, is unlike anything of creation 
nor does any of His creation resembles Him in any way.116 In fact, according to al-Sijzī, 
affirming divine attributes (ithbāt al-ṣifāt) as they are described in the Qur’an and Sunnah 
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does not lead to tajsīm and tashbīh. For it is only that which is created can be explained 
(kullu shay’ yata‛allaq bi al-muḥdathāt mukayyaf), and divine attributes have no need for 
kayfiyyah.117 
On the other end, other groups of Muslims negated wholesale the existence of 
God’s attributes (al-nāfūna li al-asmā’ wa al-ṣifāt), especially the Jahmiyyah (that is, the 
followers of Jahm ibn Ṣafwān), and others such as the Mu‛tazilah.118 These two extreme 
views in relation to divine attributes are in stark difference from the view of the Salaf, as 
it is portrayed by the Ahl al-Sunnah. Generally depicted as a moderate representing the 
middle ground, the Salaf’s view affirmed God’s divine attributes as He attributes them to 
Himself, and which are different from those belonging to His creation. In short, the 
Salaf’s position with respect to divine attributes is in the middle between the 
Mujassimah/Mushabbihah (those who physicalized God) and Mu‛aṭṭilah (those who 
negated divine attributes).119 The Salaf scholars accepted the description of the Qur’an 
and ḥādīths with respect to divine attributes without further question (bi lā takyīf) and no 
comparison with creation (lā tamthīl).120 In the words of Nu‛aym ibn Ḥamād, “whosoever 
treats God as equal as His creation has committed disbelief; whosoever rejects what God 
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has attributed to Himself has committed disbelief; and believing in whatever God and His 
Messenger have mentioned as divine attributes is not an act of tashbīh.121 
Sometimes, Muqātil is mentioned as a member of the Murji’ah, with his alleged 
view often quoted in the sources in relation to judgment (al-muwāzanah) on the believers 
in the hereafter. According to Muqātil, as the sources have it, believers in divine unicity 
will not be punished despite their sins, for belief is so stable that it is not affected by 
deeds.122 As a result, Muqātil in particular, and Murji’ah in general, was mentioned as the 
author of the view that punishment is specifically designed for disbelievers. Other 
members of the Murji’ah, however, were generally described as believing that the 
believers of tawḥīd may be punished if their sins outweigh their good deeds, as stated by 
Ibn Mu‛ādh.123 
Muqātil in works of tafsīr 
In qur’anic commentaries, the accounts of Muqātil are similar to those in the 
biographical dictionaries or works on rijāl al-ḥadīth; some accept his scholarly 
credentials, and others are critical and hence reject him. The difference is that the two 
attitudes of accepting and rejecting have rarely been founded together in the same 
commentary. Authors of commentary, with a few exceptions, either accept Muqātil or 
reject him.  
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On the receiving side, al-Tha‛labī cites Muqātil approvingly, positioning himself 
as one of the transmitters of Muqātil commentary.124 Al-Baghawī’s use of Muqātil is 
quite extensive, similar to that of al-Tha‛labī.125 Al-Māwardī frequently cites Muqātil in 
his commentary al-Nukat wa al-‛Uyūn.126 So does al-Wāḥidī in his commentary al-Tafsīr 
al-Wasīṭ.127 In his commentary, al-Shā‛rawī presents Muqātil as a well-respected person 
by calling him sayyidunā Muqātil ibn Sulaymān. Furthermore, al-Sha‛rawī describes 
Muqātil’s interaction with an Abbāsid Caliph, Abū Ja‛far al-Manṣur, as a wā‛iẓ (kāna 
aḥad al-wā‛iẓīn) who admonished al-Manṣūr in the day of his coronation. 128 On the 
rejecting side, Al-Sam‛ānī cites Muqātil, underlining strange reports transmitted from the 
latter.129 Al-Zamakhsharī only mentions Muqātil once when commenting on Q68:42-43 
in relation to his alleged tashbīh in interpreting the term sāq.130 Ibn ‛Aṭiyyah mentions 
Muqātil in several places.131 Ibn al-Jawzī also frequently cites Muqātil’s views in his Zād 
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al-Masīr fī ‛Ilm al-Tafsīr132 and also in his Nawāsikh al-Qur’ān, although at times the 
former disagrees with the latter.133 Al-Rāzī cites Muqātil in nine places.134 Ibn Kathīr also 
mentions Muqātil in several places although sometimes criticizing the validity of the 
ḥadiṭhs in which Muqātil is a part of the transmission chain.135 Al-Suyūṭī mentions 
Muqātil’s reported interpretations of the Qur’an in his al-Durr al-Manthūr fī al-Tafsīr bi 
al-Ma’thūr, although he seems to hold the commonly circulated view that Muqātil is 
untrustworthy by comparing him to Muqātil ibn Ḥayyān who was considered 
trustworthy.136 Rashīd Riḍā mentions Muqātil once only to highlight his damned 
reputation as a liar (al-majrūh bi al-kadhib).137 
However, there are some exceptions, in which both appreciation and critical 
acceptance is found in the same commentary. An intriguing example appears, for 
instance, in al-Ṭabarī’s qur’anic commentary. In his tafsīr, al-Ṭabarī did not mention 
Muqātil’s name explicitly when he cited the latter’s view of the mysterious letters in the 
Qur’an as numerical counts (ḥurūf min ḥisāb al-jumal).138 Instead, al-Ṭabarī simply 
stated that he was reluctant to mention the name of the person whose views he was 
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discussing because he was among those whose views were not to be trusted. 
Alternatively, al-Ṭabarī mentions a similar view from al-Rabī‘ ibn Anas. Interestingly, al-
Ṭabarī discussed Muqātil’s alleged view on the mysterious letters at length, placed it as 
one among those he chose, and presented the prophetic traditions with which Muqātil 
justified his arguments.139  This may suggest that during al-Ṭabarī’s time Muqātil’s 
reputation had been so tainted that most people were unwilling to be associated with him. 
In general, while a number of qur’anic commentaries mentioned Muqātil and his views, 
sometimes with rehabilitative attempts, his scholarly reputation remains tarnished.140 
                                                        
139 Shiḥātah, Tafsīr, 5/205. 
140 Ibn Abī Ḥātim cites Muqātil in several places in his Tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-‘Aẓīm, ed. As‘ad Muḥammad al-
Ṭayyib (Riyāḍ: Maktabah Nizār Muṣṭafā al-Bāz, 1997), 7/2261, 9/3128; So does al-Kirmāni in his 
Gharā’ib al-Tafsīr wa ‛Ajā’ib al-Ta’wīl, ed. Shamrān Sirkāl Yūnus al-‘Ajalī (Jeddah: Dār al-Qiblah li al-
Thaqāfah al-Islāmiyyah, n.y.), 1/98; 2/692; Al-Qurṭubī mentions Muqātil’s views in eight places in al-
Jāmi‘ li Aḥkām al-Qur’ān, ed. Hishām Samīr al-Bukhārī (n.c., Dār ‘Ālam al-Kutub, n.y.); Al-Khāzin 
mentions Muqātil once in relation to Q105 in explanation of the reason for Abrahah’s attack on Mecca, one 
which was also mentioned by other commentators mentioned above, in his Tafsīr al-Khāzin (Lubāb al-
Ta’wīl fī Ma‘ānī al-Tanzīl), ed. ‘Abd al-Salām Muḥammad ‘Alī Shāhīn (Beirūt: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 
2004), 4/472; Abū Ḥayyān al-Andalūsī mentions Muqātil four times in his al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ, ed. ‘Ādil 
Aḥmad ‘Abd al-Mawjūd et al (Beirūt: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 1993); Ibn al-Qayyim mentions Muqātil 
once in his al-Tafsīr al-Qayyim, ed. Muḥammad Uways al-Nadwī (Beirūt: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, n.y.); 
Al-Samīn al-Ḥalbī mentions Muqātil once in al-Durr al-Maṣūn fī ‛Ilm al-Kitāb al-Maknūn (n.c.: n.p., n.y.), 
3/210; Abū Ḥafṣ al-Nu‛mānī also mentions Muqātil in several places in al-Lubāb fī ‛Ulūm al-Kitāb, ed. 
‘Ādil Aḥmad ‘Abd al-Mawjūd et al (Beirūt: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 1998); Al-Qummī al-Nīsābūrī also 
mentions Muqātil in his Tafsīr Gharā’ib al-Qur’ān wa Raghā’ib al-Furqān, ed. Zakariyyā ‘Umayrāt 
(Beirūt: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 1996); Al-Tha‛ālibī mentions him twice in al-Jawāhir al-Ḥisān fī 
Tafsīr al-Qur’ān (Tafsīr al-Tha‘ālibī), ed. ‘Alī Muḥammad Mu‘awwaḍ et al (Beirūt: Dār Iḥyā’ al-Turāth 
al-‘Arabī, 1997); Muḥammad al-Shirbīnī al-Khaṭīb also mentioned Muqātil in his Tafsīr al-Sirāj al-Munīr 
(Beirūt: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, n.y.); Al-Shawkānī mentioned Muqātil ten times in four of which, 
interestingly, he was mentioned together with Muqātil ibn Ḥayyān as propagating the same view, in his 
Fatḥ al-Qadīr al-Jāmi‘ bayn Fannay al-Riwāyah wa al-Dirāyah min ‘Ilm al-Tafsīr, ed. Yūsuf al-Ghūsh 
(Beirūt: Dār al-Ma‘rifah, 2007); Al-Alūsī mentions Muqātil five times in Rūḥ al-Ma‛ānī fī Tafsīr al-Qur’ān 
al-‘Aẓīm wa al-Sab‘ al-Mathānī (Beirūt: Dār Iḥyā’ al-Turāth al-‘Arabī, n.y.); al-Suyūṭī alludes to a ḥadiṭh 
that Muqātil mentioned in the beginning of his lexical commentary, al-Wujūh wa al-Naẓā’ir, in Mu‛tarak 
al-Aqrān fī I‛jāz al-Qur’ān, ed. Aḥmad Shams al-Dīn (Beirūt: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 1988); Ibn Ḥajar 
al-‛Asqalānī cites Muqātil extensively to the extent that the latter serves as the former’s major source in 
providing the asbāb al-nuzūl for some Qur’anic verses, in al-‛Ujāb fī Bayān al-Asbāb, ed. Abū ‘Abd al-
Rahmān Fawwāz Aḥmad Zamaralī (Beirūt: Dār Ibn Ḥazm, 2002); Abu al-Ḥasan al-Qayrawānī (d. 479 H) 
mentions Muqātil once in his al-Nukat fī al-Qur’ān al-Karīm, (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub, 2007), 102. 
140 Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf Abū Ḥayyān al-Andalūsī, al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ, ed. ‘Ādil Aḥmad ‘Abd al-Mawjūd et 
al (Beirūt: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 1993). 
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Muqātil in works of ḥadīth 
Ibn Ḥajar al-‛Asqalānī mentions Muqātil in his Fatḥ al-Bārī approvingly in which 
he called the later as the leader of those who confirmed divine attributes (ra’s al-
muthbitah) and attributes extreme views of ithbāt that suggested anthropomorphism only 
to those who later followed Muqātil such as al-Rāfiḍah and al-Karrāmiyyah.141 Badr al-
Dīn al-‛Aynī (d. 855 H) also mentions Muqātil nine times in his ‛Umdat al-Qārī Sharḥ 
Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī.142  However, the majority of ḥadīth scholars seemed to have dismissed 
Muqātil, and if they mentioned them in their transmitted reports they did so for the sake 
of freeing themselves from any responsibility (wa dhikruhū kana abra’a li al-‛uhdah).143 
Thus, it is true that while Muqātil is considered weak in his credential as a ḥadīth scholar, 
his transmitted reports continued to be written (wa ma‛a ḍa‛fihī yuktab ḥadīthuhu), as Ibn 
Ma‛in maintained.144 Even Ibn Ḥajar, who approvingly cited Muqātil’s views on tafsīr, 
clearly indicated Muqātil’s defect in relation to ḥadīth transmission in his Itḥāf al-
Maharah, by labeling him as ḍa‛īf,145 matrūk,146 and muttaham.147 
                                                        
141 Aḥmad ibn ‘Alī ibn Ḥajar al-‛Asqalānī, Fatḥ al-Bārī bi Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ al-Imām Abī ‘Abd Allāh ibn Ismā‘īl 
al-Bukhārī, ed. ‘Abd al-Qādir Shaybah al-Ḥamd (Riyāḍ: Fahrasah Maktabah al-Malik Fahd al-Waṭaniyyah, 
2001). 
142 Badr al-Dīn Abū Muḥammad Maḥmūd ibn Aḥmad ibn al-‛Aynī, ‛Umdat al-Qārī Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ al-
Bukhārī (Damascus: Idārat al-Ṭibā‛ah al-Munīriyyah, n.y). 
143 Ibn al-Qaṭṭān al-Fa’sī Abū al-Ḥasan ‘Alī ibn Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Malik,  Bayān al-Wahm wa al-
Īhām al-Wāqi‘ayn fī Kitāb al-Aḥkām, ed. Al-Ḥusayn Āyit Sa‘īd (Riyāḍ: Dār Ṭayyibah li al-Nashr wa al-
Tawzī‘, 1997), 3/215. 
144 Jamāl al-Dīn Abū Muḥammad ‛Abd Allāh ibn Yūsuf ibn Muḥammad al-Zīla‛ī (d. 762 H), Takhrīj al-
Aḥādīth al-Wāqi‛ah fī Tafsīr al-Kashshāf li al-Zamakhsharī, ed. ‛Abd Allāh ibn ‛Abd al-Raḥmān al-Sa‛d 
(Riyāḍ: Dār Ibn Khuzaymah, 1993), 1/153. 
145 Ibn Ḥajar al-‛Asqalānī, Itḥāf al-Maharah bi al-Fawā’id al-Mubtakirah min Aṭrāf al-‛Ashrah, ed. Zuhayr 
ibn Nāṣir al-Nāṣir et. al (Madīnah: Majma‛ al-Malik Fahd li Ṭibā‛at al-Muṣḥaf al-Sharīf, 1994), 3/245. 
146 Ibn Hajar al-‛Asqalānī, Itḥāf, 10/338. 
147Abū al-Faḍl Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn ‘Alī ibn Muḥammad ibn Hajar al-‛Asqalānī al-Shāfi‘ī (d. 852 H), 
al-Talkhīṣ al-Ḥabīr fī Takhrīj Aḥādīth al-Rāfi‛ī al-Kabīr, ed. Abū ‘Āṣim Ḥasan ibn ‘Abbās ibn Quṭb  (n.c.: 
Mu’assasah Qurṭubah, 1995). 
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Muslims’ counterarguments to accusations against Muqātil 
Amidst the overwhelmingly critical scholars to Muqātil, there are scholars, such 
as Ibn ‛Abd al-Raḥmān al-Malṭī (d. 377/987), who considered Muqātil a reliable scholar 
(al-thiqah) among the orthodox ahl al-sunnah whose views, especially in his 
interpretation of the Qur’an, are worth citing to counter the “heretics.”148 In this respect, 
al-Malṭī’s view in which he explicitly positioned Muqātil, who had been been treated as a 
heretic by the majority, as an orthodox scholar vis a vis heretic opponents is unique. 
Likewise, al-Shahrastanī (d. 1153), in his al-Milal wa al-Niḥal, regarded Muqātil as one 
the leading Salaf scholars (min a’immat al-salaf) in the company of other scholars such 
as Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, who believed in whatever comes in the Qur’an and Sunnah and 
avoided interpretation (ta’wīl) after an acknowledgment that God is different from 
creation. These scholars, according to al-Shahrastānī, despite their acceptance of God 
having physical organs as mentioned in the Qur’an and Sunnah, did not practice tashbīh. 
On the contrary, they avoided it with their best (yaḥtarizūna ‛an al-tashbīh ‛an 
ghāyah).149 In fact, most of ahl al-ḥadith held the view that God has an image (ṣūrah) 
and organs (a‛ḍā’).150 In line with this view, al-Shahrastānī corrected another widely held 
misconception of Muqātil as someone who propagated the view that bad deeds 
(ma‛ṣiyah) do not affect the believers of tawḥīd and their belief, and that such believers 
                                                        
148 See Ibn ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Malṭī, al-Tanbīh wa al-Radd ‘alā Ahl al-Hawā’ wa al-Bida‘, ed. 
Muḥammad Zaynuhum Muḥammad ‘Azb (Cairo: Maktabah Madbūlī, 1992). 
149 Abū al-Fatḥ Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Shahrastānī, al-Milal wa al-Niḥal, ed. Aḥmad Fahmī 
Muḥammad (Beirūt: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 1992). A similar view in terms of the Salaf’s belief in 
divine attributes is expressed by Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn ‘Uthmān al-Dhahabī in his 
Kitāb al-‘Arsh, ed. Muḥammad Khalīfah al-Tamīmī (Riyāḍ: Maktabah Aḍwā’ al-Salaf, 1999), 1/142. 
150 Al-Shahrastānī, Milal, 1/187. 
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never go into hell. The truth is, according to al-Shahrastānī, that Muqātil said that 
believers who committed sins will be punished according to the extent of their sins, and 
only then they will be sent to paradise.151 
Another “defender” of Muqātil was Ibn Taymiyyah who said, “in relation to 
Muqātil, only God knows what really happened. Al-Ash‛arī took these maqālāt from the 
works of the Mu‛tazilah in which there is indisposition against Muqātil. They might have 
added something to what they transmitted from him or they might have received it from 
those who were less reliable. Otherwise, it should not be this bad. Al-Shāfi‛ī said, 
“Whosoever desires [to learn] tafsīr, he is dependent on Muqātil. Whosoever wants [to 
study] fiqh, he is dependent on Abū Ḥanīfah.” Ibn Taymiyyah, therefore, argues that 
although Muqātil was not among those from whom people transmitted ḥadīth, unlike 
Muqātil ibn Ḥayyān who was considered reliable, there is no doubt in terms of his 
breadth of learning, and his knowledge on tafsīr and other matters. Similarly, while 
people may have disagreed with and rejected some of Abu Ḥanīfah’s views, they did not 
deny the latter’s authority of fiqh and the breadth of his knowledge.152 The same applies 
to Muqātil. Ibn Taymiyyah also offered reservations in relation to the accusation of 
tashbīh against Muqātil. He argued that since he could not find any traces of such views 
in Muqātil’s works (mā wajadtu shay’an min kalāmihi yastadillu bihī ‛alā dhālika), it 
could not be true. Furthermore, Ibn Taymiyyah maintained, those who accused Muqātil 
took their material from his enemies. Many of Muqātil’s works, such as his 
                                                        
151 Al-Shahrastānī, Milal, 1/143. 
152 Al-Dhahabī, ‘Arsh, 1/143; Abū al-‘Abbās Taqīy al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn ‘Abd al-Ḥalīm ibn Taymiyyah, 
Minhāj al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah, ed. Muḥammad Rashād Sālim (n.c.: n.p., n.y.), 2/618-20. 
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commentaries, which would be the place to find such views if they exist, have been 
published, but there is nothing that suggests he was a Mushabbih. This, according to Ibn 
Taymiyyah, teaches us that we need to verify. To be reliable, one’s views must be taken 
from one’s own works, not from his enemies, for the latter may say something that their 
opponents did not say.153 In addition, the term Mushabbih has become a catch word to 
accuse one’s opponents simply because of their different views.154 The author of Sharḥ 
al-‛Aqīdah al-Wāsiṭiyyah questioned the validity of the ascription of tashbīh to Muqātil 
since there are also reports in which Muqātil denies that accusation by offering 
statements that confirmed his upholding views to the contrary. For that reason, al-Mūṣilī 
concluded that the attribution of tashbīh to Muqātil is untrue and that it was merely an 
accusation that his enemies had circulated against him.155 
Muqātil’s scholarly credential in the fields other than ḥadīth is validated by 
Muqātil ibn Ḥayyān when he was asked about him. Being asked whether he or Muqātil 
Ibn Sulaymān is more knowledgeable, Ibn Ḥayyān’s answer confirmed the breadth of 
Muqātil’s knowledge (mā wajadtu ‛ilma Muqātil illā ka al-baḥr al-akhḍar fī sā’ir al-
buḥūr).156 On the other hand, when asked about Muqātil’s alleged tashbīh, Ibn Ḥayyān 
postponed his judgment on this accusation for he knew that Muqātil was a great mufassir 
although his transmission was regarded as weak. None of tashbīh-related accusations 
against Muqātil were mentioned by early scholars except in maqālāt works, the earliest of 
                                                        
153 ‘Abd Allāh Mūḥammad al-Ghanīmān, Sharḥ al-‛Aqīdah al-Wāsiṭiyyah (al-Maktabah al-Shāmilah), 12/8.  
154 Al-Ghanīmān, Aqīdah, 12/8. 
155 Al-Ghanīmān, Aqīdah, 13/27. 
156 Taqiy al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn ‘Alī al-Maqrīzī, Mukhtaṣār al-Kāmīl fī al-Ḍu‛afā’ li Ibn ‘Adī (Cairo: Maktabat 
al-Sunnah, 1994), 1/744. 
  
43 
which was al-Ash‛arī’s. However, because al-Ash‛ari’s material originated from the 
Mu‛tazilah, it may have somehow been tampered with.157  
In modern time, ones of those posing counterarguments against Muqātil’s 
opponents was Maḥmūd Shiḥātah, the editor of Muqātil’s al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr. In fact, 
Shiḥatah’s study of Muqātil is the most extensive to date.158 According to his own study 
on ḥadīths Muqātil mentioned in his commentary, Shiḥātah concludes that the majority of 
Muqātil’s ḥadīths are found in reliable ḥadīth collections (qad warada fī al-ṣaḥīḥ aw fī 
kutub al-sunan), and only rarely does he find Muqātil ḥadīths that are weak. This, 
according to Shiḥātah, suggests that Muqātil’s suspect credentials do not creep into his 
commentary.159 Shiḥātah therefore maintains that Muqātil can be used as a reference, on 
the condition that his ḥadīth must first be subjected to verification. Furthermore, Shiḥātah 
argues, Muqātil’s personal views in the commentary are too great an asset for Muslims to 
learn their intellectual history to be dismissed.160 In general, regardless of some alleged 
weaknesses that his commentary possess, Shihātah makes a case for the great 
contribution that Muqātil can make, for his commentary combines transmitted knowledge 
(al-riwāyah) and personal, rational views (dirāyah).161 
                                                        
157 Ṣadr al-Dīn ‘Alī ibn ‘Alī ibn Muḥammad ibn Abī al-‘Izz al-Ḥanafī, Sharḥ al-Ṭaḥāwiyyah fī al-‘Aqīdah 
al-Salafiyyah, ed. Aḥmad Muḥammad Shākir (Riyāḍ: Fahrasah Maktabat al-Malik Fahd al-Waṭaniyyah, 
1997). 
158 Shiḥātah provided an independent volume, after four volumes of Muqātil’s al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr that he 
edited, primarily to argue against any accusations leveled against Muqātil. 
159 Shihātah, Tafsīr, 5/51. Long before Shiḥātah, Ibn ‘Adī (d. 365/975) made a similar conclusion that 
although the majority of Muqātil’s transmitted ḥadīth was not accepted (lā yutāba‛ bihi), there are many 
that are fine (ṣāliḥ), and that there are many respected and trustworthy scholars who transmitted from 
Muqātil. See al-Maqrīzī, Mukhtaṣar, 745. 
160 Shihātah, Tafsīr, 5/53. 
161 Shihātah, Tafsīr, 5/57.  
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In terms of the accusation of anthropomorphism, Shihātah concludes that 
accusation of tashbīh against Muqātil is exaggerated (mubālagh fīhā). With regard to 
wajh Allāh (God’s face), muqātil employed a metaphorical interpretation, and understood 
the phrase to mean the essence of God (yufassir wajh Allāh ‛alā annahū huwa Allāh).162 
Likewise, Muqātil understood the term yad Allāh (God’s hand) metaphorically, through 
explicit or implicit interpretation, as fulfilling the good He promised, His power, His 
bounty, kingdom and treasure, victory or power, and covenant.163 In terms of God’s ‛ayn 
(God’s eye), Muqātil understood it in one place metaphorically as God’s knowledge, and 
in three other places literally as God’s eye. In short, Muqātil combines the ways of the 
early scholars (Salaf) and the later generation of scholars (the Khalaf) in interpreting 
some anthropomorphist verses in the Qur’an, that is, the combination of glorifying God 
(ta‘ẓīm; the way of the Salaf by accepting what God has described himself in the 
scripture) and purifying him (tanzīh; the way of the Khalaf by employing metaphorical 
interpretation to avoid anthropomorphist understanding).164 
With regard to accusation of another aspect of anthropomorphism, namely tajsīm, 
Shiḥātah studied Muqātil’s interpretation of the terms istiwā’, kursī, ‛arsh, yamīn Allāh, 
sāq, and tajsīm bi al-talmīḥ in the Qur’an.165 The result of his study shows that in general 
Muqātil is not consistently anthropomorphist in his interpretation of some seemingly 
anthropomorphist verses. Occasionally, Muqātil conducted ta’wīl or combined the 
                                                        
162 Shihātah, Tafsīr, 5/90. 
163 Shihātah, Tafsīr, 5/91-2. 
164 Shihātah, Tafsīr, 5/94. 
165 Shihātah, Tafsīr, 5/97. 
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metaphorical and literal interpretation together. Furthermore, Muqātil’s anthropomorphist 
approach was so mild that people would not recognize it had they not been massively 
shaped by reception of Muqātil within Muslim scholarship as an anthropomorphist, or 
had they not known that it is his interpretation.166 For the sake of fairness and 
impartiality, therefore, Shiḥātah disagrees with the accusation of extreme 
anthropomorphism leveled against Muqātil, for he cannot find such views in Muqātil’s 
commentary.167 While it is true that Muqātil was somewhat anthropomorphist in his 
understanding of istiwā’, fawqiyyah, sifat al-‛arsh wa al-kursī, al-yamīn and al-sāq, he 
was not alone in this. Other early and orthodox scholars shared the same views as his.168  
It is possible that such extreme views were attributed to Muqātil by his opponents. 
In this regard, al-Saksakī argued that Muqātil ibn Sulaymān, the anthropomorphist 
mentioned in the sources, was not our Muqātil ibn Sulaymān the commentator on the 
Qur’an.169 Some scholars even regarded Muqātil as a forerunner for those who reject any 
deviation. In order to know Muqātil and his views, it is an obligation to read his own 
works.170 If one reads works on sects, he must be cautious in accepting any attribution of 
views by opponents to each other. Al-Malṭī (d. 377), one of the earliest authors on 
Muslim sects, considers Muqātil trustworthy (thiqah), one whose interpretation of the 
Qur’an can be used to argue against ahl al-ahwā’ wa al -bida‛.171 Thus, Muqātil’s 
commentary is free from any view that God is flesh and blood that has been attributed to 
                                                        
166 Shiḥatah, Tafsīr, 5/110. 
167 Shiḥatah, Tafsīr, 5/113. 
168 Shiḥātah, Tafsīr, 5/113. 
169 Shiḥātah, Tafsīr, 5/113.  
170 Shiḥātah, Tafsīr, 5/114. 
171 Shiḥātah, Tafsīr, 5/114. 
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Muqātil in works on sects. It is hard to ascertain whether Muqātil expressed such view in 
the early part of his life but then refrained from it, if it was fabricated by his opponents, if 
the view could have been espoused by a different Muqātil ibn Sulaymān, if the 
transmitters of his commentary may have edited and removed such scandalous views 
from the commentary, or if Muqātil may have expressed such a view in the realm of 
speculative theology (‛ilm al-kalām) or when he was debating with Jahm on divine 
attributes, but did not include it in his commentary.172 In general, Shiḥātah argues, the 
method with which Muqātil interprets mutashābih al-ṣifāt or ayāt al-ṣifāt (divine 
attributes) is similar to the method of the Salaf and the Khalaf, since at times he 
conducted tafwīḍ, made no comments, and at other he conducted ta’wīl, despite the fact 
that some of Muqātil’s interpretation gives the impression of tajsīm and tashbīh.173 
Mun’im Sirry argues that “Muqātil was not an extreme anthropomorphist” because “in a 
number of instances, he provides a metaphorical interpretation of apparently 
anthropomorphic passages, while in other cases he interprets them literally or gives no 
explanation at all.”174 
In terms of the isrā’iliyyāt, Shiḥātah agrees that Muqātil’s commentary is replete 
with such reports.175 A great amount of the isrā’iliyyāt that Muqātil uses in the 
commentary are related to the stories of past prophets, especially in relation to their 
alleged shortcomings. My own study suggests that Muqātil’s use of the Isrā’iliyyāt is 
                                                        
172 Shiḥātah, Tafsīr, 5/115. 
173 Shiḥātah, Tafsīr, 5/188. 
174 Sirry, “Muqātil,” 65. 
175 Shiḥātah, Tafsīr, 5/220. 
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meant to criticize the People of Scripture while defending Islamic teaching or reality. 
This is quite contrary to the accusation that Muqātil’s borrowing of such material 
suggests his nodding agreement with non-Islamic views. The use of isrā’iliyyāt in 
Muqātil’s commentary was, borrowing Walid Saleh’s words, “no abdication to non-
Muslim sensibility as much as cooption of it.”176  
Muqātil’s reception in the Western, Modern Scholarship  
A growing number of Western scholars have begun to study Muqātil since the 
second half of the twentieth century. The early generation of these scholars, such as 
Goldziher (d. 1921) and Noldeke (d. 1930), however, had taken Muqātil for granted and 
they, just like their counterparts in Muslim world, tended to dismis him.177 A shift took 
place since the 1970s when younger Western scholars began to appreciate Muqātil’s 
contribution to the field of tafsīr and recognized his authority in this discipline. This 
increasing appreciation of Muqātil coincided with the emergence of “revisionist” school 
of thought during the same decade according to which the whole Muslim self-narrative 
was a pious project and its result therefore was no more than “salvation” or “sacred” 
history.178 As such, traditional Muslim scholarship was viewed as working under “a 
grand conspiracy” which sought to establish a coherent narrative for the Muslim 
community identity-making, and whose reliability, therefore, was not to be trusted. If the 
                                                        
176 See Walid Saleh, “Nishapuri School of Quranic Exegesis,” in Encyclopaedia Iranica Online: 
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/exegesis-viii-nishapuri-school-quranic-exegesis 
177 Isaiah Goldfeld “Muqātil ibn Sulaymān,” in Arabic and Islamic Studies, Bar Ilan 2 (1973): xiii-xxx.  
178 John Wansbrough, The Sectarian Milieu: Content and Composition of Islamic Salvation History 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978). Patricia Crone and Micahel Cook, Hagarism: The Making of the 
Islamic World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977). Rippin 1999. 
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mainstream of the tradition was untrustworthy, what it marginalized and suppressed 
should then be of use, for it may provide an alternative view to the tradition. Muqātil and 
his works fit this category well. 
Nabia Abbot is probably the first Western scholar who drew people’s attention to 
Muqātil through his study of the manuscript of al-Wujūh wa al-Naẓā’ir.179 Two years 
later, M. M. al-Sawwaf wrote a doctoral thesis at the University of Oxford, especially 
with regard to Muqātil’s Zaydī affiliation and his legal commentary.180 Paul Nwya is one 
of the earliest western scholars who studied Muqātil’s three extant commentaries, 
primarily to investigate the mystical interpretation of the Qur’an, which involved six or 
seven authors from the second/eight to fourth/tenth century.181 In addition, Nwya also 
noted Muqātil’s observation of the general meaning of certain qur’anic vocabularies, 
which was brought to light first by al-Malṭī (d. 377/987), since even in Muqātil’s own 
major commentary, this line of his thinking is scattered all over the place and is hence 
unnoticeable.182 Isaiah Goldfeld writes an essay about Muqātil offering a general 
explaination of Muqātil’s scholarly reputation among traditional Muslim and Western 
scholarship, and describing the general rejection of Muqātil within both camps of 
                                                        
179 Apart from some technicality, Abbott’s discussion of the manuscript focused more on understanding the 
account of Muqātil in traditional Muslim sources. See Studies, 92-113. 
180 M. M. al-Sawwaf, “Muqatil Ibn Sulayman, an Early Zaidi Theologian, with Special Reference to His 
Tafsir al-Khamsmi’at Aya,” (PhD Diss., University of Oxford, 1969). For some technical reasons, I have 
not been able to access his dissertation, after I made a concerted effort to do so. 
181 Paul Nwya, Exegese Coranique et Langage Mystique: Nouvel essay sur le lexique technique des 
mystiques musulmans. (Beyrouth: Dar el-Machreq, 1970). 
182 al-Malṭī, Tanbīh, 55-61. Al-Malṭī was the probably one of the first scholars who, contrary to the attitude 
of majority who dismissed Muqatil, regarded Muqatil as an orthodox scholar whose exegetical views could 
be used to combat heretical views among Muslim sects. So respectful was al-Malṭī toward Muqātil that he 
called the latter al-īmām.  
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scholarship.183 The most well known discussion of Muqātil is written by John 
Wansbrough who, using the manuscripts of Muqātil’s three commentaries among others, 
attempts to build a typological development of tafsīr in Muslim world.184 Another essay 
by Claude Gilliot is written primarily to investigate the theological accusation of 
anthropomorphism in Muqātil’s major commentary.185 In his studies on the genesis of 
Arabic grammar and exegesis, C.H.M. Versteegh uses Muqātil’s tafsīr as one of his 
sources to trace the development of technical terms of Arabic grammar.186 Gordon Nickel 
studies Muqatil’s commentary, among other, in order to understand the accusation of 
scriptural tampering (taḥrīf) in early Islam as understood by early commentators of the 
Qur’an.187 Michael Pregill writes a dissertation on the Golden Calf episode in the Qurʾān 
and Islamic commentary literature, in which Tafsīr Muqātil was used as one of the 
witnesses to how the event was interpreted and understood in early Islam.188 Similarly but 
                                                        
183 Isaiah Goldfeld, “Muqātil ibn Sulaymān.” Arabic and Islamic Studies. Bar Ilan 2 (1973): xiii-xxx. 
184 Wansbrough, Quranic Studies. 
185 Gilliot, Claude. “Muqātil, Grand Exegete, Traditionniste et Theologien Maudit,” in Journal Asiatique, 
CCLXXIX, 1991 (Publie par la Societe Asiatique & Du Centre National de la Recherhe Scientifique): 39-
84. 
186 C.H.M. Versteegh, “Grammar and Exegesis: The Origins of Kufan Grammar and the Tafsīr Muqātil.” 
Islam, 67:2 (1990): 206-42; also his Arabic Grammar and Qur’anic Exegesis in Early Islam (Leiden & 
New York: E. J. Brill, 1993). 
187 Nickel, Gordon, “Muqātil b. Sulaymān on the Verse on ‘Tampering’,” Islamic Culture, 76 (July 2003): 
1-25; “Early Muslim Accusations of Tahrīf: Muqātil Ibn Sulaymān’s Commentary on Key Qur’anic 
Verses.” In ed. David Thomas, The Bible in Arab Christianity (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2007): 207-223, also 
his book, Narratives of Tampering in the Earliest Commentaries on the Qurʻan (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 
2011). 
188 Michael E. Pregill, “The Living Calf of Sinai: Orientalism, “Influence,” and the Foundations of the 
Islamic Exegetical Tradition” (PhD Diss., Columbia University, 2008). In fact, Pregill also writes an article 
that elaborates further on a certain aspect of the Golden Calf, namely the punishment imposed on those 
committed idolatry, and on the implication of the qur’anic commentators’ understandings of that event, 
especially on their views of social order. In short, Pregill’s understanding of Muqātil in his study is almost 
the opposite of my understanding of him in this study. For example, Pregill argues that Muqātil sees that 
violence might be necessary for establishing social order. In contrast, my understanding of Muqātil is that 
he generally is a pacifist who condones no violent approach in commanding right and forbidding wrong. 
Moreover, I understand Muqātil’s interpretation of the Golden Calf episode in the Qur’an is to justify the 
kind of punishment imposed on Banū Qurayẓah in Medinah, decided by Sa‘d ibn Mu‘ādh and approved by 
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on a different subject matter, David Powers uses Muqātil’s commentary as one of his 
important sources to trace the origins of the idea “Muhammad as the seal of 
prophethood.”189  
In fact, there have recently been a growing number of studies, which especially 
use Muqātil’s major commentary. The majority of these studies, in which one of more of 
Muqātil’s commentaries is used, however aim at investigating anything but Muqātil’s 
own hermeneutics. In general, there are at least three orientations in the existing scholarly 
studies on Muqātil’s commentaries or those using his commentaries. First, the majority of 
these studies intend to explain something (events, technical terms, etc) mentioned in the 
Qur’an, such as in the case of Nwya (1970), Versteegh (1990, 1993), Nickel (2003, 
2011), Pregill (2008, 2012), Powers (2009), etc. Second, there are those that study his 
commentary to build the typological development of tafsīr, as in the case of Wansbrough. 
Third, there are others that study Muqātil’s commentary to disprove the theological and 
other accusations against Muqātil, as in the case of Gilliot.190 
In the spirit of the third orientation of the existing scholarship on Muqātil, the 
majority of Western, modern scholars, like their Muslim counterparts, have posed a 
number of counterarguments to the mentioned accusations against Muqātil. First, in 
                                                        
Muhammad. That is, to show that the massacre of Banū Qurayẓah was not unprecendented. It was modeled 
on the punishment Mūsā imposed on the Jews in the Golden Calf event. While Muqātil himself might not 
approve of such a violent punishment, his aim by exploiting isrā’iliyyat is to defend Islam’s Prophet and its 
teaching, just like many of his other usages of the same material in his commentary. See ““Turn in 
Repentance to your Creator, then Slay Yourselves”: The Levitical Election, Atonement, and Secession in 
Early and Classical Islamic Exegesis,” Comparative Islamic Studies, volume 6 (2012), 101-150. 
189 David S. Powers, Muhammad Is Not the Father of Any of Your Men (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2009). 
190 Mun’im Sirry writes a similar essay, which disproves the anthropomorphist accusation against Muqātil. 
“Muqātil b. Sulaymān and Anthropomorphism.” Studia Islamica, nouvelle édition/new series, 3, 2012, 35-
66. 
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relation to Muqātil’s methodological failing, the isnād negligence, Gilliot argues that at 
the time when Muqātil was producing his commentaries, the method of isnād had just 
began to emerge and was not yet fixed as the standard norm for knowledge 
transmission.191 Likewise, Goldfeld suggests that the biographers of the fourth/tenth 
century retrospectively projected the assumption that information was supposed to be 
transmitted from informant to recipient by samāʿ (oral transmission), according to the 
rule of taḥammul al-‘ilm (knowledge acquisition), even in the first/seventh and 
second/eighth centuries.192  
Viewed from yet another perspective, the objection toward Muqātil’s 
methodological failing may have something to do with the tension between writing and 
orality in early Islam. Living in a strongly oral culture, writing a book “proper” 
(syngramma), one that Muqātil possibly did, as opposed to merely mnemonic aids as 
private records (hypomnemata), would have been scandalous and anomalous.193 Indeed, 
Heck argues that writing continued to cause concerns among Muslim scholars of the 
prophetic tradition (muḥaddithūn) even long after it had become widespread in use and 
accepted in practice. A written transmission differs fundamentally from an oral one in its 
potential to be anonymous in a way that oral transmission cannot, and anonymously 
transmitted knowledge bears too close resemblance to the use of reason for the 
verification of knowledge, something generally impermissible in the case of a revealed 
                                                        
191 Gilliot, “Muqāti.” Wansbrough argued that “[t]he supplying isnāds, whether traced to the prophet, to his 
companions, or to their successors, may be understood as an exclusively formal innovation and cannot be 
dated much before 200/815.” See Quranic Studies, 179.  
192 Goldfeld, “Muqātil.” 
193 Gregor Schoeler, The Oral and the Written in Early Islam (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 
79. 
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body of knowledge. Writing is, in a way, dangerous. “Nowhere else we could find the 
tenacity to maintain the epistemological authority of isnād and to preserve the 
epistemological priority of the samāʿ (oral transmission) except in the circle of 
muḥaddithūn, whose prestige, not to mention the entire craft, was based on this 
principle.”194 The crux of the matter is, however, not the opposition between the written 
and orality because, as Schoeler has successfully showed, the written material had always 
been there accompanying the heralded face-to-face and oral method of knowledge 
transmission. In fact, using and memorizing books had been part of academic activities in 
early Islamic period in Khurāsān, for instance. Ibn al-Mubārak (d. 181/797) was said to 
memorize books when he was young.195 Muqātil’s written commentaries had also been 
circulated among some of his contemporaries to see, despite their final critical and at 
times lamenting judgment, due to some alleged shortcomings in relation to isnād. The 
crux of the problem is that these early Muslims were institutionalizing the face-to-face 
and oral transmission as a proper way for transmitting certain types of knowledge along 
with its evaluating apparatuses. The use of written material alone was not a problem in 
itself although it was considered insufficient; rather, it was the absence of face-to-face 
and oral delivery of knowledge that had become the point of contention. 
In connection with the anthropomorphist accusation, Binyamin Abrahamov said 
that there is the problem of unreliability of the sources that leveled such a charge against 
                                                        
194 Paul L. Heck, “The Epistemological Problem of Writing in Islamic Civilization: al-Ḫatib al-Baġdādī’s 
(d. 463/1071) Taqyīd al-ʿilm,” Studia Islamica, 94, G. P. Maisonneuve-Larose, Paris, 2002. 
195 Gilliot, “Schoolmaster,” 316. 
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Muqātil, especially when it is confronted with the extant commentary on Muqātil.196 In a 
different perspective, Wesley Williams argues that, in early Islam, such 
anthropomorphism was however not uncommon, especially among the muḥaddithūn who 
were inclined toward literal understanding of religious texts. In fact, “it seems that in an 
early period, anthropomorphist conceptions enjoyed wide currency among the main body 
of Muslims.”197 Dealing with such anthropomorphist verses, scholars, including the 
muḥaddithūn, invented the so-called balkafah principle. That is, simply saying bi lā kayfa 
(literally, “without how”), in the sense that they accepted the way God describes Himself 
in the scripture without further questions or asking how.198 It is true there was a strong 
opposition to such an anthropomorphist understanding of God from some of the 
mutakallimūn, especially those of the (proto-) Muʿtazilah, whose animosity toward the 
muḥaddithūn was known.199 With some exceptions, anthropomorphism was likely to be 
embraced by the more traditionalist Muslims, be they muḥaddithūn or mutakallimūn, but 
opposed by the more rationalist Muslims, especially those of the Muʿtazilī affiliation. The 
reality is, however, much more nuanced than has been thought, for even within the 
traditionalist circle itself there was internal polemic in which the champions of 
                                                        
196 Binyamin Abrahamov, Anthropomorphism and Interpretation of the Qur’an in the Theology of al-Qāsim 
ibn Ibrāhīm (Leiden, New York, Koln: E. J. Brill, 1996), p. 4. Richard C. Martin, “Anthropomorphism,” 
Encylopaedia of the Qur’ān. General Editor: Jane Dammen McAuliffe, Georgetown University, 
Washington DC. Brill Online, 2012. 
197 Wesley William (2002), “A Body Unlike Bodies: Transcendent Anthropomorphism in Ancient Semitic 
Tradition and Early Islam,” Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 129, No. 1 (January-March 
2009), pp. 
19-44, p. 442. 
198 W. Montgomery Watt, Muhammad’s Mecca: History in the Qur’an (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 1988), 88-9. 
199 See Harry Austryn Wolfson, The Philosophy of Kalam (Cambridge, MA and London, England: Harvard 
University Press, 1976). 
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anthropomorphic conceptions were confronted by their fellow traditionalists who 
criticized their views, as in the case of Ibn al-Jawzī, whose Kitāb Akhbār aṣ-Ṣifāt was an 
“impassioned critique of anthromorphic ways of conceiving the divine attributes” among 
the Hanbalīs.200   
Faced with the fact that they could not find any explicit anthropomorphism in 
Muqātil’s commentary, these modern scholars argued instead that this charge against 
Muqātil is unfounded or falsified or, if it is true, it may have been based on Muqātil’s 
other, lost, works.201 Gilliot, for instance, entertains the idea that Muqātil might have 
written his theologically anthropomorphist views in another work of his that no longer 
exists. 
In terms of Muqātil’s incorporation of the isrāʾiliyyāt material, scholars seem to 
concur that his extant commentaries indeed confirm this.202 In particular, Muqātil’s Great 
Commentary (al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr), given its narrative character, is the one with expansive 
incorporation of biblical materials in order to fill the gaps within the Qurʾān’s narrative 
which is generally truncated, referential, and oftentimes elliptical, if not cryptic. Scholars 
are of different views as to the impact of Muqātil’s great use of isrā’iliyyāt in his tafsīr. 
Andrew Rippin, for instance, argued that Muqātil only used the isrā’iliyyāt in the realm 
                                                        
200 See Merlin Swartz, A Medieval Critique of Anthropomorphism: Ibn al-Jawzī’s Kitāb Akhbār aṣ-Ṣifāt 
(Leiden, Boston, Koln: Brill, 2002). 
201 Claude Gilliot, “Muqātil, Grand Exegete, Traditionniste et Theologien Maudit,” Journal Asiatique, 
CCLXXIX, 1991 (Publie par la Societe Asiatique & Du Centre National de la Recherhe Scientifique): 
39-84. Paul Nwya, Exegese Coranique et Langage Mystique: Nouvel essay sur le lexique technique des 
mystiques musulmans ((Beyrouth: Dar el-Machreq Editeurs [Imprimerie Catholique], 1970). 
202 Wansbrough, Quranic Studies. C.H.M. Versteegh, “Grammar and Exegesis: The Origins of Kufan 
Grammar and the Tafsīr Muqātil.” Islam, 67:2 (1990): 206-42. Michael E. Pregill, “The Living Calf of 
Sinai: Orientalism, “Influence,” and the Foundations of the Islamic Exegetical Tradition (Phd Diss., 
Columbia University, 2008). 
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of stories or narrative to embellish the Qur’an, and it never had a real relevance to legal 
or theological judgments in the Muslim society. In other words, the use of isrā’iliyyāt is 
harmless.203 At some point, Rippin’s argument sounds true because criticism against 
Muqātil’s use of the isrā’iliyyāt did not come about until the second half of the tenth 
century raised for the first time by Abū Ḥātim ibn Ḥibbān (354/965). However, contrary 
to Rippins view, David Powers demonstrates that the use of isrā’iliyyāt does have legal 
and theological ramifications and is not merely a narrative embellishment.204 
Furthermore, it is possible that criticism against Muqātil’s great use of isrā’iliyyāt in the 
Muslim scholarship is based on the assumption that such materials might bring about 
embarrassment to the later established understanding of Islam, especially in relation to 
the Prophet of Islam. This is especially true since in much of the isrā’iliyyāt the early 
prophets were pictured as being vulnerable to committing sins and offenses to God, just 
like other human beings. Later Muslims treated prophets and, accordingly, Muhammad as 
those who upheld the highest standard of morality and hence were infallible. In fact, 
given his techniques and goals in using the isra’iliyyāt material, it is possible to argue that 
the seed of the doctrine ‘ismah (the infallibility of prophets, especially that of 
Muhammad) had began to grow during Muqātil’s time in his commentary. 
Based on all studies of Muqātil we have, conducted by both Muslim and non-
Muslim scholars, it can be concluded that of the four accusations made against him one 
                                                        
203 Andrew Rippin, The Qur’an and Its Interpretative Tradition (Aldershot, Brookfield USA, Singapore, 
Sydney: Asghate-Variorum, 2001), 252. 
204 See David S. Powers, Muhammad Is Not the Father of Any of Your Men (Philadelphia: University of 
Pensylvania Press, 2009). 
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(theological, in terms of anthropomorphism) is exagerated, one (methodological,with 
regard to isnād) needs to be understood differently from the later understanding of the 
term isnād, one (substantive, with respect of isrā’iliyyāt) is only partially correct but 
misleading as well as anachronistic, and one (personal, in relation to his alleged 
unreliability) has no credible evidence to support it. Three of these accusations—namely 
theological, methodological, and personal—are contemporary as they were first raised, as 
far as traditional Muslim sources are concerned, by Muqātil’s contemporaries. Therefore, 
it is only the substantive accusation with regard to isrā’iliyyāt that is anachronistic as it 
was only raised in the tenth century.  
The charge of anthropomorphism appears to have been exaggerated and hence 
innacurate, for Muqātil uses different techniques of interpretation between literal and 
metaphorical, a combination of the two, or even non-interpretation at all (tafwīḍ) when it 
comes to Qur’anic verses with an anthropomorphist coloring. The charge of Isrā’iliyyāt is 
anachronistic for it emerged two centuries after Muqātil’s own time; it is also misleading 
because, unlike what Ibn Ḥibbān thought, Muqātil’s use of isrā’iliyyāt in his tafsīr was 
not a nodding agreement with non-Muslims. In fact, Muqātil’ use of the isrā’iliyyāt 
actually aims at defending Islam’s teachings and its Prophet in addition to attacking non-
Muslims using their own arsenal. Moreover, to suggest that his use of such material 
shows his agreement with non-Muslims is incongruent with Muqātil’s theologically 
unfriendly attitude to non-Muslims, although he may have been legally pragmatist in 
terms of possible, peaceful coexistence with them.  
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The charge on his inattention to isnād should be understood more as related to 
Muqātil’s alleged violation of the social convention in knowledge acquisition and 
transmission than to his inconsistent enumeration of his authorities in his commentaries. 
Isnād as a technical term for the formal enumeration of authorities in one’s work had just 
emerged and had not not yet been standardized.205 But isnād as the term for personal 
contact in knowledge acquisition and transmission seems to have been socially 
established and hence relevant in Muqātil’s case. Thus, isnād-related accusation against 
Muqātil appears to have emerged because Muqātil relied more on written records than 
acquiring his knowledge of the Qur’an through oral delivery or by attending lecture 
sessions, a social convention for knowledge transmission that had been somewhat 
followed at the time. Muqātil’s violation of this institutionalized way of how knowledge 
should be acquired does not, however, make his commentary less reliable, for people 
admired his work and lamented only his weakness in terms of isnād, which most likely 
refers to how he gained his knowledge. This is also supported by the existing scholarship 
that shows that the majority of ḥadīths used in Muqātil’s commentary are confirmed in 
the later and well-accepted compilations of ḥadīth. Furthermore, Muqātil could have had 
different priorities and sensibilities when he wrote his commentaries. By that I mean that 
Muqātil might not have prioritized the inclusion of only sound traditions in his 
commentary as much as he used what was circulating at his time that could serve his 
                                                        
205 Joseph Schacht, one of the sceptists with regard to the reliability of isnād, posit the year 100/719 as the 
beginning of the use of the isnāds. See his The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1979), 5. See also Herbert Berg, The Development of Exegesis in Early Islam: the 
Authenticity of Muslim Literature from the Formative Period (London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 
2000), 68.   
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exegetical agenda. Moreover, in terms of the use of isnād, it is not that Muqātil did not 
use it altogether; rather he used it inconsistently, based on the standard that only 
developed more fully much later than his time. As such, criticism against his use of isnād 
does not necessarily point to how Muqātil should have formally and more diligently 
mentioned his authorities in his commentaries, but rather to the fact that he did not follow 
the institutionalized way of knowledge transmission, especially religious ones, through 
face-to-face and oral delivery, as the only way to have access to isnād. While the use of 
written material was already there from beginning, it did not constitute the proper way for 
knowledge transmission. 
 Muqātil’s reliance on written records, instead of dependence on knowledge 
through oral delivery and face-to-face learning, might have some bearing on how he 
responded to people who questioned him as to the authorities from whom he studied his 
reports. Traditional Muslim sources often described him as confusing his authorities, or 
as committing tadlīs by transmitting from someone whom he met but never learned from, 
or transmitting from a contemporary whom he never met as if he heard from him, as in 
the case of Muqātil’s transmission from al-Kalbī and Mujāhid. If the sources are correct, 
what initialy was a methodological problem had become a moral problem. That is, 
because Muqātil did not gain his knowledge by meeting authorities personally or by 
attending their lectures, but rather made use of people’s records or other circulating 
written material, he could not remember who-said-what. Consequently, when people 
were asking him for the authorities of certain reports he taught, Muqātil had to mention 
names to endow his reports with the weight of authority. However, since he sometimes 
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was inconsistent, people had began to doubt his reliability, and hence the accusation of 
lying. This is further exarceberated by some allegation that Muqātil did not hesitate to 
offer some of the ‘Abbāsid Princes reports that would enhance their status. This suggests 
that Muqātil will not mind to lie or fabricate some reports. Nonetheless, there is no solid 
evidence to support the charge that Muqātil had fabricated ḥadīth. Some sources did 
mention a few reports allegedly fabricated by Muqātil, but they are largely disputed. 
Some scholars ascribed such fabrication to other individuals. Therefore, the charge 
against Muqātil’s personality must also be discarded because it is unfounded. 
Above all, as valuable as the existing scholarship on Muqātil and his 
commentaries, they are largely partial in the sense that they do not offer a complete 
picture of Muqātil and his exegetical endeavor. In fact, the majority of these studies have 
aimed more toward understanding everything but Muqātil and his commentaries. 
Therefore, it is time to understand Muqātil’s exegetical project by investigating his 
hermeneutics, his exegetical concerns and agenda through a close reading of his extant 
commentaries. This is what I intend to do in the next chapters of this study. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr: Narratives of the Qur’ān 
 
The Qur’ān is revealed in five aspects: his [God’s] command, his prohibition, his 
promises, his threat, and narrative of past generation.206 
 
In the Qur’an, [there is] the particular and the general, particular for Muslims and for 
polytheists, general for the whole humanity, ambiguous and unambiguous, well-
explained and vague, elliptic and explicit, redundant, abrogating and abrogated, …       
the same words with multiple meanings… and interpretation; an interretation is subject to 
another interpretation.207 
 
Muqātil ibn Sulaymān 
 
By reading closely Muqātil’s al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr in this chapter, I will investigate 
Muqātil’s hermeneutics with regard to his views of the Qur’an and its interpretation, his 
methods of interpretation, as well as his exegetical thrust and its consequences for his 
views of Islam and non-Islamic traditions such as Arab Paganism, Judaism, Christianity, 
and also the internal dynamic within Muslim community with regard to hypocrites and 
hypocrisy.208  
                                                        
206 Unzila al-qur’ān ‘alā khamsat awjuhin amruhū wa nahyuhū wa wa‘duhū wa wa‘īduhū wa khabar al-
awaalīn. Muqātil ibn Sulaymān, al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr, 1/26. 
207 Fī al-qur’ān khāṣṣ wa ‘ām, khāṣṣ li al-muslimīn wa khāṣṣ fī al-mushrikīn, wa ‘ām li jamī‘ al-nās, wa 
mutashābih wa muḥkam, wa mufassar wa mubham, wa iḍmār wa tamām, wa ṣilāt fī al-kalām, ma‘a nāsihk 
wa mansūkh, wa taqdīm wa ta’khīr, wa ashbāh ma‘a wujūh kathīrah… wa tafsīr, wa li al-tafsīr tafsīr. 
Muqātil ibn Sulaymān, al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr, 1/27. 
208 Luis Alonso Schökel set up “a clear triple distinction within the task of interpreting literary text…to give 
hermeneutics its appropriate position, defined relative to other levels of interpretation, comprehension and 
explanation of literary texts. (l) Exegesis: the exercise of comprehending and interpreting a text. (2) The 
exegetical method: the way of proceeding systematically in the interpretation of a text. (3) Hermeneutics: 
the theory of the activity of understanding and interpreting texts.” See his A Manual of Hermenutics, 
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Muqātil’s hermeneutics is founded upon four principles: the identification of the 
building blocks of the Qur’an, a typology of qur’anic utterances, the necessity of 
interpretation for understanding qur’anic meanings, and the virtue of qur’anic education. 
In general, Muqātil’s exegesis aims at clarifying the Qur’an as best as possible by 
resorting to three different methods: paraphrastic, crossreferencing, and narrative. 
Muqātil’s exegetical thrust revolves around the opposition of īmān (belief) and 
kufr (disbelief). The notion of īmān manifests in the belief in the unity of God (tawḥīd) 
and in the acknowledgement of Muhammad’s prophethood (taṣdīq), while kufr manifests 
in the association of God with creation (shirk) and the rejection of Muhammad’s 
prophethood (takdhīb). Muqātil views al-islām as the primordial religion that all 
prophets, including Muhammad, had preached.209 Consequently, he considers other 
religions human creations that are false, and their followers as therefore having deviated 
from the truth. Despite his harsh criticism of Jews and Christians, along with their alleged 
self-made religions, Judaism and Christianity, respectively, Muqātil is, however, of the 
view that their scriptures are divinely valid.210 His criticism is aimed more at the fact that 
                                                        
Translated by Liliana M. Rosa Further editing by Brook W.R. Pearson (England: Sheffield Academic 
Press, 1998), 13. 
209 In the pre-Christian era, following Cicero, the term “religion” was synonymous with “tradition,” which 
represents “the teachings of one’s ancestors and was essentially not open to question.” The Latin religio 
“involved performing ancient ritual practices and paying homage to the gods…clearly denotes an 
inherently pluralistic context.” In the third century CE, the Christian Lactantius, argued that religio derives 
from re-ligare, “meaning to bind together or link,” thus refuting Cicero’s view that it derives from relegere, 
meaning to re-trace or re-read. In the new Christian view, religio means “the Covenant between the true 
God and man…to exclude certain groups from equal consideration. Those who did not bow down to the 
Almighty and Supreme Deity, worshipping other gods, were now 'alterized’ as pagan and superstitious. The 
redefining of religio also served to establish the monotheistic exclusivism of Christianity as the normative 
paradigm for understanding what a religion is.” See Richard King, Orientalism and Religion: Postcolonial 
Theory, India and ‘the Mystic East’ (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), 35-6.    
210 The fact that Muqātil criticizes both al-yahūdiyyah and al-naṣrāniyyah as man made suggests that he 
understands al-islām in the Qur’an as the institutionalized religion of Islam, more than just a term that 
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some of the Jews and Christians had been unfaithful to their scriptures, especially in the 
case of tawḥīd and taṣdīq, but also with regard to some points of law, such as stoning 
(rajm), blood money (diyah), and qiṣāṣ (lex talionis).  
   As long as the People of Scripture (ahl al-kitāb) practice what their scriptures 
taught, Muqātil believed that they need not convert to Islam.211 While Muhammad used 
to expect that the People of Scripture would follow him, Muqātil maintains that 
Muhammad’s primary mission was to invite them to uphold tawḥīd and accept his claim 
of prophethood (taṣdīq). These two principles are the common ground that would unite 
these three monotheistic religions. The only people upon whom Muhammad imposed 
                                                        
means “submission”. Of course the original use of al-islām in the Qur’an is elusive for it opens to 
posssibilty to mean “submission” or the institutionalized religion called Islam. Regardless of how elusive 
the term al-islām and it use in the Qur’an has been, it paves the way for its use that denotes the 
institutionalized religion of Islam. Wilfred Cantwell Smith argued, “of all the world’s religious traditions 
the Islamic would seem to be the one with a built-in name.” see his The Meaning and End of Religion: A 
New Approach to the Religious Traditions of Mankind (New York: Mentor Books, 1964), 75. Fred M. 
Donner however maintains that it would have not been historically accurate to apply the term “Islam” to the 
early Believers’ movement. Therefore, Donners points to the time of the Umayyad Caliph ‛Abd al-Mālik 
(65/685–86/705) in which Islam was redefined as the religion of Muhammad and his followers distinct 
from that of the Jews and Christians. See his Muhammad and the Believers: at the Origins of Islam 
(Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010), 195, 204-5. In understanding 
Q5:3, revealed at the conclusion of Muhammad’s farewell speech at the last pilgrimage, Afsaruddin notes 
that the term islām in the verse could be “understood in the universal Qur’anic sense as referring to the 
primordial monotheistic religion of submission to the one God or in a narrow, confessional sense, which 
became the predominant understanding.” See Asma Afsaruddin, The First Muslims: History and Memory 
(Oxford: OneWorld, 2007), 15. Since Muqātil seems to have taken it for granted that Qur’anic islām is a 
term for religion, especially that of Muhammad, this may indicate that in the middle of the second/eighth 
century, the term Islam had been used to refer to the “religion” brought about by Muhammad. 
211 Garth Fowden noted early Islam is more receptive to converts rather than actively proselytizing, as in 
the case of Christianity. “Always potentially and usually by tendency universalist, monotheism may also be 
ethnically based (Judaism).” See his Empire to Commonwealth: Consequences of Monotheism in Late 
Antiquity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 5-6. Mahmoud Ayoub is “convinced that the 
Prophet Muhammad and the Qur’an did not expect Jews and Christians to give up their religion and 
become Muslims unless they wanted to but only to observe God’s continuous care for humankind and 
acknowledge that the revelation he gave to the Prophet Muhammad is a genuine revelation and that 
Muhammad is a genuine prophet.” See his A Muslim View of Christianity: Essays on Dialogue by 
Mahmoud Ayoub, ed. Irfan A. Omar (New York: Orbis Book, 2007), 14. 
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Islam were the Arab polytheists, after whose submission the principle that “there is no 
compulsion in religion” (Q2:256) must be upheld. 
Muqātil’s Hermeneutics: the Qur’an and the necessity of interpretation 
In the introduction of the commentary, four reports transmitted from Muqātil 
explain his hermeneutics in relation to the Qur’an.212 They describe the major themes and 
messages in the Qur’an, set out typological classes of qur’anic utterances, emphasize the 
necessity of interpretation in understanding the Qur’an and of knowing such 
interpretation, and, finally, explain the virtue of the Qur’an’s education.213 The first two 
reports offer Muqātil’s theoretical understanding of what the Qur’an is, and the last two 
describe practices to be undertaken for understanding the Qur’an and sustaining that 
understanding through education, so that Qur’an’s main function as guidance can be 
applied in the believers’ lives. 
                                                        
212 There is a series of seventeen isnāds in the beginning of the commentary that convey traditions about the 
Qur’ān and its interpretation. Of these, only eight isnāds mention Muqātil as an authority. In six out of the 
eight, Muqātil is mention as the ultimate authority, while in two other isnāds, authorities from which 
Muqātil received the information are mentioned. The rest nine isnāds do not mention Muqātil as an 
authority. Instead, Muqātil’s immediate transmitter, Abū Ṣāliḥ al-Hudhayl ibn Ḥabīb, mentions other 
authorities from which he gained his information, such as al-Musayyab (ibn Sharīk), Abu Qilābah, Ismā‛īl 
ibn ‘Ayyāsh al-Ḥimṣī, Sufyān al-Wāsiṭī, Ibn ‘Āsim, Ibn al-Musayyab, Abū Ja‛far al-Rāzī, and Abū Bakr al-
Hudhlī. Of the eight isnāds in which Muqātil is mentioned as an authority, only four convey traditions that 
speak to Muqātil’s exegetical concepts. Some isnāḍs, although their content may be relevant to the 
discussion of exegetical task, are ignored primarily because they do not name Muqātil as an authority, and 
therefore do not communicate his hermeneutics. Instead, these reports, along with their isnāds, may have 
been added to the commentary by Muqātil’s commentary. See Tafsīr Muqātil Ibn Sulaymān, 1/26-28. 
213 There is actually another important view of Muqātil but mentioned without an isnād in the introduction, 
and is less relevant to the theoretical explication of his hermeneutics. This view explains a numerical 
interpretation (ḥisāb al-jumal) of Qur’anic alphabets, pertaining specifically to those sets of letters that 
open 29 nine chapters of the Qur’an, generally known as the mysterious letters (al-ḥurūf al-mutaqāṭi‛ah or 
al-ḥurūf al-muqaṭṭa‛ah). Thus, letter alif is one, bā’ two, jīm three, yā’ ten, kāf twenty, qāf a hundred, 
ghayn a thousand, and so forth. Such a numerical interpretation of Qur’anic alphabets will be discussed 
when I deal with the question of al-āyāt al-mutashābihāh. Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/26-28. 
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First principle: five major themes of the Qur’an 
The first of Muqātil’s hermeneutic principles is the knowledge of the building 
blocks of the Qur’an. In this respect, Muqātil mentions that the Qur’an consists of five 
aspects: a divine command (amruhu), prohibition (nahyuhu), promise (wa‛duhu), threat 
(wa‛īduhu), and narrative of past generations (khabar al-awwalīn).214 These five aspects, 
which make up the totality of the Qur’an, illuminate the relative position between God 
and human beings. God is the source of any rules pertaining to human beings’ conduct in 
life, and He also requires their complete submission by heeding what He has revealed. 
The divine set of rules includes commands, the adherence to which leads to the promise 
of good tidings, and prohibition, the violation of which is threatened with punishment. 
The realization of both command and prohibition, along with their concomitant promise 
and threat, had been played out in the past generations, a medium for learning and 
reflection for the present and upcoming generations. Thus, the Qur’an is a collection of 
divine commands with the rewards for adherence, divine prohibitions with their 
accompanying punishment, and narratives of the past communities in which the 
combinations of command-promise and prohibition-threat had been equally 
communicated, acted upon, and finally unfolded for later generations to learn. This first 
principle therefore offers an ethical-moral basis in terms of the relation between God and 
human beings with regard to divine revelation sent through his prophet(s). 
                                                        
214 Qāla: ḥaddathanā ‘Abd Allāh, qāla: wa ḥaddathanī Abī, qāla: ḥaddathanā al-Hudhayl ‘an Muqātil, 
qāla: “Unzila al-Qur’ān ‘alā khamsat awjuh amruhū wa nahyuhū wa wa‛duhū wa wa‛īduhū wa khabar al-
awwalīn. Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/26. 
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By mentioning these five aspects of the Qur’an, Muqātil has provided a 
fundamental framework to categorize the diverse messages of the Qur’an. The 
identification of these five aspects that build the qur’anic structure has enabled Muqātil to 
give an identity to what the Qur’an is, and eventually lead him to conceptualize ways to 
approach it, define its fundamental principles and worldview, and identify the supporting 
elements of these principles and worldview. As such, Muqātil has made the interpretive 
act of the Qur’an more purposeful, for he has been able to imagine the Qur’an as a 
coherently cohesive book. 
Second principle: typology of qur’anic utterances   
The second of Muqātil's hermeneutic principles is related to the language through 
which the content of the Qur’an (first principle) is communicated. The report runs as 
follows:  
In the Qur’an there is the particular (khāṣṣ) and the general (‛āmm); particular for 
the Muslims and particular for the polytheists; general for the whole of human 
beings; there is the equivocal (mutashābih) and the unequivocal (muḥkam),  the 
explained (mufassar) and the obscure (mubham), implicit (iḍmār) and explicit 
(tamām), the redundant (ṣilat fī al-kalām), along with with the abrogator (nāsikh) 
and abrogated (mansūkh), advancement (taqdīm) and  postponement (ta’khīr), 
ashbāh (equivalents) and their multi-meanings (wujūh kathīrah), an answer [for a 
question in a sūrah] in another sūrah, and metaphors God made of Himself, of 
disbeliever, of idol, of the world, of resurrection, of hereafter, and narratives of 
early generations, of what is in heaven and hell; and particular for a single 
polytheist; and obligations (farā’id), laws (ahkam), and punishments (ḥudūd), and 
narrative of what is in the heart of the believers and of the disbelievers, and the 
hostility of Arab polytheists; and there is interpretation, and interpretation of that 
interpretation.215  
                                                        
215 Qāla: ḥaddathanā  ‘Ubayd Allāh, qāla: wa ḥaddathanā Abī ‘an al-Hudhayl ‘an Muqātil annahū qāla: 
“Fī al-Qur’ān khāṣṣ wa ‘āmm, khāṣṣ li al-muslimīn wa khāṣṣ fī al-mushrikīn wa ‘āmm li jamī‛ al-nās wa 
mutashābih wa muḥkam wa mufassar wa mubham wa iḍmār wa tamām wa ṣilat fī al-kalām ma’a nāsikh wa 
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The report suggests that the qur’anic utterances are of different types. There are 
particular utterances (khāṣ), specifically pointing to the believers, polytheists, and so 
forth. But there are also general utterances (‛āmm) that apply to the whole of humanity. 
There are utterances whose meanings seem contradictory (mutashābih), but others are 
clearly discerned (muḥkam). There are utterances whose subject matter is well explained 
(mufassar), but others are obscure (mubham). Some utterances mention their subjects 
explicitly (tamām), while others conceal them (iḍmār). There are utterances that, despite 
their presence, do not affect anything; hence they are redundant (ṣilah fī al-kalām). Some 
utterances override (nāsikh) another (mansūkh) in terms of their legal consequences, their 
recitation or both.  There are also utterances that are placed in reverse order: either put 
forward (taqdīm) or backward (ta’khīr). Some utterances (al-ashbāh) offer different 
meanings (wujūh kathīrah) depending on where they occur in the Qur’an.  Utterances 
pertaining to certain questions in one chapter might find their answers in other utterances 
in another chapter. There are metaphorical utterances, utterances of laws, of obligations, 
and so forth. More importantly, these utterances are subject to interpretation, which may 
well lead to further interpretation. 
Muqātil’s second hermeneutic principle demonstrates that qur’anic utterances are 
of different kinds and whose categorization depends on their relative relations to each 
other. The interaction between them brings about unending possibilities, which can only 
                                                        
mansūkh wa taqdīm wa ta’khīr wa ashbāh ma’a wujūh kathīrah wa jawāb fi sūrah ukhrā wa amthāl  
ḍarabahā Allāh—‘azza wa jalla—linafsihī wa amthāl ḍarabahā li al-kāfir wa al-ṣanam wa amthāl 
ḍarabahā li al-dunyā wa al-ba‛th wa al-ākhirah wa khabar al-awwalīn  wa khabar ma fī al-jannah wa al-
nār wa khāṣṣ li mushrik wāḥid wa farā’iḍ wa aḥkām wa ḥudūd wa khabar mā fī qulūb al-mu’minīn wa 
khabar ma fī qulūb al-kāfirīn wa khuṣumat mushrikī al-‘Arab wa tafsīr wa li al-tafsīr tafsīr. See Muqātil, 
Tafsīr, 1/27. 
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be mitigated by an interpretive act. Such interpretation is of two layers: first, based on 
their internal and intratextual interactions, and second, based on external knowledge that 
anchors revelation within a particular, larger context than merely linguistic context. 
These typological classes of qur’anic utterances are therefore not readily-made or simply 
to be found in the Qur’an. On the contrary, Muqātil suggests that while the utterances are 
there in the Qur’an, their identification as general, particular, and so forth, has to be 
“invented”. Interpretation is the only way to do so. 
The fact that Muqātil closes his statement with an emphasis that upon 
interpretation is further interpretation (wa li al-tafsīr tafsīr) is rather unexpected, given 
his general monovalent approach, it therefore is so refreshing. This phrase may point to 
two layers of interpretation that Muqātil is explaining—the intratextual and the 
extratextual or contextual—and the need for the two modes of interpretation to be 
subjected to one another. This phrase may bear further consequence suggesting a 
continuous process of interpretation in which every product of interpretation is always 
subject to another interpretation. 
Muqatil’s contribution in defining the typology of utterances in the Qur’an is 
valuable, but his emphasis on the interpretative nature of the identification of those 
utterances is equally valuable. The rigidity of his conceptual pairs (e.g., khāṣ-‛āmm, 
muffasar-mubham, etc.), which he always presents in a series of a binary opposition, 
contrasts with the plasticity of an act of interpretation that he suggests. While it sustains 
tension, the combination of rigidity and elasticity in Muqātil’s hermeneutics energizes the 
process of seeking the best possible in relation to qur’anic exegesis. Furthermore, the 
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sincerity required by the ethico-moral obligation to submit to divine precepts (resulted 
from the first hermeneutic principle) is combined with the realization of the huge 
undertaking that an interpretative act requires in understanding the Qur’an (resulted from 
the second hermeneutic principle). But it is the product of the second principle that brings 
us further to Muqātil’s third hermeneutic principle. 
Third principle: knowing meaning is literacy  
Muqātil’s third hermeneutic principle underlines the intended goal of 
interpretation, namely the pursuit of meaning of qur’anic utterances. Muqātil says, 
“Whoever reads the Qur’an but does not know its meaning, he is illiterate.”216  
What this third principle may further suggest is that understanding the Qur’an by 
knowing qur’anic meaning, not necessarily undertaking an interpretive task, is an 
individual reponsibility and obligation. Not every individual is able to undertake an act of 
interpretation. But knowing the result of such interpretation, even if it is the result of 
others’ undertaking, which leads to understanding the Qur’an, is a necessity without 
which it is impossible to even understand the building blocks of the Qur’an, let alone to 
feel the obligation to submit to the divine precepts. This principle thus suggests a 
minimum knowledge that a believer must have in order to be qur’anically literate, that is, 
to know its message, or the meaning of qur’anic utterances. How can every believer 
attain such knowledge of qur’anic meaning if not every body is capable for undertaking 
his own interpretative endeavors due to different reasons? What does Muqātil envision to 
                                                        
216 Qāla: ḥaddathanā ‘Ubayd Allāh, qāla: ḥaddathanā Abī ‘an al-Hudhayl ibn Ḥabīb ‘an Muqātil qāla: 
“Man qara’a al-Qur’ān fa lam ya‛lam ta’wīlahū fa huwa fīhī ummī. Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/27. 
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overcome the fact that the believers are of different ability in terms of their knowledge 
and understanding of the Qur’an? This leads us to the fourth principle of Muqātil’s 
hermeneutics.  
Fourth principle: the virtue of qur’anic education 
Now we know Muqātil’s hermeneutics in relation to the structure of the Qur’an, 
the typology of its utterances that necessitates an interpretative act, and the individual 
nature of the obligation to know the Qur’an’s message. The question is how, with their 
differing abilities to understand the Qur’an, it is possible to make every individual have 
access to knowledge of qur’anic message. Muqātil’s answer is education: “I do not find 
something more worthy of reward on the Day of Judgment than one who learns the 
Qur’an and teaches it.”217 Education is Muqātil’s solution to overcome the different 
abilities that people have in terms of understanding the Qur’an and knowing its message. 
Those who are able to undertake their own act of interpretation may teach those who are 
unable to do so. While such education may or may not produce more people with 
interpretive capacity, at the very least it can lead people to some sort of literacy in terms 
of the Qur’an by knowing its meanings, which will lead them subsequently to be 
submissive to the divine precepts.  
In its own right, Muqātil’s commentary plays the role of teaching his 
interpretation of the Qur’an to his immediate students and his distant readers. In fact, in 
                                                        
217 Qāla: ḥaddathanā ‘Ubayd Allāh qala: ḥaddathanī Abī ‘an al-Hudhayl ‘an Muqātil ‘an ‘Abd al-Karīm 
al-Jazawī qāla: “Mā ajidu a‛ẓama ajran yawm al-qiyāmah min man [ta]‘allama al-Qur’āna wa ‘allamahu. 
Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/27. 
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addition to offering the interpretation of the Qur’an, Muqātil’s commentary has provided 
his readers with hermeneutic principles that explain not only why they must possess such 
knowledge but also how to attain it. For specalists and learned, understanding the Qur’an 
may be attained through a continuous act of interpretation and they disseminate the 
product of that interpretation to a wider audience. For lay people, their ways of 
understanding the Qur’an is by learning it from those who possess such knowledge. In 
this way, the Qur’an is accessible to all. Muqātil’s hermeneutic thus comes full circle:  it 
lays out the ethico-moral foundation for submission to the divine precepts, by 
understanding the Qur’an through a continuous act of interpretation, the knowledge of 
which is to be disseminated through education so that every believer attains some literacy 
of the Qur’an. As such, the function of the Qur’an as divine guidance can be realized.  
Methods of interpretation: techniques and devices 
The Tafsir Muqātil ibn Sulaymān or al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr is a commentary on the 
whole Qur’an. As such, Muqātil’s commentary is a step further from the type of 
commentary that had previously circulated among his predecessors, later known as al-
tafsīr bi al-ma’thūr (“inherited interpretation”). This last kind of commentary does not 
encompass the whole Qur’an, but merely some parts of it, by which a number of 
exegetical reports, be they from Prophet Muhammad or his Companions, were passed 
down to later generation, in a format traditionally known as ḥadīth, akhbār, or āthār.218 
The conventional Muslim view states that before it became an independent discipline, 
                                                        
218 G. H. A. Juynboll, Muslim Tradition: Studies in chronology, provenance and authorship in early Islam 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 33-4. 
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qur’anic exegesis might have been a part of a larger endeavor in ḥadīth collection. 219 
Modern studies, however, suggest the contrary; that is, tafsīr initially began as attempts 
of early Muslim scholars to explain the Qur’an as they were reciting it. In fact, “John 
Burton paints a different picture of the relationship between tafsīr and sunna… at least in 
some cases, exegetical dicussions came first which then led to their expansion in the form 
of ḥadīths.”220 Whatever the state of origins and early development of tafsīr was, 
Muqātil’s commentary is among the earliest, if not the first, complete commentary on the 
Qur’an. It may represent the transition from tafsīr as subdivision of ḥadīth to tafsīr as a 
discipline of its own, or it may well be the crystallization of exegetical ideas and attempts 
as an independent discipline.  
 In the commentary, Muqātil provides comments on almost all verses of the 
Qur’an. As such, Muqātil’s exegetical undertaking seems to aim at clarifying everything 
in the Qur’an and making it as comprehensible as possible by either paraphrasing the 
                                                        
219 To follow the development of the term tafsīr bi al-ma’thūr as an analytical term and a way of fashioning 
the mainstream Sunnī tafsīr see Walid Saleh, “Preliminary Remarks on the Historiography of tafsīr in 
Arabic: A History of the Book Approach,” in Journal of Qur’anic Studies 12 (2010): 6–40, 36. In it, Saleh 
argues, “The term is now fully entrenched on the two sides of the historiography of tafsīr, in the Arab 
world, and in the West. A confusion has ensued since, in which we all are cognisant of the inadequacies of 
this term, yet since we are all under the illusion that it is an old native analytical term, we are obliged to 
abide by it and try to understand what Muslims meant by it. The irony is that this term is of recent 
appearance, and as such is analytically useless unless a clear understanding of the genealogy of the term 
has been established.” However, distinction needs to be made between a practice for compiling the legacy 
of tafsīr of early Muslims by later Muslims, and the technical term that refers to it and emerged only much 
later after such practice had been well established. The tendency to find precedent, including in terms of 
tafsīr, is a resilient feature in the Muslim intellectual history. Prior to Muqātil’s time in the second/eighth 
century, the field of tafsīr seems to operate largely in this precedent-based framework. Muqātil’s time 
however opens a new orientation in tafsīr in which this precedent-based framework is combined with the 
creative interpretive endeavors of the Qur’an’s exegetes by using their personal views and borrowing other 
interpretative traditions. Thus, Saleh’s argument remains useful to argue against those who maintained that 
tafsīr bi al-ma’thūr is the only legitimate way for doing tafsīr. 
220 Berg, Development, 92. The more precise picture of the origins and early development of tafsīr still 
needs further studies. 
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verse or parts of it, providing the verse’s counterparts from other places in the Qur’an, or 
giving a relevant narrative report that provides the context within which the verse was 
revealed or the context within which the story unfolded in the verse took place. On 
occasions, Muqātil combines these three methods—paraphrasing, crossreferencing, and 
narrativizing—together if the verses he is commenting on require it, and if he has the 
material at his disposal. 
 The paraphrasing method uses techniques such as fragmentation of a verse into 
smaller parts, completing a verse with complementing phrases, and specifying the 
intended meaning or reference of a verse. The crossreferencing method connects similar 
words, phrases or relevant passages mentioned in different places in the Qur’an. Finally, 
the narrativizing method mentions any narrative reports that either situate the revelation 
of a verse, traditionally known as asbāb al-nuzūl (“occasions of revelation”), or relate the 
story unfolded in the verse to the narratives of the past, biblical or otherwise, 
conventionally known as isrā’iliyyāt.  
Muqātil’s use of these three methods suggests that he views the Qur’an as a 
unified whole whose elements are interconnected with each other sustaining its structure. 
These three methods recall his second hermeneutic principle in which interpretation of 
the Qur’an is performed at two levels: interpretation based on internal and intratextual 
relation between different parts of the Qur’an, best represented by his paraphrasing and 
crossreferencing methods, and interpretation based on a larger socio-historical contexts, 
carried out through his narrativizing method. When he employs the paraphrasing and 
crossreferencing methods, his comments are relatively short and straightforward. 
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However, when he uses the narrative method, Muqātil’s comments on the qur’anic 
passages are relatively long, sometimes even quite extensive, running a few pages long. 
Throughout the commentary, Muqātil presents monovalent interpretive ideas of 
his choosing, and provides nothing about scholarly differences in interpretation of 
Qur’ānic passages, as later commentators would do.221 This is interesting, not only 
because it is mentioned that he received his knowledge of tafsīr from about thirty 
scholars, but also because of his idea with regard to the endlessly generative nature of 
interpretation. While he might have been a “container” of knowledge (aw‘iyat al-‘ilm), as 
some scholars said, Muqātil apparently does not present himself as a “compiler” of 
exegetical views, such as al-Ṭabarī. Rather, he plays the part of an independent 
commentator who, among several choices that he has, offers his chosen views with more 
authority to influence his potential readers.  
Muqātil is straightforward in his exegetical style. Simplicity is perhaps the most 
notable characteristic of his commentary. Despite this simplicity, Muqātil is able to create 
an aura that the Qur’an is a coherently cohesive unity. If his primary aim is to make the 
Qur’an as comprehensible as possible, Muqātil does succeed in achieving it.  Just 
imagine how one verse is explained using a combination of three different methods—
                                                        
221 In this regard, there are at least three types of commentaries. First, there are commentaries which expose 
only the ideas chosen by the commentators that best represent their own views and present no differences 
of opinions among scholars. Examples of these are commentaries of al-Bayḍawī, al-Nasafī, al-Jalālayn, al-
Sa‛dī, and certainly Muqātil ibn Sulaymān. Second, there are commentaries that simply present different 
exegetical views among scholars without offering any preferences, such as the commentaries of al-
Māwardī and Ibn al-Jawzī. Third, there are commentaries that elaborate different exegetical opinions 
among scholars with regard to certain Qur’anic passages, choose some of these views as preferable, and 
provide the reasons for that preference. Exmples of these are the commentaries of al-Ṭabarī, Ibn ‛Aṭiyyah, 
al-Qurṭubī, Abū Ḥayyān, Ibn Kathīr, al-Shanqīṭī, and others. See Ḥusayn ibn ‛Alī ibn Ḥusayn al-Ḥarbī, 
Qawā‛id al-Tarjīḥ ‛inda al-Mufassirīn: Dirāsah Naẓriyyah Taṭbīqiyyah (Riyāḍ: Dār al-Qāsim, 1996), 11. 
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paraphrasing, crossreferencing, and narrativizing—at the same time. It is almost certain 
there is nothing in the verse left untouched. Muqātil’s exegetical strategies work and are 
entirely justified by the fact that, without such commentaries and clarifying statements, 
the Qur’an would have been very hard to discern. The Qur’an is, as some would have it, 
disjointed;222 it is not written cohesively from the very beginning as a book. Rather, the 
Qur’an is a compilation of a series of revelations sent down during the period of twenty-
three years, and later codified not in chronological order of its revelations, but randomly 
under the direction of the Prophet.  In this respect, the commentary is almost unavoidable 
not only to connect different parts of revelations but also to make sense of thie newly 
acquired composition in the post-oral recitation of the Qur’an. As such, commentary on 
the Qur’an does not only enhance the content of scripture, but “the scriptural style is itself 
incomplete without commentary.”223 
Paraphrastic Method 
Muqātil uses the paraphrastic method in almost every part of the Qur’an on which 
he is commenting. In general, when he uses this method, he breaks up a verse into 
smaller meaningful parts, either in words or phrases (fragmentation technique). 
                                                        
222 Carlyle maintained that “It [the Qur’an] is as toilsome reading as I ever undertook, a wearisome, 
confused jumble, crude, incondite.” However, after years of close study of the Qur’an, he suggested that 
“there is a merit quite other than the literary one. If a book comes from the heart, it will contrive to reach 
other hearts; all art and authorcraft are of small account to that.” See H. A. R. Gibb, Mohammedanism: An 
Historical Survey (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), 36. 
223 Wansbrough, Quranic Studies, 100, 131. G. R. Hawting maintains, “Reading the Koran on its own 
terms, trying to interpret it without resorting to commentaries, is a difficult and questionable exercise 
because of the nature of the text – its allusive and referential style and its grammatical and logical 
discontinuities, as well as our lack of sure information about its origins and the circumstances of its 
composition. Often such a reading seems arbitrary and necessarily inconclusive.” See his The Idea of 
idolatry and the Emergence of Islam: from polemic to history (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), 48. 
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Subsequently, he provides a synonym or a paraphrase to clarify the intended meaning of 
such a word or phrase used in the verse (specification technique). To separate his 
comments from the original qur’anic passages, Muqātil very often uses a number of 
connective, “paraphrastic” devices such as ya‛nī, yaqūlu, or ay, which in English may be 
rendered “that is.” Occasionally, Muqātil uses none of these devices, but instead he 
immediately provides complementary statements that complete the qur’anic statements, 
such as giving an object for a qur’anic verb, an adverbial explanation, or simply 
paraphrasing qur’anic passages with his own phrases with a pattern similar to the original 
(completion technique). 224  
As examples of how Muqātil uses the paraphrastic method, let us see his 
commentary on some parts of the Qur’an, in which he argued for the two most important 
messages of the Qur’an that has occupied his exegetical concerns, namely propagation of 
tawḥīd and taṣdīq. Consequently, condemnation of their opposites, namely shirk and 
takdhīb occupies an equally important place in Muqātil’s exegetical endeavor. In his 
commentary on Q2: 21-22, Muqātil emphasizes the question of tawḥīd:  
[21] People, worship your Lord, that is (ya‛nī), [the intended people were] the 
hypocrites and the Jews, worship only your one God (waḥḥidū rabbakum), who 
created you, before you were nothing, and [created] those before you, among the 
bygone communities, so that, in order (likay), you may be mindful, of associating 
him with anything else (al-shirk), and worship only Allāh, the Powerful and the 
Exalted, if you contemplate on your own creation and the creation of those before 
you. God then drew attention to Himself through what he had done so that these 
people only worshipped Him by mentioning His favors, in which the Greatest the 
Exalted said, worship your God, [22] who spread out the earth for you, that is 
(ya‛nī) as if it is a carpet (bisātan), and built the sky, that is, as a roof (saqafan); 
who sent water down from it, that is (ya‛nī) rain (al-maṭar), and with that water 
[He] produced, God says (yaqūlu) that He produced with that rain out the earth a 
                                                        
224 Wansbrough called this phenomenon “zero connective.” See his Quranic Studies, 124.  
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variety of, fruits for your sustenance. Do not set up rivals to God, God says 
(yaqūlu) do not create along with God associates, while you know, that 
everything He mentioned is His creation, then how come you worshipped 
anything else?225 
In the example above, the connective devices that Muqātil uses to separate his 
commentary from the original qur’anic passages are ya‛nī and yaqūlu. There are times 
when Muqātil does not use any connective, but inserts clarifying statements, such as 
when the Qur’an says “[who created] those before you”, Muqātil immediately follows it 
up with his “among the bygone communities” just to clarify that the people intended are 
the communities of past prophets, not just their parents or their grandparents. 
To specify the addressees intended in the verse, which the Qur’an generally 
renders as people (al-nās), Muqātil mentions the hypocrites (al-munāfiqīn) and the Jews 
(al-yahūd). The imperative term u‛budū which in general means worship! was 
paraphrased as waḥḥidū to specify that the intended meaning was to belief in the unity of 
God, thus worshipping Him alone. As Muqātil specifies ‛ibādah (worship) as tawḥīd 
(belief in unity of God and worship Him alone), he also contrasts it with shirk 
(associating God with anything else of His creation), something that these people should 
avoid (la‛allakum tattaqūn). Subsequently, Muqātil also explains the reason why they 
must embrace tawḥīd and avoid shirk: because God has created them and gave them 
favors and sustenance. If they contemplate this, Muqātil argued, they would not worship 
anything else. 
                                                        
225 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/93. 
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The next example is Muqātil’s commentary on Q2: 16, in which Muqātil 
condemns the rejection of Muhammad (takdhīb): 
[16] They have bought error in exchange for guidance, [God] says (yaqūlu) they 
traded guidance in which they were with regard to believing in Muhammad 
before he was sent [as a messenger] with error to which they enter after 
Muhammad was sent, due to their rejection of him (min takdhībihim bi 
muḥammad); that is the worse trade ever, so their trade reaps no profit, and they 
are not rightly guided.226 
In his commentary, Muqātil uses the connective yaqūlu to facilitate his comments 
on the first half of the verse that he fragments from the second half. The people who 
traded guidance with error, the Jews, were, according to Muqātil, actually expecting the 
coming of a Prophet. They had had some knowledge of what this prophet would look 
like, as he was already described in the Torah. They believed in him and even prayed in 
his name before they went to war so that God granted them victory. However, when they 
found out that the expected prophet was Muhammad, they rejected him. They did so 
because in their imagination, the upcoming prophet would be of Isḥāq’s descendant; 
instead, it was Muhammad who claimed the prophethood, an Arab, and thus Ismā‛il’s 
decendant.227 If in his previous commentary on Q2: 21-22 Muqātil contrasted tawḥīd to 
shirk, this time in his interpretation on Q2: 16, īmān bi Muḥammad (belief in 
Muhammad) is contrasted to takdhīb bi Muḥammad (rejection of Muhammad).  
                                                        
226 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/91. 
227 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/91. 
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Crossreferencing Method  
Muqātil uses the “crossreferencing method” to connect the verse on which he is 
commenting to other verses in the Qur’an which either possess linguistic similarities or 
shared messages. Identifying and linking qur’anic counterparts is one of Muqātil’s 
strategies to show the cohesiveness of the Qur’an. Furthermore, his linking of qur’anic 
verses to one another is a pioneering step into what was later regarded as the best 
interpretation of the Qur’an, namely interpreting the Qur’an with the Qur’an. The 
intratextual approach that he takes in terms of qur’anic interpretation is later furthered by 
his more firmly thematic studies of, among other, legal and lexical questions that resulted 
in the composition of Tafsīr al-Khams Mi’at Āyah and al-Wujūh wa al-Naẓā’ir, which I 
will study in the next two chapters. If Muqātil’s legal commentary is not entirely based 
on interpretation of the Qur’an with the Qur’an, as he also uses external resources such as 
prophetic traditions and some of scholarly views of early Muslims, his lexical 
commentary was purely qur’anic, since the multi-meanings that a word has are generated 
fully from its qur’anic use. 
Using this crossreferencing method, Muqātil treats the Qur’an as a structure of its 
own in which its different parts have the ability to explain one another. In applying this 
crossreferencing method and in order to distinguish it from other methods that he uses, 
Muqātil employs some devices, such as mithl qawlihī (“like [God’s] saying”), ka-qawlihī 
(“like [God’s] saying”), and naẓīruhā (“the counterpart [of the verse]”). Following these 
devices, Muqātil mentions other verses or parts of those that shared commonality with the 
present verse being discussed either in linguistic form or content. 
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The following is the example where Muqātil uses his crossreferencing method in 
commenting on Q38: 5-9, 
[5] How can he [Muhammad] claim that all the gods are but one God? What an 
astonishing thing [to claim]!’, that is when ‛Umar al-Khaṭṭāb—may God be 
pleased with him—was accepting Islam; ‛Umar’s becoming a Muslim had created 
a fissure among the Quraysh people, but created an excitement among the 
believers, [6] Their leaders depart, there were twenty seven of them…such as al-
Walīd ibn al-Mughīra, Abū Jahl ibn Hishām, Umayyah and Ubayy sons of Khalaf, 
and some others. Then al-Walīd ibn al-Mughīrah was saying, ‘Walk away! To 
Abū Ṭālib, Stay faithful to your gods! [wa ṣbirū--wa thbutū--‛alā  alā 
ālihatikum] That is what you must do. And the counterpart (naẓīruhā) of this is 
in al-Furqān [Q25: 42] [lawlā an ṣabarnā ‛alayhā, “had we not been steadfast in 
worship of Him”], that is (ya‛nī) we had been steadfast. But God said in reponse: 
Fain yaṣbirū fa al-nāru mathwan lahum, The Fire will still be their home, even 
if they resign themselves to patience. These people then went to Abū Ṭālib, 
saying: “You are our leader and the most senior among us, you have seen 
yourself what those stupid people did. We came to you so that you adjudicate 
between us and the son of your brother [Muhammad]. Abū Ṭālib then sent 
someone to Muhammad, after which the latter came. Abū Ṭālib said [to 
Muhammad]: “These are your people. They are asking from you justice. So 
please don’t let your heart be inclined only to your followers.” Muhammad 
replied: “What did they ask from me?” The people replied themselves: “Stop 
mentioning our gods, then we’ll leave your god alone!” The Prophet replied: 
“Give me one word so that the Arabs and non Arabs would be united!” Abū Jahl 
soon replied: “For God and your ancestor, we’ll give that word and even ten 
more.” The Prophet told them: “Say Lā ilāha illā Allāh!”  They eschewed that 
request, saying: “How can he [Muhammad] claim that all the gods are but one 
God? What an astonishing thing [to claim]!’, that is (ya‛nī) abhorrent that our 
gods become only one. [7] We did not hear, the thing that Muhammad has just 
said, in the last religion, that is (ya‛nī) Christianity (al-millah al-naṣrāniyyah); it 
is the last among religions because the Christians thought that God is ‛Īsā son of 
Maryam. Al-Walīd then said: “it, [the Qur’an’], is all an invention,” from 
Muhammad that he made it up himself. Al-Walid then said again: “[8] Was the 
message sent only to him out of all of us?’”, “while we are more senior and 
nobler?” In response to Walid’s saying that “It is all an invention”, God said:  
“In fact they doubt My warning, that is (ya‛nī) the Qur’an; in fact they have not 
tasted My punishment yet [bal lammā ya‛nī lam yadhūqū ‛adhābi], such God’s 
saying (mithl qawlihī) (… wa lammā yadkhul al-īmān fī qulūbikum…) 
[Q49:14], that is (ya‛nī) belief has not entered their hearts yet (ya‛nī lam 
yadkhul al-īmān fī qulūbikum) . [9] Do they possess the treasures of your Lord’s 
bounty (am ‛indahum khazā’in raḥmat rabbik), that is, what was meant with 
“your Lord’ bounty” was prophethood (nubuwwah), and its counterpart (wa 
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naẓīruhā) is in al-Zukhruf [Q43:32]: “… Are they the ones who share out your 
Lord’s grace?...” [ahum yaqsimūn raḥmat rabbik], that is prophethood; God 
said: “It is on their hands the keys for prophethood and messengership and that 
they can put them wherever they like? No, they are not in their hands, but in the 
hand of the Mighty, and in the property of the All Giving; lies the prophethood 
and messengerhood of Muhammad.228 
The example above, pertaining to Muhammad’s prophethood, shows not only 
Muqātil’s use of the crossreferencing method, but also, as always, his use of the 
paraphrasing method, indicated by the repeated use of connective ya‛nī and yaqūlu, and 
the narrative method, to be dealt with later, by providing the background narrative within 
which the verses were revealed or to be understood. To focus on our main topic 
discussion, Muqātil’s crossreferencing method, let me now deal with this at the moment.  
Based on the devices used, there are three instances where Muqātil is employing 
the crossreferencing method. First, when Muqātil explains that the word ṣ-b-r used in 
Q38: 6, wa ṣbirū ‛alā ālihatikum, and in 25: 42, lawlā an ṣabarnā ‛alayhā, share the 
same meaning as th-b-t, “being steadfast”. Therefore Muqātil interprets iṣbirū as uthbutū 
(“be steadfast), and ṣabarnā as thabatnā (“we had been steadfast”).  The two are thus 
counterparts (naẓīr).   
Second, when Muqātil explains that particle lammā in the phrase bal lammā 
yadhūqū ‛adhābi in Q38: 8 has the same meaning as particle lam. Therefore, in his 
commentary Muqātil said: bal lammā ya‛nī lam yadhūqū ‛adhābi, “they have not tasted 
My punishment yet”. Furthermore, Muqātil alludes to another qur’anic phrase in Q49: 14, 
wa lammā yadkhul al-īmān fī qulūbikum, in which the same particle lammā also 
                                                        
228 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/635-37. 
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presents. Thus, the two-particle lammā in the two verses, Q38: 8 and 49: 14, have the 
meaning of particle lam, “not yet”. The two are therefore counterparts (naẓīr), which 
Muqātil connects with each other using the device mithl qawlihī. 
Third, when Muqātil couterparts raḥmat rabbik (“God’s bounty”) in Q38: 9 with 
the same phrase in Q43: 32. Muqātil interprets the phrase raḥmat rabbik in am ‛indahum 
khazā’in raḥmat rabbik (Q38: 9) and in ahum yaqsimūn raḥmat rabbik (Q43: 32) as 
“prophethood and messengership”. The device Muqātil employs for this crossreferencing 
of the two is wa naẓīruhā. If noticed, Muqātil uses the crossreferencing method not only 
to show the connection that different verses have with each other but also, more 
specifically, to demonstrate that the same words may share the same meaning, although 
they take place in different places in the Qur’an. The contrary is true, that the same words 
may have different meanings when they are used in different places in the Qur’an, as I 
will discuss in the third chapter when I deal with Muqātil’s al-Wujūh wa al-Naẓā’ir. 
Narrative Method  
Muqātil uses the narrative method in his commentary when he has at his disposal 
the material by which he can illuminate either the context of revelation or the context 
within which certain passages in the Qur’an should be understood. In general, the 
narrative materials that Muqātil uses may fall into one of two categories: first, narratives 
that, partly due to their transmission through reliable people and partly due to the 
agreement of their content with with the teaching of Islam, can be accepted, and others 
which, because their transmitters were suspect or their content was not in accord with and 
or even against the teaching of Islam, are denied. The first group of materials is usually 
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known as asbāb al-nuzūl consisting of prophetic ḥadīths, akhbār, or athār. The second 
group of materials is usully categorized as isrā’iliyyāt.229 
Some scholars have argued that some of what has traditionally been known as 
asbāb al-nuzūl (literally, “causes of revelation”) might only be a commentary or an 
extended explanation of revelation, rather than real triggers for revelation.230 This and 
similar material that Muqātil incorporates to shed light on the qur’anic passages come 
from a body of traditions called ḥadīth (prophetic traditions) and akhbār (traditions that 
convey the views of the Companions and Successors).231 In the meantime, the isrā’iliyyāt 
reports usually relate to the narratives of past prophets and bygone generations. Unlike 
ḥadīth and āthār that come from what is related to the Prophet and his Companions as 
well as Successors, this body of material, as the term indicates, comes from non-Muslim 
                                                        
229 In the Muslim scholarship, the Isrāiliyyāt reports are divided into three categories: first, those which are 
in agreement with Islamic teaching, hence acceptable; second, those which are in disagreement with 
Islamic teaching, and threrefore are rejected, and third, those about which Islamic teaching has nothing to 
say, either in acceptance or rejection, and therefore is no judgment about it is made. See Muḥammad 
Ḥusayn al-Dhahabī, al-Isrā’iliyyāt fi al-Tafsīr wa al-Ḥadīth (Cairo: Maktabah Wahbah, 1990), 35-41; 
Ramzī Na‛na‛ah, al-Isrā’iliyyāt wa Atharuhā fī Kutub al-Tafsīr (Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 1970); 
Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad Abū Shahbah, al-Isrā’iliyyāt wa al-Mawḍū‛āt fi Kutub al-Tafsīr (Cairo: 
Maktabat al-Sunnah, 1987). 
230 Perhaps for this reason that the term asbāb al-nuzūl is often rendered “occasions of revelation” in 
English. In traditional Muslim literature, asbāb al-nuzūl is understood primarily as having historical 
validity, not simply an exegetical tool. Therefore, Muslim scholars maintained that asbāb al-nuzūl should 
pertain to two things: (1) an event because of which revelation came, and (2) a question about which the 
Prophet was asked and in which revelation came as the answer to it. Thus, for a narrative report to be called 
asbāb al-nuzūl it must suggest that it has triggered or caused revelation. Al-Zarkashī and al-Suyūṭī 
maintained that asbāb al-nuzūl have “to be limited to events contemporaneous with the revelation; those 
which were only connected to events mentioned in the Qur'an were reclassified as akhbār.” See Andrew 
Rippin, “The Exegetical Genre "asbāb  al-nuzūl": A Bibliographical and Terminological Survey,” in 
Bulletin of the School  of Oriental and  African Studies, University of London, vol. 48, No. 1 (1985), pp. 1-
15, 15. 
231 There are a great amount of ḥadīth and akhbār in the commentary although the majority of them are 
with truncated isnāds. While Muqātil did not meet with any Companions and the Prophet, they are often 
mentioned in many isnāds as Muqātil’s immediate authorities. See for instance (1/28): wa ḥaddathanā 
‛Ubayd Allāh qāla: wa ḥaddathanī abī ‛an al-Hudhayl ‛an Muqātil qāla: qāla Rasūl Allāh… (2/630): 
ḥaddathanā ‛Ubayd Allāh qāla: ḥaddathanī abī ‛an Abī Ṣāliḥ ‛an Ibn ‛Abbās:… and so forth. 
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sources, be they Jewish, Christian, or other.232 Both types of the narratives of the past--
ḥadīth and isrā’iliyyāt—however, serve the same function, that is, to explain and 
contextualize the text. 
The status of the isrā’iliyyāt reports is controversial within Muslim scholarship, 
primarily because their content is sometimes deemed counterproductive to the well-
accepted teachings of Islam.233 As an example for the scandalous views that may result 
from the use of the isrā’iliyyāt reports was related to the idea of infallibity of the prophets 
(‛iṣmah) in Islam.234 If in Islam the prophets are considered protected from committing 
sins or inappropriate conduct (ma‛ṣūm, ‛iṣmah), the isrā’iliyyāt reports often depict them 
as people who, just like ordinary people, were able to do innapropriate actions, especially 
in relation to their sexual conduct.235  
                                                        
232 Many of the isrā’iliyyāt reports were attached to the Companions and even to the Prophet himself, the 
phenomonon which Muslim scholars have certainly denied as fabrication. See Ḥusayn al-Dhahabī, 
Isrā’iliyyāt, 6. 
233 Al-Kawtharī states that many commentators of the Qur’ān incorporated isrā’iliyyāt in their 
commentaries because they saw some advantage in them for explaining some parts of the Qur’ān. In doing 
so, these commentators left the task of scrutiny for later generation. One of the reasons they did this is 
because they did not want to miss passing knowledge that might be of use for later generation. See al-Ṭūfī, 
al-Iksīr fī Uṣūl al-Tafsīr, 32; Walid Humaymil ‛Awajān, “Tafsīr Khams Mi’at Āyah min al-Qur’ān al-
Karīm fī al-Amr wa al-Nahy wa al-Ḥalāl wa al-Ḥarām li Muqātil ibn Sulaymān,” in Dirāsāt, ‛Ulūm al-
Sharī‛ah wa al-Qānūn, vol. 33, edition 2, 2008, 444. 
234 Jewish tradition does not recognize any infallibility of its prophets and ancestors. Instead, it 
acknowledges that these people have, in one way or another, committed sins. This view has resulted in the 
emergence of Islamic anti-Jewish polemic in the medieval period. See Shari L. Lowin, The Making of A 
Forefather: Abraham in Islamic and Jewish Exegetical Narratives (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2006), 64-5. 
235 See, for instance, how Muqātil comments on Q38: 21 that he relates to the story of Dāwūd who desired 
the wife of one of his soldiers after he saw her bathing naked (3/639-40); how in his commentary on Q12: 
24, Muqātil relates to the story of Yūsuf who almost fell for the sexual seduction of the Egyptian prime 
minister’s wife by loosening his own pants and sitting in between the woman’s feet, ready to have a sexual 
intercourse (2/328-30), and how Muqātil, in his commentary on Q33: 37, describes the story of how 
Muḥammad fell in love with his adopted son’s (Zayd) wife, Zaynab, due to her sexual appeal (3/493-496). 
However, it seems that, in doing this, Muqātil does not have ill-intention to disgrace the Prophet, for he 
also presents the view of ‛Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb that says, “If there is something of the Qur’an that the 
Prophet would conceal, he would have concealed this verse for it exposes him” (3/495-6). Furthermore, in 
his commentary on Q33: 54, Muqātil is defending the Prophet when the Jews mocked the the Prophet as a 
womanizer by showing that their own prophets, Dāwūd, was married to ninety nine women, and Sulaymān, 
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Muqātil uses the asbāb al-nuzūl and isrā’iliyyāt reports to provide more details of 
an event or story told in the Qur’an only obliquely.  To do so, Muqātil usually hints their 
presence in his commentary using some devices, such as nazalat fī (“the verse(s) was 
revealed to/in the context of”), fa lammā (“the verse(s) was revealed when…”), wa 
dhālika ḥīna (“that is when…”), and wa dhālika anna (“that is when…”). Bringing about 
such detailed narratives, which mention names, places, and dialogues that occurred 
among the actors, Muqātil makes the stories in the Qur’an more alive and engaging.   
As an example of how Muqātil uses the narrative method, let us see his 
commentary on Q2: 6-10. In the verses that address both Arab polytheists (Q2: 6-7) and 
the Jewish hypocrites (Q2: 8-10), Muqātil employs not only the narrative method, but 
also the paraphrastic and crossreferencing methods as well. However, it is arguably his 
use of the narrative method that makes the verses more imaginatively vivid as he names 
the alleged actors involved and narrates the lively dialogue between them. Now, the 
message of the Qur’an is understood not only through its wording, but more importantly 
through the unfolding of the story, the dialogue between actors, and the real life that they 
experienced. As such, the understanding that emerges from the qur’anic passages is much 
more nuanced than if it were merely conveyed through language alone. 
[6] As for those who disbelieve, it makes no difference whether you warn them or 
not: they will not believe, that is (ya‛nī) they will not accept. [7] God has sealed 
their hearts, that is (ya‛nī) God has shut off their hearts that they could not 
contemplate on guidance, and their hearing, that is (ya‛nī) their ears so that they 
could not hear guidance, and their eyes are covered, that is (ya‛nī) veiled so that 
                                                        
who was married to three hundred free women and possessed seven hundred slave women (1/379-80). Thus 
said, Muqātil seems to merely describe what he believes to have happened and what he receives from older 
generation about past communities and their prophets. It may further be argued that Muqātil’s use of the 
isrā’iliyyāt is meant to defend the Prophet of Islam and attack non-Muslims using their own arsenal.  
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they could not see guidance. They will have great torment, that is (ya‛nī) 
abundant and endless. These two verses were sent in relation to the Arab 
polytheists (nazalat hātānī al-āyātānī fī mushrikī al-‛Arab), such as Shaybah and 
‛Utbah sons of Rabī‛ah, al-Walīd ibn al-Mughīrah, Abū Jahl ibn Hishām—whose 
name was ‛Amr--, ‛Abd Allāh ibn Abī Umayyah, Umayyah ibn Khalaf, ‛Amr ibn 
Wahb, al-‛Āṣ ibn Wā’il, al-Ḥārith ibn ‛Amr, al-Naḍr ibn al-Ḥārith, ‛Adī ibn 
Muṭ‛im ibn ‛Adī, ‛Āmir ibn Khālid, Abū al-Bukhturī ibn Hishām; then God 
returned to [addressing] the hypocrites, saying:  [8] Some people say, ‘We 
believe in God and the Last Day,’ that is (ya‛nī) we accepted that God is One 
having no associate and we also accepted that there would be the Resurrection 
Day in which deed are rewarded; but God rejected [the truthfulness of their 
statements] saying: when really they do not believe, that is (ya’nī) [they did not] 
accept the unity of God (tawḥīd) nor the Resurrection Day in which deeds are 
rewarded [9] They seek to deceive God, when they show their belief in 
Muhammad, while hiding their rejection [of him], and [they seek to deceive] the 
believers, but they only deceive themselves, though they do not realize it. These 
verses were sent down to the Jewish hypocrytes among the People of Scripture 
(nazalat fī munāfiqī ahl al-kitāb al-yahūd), such as ‛Abd Allāh ibn Ubayy ibn 
Salūl, Judd ibn Qays, al-Ḥārith ibn ‛Amr, Mughīth ibn Qushayr, and ‛Amr ibn 
Zayd. [Instead] God will deceive them in the hereafter when He says in chapter 
al-Ḥadīd [Q57:13] ‘Go back and look for a light.’ God said this just to mock 
them, just like when they mocked the believers on earth by saying: ‘We believed’, 
while they were not believers. That is when God said: ‘The hypocrites try to 
deceive God, but it is He who causes them to be deceived’ [Q4: 142]. Likewise, 
[when God said to the hypocrites when they were] on the Bridge (ṣirāṭ): ‘Go back 
and look for a light’ [Q57:13]. [10] There is a disease in their hearts (fī 
qulūbihim maraḍ), that is (ya‛nī) doubt about God and Muhammad; its 
counterpart (naẓīruhā) is chapter Muhammad [47:29]: am ḥasiba alladhīna fi 
qulūbihim maraḍ, that is (ya‛nī) doubt; to which God has added more, that is 
(ya‛nī) doubt in their hearts, agonizing torment awaits them, that is (ya‛nī) 
excruciating [punishment] in the hereafter, for their persistent lying, due to their 
saying ‘We believed in Allāh and in the Day of Judgment’. That was when (wa 
dhālika anna) ‛Abd Allāh ibn Ubayy, the hypocrite, said to his companions: ‘Look 
at me and what I have done, and learn from it, and look how I got rid of those 
people from me and from you all.’ His companions replied: ‘O our Master and 
Teacher, were it not for you, we would not be able to mingle with them.’ ‛Abd 
Allāh ibn Ubayy told Abū Bakr by holding the latter’s hand: ‘Welcome, the 
Leader of Banū Tamīm ibn Murrah, the second of the two, and his 
[Muhammad]’s companion in the cave, the chosen among his people who 
dedicated his life and wealth.’ He [‛Abd Allāh ibn Ubayy] then took ‛Umar ibn 
al-Khaṭṭāb’s hand, saying: ‘Welcome, the Leader of Banū ‛Adī ibn Ka‛b, who is 
strong in terms of God’s affair, and who dedicated his life and wealth.’ Then he 
took ‛Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib’s hand, saying: ‘Welcome, the Leader of Banū Hāshim, 
second only to another [Muhammad who was also from Banū Hāshim] whom 
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God chose for prophethood, known for ghis sincerity and belief.’ ‛Umar ibn al-
Khaṭṭāb then said: ‘Woe unto you, Son of Ubayy. Fear of Allāh. Stop pretending 
and repent. Don’t corrupt. Verily a hypocrite is the worst of all God’s creation, 
the most malicious, and the most deceitful!’ ‛Abd Allāh ibn Ubayy ibn Salūl 
interrupted: ‘O ‛Umar, slow down, for God sake. I believed as you did, and 
proclaimed my belief as you did!’ They then parted a way. Abū Bakr, ‛Umar and 
‛Alī then went to the God’s Messenger and told him what ‛Abd Allāh ibn Ubay ibn 
Salūl has just said. [It was then when] God revealed: ‘Some people say, ‘We 
believe in God and the Last Day,’ when really they do not believe’ [Q2:8].236    
In the example above, Muqātil uses not only the narrative method, but also the 
paraphrastic and crossreferencing methods. Throughout the commentary, the paraphrastic 
method is likely the most prominent and one that guarantees that Muqātil’s inspection of 
the Qur’an is thorough. With it, Muqātil embarks on almost every inch of the qur’anic 
passages, commenting on them and providing further explanations. 
The crossreferencing method plays a major role in creating an aura of 
cohesieveness and coherence of the Qur’an by interconnecting verses with one another. 
This method takes a place between the paraphrastic method, which focuses on a smaller 
level of interpretation by investigating qur’anic verses and their fragmented parts, and the 
narrative method, which pays attention to the larger socio-historical context in 
understanding of the Qur’an. It moves across the whole Qur’an, connecting the already 
established meaning of some parts of the Qur’an with its other parts on which Muqātil is 
commenting. It also serves as the basis for Muqātil’s theory on the multiplicity of words’ 
meanings in the Qur’an depending on the context of their uses. 
However, the narrative method seems to create more of an impression and gives a 
stronger sense of presence to the readers. This perhaps owes to the fact that the narrative 
                                                        
236 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/88-90. 
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method contributes better to clarifying the understanding of the Qur’an for it involves not 
only intellectual aspect of the readers but also all their sensory aspects, thanks to the 
strong visualization that this method produces. The readers of Muqātil’s commentary 
could feel that they are present in the moments of revelation or other situations that the 
Qur’an tries to depict. The narrative method not only feeds their intellect by providing 
information they need, but also indulges their imagination, emotion, and even their 
vision. Just consider how much Muqātil’s readers could learn when he is employing this 
narrative method: names of the actors involved, the setting within which an event occurs, 
and the dialogue between the actors that very often than not arouse feelings and 
emotions.   
In his commentary, Muqātil follows the narrative flowing of the Qur’an, very 
closely and loyally, not only in procedure but also in proportion. Procedurally, Muqātil 
proceeds at the same rate as the Qur’an proceeds, supplying his interpretation of words 
and phrases, identifying individuals and groups intended by the Qur’an, providing 
contexts and places referred to in the Qur’an, or suggesting other events associated with 
the recent discussions at hand, and so forth. When the qur’anic verses discuss past 
generations, Muqātil follows suit, but by presenting more material to complete the picture 
of the story. If the qur’anic verses discuss the legal matters, Muqātil jumps in by 
clarifying the wider context of discussion to make the otherwise compact handling of the 
Qur’an more comprehensible. If the Qur’an discusses matters of ritual and worship, 
Muqātil joins in by providing more insight and information that would never be gained 
by reading the qur’anic passages alone. 
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Take for instance, Muqātil’s comment on Q2: 75, “So can you [Muhammad] hope 
that such people will believe you, when some of them used to hear the words of God and 
then deliberately twist them, even when they understood them?” Based on Muqātil’s 
commentary, the verse suggests that Muhammad’s hope that the Jews of Medina would 
someday accept his mission is in vain. The Jews, or some of them, to be more precise, 
had a bad history in relation to rebellion to their prophets, especially Mūsā.  
That is, seventy people whom Mūsā chose [to accompany him to receive 
the Torah] said to him: “Let us see God with our own eyes!” God punished 
them because of that request by taking their lives. Mūsā was left alone, 
crying. When God brought them to life again, they said: “We know now 
that you [Mūsā] did not see God [with your eyes], but you only heard His 
voice. [Therefore] let us hear His voice!” Mūsā replied: “This [hearing of 
God’s voice] is possible.”  Mūsā then talked to God: “O God, Your 
servants, the Children of Israel, want to hear Your Speech.” God replied: 
“Those who want to hear my speech should avoid their wives for three 
days, take bath in the third day, and wear new attires. Afterward they come 
to the mountain, and I will let them hear my speech.” These people did 
exactly that, and they went up to the mountain with Mūsā. Mūsā then told 
them: “If you see a cloud becoming dark, you’ll see a light and hear a 
voice, then prostrate yourselves in front of your God and pay heed to what 
He commands you, and do it!” “Fine,” they said. Mūsā ascended to the 
mountain, and the cloud blocked between him and his people who were 
now seeing a light and hearing a voice like a trumpet. They kneeled and 
listened to God saying: “Verily, I am your Lord. There is no God but I am, 
the Everlasting, the Self-Existent. I am who took you out from the land of 
Egypt with the hand of a slave and a strong arm. Don’t worship any god 
but me. Don’t ever associate anything with me, nor make any resemblance 
of me. You will never see me, but you will hear my speech.” When they 
heard the Speech, their souls were gone due to the shock of what they 
heard. When they were conscious, they told Mūsā: “We are incapable of 
hearing God’s Speech, be intermediate between us and Him. God talks to 
you, and you tell us.” Mūsā talked to God again: “O God, the Children of 
Israel could not hear Your Speech, please talk to me, and I will tell them.” 
God replied: “What a plan!” God then gave His command to Mūsā, and 
Mūsā tell the people. They said: “We pay heed and obey, Our Lord.” When 
God was finished giving His command and prohibition, the cloud rose up, 
the voice dwindled, and the people raised their heads, and went back to 
their community. Their community asked them: “What did God command 
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and prohibit you?” Some of them replied: “We were commanded so and 
so, and forbidden so and so.” Some others added to that [something which 
God did not tell them]: “If you are unable to avoid what is prohibited, then 
you do whatever you can.”237 
 
 As such, the aura of narrativity is strongly present in his entire exegetical 
endeavor. The narrative power of his commentary gives an impression that it is a 
storybook-like and a cohesive work, indeed. Reading Muqātil’s commentary, one would 
be transported to a state where he feels he is reading a storybook, or probably a 
combination of story and history book, with a nice flow of narration. Muqātil’s 
commentary’s narrativity owes partly to the effect of the presentation of the Qur’an, 
which is largely narrative. In fact, as scholars of the Qur’an would concur, about two 
thirds of the Qur’an is actually (a collection of) stories, especially of past generations, 
which Muqātil calls khabar al-awwalīn. It is important, however, to underline that the 
                                                        
237 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/116-117. Q2: 75 on which Muqātil is commenting is one of the twenty five verses in 
which the charge of scriptural tampering (taḥrīf) was leveled against the Jews. See Gordon Nickel, “Early 
Muslim Accusations of Taḥrīf: Muqātil ibn Sulaymān’s Commentary on Key Qur’anic Verses” in ed. 
David Thomas, The Bible in Arab Christianity (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2007), 207-223. In this instance, 
Muqātil seems to have adapted rather freely by weaving together Exodus 19 and 20, and also Deutoronomy 
5. These parts of the Bible that deal with God’s revelation at Mount Sinai where Moses received the Ten 
Commandments were modified as such by Muqātil in order to emphasize his point with regard to the 
presumptuous and rebellious act of the Jews against God, especially in relation to tawḥīd and taṣdīq. At 
least, Muqātil’s redaction of the Sinai event reflects his understanding of the people of Israel who often 
lacked trust in their prophets, twisted their teaching, and their return to commiting shirk, as in the case of 
Golden Calf following Mūsā’s reception of divine law at Sinai. Furthermore, parts of the Bible that recount 
the event at Sinai are of different if contradictory, versions that, according to Aaron Rothkoff, “[t]he 
attempts to reconcile these accounts internally and with each other are not convincing.” See “Decalogue” in 
Encyclopaedia Judaica, vol. 5, 522. This was perhaps one of the reasons why Muqātil offers his own 
redaction of the story that is relatively different from the biblical versions. In respect to the Ten 
Commandments, the historian Josephus, writing in the First century, summed it up nicely: “The first 
commandment teaches us that there is but one God, and that we ought to worship him only. The second 
commands us not to make the image of any living creature to worship it. The third, that we must not swear 
by God in a false matter. The fourth, that we must keep the seventh day, by resting from all sorts of work. 
The fifth, that we must honor our parents. The sixth that we must abstain from murder. The seventh that we 
must not commit adultery. The eighth, that we must not be guilty of theft. The ninth, that we must not bear 
false witness. The tenth, that we must not admit of the desire of any thing that is another's.” See Flavius 
Josephus, The Antiquities of the Jews, trans. William Whiston (2006), 86. 
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narrativity of the Qur’an, and for that matter Muqātil’s narrative method, is not simply 
mimicking or repeating the whole narratives that had been circulating in the vissicitues in 
which it emerged. Rather, the Qur’an frequently shaped, modified and even made new 
the existing narratives to serve its own goals. Thus, the Qur’an’s use of khabar al-
awwalīn is not an innocent recast of the past, but more an active act of discursivity.238 
Likewise, Muqātil’s use of these narratives of the past is often an attempt to serve his 
exegetical agenda, for while his narratives were often thought of as an isrā’iliyyāt, they 
have no counterparts in the biblical literature, as in the case of his commentary on Q2: 75 
above. Furthermore, some of Muqātil’use of the isrā’iliyyāt is, contrary to general 
assumption, to defend the teachings of Islam and its prophet, rather than noddingly 
agreeing with non-Muslims and thus embarrassing Islam. 
But why this emphasis on narrativity? What does Muqātil think of narrative and 
narrativity in relation to the Qur’an? Looking back at what Muqātil asserts in the 
beginning of his commentary, especially in relation to five aspects of the Qur’an, namely 
divine obligation, prohibition, promise, threat, and finally the narrative of past 
generations, may provide a tentative answer. Since the very beginning, Muqātil has 
already noticed the centrality of narrative in the Qur’an. Therefore, narrative constitutes 
one of five central elements with which his hermeneutical project would deal. In fact, the 
                                                        
238 See, for instance, Angelika Neuwirth’s “Foreword” to Hosn Abboud, Mary in the Qur’an: A Literary 
Reading (New York: Routledge, 2014), xiii-xviii. There are other instances where the Qur’an seems to 
recast biblical stories, but they are not found in the Bible or biblical literature, such as the story of the Feast 
(al-mā’idah). 
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predominance of narrative in the Qur’an is so unmistakable that Muqātil may have 
thought of it as a fundamental element in its function as guidance (hudan).   
The idea of guidance is closely related to the idea of wisdom. Although wisdom 
can be reached in different ways, one way that has been mostly standing out is through 
story telling. Narrative is, in a way, one of the best methods to teaching wisdom, 
therefore it was adopted in the Qur’an itself. Lessons are learned from stories, and so is 
God’s guidance. This may explain why the Qur’an is so narrative regardless of the 
varying contents that it attempts to communicate to human beings. This is perhaps how 
Muqātil has understood the Qur’an. 
Furthermore, presented as a series of stories, the interpretation of the Qur’an 
cannot be undertaken in a linear and straightforward, let alone literal, way. The 
interpretation of the Qur’an is always a mediated process, for behind every part of the 
Qur’an there are stories presupposed by its revelation. The “revelation” of this revelation 
requires one to understand what operates behind the scene that might have been forgotten 
or overlooked. The rich cultural and sociological background that accompanied the 
revelation of the Qur’an must be included in the process of understanding of the Qur’an, 
despite the fact that such anchoring can only approximate what had really happened. 239 
For grounding qur’anic passages to particular historical contexts or events such as this 
                                                        
239 Any attempts to evoke the moments of revelation in the order the Qur’an as we have it now are always 
approximation of those moments that are basically unreconstructable. Angelika Neuwirth maintains, “By 
focusing exclusively on the final, canonised form of the Qur'an, by ranking the achievement of its fixation 
as the crucial event in Qur'anic genesis, a momentous epistemic course has been set: the stages of the 
emergence of the Qur'an preceding the canonisation fade into a kind of pre-history; something no longer 
possible to reconstruct.” See her “Qur'an and History —a Disputed Relationship: Some Reflections on 
Qur'anic History and History in the Qur'an,” in Journal of Qur'anic Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2003), 1-18, 3.  
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helps the readers of the Qur’an relate their own situations to those being told in it. 
Bringing the context of revelation to the forefront, Muqātil’s commentary seems to bring 
back the intimacy that the Qur’an once had when it was first revealed and circulated 
orally among its first listerners, but slowly diminished once time progressed away from 
those moments of revelation and once the Qur’an was codified into a closed corpus. 
Muqātil’s Exegetical Thrust 
Reading Muqātil’s commentary closely, one is faced with terms repeated 
overwhelmingly often that Muqātil always puts in opposition to each other, namely the 
propagation of belief (īmān) against condemnation of disbelief (kufr). This propagation of 
belief (īmān) was manifested into two more specific terms, that is, tawhīd and taṣdīq, 
which are opposed to two specified terms of disbelief (kufr), namely shirk and takdhīb. 
Furthermore, Muqātil relates almost everything to this theme. 
The strong emphasis that Muqātil put on the significance of tawḥīd and taṣdīq as 
the defining traits of Islam, not only as the name of the religion that Muhammad 
propagated but also of the primordial religion which all prophets, before Muhammad, had 
also advocated, suggests that the two serve not only as the nonnegotiable fundamentals 
for the true religion, but also as a distinguishing tool from the false religion(s).  
Consequently, shirk and takdhīb constitute the two most serious violations of the true 
religion. Muqātil’s conception of what constitutes the thrust of the qur’anic message will 
eventually shape his views not only of other religious communities, such as Jews and 
Christians, but also of those called themselves Muslims but were lukewarm in their 
upholding of tawhīd and taṣdīq, as is the case with hypocrites.  
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In order to understand how Muqātil’s exegetical thrust plays out in his 
commentary, I will discuss a number of topics to which they are closely related. This is in 
part to show how consistent Muqātil has been in advancing his theological center of 
Islam, and how everything else is often closely associated with the question of tawḥīd 
and taṣdīq. There are four topic groups that I shall discuss, including Islam as the 
primordial religion, the Arab Disbelievers, the People of Scripture, and the hypocrites. 
 These four topics are closely related to one another. Hence, the following 
discussion of each of them may overlap in one place and another.  My argument in 
presenting these religious communities is this: īmān and kufr, each with its two 
fundamental elements--tawḥīd wa taṣdīq and shirk wa takdhīb, respectively—are traits 
the Qur’an always mentions when it deals with different confessional communities. It is 
the relative adherence to īmān and kufr that subsequently defines whether a community 
or its individual members are Muslim, Jewish, Christian, polytheist, or, to some extent, 
hypocrites.  
At the extreme ends of the spectrum are Muslim community and polytheist 
community, whose religio-communal identity is really defined and distinguished by their 
adherence and rejection of the principle of tawḥīd and taṣdīq. In between, stand the 
Jewish, Christian, and hypocrite communities. While qur’anic criticism of the polytheist 
community is clear-cut, the same cannot be said about its criticism of the Jewish, 
Christian and hypocrite communities. Since the Jews, Christians, and hypocrites are, in 
one way or another, believers, the ways by which the Qur’an addresses them are selective 
and situational. 
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Primordial Religion: Islām 
In his commentary on Q10: 19, Muqātil states that at the time of Ādam, human 
beings were one community (ummah wāḥidah) united under one religion (millah 
wāḥidah). They were all believers and knew nothing about idolatry.240 However, they 
have since split into different communities and differed in terms of their religious views 
and practices. Some people began to worship idols (al-aṣnām wa al-awthān). God then 
sent prophets to different human communities to invite them back to worshipping God 
and to leave idolatry (Q10: 47). Those who responded positively to this prophetic call 
would be rewarded with paradise, and others who rejected would be led to hellfire.241 
Indeed, people had different responses, positive and negative, to this prophetic call. Q16: 
36 mentions that only people who received divine grace would worship God and uphold 
the principle of tawḥīd, while others would follow different religions.242 This, according 
to Muqātil, is simply the implementation of Q16: 93, which states that God gains control 
over whom He would provide guidance and whom He would lead astray.243  
The religion that had originally united human beings, but was then abandoned by 
some, was Islam (millat al-islām, dīn al-islām).244 After God sent punishment through the 
flood, supposedly in Noah’s time, human beings were, once again, united under this 
religion, Islam.245 Since then, Islam has been the religion, as Muqātil states in his 
                                                        
240 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2/232. 
241 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2/240. 
242 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2/468, 2/301-302. 
243 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2/485. 
244 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/764. 
245 See Gerald Hawting’s “The Religion of Abraham and Islam,” in Martin Goodman, et al., eds., Abraham, 
the Nations, and the Hagarites: Jewish, Christian, and Islamic Perspectives on Kinship with Abraham 
(Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2010), 477-501. 
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commentary on Q21: 92 and Q23: 52, embraced by early prophets and believers saved 
from that punishment.246 But it appears that human beings could not, once again, resist 
differences, especially in relation to their religious views and practices. Once more, God 
sent prophets to different communities, to call human beings back to Islam and worship 
of only one God. Prophets Ibrāhīm, Ismā‛īl, Ishāq, Ya‛qūb, and Lūṭ, they all came as both 
mubashshirūn (carrier of good news of paradise for those obedient) and mundhirūn 
(carrier of bad news of hellfire for the disobedient). These prophets adjudicated people’s 
differences in terms of religion (Q2:213), inviting them to worship only one God 
(tawḥīd).247 But the cycle of differences and disobedience came again and again, to the 
extent that God states in many places in the Qur’ān, that had He willed He would have 
made human beings one community united under one religion. It appears, however, that 
God, after some attempts to unite human beings under one religion by sending them 
prophets, finally allows such differences and even disobediences not only to provide 
human beings with choices and responsibility that comes with that freedom to choose, but 
also as a test to see how well human beings pay heed to divine commands.  
Despite this space for a tolerated, but condemned, disobedience, God’s decision to 
acknowledge Islam as the only true religion is unshakeable. The Qur’an invites people to 
this primordial religion, Islam.248 In his commentary on Q23: 52, Wa innā hādhihī 
ummatukum ummatan wahidatan wa ana rabbukum fa’budūnī, “This community of 
yours is one– and I am your Lord: be mindful of Me,” Muqātil glosses, yaqūlu hādhihī 
                                                        
246 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/92, 158. 
247 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/181-182. 
248 See Afsaruddin, First Muslims, xii.  
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millatukum allatī antum ‘alayhā ya‛nī millat al-islām millatan wahidatan ‘alayhā kanat 
al-anbiyā’—‘alayhim al-salām—wa al-mu’minūn alladhīna najaw min al-‘adhāb’, 
“[God] says this is your religion that you have held, that is, the religion of Islam, the 
same religion that the prophets—peace be upon them—and the believers who were saved 
from punishment, have held.”249 Muhammad’s mission with this religion is universal, at 
least according to Muqātil’s understanding of otherwise very limited Q26: 214, “Warn 
your nearest kinsfolk.” On his commentary on this verse, Muqātil says, “When this verse 
is sent down, the Prophet said, “I am sent to human beings in general, and especially to 
you, O Banū Hāshim and Banū al-Muttalib.”250   
Indeed, people had left this primordial religion and split into different groups: 
Jews, Christians, Ṣābi’īn,251 Majūs,252 and many more groups (ya‛nī firaqan fa ṣārū 
ahzāban yahūdan wa naṣārā wa ṣābi’īn wa majūsan wa aṣnāfan shattā kathīrah).253 
Instead of worshiping God alone (fa‛budūnī bi al-ikhlāṣ),254 these religious aḥzāb255 
worshiped creations, such as angels, the sun, the moon, fire, and other idols.256 Even 
worse, each of these groups was rejoiced with themselves, kullu ḥizbin bimā ladayhim 
fariḥūn,257 yaqūlu kullu ahlin bimā ‘indahum min al-dīn rādūna ‘anhu, “[God] says every 
                                                        
249 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/158. 
250 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/281, 764. 
251 Ṣābi’īn, according to Muqātil, is a group of people who worshiped angels, prayed toward qiblah, and 
read Zābūr. Tafsīr, 3/119. 
252 Majūs is a group of people worshipping the sun, the moon, and fire. Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/119. 
253 Tafsīr Muqātil Ibn Sulaymān, 3/159. This is Muqātil’s commentary on Q23: 53, “but they have split 
their community into sects, each rejoicing in their own.” 
254 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/159. 
255 The term aḥzāb reminds us of how the Qur’an pejoratively calls those involved in conspiracy against 
Muhammad, and it is used to name one of the Qur’anic chapters, al-Aḥzāb. 
256 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/119. 
257 Q23: 53. 
  
97 
people rejoiced with what they have in terms of religion.”258 
Muqātil has a very strong opinion about these religious aḥzāb. This is reflected in 
his commentary on Q22: 17.259 In it, Muqātil says that of the six religions that exist, 
namely Judaism, Sabian, Christian, Magian, polytheism, and Islam, only the last [Islam] 
is for God, while the other five are for Satan.260 The strength of Muqātil’s opinion of 
these religions other than Islam is primarily due to the fact that in his view, they are not 
more than deviation from the true path that all prophets have preached, and the one that 
Muhammad was now preaching to bring back these religious aḥzāb to its fold. 
The fundamental message of Islam is īmān (belief), whose two central elements 
are tawḥīd and taṣdīq. In general, īmān stands in opposition to kufr that also has two 
central elements, namely shirk and takdhīb. Thus, a belief in both tawḥīd and taṣdīq is a 
thread of prophetic mission that Muqātil strongly emphasizes, in opposition to shirk and 
takdhīb. In this respect, it is not surprising to find out that the word tawḥīd and its various 
derivatives, and its opposite, shirk, with its various derivatives, are arguably the most 
recurrent words used by Muqātil in his commentary, followed closely by the term taṣdīq 
and its derivatives, as well as kufr and takdhīb. In this regard, Muqātil interprets a number 
of other terms as suggesting tawḥīd: such as īmān and its derivative,261 ‘ibādah and its 
                                                        
258 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3 /159. 
259 Q22: 17: ‘As for the believers, those who follow the Jewish faith, the Sabians, the Christians, the 
Magians, and the idolaters, God will judge between them on the Day of Resurrection; God witnesses all 
things.’ 
260 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/119. 
261 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/92. 
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derivative,262 al-ḥaqq,263 ḥunafā’ and its derivative,264 al-ma‛rūf,265 ḥasanah,266 etc. 
Likewise, Muqātil understands several words as pointing to shirk, such as ẓulm and its 
derivative,267 al-munkar,268 al-zūr,269  al-ḍāl,270 al-sayyi’ah,271  al-isrāf,272 jarīmah,273 etc. 
Apart from the terms that he has constantly understood as connoting either tawḥīd or 
shirk, very often Muqātil relates almost anything to either, hence the highly frequent 
appearance of the terms tawḥīd and shirk throughout the commentary. 
If there is only a little mention of the Sabians and Magians in the Qur’an, most of 
qur’anic discourse is centered around the other four religions mentioned earlier: Judaism, 
Christianity, Paganism, and, certainly, Islam. Except Islam, the other three religious 
aḥzāb can be categorized into two: ahl al-kitāb (the People of Scripture), that is, the Jews 
and Christians, and mushrikū Makkah or al-‛Arab (Meccan or Arab polytheists). The 
qur’anic criticism of these two groups of people are always related to their worshiping 
idols other than, and together with, God, as well as their rejection of Muhammad’s 
prophethood. This, for instance, is illustrated in Q17: 111.274 In his commentary on the 
verse, Muqātil sets out a context of revelation in which the Jews said, “Uzayr is son of 
                                                        
262 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/97. 
263 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/161. 
264 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/126. 
265 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/130. 
266 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/358. 
267 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/155. 
268 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/130. 
269 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/123, 242. 
270 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/270. 
271 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/318, 372. 
272 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/415, 576. 
273 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/ 418. 
274 “And say, ‘Praise belongs to God, who has no child nor partner in His rule. He is not so weak as to need 
a protector. Proclaim His limitless greatness!” 
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God”; the Christians said, “The Messiah is son of God”;275 and the Arabs said that God 
has associates, namely the angels.276 Likewise, Muqātil provided a commentary on Q25: 
2-5, in relation to the supposedly polytheistic activities of the Jews, Christians, and 
Arabs, and also their rejection of Muhammad and the Qur’an that he received. In his 
commentary on Q25: 4-6,277 Muqātil set out a context of revelation in which al-Naḍr ibn 
al-Ḥārith from Banū ‘Abd al-Dār said that the Qur’an was nothing but a lie forged by 
Muhammad (mā hādhā al-Qur’an illā kadhib ikhtalaqahū Muḥammad—ṣalla Allāhu 
‘alayhi wa sallam—min tilqā’i nafsihi). In doing so, al-Naḍr argued, Muhammad was 
aided by three people of ahl al-kitāb who then converted to Islam, namely ‘Addās the 
client of Huwayṭib ibn ‘Abd al-‘Uzzā, Yasar ghulām of al-‘Āmir ibn al-Ḥaḍramī, and 
                                                        
275 “In the Synoptic Gospels (Mark, Matthew, Luke) Jesus never speaks of himself as Son of God, and 
rarely, if ever, as Son. Cullmann speaks of Jesus' 'reserve' in using this title, and points out that his primary 
designation for himself was not 'Son of God' but ' Son of Man'. 'Son of God' was said about Jesus by others, 
demoniacs, disciples, the high priest and the crowds at the cross. But Jesus himself clearly wished to avoid 
the misunderstandings that might be attached to this title, ideas that expressed wrong notions of the 
Messiah.” “The Gospel according to John uses the title Son of God most frequently, but also the 'only 
begotten Son', and especially 'the Son'. Paul also writes often of' the Son of God', 'the Son', and 'his Son'. 
This usage by these two great theologians, John and Paul, shows Christianity moving out into the Greek 
world. On the other hand it is remarkable that 'Son' and 'Son of God' are not used at all in the Pastoral 
Epistles (Timothy and Titus) or in Peter and Jude, once in Revelation, and only twice in Acts.” See 
Geoffrey Parrinder, Jesus in the Qur’an (Oxford: Oneworld, 2003), 128-130. 
276 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2/556. Parrinder argued that “The Qur'an also, here and in other verses, denounces the 
current pagan ideas of Mecca and Arabia of families of gods. Pagan deities were male and female and had 
children. We saw in the last chapter that it is probably here that lies the Muslim reluctance to use the term 
'Son of God', because it might seem to imply physical procreation by God. This is in the Arabian context. 
But among the Jews, who were monotheists of long standing and had rooted out all fertility notions from 
their highly purified religion, the New Testament did not hesitate to speak of the Son of God, meaning the 
Messiah. Similarly, the Christian doctrine of the Trinity rigidly excludes all suggestions of physical 
generation, and any idea of polytheism or tritheism. God is one God, as Paul said, 'A false god has no 
existence in the real world. There is no God but one. ' (I Cor. 8,4)…It is in the light of the above that other 
Quranic references to 'three' gods may be understood.” See Jesus, 136. 
277  “(4) The disbelievers say, ‘This can only be a lie he has forged with the help of others’––they 
themselves have done great wrong and told lies––(5) and they say, ‘It is just ancient fables, which he has 
had written down: they are dictated to him morning and evening.’ (6) Say, ‘It was sent down by Him who 
knows the secrets of the heavens and earth. He is all forgiving, all merciful.” 
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Jabr278 the client of ‘Āmir ibn al-Ḥaḍramī.279 
Based on the Muqātil’s explanation above, it becomes clearer now that the 
fundamental message of Islam in the Qur’an, and one that has become a center of 
polemics is īmān.280 The target of qur’anic criticism, in this respect, are specifically three 
religious aḥzāb (Jewish, Christian, and Arab Pagan), for their performance of kufr, 
specifically in relation to their violation of both tawḥīd and taṣdīq and in their committing 
shirk and takdhīb.  
Islām, dīn, and millah in the Qur’ān and Muqātil’s commentary 
In order to better understand how Islam is depicted in the Qur’ān and Muqātil’s 
commentary, I would like to briefly discus how the term islām and other related terms, 
such as dīn and millah are used in both sources, and how these three terms related to each 
other. 
The word islām appears five times in four different qur’anic chapters of the 
Medinan period.281 Of these five, four are rendered as al-islām, and one as islāmakum. 
The word islām is one of the most used terms in Muqātil’s commentary.282 Verbal 
derivatives of s-l-m, such as aslama, aslamū, aslamnā, yuslimu, yuslimūn, tuslimū, occur 
                                                        
278 According to Muqātil, Jabr mawlā of ‘Amir ibn al-Ḥaḍrami was threatened by the Meccan leaders, 
including ‘Uqbah ibn Abī Mu‛ayṭ, to stop teaching Muhammad, otherwise they would purchase him from 
his master and butcher him. Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/819.  
279 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/226. 
280 Jonathan P. Berkey notes that “[o]ne of the characteristic features of the religious literature of late 
antiquity is its highly polemical nature. Polemics helped the traditions to define themselves, but also 
betrayed the underlying uncertainties and competition which fueled them in the first place.” See his The 
Formation of Islam: Religion and Society in the Near East, 600–1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), 19. 
281 They are: Q3:19 and 85, Q49:17, Q61:7, and Q5:3, based on the chronological order of revelation. 
282 It appears in Muqātil’s commentary for about 301 times, encompassing a number of other terms, which 
Muqātil interpret as islām. 
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in twelve chapters, in both Meccan and Medinan period.  Nominal derivatives of s-l-m, 
such as muslim, muslimah, muslimūn, muslimīn, silm, appear in twenty four chapters, in 
both Meccan and Medinan period.283  
Most of nominal derivatives of s-l-m are in the form of muslimū/īn, which Muqātil 
glosses as mukhliṣūn,284 muhkhliṣūn li Allāh,285 mukhliṣūn bi al-tawḥīd,286 mukhliṣūn li 
Allāh ‛Azza wa Jalla bi al-tawḥīd,287 muwaḥḥidūn,288 muqirrūn bi al-tawḥīd,289 
mukhliṣūn fi al-dunyā bi al-tawḥīd,290 muhkliṣūn bi tawḥīd Allāh ‛Azza wa Jalla.291 Thus, 
as far as the nominal derivatives of s-l-m used in the Qur’an are concerned, they always 
point to a complete and sincere devotion to God (the meaning of the root kh-l-ṣ) by 
acknowledging and upholding tawḥīd. 
Verbal derivatives of s-l-m in the Qur’an are aslama, yuslimu, uslimu, tuslimūn, 
aslim, and aslamnā. Similar to the nominal derivatives of s-l-m, these derivatives are 
interpreted by Muqātil to be a complete and sincere devotion to God (ikhlāṣ), glossing 
aslama as akhlaṣa li Allāh,292 akhlaṣa,293 akhlaṣa li rabb al-‛ālamīn.294 Likewise, 
                                                        
283 Chapters of the Meccan period (17 chapters) are Q68:35, Q7:126, Q72:14, Q27:31, 38, 42, 91; Q28:53, 
Q10:72, 84, 90; Q11:14; Q15:2, Q6:163, Q39:12, Q41:33, Q43:69, Q46:15, Q51:36, Q21:108, Q30:53, 
Q29:46; and chapters of the Medinan period (7 chapters) are Q2:71, 128, 132, 133, 136, 208; Q3:52, 64, 
80, 84, 102; Q33:35, Q94:92, Q22:78, Q66:5, and Q5:111. 
284Muqātil, Tafsīr, 4/461-464, 131; 3/743, 97. 
285 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2/55. 
286 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/306, 308, 319, 385, 420, 802; 2/275; 4/20. 
287 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/349. 
288 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2/244. 
289 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2/246. 
290 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2/424. 
291 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/672. 
292 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/131; 4/464. 
293 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/552, 267. 
294 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/140. 
  
102 
Muqātil glosses yuslimu as yukhliṣu.295 Similarly, Muqātil interprets uslimu as ukhliṣu al-
tawḥīd li rabb al-‛ālamīn.296 Muqātil understands the word tuslimūna as tukhlisūna ilayhi 
bi al-tawḥīd.297 Similarly, Muqātil interprets aslim as akhliṣ.298 But when it comes to 
aslamnā (“We surrender”), unlike previous verbal derivatives of s-l-m that possess a 
positive meaning as a complete devotion to God by upholding tawḥīḍ, Muqātil ascribes to 
it a negative meaning, that is, aqrarnā bi al-lisān, which suggests that the proclamation 
of islām in this respect is merely a “lip service.” This negative meaning is given to the 
profession of islām by the A‛rāb (Bedouins)—of Juhaynah, Mazīnah, Aslam, Ghifār, and 
Ashja‛ who lived in between Mecca and Medina—who pretended to be believers when 
the Muslim army passed by their places in order to secure their lives and property.299 In 
the verse where the phrase aslamnā takes place, the bedouins’ profession of islām is 
opposed to īmān, the second being the true expression of belief, not merely a lip service, 
as the former would indicate. It seems here that the Qur’an, and Muqātil as well, 
insinuates that the understanding of the term islām by these Bedouins is a merely socio-
political submission or surrender to Muhammad, not a religious surrender as it demands: 
a complete and sincere devotion to God by upholding His tawḥīd. 
A similar phenomenon occurs in Q49: 17, in which the word islāmakum, which 
Muqātil relates to a group of Bedouin (A‛rāb) of Banū Asad ibn Khuzaymah, is 
interpreted as more or less a nominal submission for political, rather than religious, 
                                                        
295 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/437. 
296 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/719. 
297 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2/481. 
298 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/140. 
299 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 4/98. 
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reasons.  Muqātil explains that these Bedouins came to the Prophet and professed their 
islām peacefully, and they thought by doing so they had done favor to the Prophet. 
Unlike many Arab tribes that professed their submission only after they were defeated in 
war, the Bedouins of Banū Asad ibn Khuzaymah claimed that their peaceful submission 
to the Prophet had made things easier for him. In response, the Prophet told them, ‘Do 
not consider your submission a favor to me; it is God who has done you a favor, by 
guiding you to faith, if you are truly sincere.’300 Therefore, the phrase aslamū in the verse 
is understood with a grain of salt as a submission unaccompanied by a sense of ikhlāṣ 
(complete and sincere devotion to God), as seen in the majority of Muqātil’s commentary 
on the root s-l-m. Moreover, while the Prophet seems to accept such lukewarm profession 
of islām by the bedouins, Muqātil appears to be so cynical about it. 
Thus, with the exception of the case of the Bedouins of the Banū Asad ibn 
Khuzaymah, the meaning of the verbal derivatives of s-l-m here is congruent with the 
majority of how the terms have been understood and interpreted by Muqātil, a complete 
and sincere devotion to God. Likewise, the meanings of both nominal and verbal 
derivatives of s-l-m point to a sincere devotion to God (ikhlāṣ) by acknowledging and 
upholding tawḥīd. A surprising development of the meaning of the root s-l-m occurred in 
Medinan context, in which a political nuance appeared, one that was completely absent 
during the Meccan period. If during the Meccan period, the root s-l-m meant a sincere 
devotion to God by upholding tawḥīd, the core meaning that the Qur’an intends as far as 
Islam is concerned, in the Medinan period, the meaning of the term was no longer 
                                                        
300 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 4/99-100. 
  
104 
confined to the spiritual realm as sincere submission and devotion to God, but suggests 
also a sense of nominal submission, a political submission. In that sense, such submission 
is merely a lip service. 
There are two other terms Muqātil often relates to islām, namely dīn and millah. 
The word dīn, appears in seven chapters, two of which are of the Meccan period, and the 
rest of which are of the Medinan period.301 Muqātil interprets dīn that takes place in two 
Meccan verses as alladhī antum ‛alayhi or alladhī anā ‛alayhi,302 and ḥukm.303 As seen, 
there is no elaborate understanding of the term. Instead, the definition remains very 
general, pointing to general system or law that a community follows. During the Medinan 
period, Muqātil understands dīn al-qayyimah as al-millat al-mustaqīmah,304 fī dīn Allāh 
as fī amr Allāh,305 dīn al-haqq as al-islām.306 Thus, it is during the Medinan period that 
the term dīn received a more religious meaning according the qur’anic perspective and 
finally pointed to Islam. 
Meanwhile, the word millah occurs eight times in seven chapters, in both the 
Meccan period307 and the Medinan period.308 When the term millah stands alone, Muqātil 
interprets it as a generic term that points to either “wrong religion” or “correct religion. 
The “wrong religions” refers to the sorcerers and magicians of Egypt who neither upheld 
tawḥīd nor believed in the Resurrection Day; while the “correct religion” is the religion 
                                                        
301 They are Q109: 6, Q12: 76 (Meccan), and Q3: 3, Q98: 5, Q24: 2, Q9: 29, Q110: 2 (Medinan). 
302 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 4/888. 
303 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2/346. 
304 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 4/780. 
305 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/182. 
306 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2/167. 
307 Namely Q12: 37, 38; Q6: 161, Q16: 123. 
308 Namely Q2: 130, 135; Q3: 95, Q4: 125, Q22: 78. 
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of prophets such as Ibrāhīm, Isḥāq and Ya‛qūb in which shirk is forbidden. Muqātil calls 
such a correct religion Islam. 309 When rendered as millat Ibrāhīm, that takes place in 
both Meccan and, mostly, Medinan chapters, Muqātil interprets it as Islam as well. 
Muqātil glosses millat Ibrāhīm in Q2: 130 as al-Islām.310 Likewise, Muqātil interprets 
millat Ibrāhīm in Q2: 135 as al-Islām.311 In Q3: 95, Muqātil does not provide any 
comment on millat Ibrāhīm here.312 In Q4: 125, although Muqātil does not specifically 
address the term millah, it can be understood that the term points to Islam as a religion 
that God had chosen from among several religions.313 In the Qur’an, things that 
characterized Islam, such as being ḥanīfan, mukhliṣan, also characterize millat Ibrāhīm. 
In Q22: 78, the term millat is again attached to Ibrāhīm, and it points to Islam.314 During 
the Meccan period, the term millat is always attached to Ibrāhīm, and it always points to 
Islam, the chosen religion, due to its upholding of tawḥīd and opposition to shirk. Thus, 
based on previous explanation, it can now be said that the terms islām and its derivatives, 
as well as dīn and millah converge in the idea of ikhlāṣ bi al-tawḥīd, a sincere devotion to 
God by upholding His oneness (tawḥīd), in opposition to shirk.   
In what follows I will discuss in more detail the intensity of qur’anic criticism, as 
Muqātil has understood it, toward each of three religious groups: the Arab polytheists, 
Jews, and Christians. In addition, there is yet another socio-religious community that 
receives some important notices in the Qur’an and is therefore worth a separate 
                                                        
309 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2/334. 
310 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/140. 
311 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/141. 
312 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/291. 
313 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/410. 
314 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/140. 
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discussion, namely the munāfiqūn (hypocrites)—those who converted to Islam but not 
wholeheartedly. Their double-faced attitude toward Muhammad and Islam had caused 
troubles for Muslims that the Qur’an did not leave them free from its harsh criticism, 
similar to the other three religious communities. 
The Meccan Polytheists (mushrikūn) 
The term mushrikūn appears in thirty-four verses,315 in one of which it is 
accompanied by the single female form mushrikah, single male form mushrik, and plural 
female form mushrikāt. In Muqātil’s exegetical framework, the majority of the term 
mushrikūn points to the Arab idolaters in general and polytheists of Mecca in particular. 
But there are places where Muqātil relates the term mushrikūn to Jews and Christians 
who contested the status of Ibrāhīm.316 The term mushrikūn that Muqātil understands as 
                                                        
315 16 verses of the Meccan period, namely: Q28:87, Q10:105; Q12:106, 108; Q15:94; Q6:14, 23, 79, 106, 
121, 137, 161; Q16:100, 120, 123; Q30:31, 18 verses of the Medinan period, namely: Q2:105, 135, 221; 
Q3:67, 95; Q22:31; Q61:9, Q9:1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 17, 28, 33, 36, 113. 
316 In his book, The Idea of Idolatry, Hawting questioned the Muslim tradition that asserts that Islam “arose 
in arguments with real polytheists and idolaters.” Instead, Hawting suggested “that it was concerned rather 
with other monotheists whose monotheism it saw as inadequate and attacked polemically as the equivalent 
of idolatry” (xi). As such, the Qur’anic charge of polytheism is polemical. “It does not mean what it says. It 
is nonliteral. But the Muslim scholars misread the Qur’anic polemic by understanding it in a literal sense” 
(p. 150). Or, “If not because of misleading, the early Muslims creatively worked out to explain the milieu 
of revelation in order to create their own salvation history by creating this myth of idolatry” (pp. 150-51). 
As Hawting often emphasized, his criticism of the origins of Islam was targeted not to the Qur’an, but the 
Muslim traditional literature—such as “the commentaries on the Koran, the traditional lives of the Prophet, 
the collections of material describing conditions in the jāhiliyya and providing information about the 
idolatrous pre-Islamic Arab religion, and other such works” which “constantly made clear that the koranic 
mushrikūn were Arab polytheists and worshippers of idols in the Hijāz at the time of Muhammad” ( 45). 
However, Hawting also acknowledged that “it is not impossible that such an emphasis could result from an 
initial struggle with a real idolatry” (xiii), “but it does seem remarkable and is a reason for suggesting that 
the traditional account might be questioned” (7). As a result of his study, Hawting suggested that if the 
traditional narrative of Islam’s origins “found not to be persuasive, then we might conclude either that the 
jāhilī Arabs were in fact monotheists whom the Koran was attacking polemically, or – and this is the 
alternative favoured here – that we need to rethink more drastically our ideas about when and where Islam 
emerged” (67). My general response to Hawting is that while he was correct to situate Islam’s emergence 
in its polemic with other monotheists, he could be wrong in discounting altogether the possibility of the 
presence of polytheism in Hijāz at the time and in his sweeping conclusion of the traditional Muslim 
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literature. Berkey argues that “…the story of the struggle and decline of paganism is incomplete… the 
actual death of paganism was a protracted affair– and again, one which was by no means complete at the 
rise of Islam. Signs of the survival of pagan traditions abound throughout the Near East.” See Formation, 
34. Furthermore, in relation to the Qur’an’s depiction of Islam’s origins, which Hawting himself 
acknowledged, “[t]he tendency to associate shirk with idolatry and polytheism is evident in the Koran itself 
(68). Therefore, I argue, first, the charge of polytheism in the Qur’an targets both polytheists and the People 
of the Book. The Qur’an implies that some of its audience practiced some sort of henotheistic religion 
which syncretically worshiped a supreme God—they called Allāh—and lesser gods, such as al-Lāt, Manāt, 
‛Uzzā, and so forth. In their book, One God: Pagan Monotheism in the Roman Empire (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), Stephen Mitchell and Peter Van Nuffelen argued, “[t]he affirmation of 
the powers of one god in the superlative, not the exclusive sense, was not a statement of strict monotheism, 
but acknowledged, while it also devalued, those of other divinities… The readiness to fuse these divine 
figures by a process of syncretism did not generally lead to monotheism. There was much religious 
competition, but the promoters of successful cults had no interest in annihilating or denying the existence of 
other gods; it served their interests much better to prove the superiority of their own” (10-11). Mitchell and 
Van Nuffelen maintained that the monotheism historically calls for “a fundamental moral revolution within 
religious thought” (10). “These include the replacement of an indefinite mass of written and unwritten 
traditions by a fixed body of religious texts; the prevalence of exclusive belief in one God rather than the 
inclusive acceptance of the existence of many gods; the capacity of monotheism to be used as an instrument 
for social and political control at a supra-national level; and the emergence of religious identities as a key 
element in social organization” (4). Such a “revolution” or massive transformation in the Arab society of 
seventh century Hijāz arguably happened only after Muhammad came with his prophetic mission. In this 
respect, the question I am asking (to Hawting) is the same as was asked by Mitchell and Van Nuffelen, “Is 
the term monotheism, or any of the other modern coinages that have been used to denote belief in one god, 
or at least belief in a supreme god, adequate to describe not only the narrow phenomenon, but also the sum 
of the changes that it brought about?” (4-5). To see further the revolution that Muhammad’s preaching of 
Islamic monotheism brought about, not only in terms of theological matters—such as faith and rituals, but 
also communal identity-making, political and military achievements, see, for instance, Richard A. Gabriel, 
Muhammad: Islam’s First Great General (Norman: Oklahoma University Press, 2007), and Fred M. 
Donner, Muhammad and the Believers. Second, although the majority of traditional Muslim literature does 
not account for the origins of Islam as the result of influence of older monotheist religions, i.e. Judaism and 
Christianity, that is expected due to the fact that its Muslim authors believed in that Islam was the product 
of divine revelation, yet the same tradition also describes the presence of other Jewish and Christian 
monotheists in Hijāz and its vicinity, which opens the possibility of interaction and therefore influence, 
albeit it is reluctantly admitted. While modern scholarship has not found any archaeological evidence, the 
settlements of the Jews in Medina and its vicinity were mentioned in the traditional Muslim literature; the 
Jewish population is Yemen was also mentioned; and so was the presence of Christians in both Mecca and 
Medina. Using traditional Muslim literature, Ghada Osman, for instance, wrote “Pre-Islamic Arab Converts 
to Christianity in Mecca and Medina: An Investigation into the Arabic Sources” in The Muslim World (Vol. 
95, January 2005), which describes how the people of Hijāz interacted with the Christians from adjacent 
cities in the Near East, and finally converted to Christianity. Hawting might be true to emphasize that 
Hijāz, at the time of Muhammad, was not as isolated as the traditional Muslim tradition would have it. But 
Hawting’s large reference to a book such as Hishām ibn al-Kalbī’s (d. 206/821) Kitāb al-Aṣnām, which 
describes intensively the prevalence of idolatry in Hijāz, has probably led him to his conclusion that the 
Muslim tradition asserts the emergence of Islam in the polytheistic and idolatrous environment, a portrayal 
he readily dismissed. As Hawting himself acknowledged, “Ibn al-Kalbī’s book on the idols of the Arabs 
has been of central importance for discussions of pre-Islamic Arab religion. It was extensively cited in the 
Mu‛jam al-buldān of Yāqūt (d. 626/1229) and, lacking access to any manuscript of Ibn al-Kalbī’s work, 
Wellhausen used those citations as a main source in his Reste arabischen Heidentums (first edition 1887). 
Wellhausen’s Reste, although it was not the first western investigation of pre-Islamic Arab religion, is 
undoubtedly the most important and influential and is still widely regarded as authoritative in that field… 
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pointing to the Jews and Christians takes place in three verses of the Meccan period, 
namely Q6: 161;317 Q16: 120318 and 123,319 and three verses of the Medinan period, 
namely Q2: 135320 and Q3: 67321 and 95.322 Thus, the use of the term mushrikūn in the 
Qur’an, as long as Muqātil’s commentary is concerned, points to two major meanings: 
the pure polytheists or idolaters, and the Jews and Christians. As such, the Qur’an sees all 
Muhammad’s opponents as idolaters or polytheists in one way or another, and it 
establishes Islam as the only rigorous upholder of monotheism. 
Muqātil interprets the term mushrikūn as both Jews and Christians in verses where 
both religious communities are making an exclusive truth claim for their own religion 
and each justified itself by referring to Ibrāhīm as the prototype of their own.323 But the 
Qur’an rejects categorically their claims, and it argues instead that Ibrāhīm whose 
                                                        
Since the Kitāb al-Aṣnām is so central to the subject, much of the discussion here about the nature of 
Muslim tradition in general will refer to it: conclusions about Ibn al-Kalbī’s work will affect our attitude to 
the tradition as a whole” (89). But Much of Hawting’s general view of traditional Muslim literature was not 
necessarily true, if Muqātil’s commentary is considered, especially how Muqātil understands the use of the 
term mushrikūn in the Qur’an. 
317 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/600. 
318 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2/492. 
319 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2/493. 
320 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/141. 
321 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/283. 
322 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/291. 
323 These are how the Qur’an presents such polemics between the Jews and Christians, and how it builds 
the real position of Ibrāhim: 
Q2: 135, “They say, ‘Become Jews or Christians, and you will be rightly guided.’ Say [Prophet], ‘No, [ours 
is] the religion of Abraham, the upright, who did not worship any god besides God.’” 
Q3: 67, “Abraham was neither a Jew nor a Christian. He was upright and devoted to God, never an 
idolater.” 
Q3: 95, “[Prophet], say, ‘God speaks the truth, so follow Abraham’s religion: he had true faith and he was 
never an idolater.’” 
Q6: 161 Say, ‘My Lord has guided me to a straight path, an upright religion, the faith of Abraham, a man of 
pure faith. He was not a polytheist.’ 
Q16: 120, “Abraham was truly an example: devoutly obedient to God and true in faith. He was not an 
idolater.” 
Q16: 123, “Then We revealed to you [Muhammad], ‘Follow the creed of Abraham, a man of pure faith 
who was not an idolater.’” 
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religion it considers the true religion was neither a Jew nor a Christian.324 Ibrāhim’s 
religion is Islām, the same religion that the Qur’an and Muhammad are now propagating.  
Meanwhile, the term mushrikūn used in the remaining twenty-eight verses and 
which Muqātil understands as pointing to general idolaters or polytheists usually refers to 
Arab or Meccan polytheists, with probably one exception. That is, when Muqātil 
understands the term mushrikūn in Q30: 31325 as pointing to ahl al-adyān (the people of 
religions) who split their primordial religion (Islām) into sects (shiya‛an), that is, 
religious groups (aḥzāban fi al-dīn), namely Jews, Christians, Magians, and others. 
In relation to the mushrikūn and the reasons—religious and political—as to why 
they rejected Muhammad’s prophetic mission, Muqātil offers the following. First, 
Muqātil shows that, contrary to widely accepted view, Hijāz at the time of Muhammad 
was not as isolated in terms of interaction between monotheists—here Jews and 
Christians—and polytheists. Second, rejection of Muhammad’s mission was primarily 
because Muhammad’s strict preaching of tawḥīd was unsuited to the environment of the 
Hijāz, which was polytheistic and tolerant of multiple divinities.326 Third, the rejection of 
                                                        
324 Much of the early Christian polemics against Jews indicate the contestation between these two 
communities concerning who were the true heirs of Abrahamic tradition. By the latter part of the first 
century C.E., as James Raymond Lord points out, “The Abrahamic tradition then became something of a 
focus of Jewish-Christian polemic.” James Raymond Lord, Abraham: A Study in Ancient Jewish and 
Christian Interpretation, (PhD Diss., Duke University, 1968), 288. Jeffrey S. Siker in his detailed study of 
the uses of Abraham in early Christian controversies suggests that “the use of Abraham in early Christian 
controversy with Judaism moved away from appealing to Abraham as the father of Jew and Gentile alike 
and moved increasingly toward the portrayal of a Christian Abraham who has abandoned and disinherited 
his children, the Jews.” Jeffrey S. Siker, Disinheriting the Jews: Abraham in Early Christian Controversy 
(Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1991), 27. 
325 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/414. 
326 Gibb notes that “[t]he resistance of the Meccans appears to have been due not so much to their 
conservatism or even to religious disbelief (though they ridiculed Mohammed's doctrine of resurrection) as 
to political and economic causes. They were afraid of the effects that his preaching might have on their 
economic prosperity, and especially that his pure monotheism might injure the economic assets of their 
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Muhammad’s mission was due partly to the eschatological teaching that Muhammad 
brought, which stood in contrast to the pragmatic approach of the polytheistic culture that 
saw life as being here and now, and which was also flexible in adopting divinities that 
best supported their pragmatic vision of life. Fourth, the rejection was due to the impact 
of hierarchically social classes on people’s socio-political and religious perspectives; on 
the one hand, the Meccan aristocracy saw that Muhammad would not be a chosen 
prophet favorable to their interests, and on the other, some of the poor and weak feared 
the consequences of believing in Muhammad that the aristocracy would impose on them. 
Fifth was probably the influence of monotheistic tradition; Muhammad’s inability to 
fulfill the Meccans’ request for miracles held them back from believing in him.  
When Muhammad first proclaimed his prophethood and began to preach Islam to 
the Meccan audience, people were curious of his motivation. In his commentary on Q40: 
66,327 Muqātil sets out a context of revelation in which the Meccan disbelievers of 
Quraish asked Muhammad, “What brings you to what you have brought to us? Don’t you 
look at the religion of your father ‘Abd Allāh, and of your grandfather ‘Abd al-Muṭṭalib, 
and at the leaders of your people who worshiped al-Lāt, al-‘Uzzā, and Manāt,328 that you 
bring what you bring? Nothing will make you do that except that you want something. 
                                                        
sanctuaries.” See his Mohammedanism, 26, 28. F. E. Peters seems to offers a similar view that the Meccans 
feared for their “business of polytheism” whose annual income through pilgrimage was threatened by 
Muhammad’s mission. However, Peters soon qualified his statement that “it is too simple to dismiss the 
degree of personal devotion to the deities of polytheism” and “that it was the loss of their gods that 
disturbed the Quraysh.” See his The Monotheists: Jews, Christians and Muslims in Conflict and 
Competition (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2003), 91, 94. 
327 “Say [Prophet], ‘Since clear evidence has come to me from my Lord I am forbidden to serve those you 
call upon besides God: I am commanded to submit to the Lord of the Worlds.’” 
328 Muqātil mentions a number of idols worship by different social and tribal groups of the Arab, such as al-
Lāt worshipped by people of Ṭā’if; al-‘Uzzā by the Meccans; Manāt, Hubāl, Usāf, and Nā’ilah by Qurayshī 
clans; etc. see Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2/233.  
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We will collect our wealth for you.” Accordingly, the Meccan disbelievers asked 
Muhammad to leave his worship of God, following which this verse is revealed, ‘Say, O 
Muhammad, “I am forbidden from worshiping what you worship other than God”.’329 
Muhammad’s preaching of worshiping only one god was quite strange from the 
Meccan view. 330 The Qur’an best expresses their view in Q38: 5, “How can he 
[Muhammad] claim that all the gods are but one God? What an astonishing thing [to 
claim]!” The Meccans maintained that they did not hear such a view even from the last 
monotheist religion, that is, Christianity, according to whose view Allāh has an associate 
in ‘Īsā ibn Maryam.331 One incident is mentioned by Muqātil in his commentary on Q38: 
5-6.332 This was following the conversion of ‘Umar ibn Khaṭṭāb to Islam that had 
strengthened the negotiation power of the believers, and had a significant impact on the 
relationship between them and disbelievers. Some twenty seven people of Meccan 
leadership—including al-Walīd ibn al-Mughīrah, Abū Jahl ibn Hishām, Umayyah and 
Ubay sons of Khalaf, etc.—went to meet with Abū Ṭālib, Muhammad’s uncle, asking 
him to adjudicate between them and Muhammad. Abū Ṭālib sent someone asking 
Muhammad to come to the assembly. Abū Ṭālib said [to Muhammad], “These are your 
people requiring justice (sawā’) from you, so please don’t be inclined to your own 
                                                        
329 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/719. In fact, similar commentary is given on Q 39: 11; see Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/672. 
330 Mitchell and Van Nuffelen maintained that “[i]n a polytheistic environment the divine world is 
generally seen as a source of support and legitimation for society at large, rather than as an independent 
source of absolute moral authority. In polytheism, if one god did not serve a society’s purpose, another 
could be called upon to do so. The will of the gods for mankind, therefore, was not absolute but relative, 
and was adaptable to the needs and circumstances of a particular society. This was true even within the 
henotheistic but not exclusive religious systems.” See One God, 8. 
331 Tafsīr Muqātil Ibn Sulaymān, 3/636-7. Q38: 5 describes well the polytheistic or henotheistic nature of 
the religion of the Arabs that while worshiping the supreme God, Allāh, they also worshiped lesser gods. 
332 Q38: 6, “Their leaders depart, saying, ‘Walk away! Stay faithful to your gods! That is what you must 
do.” 
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followers.” The Prophet said, “What did they ask from me?”  The Meccans replied, “Stop 
mentioning our gods, and we’ll leave you and your God alone!” The Prophet said, “Give 
me one word that will unite both Arabs and non-Arabs!”333 Abū Jahl responded, “By God 
and your father, I will give you that one word and even ten more.” “Say: ‘Lā ilāha illā 
Allāh,” Muhammad told them. The Meccan leaders refused that, stood up and said 
something whence Q38: 5, aja‛ala al-ālihāt ilāhan wāḥidan, inna hādhā lashay’un ‘ujab, 
“How can he [Muhammad] claim that all the gods are but one God? What an astonishing 
thing [to claim]!’334  
The fact that the Meccan leaders cited Christian views (millat al-naṣārā) with 
regard to their understanding of god suggests that, in Muqātl’s view, Christianity was 
relatively known to the Meccan pagans at the time of Muhammad, either through trading 
travels they conducted regularly, or the presence of the Christians in Mecca in particular 
or Hijāz in general.335  This demonstrates that, unlike Hawting’s thesis, traditional 
                                                        
333 In this case, the Prophet asked the group of the Meccan leaders to say one word, that is, lā ilāha illā 
Allāh, by which they would control not only the Arabs, but also non-Arabs. Before they knew that the one 
word Muhammad asked them to say was lā ilāha illā Allāh, the Meccan leaders said to Muhammad that 
they would not only say that one word, but added more if Muhammad liked. But once they knew that the 
one word Muhammad asked them to say is lā ilāha illā Allāh, they refused immediately. What is startling is 
that here the Prophet had predicted that the Muslims (those who said lā ilāha illā Allāh) would reign over 
the Arabs and non-Arabs.  
334 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/636. 
335 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/636. Ira M. Lapidus maintained that monotheistic religions “were introduced into 
Arabia by foreign influences: Jewish and Christian settlements, traveling preachers and merchants, and the 
political pressure of the Byzantine Empire and Abyssinia. By the sixth century, monotheism already had a 
certain vogue. Many non-believers understood the monotheistic religions; others, called hanīf in the Quran, 
were believers in one God but not adherents of any particular faith. Christians settled in Yemen, in small 
oases, and in the border regions of the north; they were a minority but were profoundly influential and, to 
many people, deeply appealing, both by the force of their teaching and by force of representing what was 
felt to be a more powerful, more sophisticated, and more profound civilization.” See his A History of 
Islamic Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 16. J Spencer Trimingham argued, 
however, that their recognition of Allāh “had nothing to do with either Judaism or Christianity, both 
exclusivist religions. The opposition of the Meccans to Muhammad arose only when he proclaimed the 
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Muslim literature, such as Muqātil’s commentary, does tell possible contact and 
interaction between the Hijāzi people, who were polytheists and idolators, with 
monotheists, including Christians. And to their understanding, Christianity taught, or at 
least allowed, some sort of polytheism.336  
Therefore, instead of following Muhammad’s preaching to tawḥīd, the Meccan 
disbelievers accused Muhammad of committing similar shirk, for, at a time, he calls his 
God Allāh, and, at another, al-Raḥmān. Apparently, during that time, the term al-raḥmān 
had been attached to Musaylamah, a person who also claimed prophethood for himself in 
Yamāmah and had been well known as such to the Arabs. In his commentary on Q12: 
60,337 Muqātil sets out a context of revelation in which a dialogue runs between Abū Jahl 
and Muhammad, in relation to the Qur’an. Abū Jahl claimed, “O Muhammad, if you 
know a poem, we know it, too.” The Prophet replied, “This is not a poem. This is kalām 
al-Raḥmān (the speech of al-Raḥmān).” Abū Jahl said, “Yes, right. This is the speech of 
al-raḥmān who is in Yamamah. He who teaches you!” The Prophet explained, “al-
Raḥmān is Allāh who is in heaven and from whom Jibrīl receives commands.” Abū Jahl 
mocked, “O the family of Ghālib,338 who can help me understand Ibn Abī Kabshah339 
                                                        
exclusiveness of the worship of Allāh.” See Christianity Among the Arabs in Pre-Islamic Times (London, 
New York, and Beirut: Longman & Librairie du Liban, 1979), 249. 
336 The fact that the presence of Christian ideas among the pre-Islamic Arabs could not entirely persuade 
them toward monotheism suggests “its failure to influence the Arab soul in any profound sense.” Such 
failure was due to two factors, namely the unchallenging interpretations of the Gospel to the Arab way of 
life, and the exceptional power of resistance that their way of life had. The Arab social consciousness, 
which was largely tribal, had made them in no need for religion, for the meaning of life was derived from 
the community. See Trimingham, Christianity, 6, 258, 309.  
337 “Yet when they are told, ‘Bow down before the Lord of Mercy,’ they say, ‘What is the Lord of Mercy? 
Should we bow down before anything you command?’ and they turn even further away.” 
338 Gālib was the maternal ancestor of the Prophet: Gālib ibn ‘Āmir ibn al-Ḥārith. See footnote below.   
339 This is a nickname for the Prophet Muhammad. Some Quraishī leaders called Muhammad Ibn Abī 
Kabsah because some of his paternal and maternal ancestors were called the same. Wahb ibn ‘Abd Manāf 
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[Muhammad]; He said his God is one; yet he said that ‘Allāh teaches me’, and ‘al-
Raḥmān teaches me’? Don’t you think that these are two different gods?” In response, al-
Walīd ibn al-Mughīrah, ‘Utbah, and ‘Uqbah said [mockingly], “We don’t know, except 
that Allāh and al-Raḥmān are two different names. Allāh, we have known Him. He who 
has created everything we see. But al-Raḥmān we don’t know him except [that he is] 
Musaylamah al-Kadhdhāb (“the Liar”).” Abū Jahl then asked, “O, Ibn Abī Kabshah, you 
do invite [us] to worship the one in Yamamah!”340 
With this short conversation between Muhammad and Abū Jahl, it appears that 
Muqātil wants to show at least three things. First, he desired to show that the revelation 
that Muhammad received and that he accordingly propagated to the people seemed 
similar to the poetic convention of the Arabs. Second, he wanted to demonstrate that 
while the central mission of Muhammad is tawḥīd, the Meccans had misunderstood it as 
another form of polytheism because he called his God with two different names. Finally, 
he wanted to explain that the prevalence of polytheism among the Meccans who could 
easily use polytheistic framework to understand both Christianity’s teaching and 
                                                        
ibn Zuhrah, Aminah’s [the Prophet’s mother] father was called (yukannā) Abū Kabshah. ‘Amr ibn Zayd 
ibn Labīd was also called Abu Kabshah. He was ‘Abd al-Muṭṭalib’s grandfather, Salmā’s [his mother] 
father. The Prophet’s maternal grandfather, Wajīz ibn Ghālib ibn ‘Āmir ibn al-Ḥārith ibn ‘Umar ibn Buayy 
ibn Malakān ibn Afsayy ibn Ḥārithah, was also called Ibn Kabshah. He was worshipping the star al-shi’rā 
(Sirius). According to Muqātil (4/166), the Bedouins of Khuzā‛ah, Ghassān, and Gaṭafān also worshiped 
this star.  al-Ḥārith ibn ‘Abd al-‘Uzzā ibn Rifā‛ah ibn Malan, the brother of Banū Sa‛d ibn Bakr ibn 
Hawāzin, husband of Ḥalīmah bin al-Ḥārith ibn ‘Abd Allāh ibn Shajnah ibn Jābir ibn Nāsirah who nursed 
Muhammad when he was a baby, was also called Ibn Kabshah. Thus, the Prophet was nicknamed this after 
these people who were also known with the same nickname: Abū Kabshah. The reason for this is because 
they thought Muhammad, with his mission, had deviated from the religion of the Arabs religion. See Abu 
Ja’far Muhammad ibn Habib, Kitab al-Muḥabbar (Beirut: Dar al-Āfāq al-Jadidah, N.Y.); Al-Qurtubi also 
mentions this in his al-Jāmi’ li Aḥkām al-Qur’an, when he comments on Q53: 49, so did al-Baghawī in his 
commentary and al-Shawkānī in his Fatḥ al-Qadīr. 
340 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/239. 
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Muhammad’s mission held them back.341 
In another place in his commentary, Muqātil also brings forth similar reasons for 
the polytheists’ rejection of Muhammad’s Qur’an, namely the insult that the Qur’an 
threw to their gods and its imposition to renounce them altogether. As explained, 
Muhammad’s mission of converting people to the worship of only one God and the 
renunciation of other gods seemed to be too harsh within the tolerant polytheistic 
environment of multiple divinities. In reponse, the polytheists sought ways to counter 
Muhammad, one of which by accusing him as making up the Qur’an out whim 
(taqawwalahū min tilqā’i nafsihi), under the guidance of a Satan called Rayy. To that 
accusation, the Qur’an responded back by challenging them to produce the like of it.342  
It turns out that their accusation that the Qur’an was of Muhammad’s own making 
was to prepare a way for their next move, when they asked Muhammad to bring them 
“another Qur’an.” One that is more tolerant to their gods. If Muhammad could not bring 
this friendly version of Qur’an from his God, they wanted him to just create it himself 
(i‛ti bi-qur’ānin ghayri hādhā laysa fīhi tark ‘ibādat ālihatinā wa la ‘ayyabaha, aw 
baddilhū anta min tilqā’i nafsika).343 Despite his strict monotheist mission, upon hearing 
this request, Muhammad was tempted to soften his voice against their gods hoping that 
                                                        
341 In such a polytheistic environment, as Mitchell and Van Nuffelen (2010) argued, tolerance of different 
divinities was common, and the demand was to respect each other’s beliefs and practices. In other words, 
the religious practices of the Meccans lacked one of the most important defining characteristics of 
monotheism, that is, the strict requirement to worship one God and renounce all others. There might be a 
religious competition between different groups that worshiped different divinities, “but the promoters of 
successful cults had no interest in annihilating or denying the existence of other gods; it served their 
interests much better to prove the superiority of their own.” Mitchell and Van Nuffelen, One God, 10-11. 
342 See Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2/275-5. 
343 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2/273-274; 231. 
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they would eventually follow him. God however soon reminded him of his original 
mission as nadhīr (reminder of God’s threat of punishment) by revealing Q11: 12.344  
Furthermore, the beyond-worldly matters also overwhelmed the Meccans to 
whom Muhammad preached, which either seemed to be out of their rational reach, or 
which they simply rejected. Muqātil, for instance, notes their doubts toward resurrection 
and hell, when he comments on Q44: 33-36.345 In his commentary on their response to 
the matter of resurrection in Q23: 81-2,346 Muqātil maintains that the question they asked 
was rhetorical, simply to deny the existence or possibility of resurrection. Such a 
rhetorical question was posed by a number of people, such as the family of Talḥah ibn 
‘Abd  al-‘Uzzā, including Shaybah, Talḥah, ‘Uthmān, Abu Sa‛īd, Mushāfi‛, Arṭa’ah, Ibn 
Shuraḥbil, al-Naḍr ibn al-Ḥārith, and Abū al-Ḥārith ibn ‘Alqamah.347 Some of the 
Meccans, such as Abū Jahl ibn Hishām even challenged Muhammad, “O Muhammad, if 
you are truly a prophet, resurrect for us two or three people who had died among our 
forefathers, including Qusayy ibn Kilāb who was trustworthy and their leader, so that we 
could ask him and he would tell us what is there after death; whether it is true or 
false?”348  
In another place, upon his commentary on Q36: 76-83, Muqātil sets out a similar 
                                                        
344 “So [Prophet] are you going to abandon some part of what is revealed to you, and let your heart be 
oppressed by it, because they say, ‘Why is no treasure sent down to him? Why has no angel come with 
him?’? You are only there to warn; it is God who is in charge of everything.’” 
345 “When the Prophet told them that they will be resurrected after their death, they denied him; instead 
they said, “Nothing but our life in this world.” Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/823. 
346  “(81) But, like others before them, (82) they say, ‘What? When we die and turn to dust and bones, shall 
we really be resurrected?’” 
347 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/163. 
348 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/823. 
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scene of revelation that Ubayy ibn Khalaf al-Jumaḥī349 discussed amr al-‘aẓm (the matter 
of bone) with some of his companions, including Abū Jahl, al-Walīd ibn al-Mughīrah, 
‘Utbah and Shaybah sons of Rabī‛ah, ‘Uqbah, al-‘Ās ibn Wā’il. Ubayy said, 
“Muhammad thought that God would resurrect the dead, and I came to him bringing 
some bones, and I asked him, “O Muhammad, you think that God would resurrect the 
dead after their bones dry and we have become dust. You think that He will create us 
anew?” Ubayy then broke the bone into pieces and threw it to the air, saying, “O 
Muhammad, who will bring them to life again?” The Prophet replied, “God will bring 
them to life again, then He will put you into death, resurrect you, and throw you into the 
hell of Jahannam!”350 To the Meccans, the resurrection was merely an ancient fable: “We 
have heard such promises before, and so did our forefathers. These are just ancient 
fables.”351 And in Q11: 7, the Meccan disebelievers called such teaching on resurrection 
a flat magic (siḥr mubīn).352 
The disbelief in eschatology by the polytheist Meccans was not shared by the 
monotheists, such Jews and Christians. Just like Islam, which came after them, both 
Judaism and Christianity taught eschatology as one of the fundamentals of their teaching. 
Thus, the difficulty of the Meccans to accept the possibility of resurrection after death 
might only vindicate the fact that they were still living in a polytheistic culture, and even 
                                                        
349 He is probably Abū al-Ashaddīn whose name is Usaid ibn Kildah ibn Khalaf al-Jumahī. He was 
nicknamed “Abū al-Ashaddīn” for his strong fist. See Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/603. 
350 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/585-6. 
351 Q23: 83. A similar response is mentioned in Q 27: 67-8, “[67] So the disbelievers say, ‘What! When we 
and our forefathers have become dust, shall we be brought back to life again? [68] We have heard such 
promises before, and so did our forefathers. These are just ancient fables.’” 
352 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2/272. 
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if they possessed some knowledge of the monotheistic religions, they had not yet 
completely acculturated with monotheist teachings. Instead, they picked things from 
those monotheistic religions that well suited their own religious belief and practice, that 
is, the worshiping of many gods, the polytheism itself. The disbelief in eschatology may 
also, if anything, hint at their pragmatic view of life as merely here and now. Such a 
pragmatic view of life was congruent with polytheistic culture in which the divine world 
was called for as “a source of support and legitimation for society at large, rather than as 
an independent source of absolute moral authority. In polytheism, if one god did not 
serve a society’s purpose, another could be called upon to do so.”353 
In their attempts to understand the working of prophethood, the Meccans also 
consulted the Jews in Medina. Once, Abū Jahl said to the Quraish, “Send some people 
among you to the Jews of Yathrib, to ask them about your friend [Muhammad], whether 
he is a prophet or a liar?” Following that, they decided to choose five people as 
delegation including al-Naḍr ibn al-Ḥārith and ‘Uqbah ibn Abī Mu‛ayṭ. Upon their arrival 
in Medina, this delegation told the Jews, “We came to you because of what happened to 
us and it keeps growing. We don’t like it. We are afraid that he [Muhammad] will destroy 
our religion and confuse our matter. He is of lower class, poor, and an orphan calling for 
al-Raḥmān whom we know nothing about but [that he is] Musaylamah al-Kadhdhāb. You 
do know that he [Musaylamah] commands nothing but decay and war (al-fasad wa al-
qitāl). And that’s under the auspices of Jibrīl—peace be upon him354—who is your 
                                                        
353 Mitchell and Van Nuffelen, One God, 8-9. 
354 Given the negative tone of the whole statement, the benediction to Jibrīl was likely addition of Muqātil, 
not stated by the Meccan delegation to the Medinan Jews. Muqātil also likely provided similar 
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enemy. So please tell us whether you find him [Muhammad] in your Book?”  
The Jews responded, “We found his description as you have just said.” The 
Meccans said, “In his [Muhammad] people, there is other who is nobler and older than 
him.” “But we don’t believe him [Muhammad],” the Meccan said. The Jews responded, 
“We found his people are the toughest against him, and this is about the time in which he 
will appear.” The Meccans said, “He is taught by Musaylamah ‘the liar.’ Tell us some 
questions to ask [Muhammad], ones that Musaylamah knows nothing of and that no one 
else knows but a prophet.” The Jews said, “Ask him three questions, if he answers them 
correctly, he is a prophet; if he doesn’t, he is a liar. Ask him about Aṣḥāb al-Kahf.” The 
Jews then told the Meccan the story of Aṣḥāb al-Kahf. “And ask him about Dhū al-
Qarnayn; he was a king, and so, so. And ask him about rūḥ (soul). If he teaches you 
something about it [rūḥ], a little or a lot, then he is a liar.” The Jews then told the Meccan 
the story of soul. 
 The Meccans went home with everything they heard, and were amazed. They 
then came to Muhammad—peace be upon him,355 to whom Abū Jahl said, “O the son of 
‘Abd al-Muṭṭalib, we will ask you three things; if you know the answers then you’re 
right, otherwise you’re a liar. And leave our gods alone!” The Prophet asked, “What are 
they? Ask me anything you like.” They responded, “We are asking you about Aṣḥāb al-
Kahf. We have been told about them. We are asking you about Dhū al-Qarnayn. We have 
                                                        
benedictions, some of them to Muhammad, in his commentary that are unlikely put by the actors involved 
in the scenes told in the commentary.  
355 This is another instance of a benediction that Muqātil likely provided for Muhammad. It seems unlikely 
that the Meccan Polytheists—who were hostile to him—would give it to Muhammad. 
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also been told about him. We are asking you about rūḥ. We have also been told about its 
amazing matter. If you know all the answers, you are then pardoned, but if you don’t, you 
are actually deceivably possessed!” The Prophet responded, “Come back to me 
tomorrow, I will tell you,” but Muhammad failed to say “God Willing.”356 Muhammad 
waited (for the revelation) for three days, until Jibrīl came to him. The Prophet told him, 
“O Jibrīl, my people have asked me three questions.” “I came to you with respect to these 
questions,” replied Jibrīl.357 
This anecdote, if anything, supports the idea that the Arab polytheists did exist 
and indeed have contact with the monotheists, and in this case with the Jews of Medina. 
As seen through their dialog, the delegation of the polytheist Meccans learned a lot from 
the Jews of Medina and were amazed with what they had learned. The Jews provided the 
Meccans with “a test for prophecy” in the form of three points of knowledge—of asḥab 
al-kahf, Dhū al-qarnayn, and rūḥ--whose possession or otherwise would vindicate or 
invalidate Muhammad’s claim of prophecy. Prior to their encounter with the Jews, it 
seems that the Meccans perceived prophecy as something to be attached to someone who 
was noble and coming from a high class, in term of social standing, wealth and even 
seniority. And Muhammad, in their view, did not match these categories.  
If anything, these Meccan polytheists believed that there were at least two other 
people who were more deserving to prophethood than Muhammad due to their social 
standing, namely Abū Mas‛ūd al-Thaqafī whose real name was  ‘Amr ibn ‘Āmir ibn 
                                                        
356 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2/581. 
357 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2/574-6. 
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‘Awf, and al-Walīd ibn al-Mughīrah.358 Al-Walīd ibn al-Mughīrah himself was reported 
to say, “Had the Qur’an been true, it would have been sent down to Abū Mas‛ūd al-
Thaqafī.”359 Therefore, some of the Meccan aristocracy saw that Muhammad’s mission is 
best suited to people from a lower social class than people like they were. His teaching 
was more appropriate for poor people or non-Arab clients, such as ‘Abd Allāh ibn 
Mas‛ūd, ‘Ammār ibn Yāsir, Ṣuhayb, Bilāl, Khabāb ibn al-Art, Jabr client of ‘Āmir ibn al-
Ḥaḍrami, Sālim client of Abū Ḥudhaifah, al-Namr ibn Qāsiṭ, ‘Āmir ibn Fuhairah, Mahja‛ 
ibn ‘Abd Allāh, and so on.360 If the Qur’an posits that every prophet has his own 
enemy,361 it portrays that the resistance to the prophetic mission usually came from the 
upper class of society it calls mala’,362 and that the early followers of the prophets are 
usually lowly people (ardhalūn).363 
To further challenge Muhammad’s claim of prophethood, after throwing a 
number of accusations against him,364 the Meccans demanded that he perform 
                                                        
358 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/794. 
359 Muqātil,Tafsīr, 3/793. 
360 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/230. 
361 Q 15: 31, and see Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/233. 
362 Q 38: 6, and see Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/636. 
363 Q 26: 111, and see Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2/278-81; 3/272. According to Lapidus, “Significantly, the first 
converts were rootless migrants, poor men, members of weak clans, and younger sons of strong clans - 
those people most dissatisfied with the changing moral and social clirnate of Mecca, for whom the 
Prophet's message proved a vital alternative. See History, 21. 
364 In his commentary on Q 15: 95, Muqātil mentions that al-Walid ibn al-Mughirah al-Makhzumi, when 
the pilgrimage season came, convened a meeting with the people of Quraish to discuss what to tell people 
who would come to Mecca to perform ḥājj when they asked about Muhammad. The result was that there 
must be some delegates in all ways to Mecca to answer all questions regarding Muhammad. The answers 
were set. If anyone asked who Muhammad was, these delegates must answer, “Muhammad was a magician 
(sāḥir) who separate a husband and a wife”; or “he was a sorcerer (kāhin) that prophecies the future”, or 
“he was a liar magician (sāḥir kadhdhāb)”; or “he was a poet (shā‛ir)”; or “liar possessed” (kadhdhāb 
majnūn). See Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2/437-8.   
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miracles,365 such as illustrated in Q21: 5 and Q17: 90-93,366 the performance of which 
would serve as a condition for their believing in him. Upon hearing these challenges, as 
suggested by the Qur’an itself, Muhammad had to admit that he could not fulfill their 
request367 and could only say, Subḥāna rabbī hal kuntu illā basharan rasūlan, “Glory be 
to my Lord! Am I anything but a mortal, messenger.” In this regard, Muqātil argues that 
had Muhammad been able to perform the requested miracles, the Meccans would not 
necessarily have believed in him, for Abū Jahl was said to have said this: “By God, I am 
not sure, had you done that, whether I would become a believer or not.”368 Their request 
for miracles was merely to mock Muhammad. In the end, the best answer to any 
challenges that required the performance of miracles, as suggested by the Qur’an 
especially Q2: 164, was that Muhammad should ask the people to simply look at God’s 
creation.369 
Apart from this religiously strong opposition, Muqātil offers another reason for 
the Meccan reluctance to follow Muhammad, which had to do with real social, economic, 
and political concerns. In commenting on Q28: 57-8, Muqātil sets out a context of 
revelation in which al-Ḥārith ibn Nawfal ibn ‘Abd Manāf al-Qurashī said to the Prophet, 
“We know that what you said is true, but we fear that the Arabs would push us out of 
                                                        
365 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2/233. 
366  “(90) They say, ‘We will not believe for you [Muhammad] until you make a spring gush out of the 
ground for us; (91) or until you have a garden of date palms and vines, and make rivers pour through them; 
(92) or make the sky fall on us in pieces, as you claimed will happen; or bring God and the angels before us 
face to face; (93) or have a house made of gold; or ascend into the sky– even then, we will not believe in 
your ascension until you send a real book down for us to read.’” Say, ‘Glory be to my Lord! Am I anything 
but a mortal, messenger.’” 
367 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2/549-50. 
368 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2/550.  
369 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/153-4. 
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Mecca if we follow the guidance with you. That is what has prevented us from doing so. 
We are only a minority and we have no power over them” (fa-innamā naḥnu akalatu 
ra’sin wa la ṭāqata lanā bihim).370 
Muqātil maintains that the Qur’an does not, however, justify such a fear. These 
people have enjoyed God’s provision even when they were worshiping something other 
than God; why wouldn’t they enjoy the same after embracing Islam?371 On the contrary, 
if they persisted in their disbelief even after God sent to them a messenger, they would 
receive punishment, similar to that of the bygone people (umam khāliyah) due to their 
rejection of their prophets: the people of Lūṭ were punished with a stoning storm 
(ḥāṣiban), the people of Ṣāliḥ, Shu‛ayb, Hūd, and Ibrāhīm were punished with Jibril’s 
shout (ṣayḥat Jibrīl), others were buried under the earth (wa khasafnā bihī al-arḍ) as 
were Qārūn and his people, and drowned as in the case of the people of Nūḥ and 
Fir‛aun.372 In the same way, the people of Muhammad who rejected him would receive 
similar punishment, not only in the hereafter but also in this world. 
In his commentary, based on the precedence of ancient Prophets and their people, 
Muqātil seems to understand the resistance against Muhammad, along with its 
concomitant violence, as part of a larger divine scenario that had also occurred to earlier 
prophets and their peoples. This divine scenario runs as follows: God sent prophets, these 
prophets preached to their respective people, the people rejected them, and finally 
                                                        
370 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/351. Such a fear of hardship as a result of joining Muhammad was, according to 
Lapidus, an invitation to hardship, expressed in the aftermath of the Meccan boycott against him and his 
followers. Therefore, since 615 or 616, Muhammad did not make more converts, and his followers were at 
the time around 100 people. See History, 22. 
371 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/351, 390. 
372 Q 29: 40, and see Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/383-4. 
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punishment ensued. With this perspective in mind, Muqātil believes that Muhammad’s 
people would also receive punishment for their rejection of him, just like early 
generations when they rejected their own prophets. In the case of the Meccan polytheists, 
Muqātil views that their punishment was inflicted with their defeat in the battle of 
Badr.373  
The purpose of God mentioning the past narrative of rejection of the prophets in 
the Qur’an, according to Muqātil, is to remind the Meccan disbelievers that they would 
bear similar consequences if they did the same.374 This is what Muqātil understands about 
the term sunnat Allāh (“God’s custom”) in the Qur’an:375 the people who rejected the 
prophets would soon be punished once the prophets left them. This had been the case 
with the bygone people (umam khāliyah). God commanded the prophets and the 
believing followers to leave the place where they used to live before divine punishment 
was sent down. In the case of the Meccans, it happened exactly one year after 
Muhammad left Mecca to Medina, at the Battle of Badr. When Muhammad was at 
Mecca, God had commanded him to be patient against the Meccan resistance, for God’s 
promise was coming;376 the Meccan disbelievers would be punished in this world. Upon 
hearing such a threat, the Meccans mockingly challenged Muhammad, asking, “When 
will this that you promised us happen?”377 Thence came God’s command to Muhammad 
to be patient, as the punishment will come for them at the Battle of Badr in which the 
                                                        
373 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2/302; 3/243. 
374 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/273. 
375 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2/545-6; 3/723.   
376 See Q 40: 55, 77; and Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/721. 
377 Q 21: 38; Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/80. 
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angels would attack them from front and back and send their souls right away to hell.378 
The People of Scripture (Ahl al-Kitāb): Jews and Christians 
The term ahl al-kitāb is mentioned thirty times in the Qur’an, dispersed unevenly 
in nine chapters.379 In general, the term refers to both Jews and Christians.380 But there 
are times when the term refers only to one of the two, as explained in tafsīr. There are at 
least three other terms the Qur’an uses to refer to the People of Scripture, namely 
alladhina ātaynāhum al-kitāba (“those whom We gave scripture”),381 alladhīna yaqra’ūn 
al-kitāba (“those who recite scripture”),382 and alladhina ūtū al-kitāba (“those who were 
given scripture”).383 
When the Qur’an uses the phrase alladhīna ātaynāhum al-kitāba, in both Meccan 
and Medinan chapters, in Muqātil’s commentary, it points to the Christians and Jews who 
believed that the Qur’an was a revelation from God, because they understood correctly 
what they read in the Bible, especially in relation to Muhammad’s prophecy. In this 
respect, Muqātil mentions, there were forty people among the Christians, thirty-two of 
                                                        
378 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/717. In commenting on Q32: 21, Muqātil maintains that there are two types of 
punishment in this world for the Meccan rejection of the Prophet, namely al-‘adhāb al-adnā, that is, hunger 
for seven years (due to drought) till they ate bones, corps, jif, dogs; and al-‘adhāb al-akbar, that is, murder 
in the Battle of Badr. See Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/452. 
379 Chronologically, the term ahl al-kitāb is mentioned in Q29:46; Q2:105, 109; Q3:64, 65, 69, 70, 71, 72, 
75, 98, 99, 110, 113, 199; Q33:26; Q4:123, 153, 159, 171; Q57:29; Q98:1, 6; Q59:11; Q5:15, 19, 59, 65, 
68, 77. 
380 In the religious term, ahl al-kitāb usually refers to the Jews and Christians; but in the political term, as in 
the case of who will have the choice to pay jizyah, it may be expanded to include other people such as the 
Magians. It had happened since the time of the Prophet in which he accepted jizyah from the Zoroastrians 
from Hajar, a decision that was criticized by the hypocrites on the ground that these Zoroastrian were not 
People of Scripture. See Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/214, and also al-Wāḥidi, Asbab Nuzūl al-Qur’ān. Legal 
scholars, such al-Shāfi’ī, undertake further discussion on this that I will deal with when I study Muqātil’s 
legal commentary. 
381 It is mentioned in Q28: 52 and Q2: 121. 
382 It is used in Q10:94. 
383 It appears in Q2: 121, Q3: 186 and 187, Q4: 131 and 160. 
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whom came to Medina from Abyssinia and eight others from Syria.384 Meanwhile, for 
Jewish representative, as usual, Muqātil mentions ‘Abd Allāh ibn Salām and his 
companions.385  
Likewise, the Qur’an uses the phrase alladhīna yaqra’ūn al-kitāba (“those who 
read scripture”) in the early Medinan chapter in a positive manner referring to people 
with whom God commanded Muhammad to consult should he have some doubt about 
God’s revelation to him. In this case, Muqātil mentions, again, ‘Abd Allāh ibn Salām as 
the prototype.386 However, when the Qur’an uses the term alladhīna ūtū al-kitāba (“those 
who were given scripture”), which occurs only in the Medinan chapters, it generally 
brings a negative tone with regard to the People of Scripture, especially the Jews. Not 
only did they, for the sake of material interest, conceal some truth in the Bible—the 
description of Muhammad’s prophecy and their obligation to follow him—they also 
spoke hurtful comments with regard to the revelation that Muhammad received. 
Furthermore, they did not stop with merely verbal assault but would proceed with 
physical assault to Muhammad and the believers.387  
If the Qur’an asserts that all human beings were previously united under one 
(religious) community (ummah wāḥidah), the Qur’an depicts both religious communities 
of the Jews and Christians as engaging in constant polemics and competition with each 
other. Q2: 111-113, best illustrate their relationship:  
“(111) They [the people of the Book] also say, ‘No one will enter Paradise unless 
                                                        
384 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/348-9. 
385 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/135. 
386 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2/248. 
387 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/320-21, 413, 
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he is a Jew or a Christian.’ This is their own wishful thinking. [Prophet], say, ‘Produce 
your evidence, if you are telling the truth.’ (112) In fact, any who direct themselves 
wholly to God and do good will have their reward with their Lord: no fear for them, nor 
will they grieve. (113) The Jews say, ‘The Christians have no ground whatsoever to stand 
on,’ and the Christians say, ‘The Jews have no ground whatsoever to stand on,’ though 
they both read the Scripture, and those who have no knowledge say the same; God will 
judge between them on the Day of Resurrection concerning their differences.”  
 
In this stalemate, the Qur’an invites both parties to come back to common ground 
(kalimat sawā’) in Q3: 64, “Say, ‘People of the Book, let us arrive at a statement that is 
common to us all: we worship God alone, we ascribe no partner to Him, and none of us 
takes others beside God as lords.’ If they turn away, say, ‘Witness our devotion to Him.’” 
As stated, the common ground that would once again unify the Jews, Christians, and 
Muhammad’s followers is tawḥīd, the upholding of the belief in and worship of only one 
God.  
When Muhammad invited the People of Scripture to this kalimat sawā’, according 
to Muqātil, some of the Jewish leaders, including Ka‛b ibn al-Ashraf, Abū Yāsir, Abū al-
Ḥaqīq  and Zayd ibn al-Tābūh,  and the Christians of Najrān, each group claimed 
Ibrāhīm, the father of monotheism, for themselves, against Muhammad. The Jews said, 
“Ibrāhīm is with us, just like our (other) prophets were of our religion. You [Muhammad] 
want nothing but to make us take you as our lord, just like the Christians take ‘Īsā as their 
lord.” Likewise, the Christians said, “You [Muhammad] want nothing with your 
invitation but to make us take you as our lord, just like the Jews take ‘Uzayr as their 
lord.” The Prophet replied, “I seek refuge to God from all of that. My invitation to all of 
you is to worship God and not associate Him with anything.” It is in this situation where 
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God revealed Q3: 65-68, 388 
“(65) People of the Book, why do you argue about Abraham when the Torah and 
the Gospels were not revealed until after his time? Do you not understand? (66) You 
argue about some things of which you have some knowledge, but why do you argue 
about things of which you know nothing? God knows and you do not. (67) Abraham was 
neither a Jew nor a Christian. He was upright and devoted to God, never an idolater, (68) 
and the people who are closest to him are those who truly follow his ways, this Prophet, 
and [true] believers– God is close to [true] believers.”  
 
In Q3: 95, similar commandment is mandated, “[Prophet], say, ‘God speaks the 
truth, so follow Abraham’s religion: he had true faith and he was never an idolater.’” But 
in his commentary on this verse, Muqātil brings forth a ḥadith in which the Prophet was 
related to have said to the Jews and Christians who said that Ibrāhim was on their 
religions: “Ibrāhīm performed pilgrimage to the House [at Mecca], and you know that, 
but why do you reject god’s signs, namely pilgrimage (hajj)?” Here, Muqātil interprets 
the descriptive ḥanīfan for millat Ibrāhīm as ḥājjan, “the one who was performing 
pilgrimage.”389 In this regard, Muqātil argues that if the People of Scripture claimed 
Ibrāhīm as their model, they should also perform pilgrimage to God’s House in Mecca. 
But they rejected pilgrimage. 
Based on the above, it is known that the common ground to which Muhammad 
and the Qur’an invited the people of the Book (ahl al-kitāb) is tawḥīd, that is, to worship 
God alone and not associate Him with anything else. In other words, the common ground 
is Ibrāhīm’s religion (millat Ibrāhīm), which exists prior to the religious aḥzāb of the 
Jews and Christians. Ibrāhīm’s religion is Islam, the same religion of Mūsā and ‛Īsā.390 
                                                        
388 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/282-3. 
389 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/290-91. 
390 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/279. 
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Ibrāhim’s religion is one that teaches pilgrimage as one of its rituals. Yet, while the Jews 
and Christians themselves claimed to be embracing Ibrāhīm’s religion, they did not 
acknowledge pilgrimage to the House as one of their religious obligations.391 
A similar competition between these religious groups was shown by Muqātil’s 
commentary on Q2: 135. There, Muqātil mentions that leaders of the Jews, including 
Ka‛ab ibn al-Ashraf, Ka‛b ibn Usayd, Abū Yāsir ibn Akhṭab, Mālik ibn al-Dayf, ‘Āzar, 
Ishmāwīl, and Khumaysha, as well as Najrāni Christians, including al-Sayyid and al-
‘Āqib and their companions, said to the believers: “Be on our religion, there is no other 
religion but ours.” But God rejects their claim, and suggests instead that millat Ibrāhīm, 
which is Islam itself, is the true religion. And Ibrāhīm was not part of mushrikūn; he was 
neither a Jew nor a Christian.392 Instead, the Qur’an suggests that believers invite these 
people to believe in God and in the revelation sent down to Muhammad, Ibrāhīm, 
‛Ismā‛īl, Isḥāq, Ya‛qūb, the Israelite tribes (al-asbāṭ), Mūsā, and ‘Īsā, and even to what 
had been previously given to Dāwūd and Sulaymān, that is, the Psalter (Zabūr).393 But 
the People of the Book insisted on believing in some prophets while rejecting others. The 
Jews did not believe in ‘Īsā and Muhammad; meanwhile, the Christians did not believe in 
Muhammad.394 
                                                        
391 It is intriguing that Muqātil does not use Q3: 64 as the foundation of the common ground for 
interreligious relations that he envisions in his legal commentary. Instead, he builds such common ground 
on Q6: 151-3 that he regards as muḥkamāt al-Qur’ān as the permanent fundamentals shared by at three 
religious traditions, including Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. This muḥkamāt is Muqātil’s version of the 
Islamic Decalogue. One possible reason that Muqātil does not use the kalimah sawā’ verses for his 
envisioned common ground because it is highly polemical and was revealed following the polemic between 
Jews and Christian in relation their relative status to Ibrāhīm. Meanwhile the muḥkamāt verses seem to be 
more balanced in treating other religious communities that they invite to join on an equal footing. 
392 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/141. 
393 Q2: 136; Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/141. 
394 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/141. 
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Muqātil’s commentary on Q4: 123 above shows that while previously only the 
Jews and the Christians were involved in disputes and claims of superiority, now another 
religious community, the muslimūn, Muhammad’s followers, joined in. It also shows that 
while he is so critical of the supposed shirk-related conducts of the Jews and Christians, 
Muqātil does not espouse the superiority claim that each of the three monotheist 
communities claimed for itself, especially the one by the Muslims. As such, Muqātil 
views the three monotheist religions as valid paths to salvation because they all stand on 
the same common ground (kalimat sawā’) that the Qur’an propagated, namely the belief 
in and worshiping only of one God. But, like the Qur’an, Muqātil is very critical toward 
the followers of both Judaism and Christianity, who he deems have deviated from the 
true teachings of their religion, especially in relation to tawḥīd, and also taṣdīq; therefore, 
Muqātil’s calls them mushrikūn and kāfirūn at times.395  
Despite his equal acknowledgment of the three monotheistic religions, there are 
times when Muqātil seems to suggest that the alternatives that Islam offers are better than 
the ones that Judaism and Christianity provide. Muqātil’s commentary on several verses 
in Q2, for instance, seems to suggest Islam’s “superiority,” over Judaism and 
Christianity. In commenting on Q2: 178, for instance, Muqātil explains different legal 
systems that Islam, Judaism and Christianity have, especially in relation to qiṣāṣ. In the 
Jewish tradition, a person who murders is to be killed, with no chance of forgiveness, and 
no compensation (diyah) to be accepted; in Christianity, such a killer is forgiven and not 
                                                        
395  See, for instance, how Muqātil uses the term kuffār al-yahūd in his commentary when commenting on 
Q2:2 (1/86), Q3:74 (1/285), Q3:112 (1/296), Q5:57 (1/487), Q29:48 (3/386), Q29:50 (3/387); or kuffār ahl 
al-kitāb when commenting on Q3:56 (1/279), Q4:125 (1/410), Q4:136 (1/414), Q13:25 (2/376). 
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to be killed with qiṣāṣ, and his family will receive no compensation; and for 
Muhammad’s followers (ummat Muḥammad), God provides them with takhfīf 
(“easement”) that gives the family of the victim possibilities to choose, either to kill the 
murderer or to forgive the killer if they will, or to accept compensation (diyah).396  
Although Muqātil’s commentary on the verse seems neutral, it nevertheless gives 
an impression that Muhammad’s Islam, by comparison, offers a better alternative than 
that in Judaism and Christianity. Similar understanding can be gained from Muqātil’s 
comment on Q2: 208. In his commentary on the verse, Muqātil mentions that some 
Jewish converts, such as ‘Abd Allāh ibn Salām, Salam ibn Qays, Usayd and Asad sons of 
Ka‛b, Yāmin ibn Yāmin, whom Muqātil calls the believers of ahl al-Tawrāt (mu’minū 
ahl al-Tawrāt), asked the Prophet’s permission to read the Torah in the prayer, observe 
Sabbath and to practice something from the Torah. In response, Muhammad told them 
that Allāh allows them to take only Muhammad’s examples and commandment (sunnat 
Muhammad wa sharā’i‛uh) as Muhammad’s Qur’an abrogates (yansakh) every scripture 
before it. In this respect, Muqātil understands the phrase udkhulū fi al-silm kāffah in this 
verse as “to follow all sharā’i‛ of Islam.”397 Furthermore, Muqātil considers al-sunnat al-
ulā (that is, the sunnah of early communities), to be invalid, not simply because of the 
coming of Muhammad, but primarily because of their conversion to being Muhammad’s 
followers. Conversion renders this al-sunnat al-ulā as ḍalālah, part of khuṭuwāt al-
shayātīn (satanic steps).398 This view is consistent with Muqātil’s attitude, mentioned 
                                                        
396 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/157. 
397 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/179-80. 
398 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/180. 
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earlier in relation to other five religious aḥzāb, in which he considered them aberrations 
from the primordial religion. Their religions were human invention and were therefore 
for Satan. It was only Islam that is a religion for God.  
However, Muqātil’s ambivalent attitudes toward Judaism and Christianity as 
religions, the followers of these two religions, and also the followers of the two religions 
who converted to Islam, can be actually differentiated. The fact that Muqātil disagrees 
with the superiority claim of the followers of three monotheistic communities 
demonstrates something about Muqātil’s acknowledgement of the People of the Book. In 
addition, Muqātil very often shows how Muhammad actually encouraged the People of 
the Book to be more faithful to the teaching of the Bible. This happened, for instance, 
when the Jews of Medina wanted to adjudicate some cases of murder and adultery in 
their community. Knowing that the punishment for these crimes was severe in their 
religion—that is, killing and stoning, respectively—they considered asking Muhammad 
for judgment, hoping that his adjudication would result in a much lighter punishment than 
what they had if they derived it from their scripture. To their shock, Muhammad decided 
the punishment by referring to what the Bible would do to such cases. Muhammad even 
accused the Jews of hiding some teachings of the Bible and challenged them to look at 
what the Bible said about punishment for murder and adultery. When he knew he was 
right, Muhammad took pride as someone who revitalized the law of the old prophecy.399 
But at the same time, this gave Muhammad leverage to accuse the Jews not only of 
                                                        
399 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/476. The Prophet was related to say, “God is Great. I am the first who revitalized the 
law of God’s Laws” (Allāh akbar. Fa anā awwalu man aḥyā sunnatan min sunan Allāh). 
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hiding rajm and qiṣāṣ, but also of hiding the description of his own prophecy as told in 
the Bible. 
As such, it seems that Muqātil actually acknowledges that the Bible is a legitimate 
scripture sent down by God. Likewise, Muqātil also believes that the People of the Book 
are in the same religious community (ummah wāḥidah), namely Islam, as long as they 
were faithful to the teaching of their scripture. In fact, Muqātil’s respect for the People of 
Scripture is attributable more to their affiliation to the Bible rather than their religious 
practices, which he regards as having deviated from the true scriptural teaching of the 
Bible. Furthermore, Muqātil sees the reality of religious difference is a divine test to see 
who follows God’s commands, especially in relation to rajm and qiṣāṣ, about which 
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam have relatively different laws.400 To Muqātil, 
Muhammad actually respected the plurality of distinct religious laws that these three 
monotheist communities possessed, and did not attempt to overwrite it with Islamic law. 
Muqātil equally suggests that what Muhammad expected from the People of the Book 
was that they would uphold stricter tawḥīd, and acknowledge the line of prophets, 
including his own prophethood.  
In this perspective, conversion to Islam by the People of the Book was a matter of 
choice. They might do so if they wanted, or they might remain in their religions, but by 
upholding the correct tawḥīd and conducting taṣdīq by acknowledging Muhammad as 
one of God’s prophets. However, once they converted to Islam, they had to leave their 
old religion altogether and follow only Muhammad’s teaching. For once the people of the 
                                                        
400 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/482, 475, 479. 
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book converted, the teaching of their old religions was considered abrogated by 
Muhammad’s teaching.401  The reason was that their old religious teaching was regarded 
as “old traditions” (sunnat ūlā) that had been contaminated by deviations. For these 
converts the command to embrace Islam in totality (udkhulū fī al-silm kāffatan) applies, 
which, in Muqātil’s view, is “to follow all sharā’i‛ (“laws”) of Islam.402 Muhammad’s 
invitation to the people of the Book was to be faithful to their scriptures in which the 
same teaching of tawḥīd and taṣdīq was instructed. This is different from Muhammad’s 
preaching to the Arab polytheist in which he imposed Islam to them. Therefore, 
according to Muqātil, after their submission, the principle that there is no compulsion in 
religion is to be upheld.403  
The Jews  
There are a number of terms with which the Qur’an addresses the Jews. Of these 
is the term yahūd. The term yahūd is used in the Qur’an in eight places dispersed over 
                                                        
401 Wansbrough said that “abrogation as supercession of earlier dispensations was of cource fundamental to 
the character of Judaeo-Christian polemic.” See his Quranic Studies, 199. But Islamic supersession has a 
slightly different, but significant, view from that developed in the Judaeo-Christian polemic. According to 
Muqātil, Islam supercedes the earlier religions when the followers of these religions chose to adopt Islam 
and leave their old religions. If these people would remain in their old religions, the minimum requirement 
that the Qur’an and Muhammad make is that they will uphold tawḥīd and taṣdīq, and be faithful to the 
teaching of their scriptures.  
402 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/179-180. 
403 While not all Arabs at the time submitted to Muhammad sincerely religiously, but more in a political 
term, Muqātil mentions however that Muhammad’s invitation to Islam was to be understood more in a 
religious term. In his invitation to the people of Hijr, for instance, Muhammad defined being a Muslim as 
proclaiming the same shahādah, eating the Muslim slaughtered animals, accepting the same qiblah, and 
embracing the same religion as Muslims. See Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/213-14. But, Gabriel maintains that the 
Arabs of Muhammad’s contemporary may have viewed their alliance or even submission to Muhammad 
was just like any other traditional alliances made in their social system. This was indicated, for instance, by 
the fact that soon following Muhammad’s death, some groups felt that their alliance with Muhammad was 
automatically annulled. See Gabriel, Muhammad, 205-206. 
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three chapters.404 Some uses of yahūd in the Qur’ān point to the polemics between the 
Jews with the Christians, each proudly claiming the truth for themselves while devaluing 
each other, as stated in Q2: 113.405 Instead of responding to Muhammad’s prophetic call, 
the two religious communities invited Muhammad to follow their religion, as recorded in 
Q2: 120.406 Q5: 18 conveys that the Jews thought they were the children of God and His 
beloved ones; therefore they had the best place in the eyes of God, and therefore, they 
believed, God would never punish them except for a very short period.407 In his 
commentary on Q5: 51, Muqātil maintains that in the aftermath of the believers’ defeat in 
the Battle of Uḥud, they were quite disheartened. For that reason, Muslims would pretend 
to be Jews or Christians when they encountered the People of Scripture for fear of their 
abuse.408  
In Q5: 64, the Jews in particular were depicted as impatient and ungrateful to 
God’s bounty; instead they said something inappropriate about God (“God is tight-
fisted”) and acted rebelliously to His commands, for instance, by concealing some 
teachings of the Bible, such as in the case of rajm, qiṣāṣ, and the description of 
                                                        
404 Namely Q2: 113 (twice), 120; Q5: 18, 51, 64, 82; and Q9: 30. 
405 Q2: 113, “The Jews say, ‘The Christians have no ground whatsoever to stand on,’ and the Christians 
say, ‘The Jews have no ground whatsoever to stand on,’ though they both read the Scripture, and those who 
have no knowledge say the same; God will judge between them on the Day of Resurrection concerning 
their differences.” Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/132. 
406 Q2: 120, “The Jews and the Christians will never be pleased with you unless you follow their ways. Say, 
‘God’s guidance is the only true guidance.’ If you were to follow their desires after the knowledge that has 
come to you, you would find no one to protect you from God or help you.” Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/135. 
407 Q5: 18, “The Jews and the Christians say, ‘We are the children of God and His beloved ones.’ Say, 
‘Then why does He punish you for your sins? You are merely human beings, part of His creation: He 
forgives whoever He will and punishes whoever He will. Control of the heavens and earth and all that is 
between them belongs to Him: all journeys lead to Him.” Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/464-5. 
408 Q5: 51, “You who believe, do not take the Jews and Christians as allies: they are allies only to each 
other. Anyone who takes them as an ally becomes one of them– God does not guide such wrongdoers.” 
Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/483-4. 
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Muhammad in their book.409 In his commentary on Q9: 30, Muqātil lays out a context for 
interpreting the verse—that the Jews killed the prophets who came after Mūsā. As a 
result, God punished them by lifting up the Torah and erasing it from their hearts. With 
the teaching of Jibrīl, ‛Uzayr recovered the lost Torah and taught it to the Jews. The Jews 
seemed so amazed with the recovery of the Torah and saw it as a miraculous event.410 For 
that reason, the Jews believed that ‛Uzayr was God’s son, otherwise he would not have 
been able to recover the Torah in such a way. This is Muqātil’s view as to how the Jews 
eleveated ‛Uzayr to divine sonship. Following in their footstep, the Christians did the 
same, by declaring ‛Īsā as God’s son.411 
The Jews are also called hūdan (“those given guidance”) in the Qur’an.412 The 
term hūdan is used in the Qur’an, only in the Medinan chapter, namely Q2: 111, 135, and 
140, with pejorative connotations. All three verses in which the term hūdan used are 
                                                        
409 Q5: 64, The Jews have said, ‘God is tight-fisted,’ but it is they who are tight-fisted, and they are rejected 
for what they have said. Truly, God’s hands are open wide: He gives as He pleases. What has been sent 
down to you from your Lord is sure to increase insolence and defiance in many of them. We have sown 
enmity and hatred amongst them till the Day of Resurrection. Whenever they kindle the fire of war, God 
will put it out. They try to spread corruption in the land, but God does not love those who corrupt.” 
Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/490. 
410 “According to the Bible, Ezra was the one who brought the Torah to the returning exiles, read and 
interpreted it publicly, and oversaw the people's solemn recommitment to its teachings (Neh. chs 8-10). 
Thus Ezra is like a second Moses. The Rabbis imply this by stating: "Ezra was sufficiently worthy that the 
Torah could have been given through him if Moses had not preceded him"…In addition, he is celebrated 
for other important accomplishments: He is said to be involved in the writing of the book of Psalms (Song 
Rab. 4. 19), and he had the Torah restored to its "original Mosaic" Assyrian characters, thereby leaving the 
old Hebrew characters for the Samaritans (e.g., b. Sanh. 21b). These legal innovations, along with other 
notable accomplishments, reflect the way Ezra is received and embraced by rabbinic Judaism. Ezra is both 
an authoritative scribe and priest, as well as a kind of proto-Rabbi who also has the authority of a prophet.” 
See Adele Berlin and Marc Zvi Brettler (eds.), The Jewish Study Bible (Oxford & New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), 1669-70. 
411 Q9:30, The Jews said, ‘Ezra is the son of God,’ and the Christians said, ‘The Messiah is the son of God’: 
they said this with their own mouths, repeating what earlier disbelievers had said. May God confound 
them! How far astray they have been led!” Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2/167. 
412 That is in Q2: 111, 135 and 140. 
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related to the exclusive truth that the Jews claimed for their religion over that of 
Muhammad, who was prophesied in the Bible and was actually following the millat 
Ibrāhīm as the correct version of religion God had taught humanity. The term hūdan is 
always used in the Qur’an together with the term naṣārā. The Qur’an denies the Jewish 
claim of truth, along with the Christian counterpart, and considers such claims wishful 
thinking.413   
In his commentary on Q2: 135,414 for instance, Muqātil lays out a context in 
which some of the leaders of Jews—such as Ka‛b ibn al-Ashraf, Ka‛b ibn Usayd, Abū 
Yāsir ibn Akhṭab, Mālik ibn al-Ḍayf, ‛Āzār, Ishmawīl, Khumayshā—and some of the 
leaders of Christians from Najrān—such as al-Sayyid and al-‛Āqib—along with their 
companions told the believers: “Be on our religion, for there is no other religion except 
ours.” But again God rejects their claims. Instead He tells them that it is Ibrāhīm’s 
religion (millat Ibrāhīm), namely al-Islām, which is the pure (mukhliṣan), true religion 
(ḥanīfan), says Muqatil. Ibrāhīm was not a polytheist; that is to say, he was part of neither 
the Jews nor the Christians. Thus, here the Qur’an uses terms such as millat Ibrāhīm and 
hanīfan as the true religion, while Muqatil interprets the two as al-Islām and mukhliṣan 
(“purely devoted to God”), respectively.415  
The Qur’an also calls the Jews Banū Isrā’īl. Banū Isrā’īl appears in fifty-seven 
places in the Qur’an. As long as the Qur’an is concerned, the term refers to predecessors 
                                                        
413 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/131, 141, 143. 
414 Q2: 135, “They say, ‘Become Jews or Christians, and you will be rightly guided.’ Say [Prophet], ‘No, 
[ours is] the religion of Abraham, the upright, who did not worship any god besides God.” 
415 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/141.  
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of the Jews, including those of Muhammad’s contemporaries. The Qur’an mentions Banū 
Isrā’īl to remind the Jews of both the rebellious tendency of the Israilites despite God’s 
favors upon them and of the covenant that they had made with God.  
Muqatil understands the Quranic portrayal of the Jews in the following way. 
During the Meccan period, the term Banū Isrā’īl was used to point to Jewish predecessors 
in general, and those of Mūsā’s contemporaries living in the land of the Pharaoh. Special 
mention of Jewish prophets was made to emphasize their obedience to God. At the same 
time, however, the Qur’an mentions the fact that the ancient Israelites were easily 
tempted to fall into shirk and to argue with one another in terms of their religion. During 
the Medinan period, the term Banū Isrā’īl was used to remind the Jews of Medina of the 
covenant that their ancestors made with God, in which they were obliged to obey God’s 
commands and avoid His prohibitions. Furthermore, the use of the term also served to 
remind them of countless favors that God had given them and how God had privileged 
their ancestors over other people at the time so that they might be thankful and obedient 
to God. Yet, some of the ancient Jews insisted on their rebellious acts and disbelief to the 
extent that they deserved God’s punishment, such as being cursed by both Dāwūd and 
‛Īsā.416 
                                                        
416 In his commentary on Q5:78, Muqātil mentions that the verse is recounting two prophetic curses, those 
of Dāwūd and ‛Īsā, respectively, along with their consequences on the ancient Jews. That is, some 
disbelievers of Banū Isrā’īl went fishing on Sabbath (Saturday), while they were prohibited to do so. 
Dāwud said: “O God, verily your servants broke your command and ignored it. Make them as a sign and 
example for the rest of your creation.” God then turned them into monkeys. This was David’s curse (la‛nat 
Dāwud). While ‛Īsā’s curse is this: after the Jews eat what God had sent them on the Table, they remained 
disbelievers. In the wake of God’s lifting up what was on the table, ‛Īsā said: “O God, verily you have 
promised us that whoever remains disbelief after he eats from the table, you will punish him with 
something you have never punished anyone in the world. O God, punish them as the people of Sabbath 
(asḥab al-sabt) were punished.” God turned them into pigs. They were 5000 adult male at the time, no 
women nor children. See Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/496. 
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When the Prophet migrated to Medinah, Muqātil maintains, the Jews of the city, 
especially Huyay ibn Akhṭab, were not excited. As a token for their rejection of his 
prophethood, the Jews told Muhammad that it would be better to go to Syria, the land of 
prophets. They said, “Since when do you think God would send prophets to the land of 
Tiḥamah? If you are truly a prophet, then go to Syria. Sure, they will stop you from 
entering the city lest that you gain victory over Rome. But if you are truly a prophet, that 
is what you expect to happen, for it also happened to the prophets before you!” 
Interestingly, Muqātil mentions that Muhammad listened to the Jews and headed toward 
Syria, camping three miles away [from Medina] at Dhu’l Ḥalīfah to wait for his 
companions to join. Jibrīl came to Muhammad with this verse, Q17: 76-77,417 following 
which Muhammad then went back to Medina, praying with Q17: 80, which, according to 
Muqātil’s commentary, was also a prayer when he was later conquering Mecca (fatḥ 
Makkah): “Say, ‘My Lord, make me go in truthfully, and come out truthfully, and grant 
me supporting authority from You.’”418 
With his migration to Medina, Muhammad wished that the People of the Book, 
i.e. the Jews, would accept him, for, he believed, his prophecy was mentioned in the 
Torah. As part of gaining the Jews’ acceptance, after the hijrah, the Prophet was 
commanded to pray toward Bayt al-Maqdis to appease the Jews, despite his preference to 
pray toward Ka’bah at Mecca.419  
                                                        
417 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2/545. 
418 “They planned to scare you off the land, but they would not have lasted for more than a little while after 
you (76); such was Our way with the messengers We sent before you, and you will find no change in Our 
ways (77).” Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2/546. 
419 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/144. See Lapidus, History, 24. 
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But this did not work; the Jews remained resistant toward him and his claim of 
prophethood. Like their Meccan Arab counterpart, the Jews asked Muhammad to provide 
them with another Qur’an that was written in heaven and a complete one, just like the one 
that Mūsā received.420 The Jews also hid the truth about the description of Muhammad’s 
prophecy in the Torah, not only from Muhammad but also from their Jewish followers, 
lest that they would lose their annual income they gained from them had they decided to 
follow Muhammad.421 Some of the Jews provoked some newly converted [Jewish] 
Muslims to come back to their old religion and persuaded them in different ways to leave 
Islam.422  
Besides takdhīb, the Jews were also reminded of their ancestors’ violation of 
tawḥīd, when they called ‘Uzayr as God’s son.423 The Jews of Medina themselves were 
                                                        
420 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/419. 
421 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/321, 156, 118, 296, 168-9. 
422 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/283, 297. 
423 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2/168. Muqātil mentions that after the Jews killed their prophets after Musa, God lifted 
the Torah from them and erased it from their hearts. Then ‘Uzayr came wandering on earth. Jibrīl 
approached him, saying, “Where are you going?” “Seeking knowledge,” ‛Uzayr answered. Jibrīl then 
taught ‘Uzayr the whole Torah, and ‘Uzayr taught it to Banū Isrā’īl. In this respect, due to their amazement, 
Banū Isrā’īl said, “’Uzayr will not know this knowledge (of the Torah) unless he is God’s son.” In her 
book, Theologies in conflict in 4 Ezra: Wisdom, Debate, and Apocalyptic Solution (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 
2008), Karina Martin Hogan maintains that in the “Fourth Ezra, a Jewish apocalypse written around 100 
c.e.” (1), “Ezra’s reputation as a scribe of the Torah was well established” (208). Ezra was proceeding with 
the restoration of the Torah or twenty-four books of the Hebrew Scriptures that were burned in the 
destruction of Jerusalem by the Babylonians. The restoration began when Ezra received the revelation of 
these twenty-four books of the Hebrew Scriptures, and also seventy additional books that contain “the 
spring of understanding, the fountain of wisdom and the river of knowledge” (205). “[T]he noteworthy 
point here is the break in the chain of scribal transmission of Scripture occasioned by the Babylonian 
destruction of Jerusalem. From this author’s perspective, the textual tradition of written revelation goes 
back only to the time of the Babylonian Exile, to Ezra and his five scribes. Hence Ezra is depicted as a 
second Moses in the epilogue. The total of forty days of fasting in the previous six episodes is balanced by 
Ezra’s forty-day fast in the epilogue, during the writing of the ninety-four books (14:42–44), recalling 
Moses’ forty day fast during the rewriting of the tablets of the law (Exod 34:28). The forty-day fast in the 
epilogue may be meant to draw an analogy between the re-inscription of the commandments on the second 
set of stone tablets after Moses destroyed the first set (Exod 32:19; Deut 9:17) and Ezra’s inspired dictation 
of the ninety-four books, after the Babylonians burned the “law” (4 Ezra 14:21–22)” (205-6).  
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accused of violating the agreements with Muhammad more than once in terms of the 
security of the city about which they shared some responsibility.424  Even worse, the Jews 
built a conspiracy with the Arab disbelievers to kill Muhammad.425 This series of 
violations that the Jews of Medina committed added more to the already long list of sins 
that their predecessors, Banū Isrā’īl, committed in the past,426 despite divine favors that 
they received.427 This, in Muqātil’s view, drew a larger picture of the Jews as a thankless 
community that deserved God’s punishment. 
Based on Muqātil’s commentary, however, the Jews were not uniform. Rather, 
they were of different kinds. There were at least three Jewish groups in relation to 
Muhammad, Qur’an, and Islam. The first was a group of the believing Jews (mu’minū ahl 
al-Tawrāh), such as ‘Abd Allāh ibn Salām and his companions, including Salām ibn 
Qays, Tha‛labah ibn Salām, Qays son of ‘Abd Allāh ibn Salam’s sister, Usayd and Asad 
                                                        
424 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2/122. 
425 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/378-9. See also F.E. Peters, Islam: A Guide for Jews and Christians (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2003), 194. 
426 The Qur’an enumerates the sins that Banū Isrā’īl had committed, such as insisting Musa to ask God so 
that they could see him directly (arinā Allāh jahratan) of which they were incapable, their worshipping of 
golden calf (ittakhadhū al-‘Ijl) when Musa was away to receive the Torah, their violation of Sabbath, their 
disbelief in the Gospel and Qur’an (wa kufrihim bi āyāt Allah), their murdering the prophets (wa qatlihim 
al-anbiyā’), their accusation against Maryam (bint ‘Imrān ibn Mathān) of adultery with her uncle’s son 
(Yūsuf ibn Mathān), their conviction that they had killed ‘Īsā, one that the Qur’an rejects as a false claim, 
their obstructing the way to Islam (wa biṣaddihim ‘an sabīl Allāh) that is from believing in Islam and 
Muhammad, their practice of ribā and unlawful consumption of other’s wealth. See Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/419-
22. 
427 Muqātil maintains, despite their sins, God had favored Banū Isrā’īl on many occasions. When they were 
still in Egypt, God has already given them His mercy in what is called “nine signs” (āyāt al-tis‛) in which 
the Jews and the Copts were saved by god from a number of natural disasters. In addition, the Jews were 
favored by God, such as when God saved them from Pharaoh and his troop, when God destroyed their 
enemy by dividing the sea, when He sent them manna wa salwa (food and drink from heaven), when He 
shaded them with the cloud during the day and shed them light during the night when they were in 
wilderness (arḍ al-tīh), when He sprang twelve fountains of water from a rock, and when He gave them the 
Torah so that they worshipped God alone, etc. It is in the Torah that God set out a covenant over human 
beings to worship Him and not associate Him with anything else and to believe Muhammad as well as 
other prophets and al-kitāb. See Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/100-103, 124; 3/30, 35, 298.  
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sons of Ka‛b, Yāmin, and Ibn Yāmin.428 Second was a group of the disbelieving Jews 
(kuffār ahl al-kitāb), such as Qays ibn ‘Amr, ‘Āzar ibn Yunḥūm,429 Ka‛b ibn al-Ashraf, 
and so forth.430 Third was a group of the hypocritical Jews (munāfiqū ahl al-kitāb al-
yahūd), such as ‘Abd Allāh ibn Salūl, Judd ibn Qays, al-Ḥārith ibn ‘Amr, Mugīth ibn 
Qushayr, and ‘Amr ibn Zayd.431  
These three Jewish groups had different responses when invited to believe in 
Muhammad, the Qur’an, and Islam. The response of the believing Jews would be “we 
believe” (yaqūlūna āmannā bihī);432 the disbelieving Jews would mock Muhammad’s 
invitation to Islam, and they instead said that believing is the work of stupid people,433 or 
else, some of them—including Abū Yāsir, al-Nu‛mān ibn Awfā—would say “We believe 
in what has been sent down to us, and reject everything after it”, that is, the Gospel and 
the Qur’an.434 The hypocritical Jews would show off their belief when they were with the 
believers and mocked Islam when they were back with their own people.435 If pushed, 
they would argue that they were believers just like the Muslims, and they had proclaimed 
shahādah just like the Muslims had.436  
The Jews, according to Muqātil, had actually found the description of Muhammad 
in the Torah, far before Muhammad proclaimed his prophethood. Their expectation was, 
                                                        
428 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/81, 120. 
429 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/129. 
430 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/91. 
431 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/89. 
432 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/87. 
433 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/90. 
434 Q2: 91; Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/123. 
435 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/89-91. 
436 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/90. 
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however, that the awaited prophet would be Isḥāq’s descendant. Once they knew that the 
Prophet they were expecting was an Arab and descended from ‛Ismā‛īl, they rejected him 
out of envy,437 and blamed Jibrīl for giving Prophethood to Muhammad. As a result, they 
considered Jibrīl their enemy.438  
Some Jews—including Rifā‛ah ibn Zayd and Zayd ibn ‘Amr—doubted the truth 
of the Qur’an claiming it to be Muhammad’s own forgery,439 and therefore God’s 
revealing the “verses of challenge” (āyāt al-taḥaddī) to them to produce the like of the 
Qur’an. Such a rejection (takdhīb) was characteristic of the Jews, as they had previously 
violated the first covenant and what had been written in the Torah, namely to worship 
only one God and not to associate Him with anything else, and to believe in the Prophets, 
including both ‘Īsā and Muhammad; the Jews, however, believed only in some prophets 
and disbelieved in others.440  
The Christians  
Apart from the general terms such as ahl al-kitāb, the Christians are mentioned in 
the Qur’an using the term naṣārā. There are fiveteen uses of the term naṣārā in the 
Qur’an, one of which is in singular form—nasrānī—dispersed in fourteen verses in five 
                                                        
437 Tafsīr Muqātil Ibn Sulaymān, 1/91. The biblical account of Ishmael is ambiguous. “In Genesis 17 he is 
circumcised, yet because of divine favoritism, a few chapters later in Genesis 21 he is expelled from his 
father’s home. Banished into the desert, he is no longer a collateral member of Abraham’s household.” This 
ambiguity influences Ishmael’s portrayal in rabbinic literature. In the pre-Islamic midrashim, as a 
marginalized figure in the Bible, Ishmael is presented as “Israel’s imagined antipode…representing a 
rabbinic conceptualization of Other that serves to reaffirm Jewish identity...to affirm Judaism’s status as 
chosen Israel.” See Carol Bakhos, Ishmael on the Border: Rabbinic Portrayals of the First Arab (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 2006), 129.  
438 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2/547-8. 
439 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/93. 
440 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/94-95, 123-4. 
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different chapters.441 Of these fiveteen apperances, the term naṣārā or naṣrānī is mostly 
accompanied by other terms referring to Jews, namely yahūd, hūd and alladhīna hādū. 
There are only two places where the term naṣārā is accompanied not only by terms that 
reference the Jews but also by those referencing other religious communities such as the 
Sabians (ṣabi’īn),442 Magians (majūs), and the polytheists (alladhīna ashrakū).443 Only 
once does the term naṣārā appear alone, in Q5: 14. In general, however, “the whole tone 
of the Koran is less friendly toward Jews than it is toward Christians.”444  
Because the number of terms referencing Christians—ahl al-kitāb and naṣārā—is 
much smaller than those that refer to the Jews—such as yahūd, hūd, alladhīna hādū, ahl 
al-kitāb, alladīna ātaynāhum al-kitāb, alladhīna yaqra’ūn al-kitāb, alladhīna ūtū al-
kitāb—their shared appearances have meant that the discussion of Christians and 
Christianity has always been overshadowed by the Qur’an’s discussion of the Jews, to 
whom it refers with more terms and more frequently. Thus, if we only rely on the 
Qur’an’s description of the Christians, there is not much information we can get about 
them, except a few verses dealing with their claims about ‘Isā. This raises a question as to 
why there is so little mention of the Christians. Is it because Muhammad very rarely had 
contact with them during the moments of revelation Muhammad very rarely had contact 
                                                        
441 They are: Q2: 62, 111, 113 (twice), 120, 135, 140; Q3: 67; Q: 22, 17; Q5: 14, 18, 51, 69, 82; Q9: 30. 
442 Parrinder maintains that the identity of the Sabaeans is unclear. Some scholars have identified him the 
the Mandaeans, who were “sometimes called 'Christians of St John'.” But since they are mentioned in the 
Qur’an, along with Jews and Christians, as 'People of the Book' it seems that they were more likely 
monotheists, “pagan monotheists of Mesopotamia who were mentioned with interest by Arabic writers 
from the fourth Islamic century onwards.” “They were a distinct pagan sect at 
Ḥarrān in Mesopotamia.” The rituals of orthodox Mandaeans are close to ancient Zoroastrian practices. See 
Jesus, 59, 153. 
443 See Q2: 62 and Q22: 17. 
444 Aubrey R. Vine, The Nestorian Churches: A Concise History of Nestorian Christianity in Asia from the 
Persian Schism to Modern Assyrians (London: Independent Press, 1937), 85. 
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with them? Or is it because the Christians did not pose a real danger to Muhammad’s 
prophetic mission, perhaps due either to their more affectionate character or to the rare 
contact with Muhammad?  
It is possible that Muhammad’s relatively intensive contact with the Jews and the 
concomitant problems that arose as a result of the latter’s disbelief in the former may 
explain some of the reasons for relative disparity in terms of the appearance of the Jews 
and Christians in the Qur’an. And if the Qur’an does not say much about the Christians, 
except for their fundamental characteristics—such as ‛Isā’s divinity, trinity, and their 
rivalry with the Jews—the commentaries, such as Muqātil’s, may promise to give us 
more information on Christians and Christianity, partly because the part of Iraq where 
Muqātil lived witnessed a significance presence of Christians.445 Contrary to the 
depiction of the Jews, however, the Qur’an and Muqātil’s commentary say almost 
nothing about the Christians’ enmity to Muhammad and the believers.446 
When the term naṣārā appears in the Qur’an together with either yahūd or hūd, it 
                                                        
445 In Baghdad, for instance, the population was diverse comprising different cultures and religions. The 
most prominent were the Christians, who had lived and built their churches and monasteries in the area 
long before the city was built in 145/762. Religious encounters and debates between Muslims and non-
Muslims occurred in Baghdad. There was a report of a debate supposedly taking place in the mid 
second/eight century between a Christian leader named Barīha and the Muslim theologian Hishām ibn al-
Ḥakam, who himself made his way from his native Baṣra to the new city as a market trader. Furthermore, 
Baghdad in the mid second/eighth century was a city in which Christian priests felt free to appear in public 
in great, even intimidating numbers, and that discussions about points of religious difference were held in 
the most public places. This suggests that Baghdad in its earliest years was a place of frequent and free 
encounters between Muslims and Christians. David Thomas, Early Muslim Polemic against Christianity: 
Abū ‘Īsā al-Warrāq’s “Against the Incarnation,” (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 3-
4. 
446 Trimingham maintains that “Whereas Christianity was non-existent among the Arabs of western Arabia 
south of the Judham tribes, Judaism was well-established in self-governing and self-sufficient colonies 
stretching south from Madyan along Wādi ‘l-Qurā to the oasis settlement of Yathrib, soon to be called 
Madinat an-Nabī, "the City of the Prophet". Nothing is known about their origins.” Christianity, 249-50. 
See also Jane Dammen McAuliffe, Qur’ānic Christians: An analysis of classical and modern exegesis 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
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usually brings up a negative tone of religious sectarianism. Indeed, the Qur’an depicts the 
Christians and the Jews as equally proud of themselves, placing themselves not only over 
other people but also over each other—thus their rivalry. In the Qur’an, God has always 
categorically rejected their claims of superiority. When the two people claimed to be 
God’s children and his Beloved and that they would therefore never be punished, in Q5: 
18447 God rejected their claim. When the two people claimed that only they could enter 
paradise, God again rejected their claim as a wishful thinking.448 When the two 
arrogantly claimed that only their religions were the true path of guidance, God rejected 
them,449 not once, but several times.450 Jews and Christians showed their pride by placing 
themselves not only over other people, but also over each other while dismissing each 
other’s religion’s validity.451 
The Qur’an also asserts that the Jews and Christians would never stop trying to 
persuade Muhammad to follow their religion,452 but God soon responded by commanding 
Muhammad to tell them that “God’s guidance is the only true guidance,” which in 
                                                        
447 “The Jews and the Christians say, ‘We are the children of God and His beloved ones.’ Say, ‘Then why 
does He punish you for your sins? You are merely human beings, part of His creation: He forgives whoever 
He will and punishes whoever He will. Control of the heavens and earth and all that is between them 
belongs to Him: all journeys lead to Him.’” 
448 Q2: 111, “They also say, ‘No one will enter Paradise unless he is a Jew or a Christian.’ This is their own 
wishful thinking. [Prophet], say, ‘Produce your evidence, if you are telling the truth.’” 
449 Q2: 135, “They say, ‘Become Jews or Christians, and you will be rightly guided.’ Say [Prophet], ‘No, 
[ours is] the religion of Abraham, the upright, who did not worship any god besides God.’” 
450 See Q2: 140 and Q3: 67  
451 Q2: 113, “The Jews say, ‘The Christians have no ground whatsoever to stand on,’ and the Christians 
say, ‘The Jews have no ground whatsoever to stand on,’ though they both read the Scripture, and those who 
have no knowledge say the same; God will judge between them on the Day of Resurrection concerning 
their differences.” 
452 Q2: 120, “The Jews and the Christians will never be pleased with you unless you follow their ways. Say, 
‘God’s guidance is the only true guidance.’ If you were to follow their desires after the knowledge that has 
come to you, you would find no one to protect you from God or help you.” 
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Muqātil’s commentary, means that it is Islam that is the true guidance.453 Instead, God 
commanded Muhammad and the believers not to take the Jews and Christians as allies: 
they are allies only to each other.454 Such a warning was given because the two people 
might possess hatred and enmity toward Muhammad and the believers as stated in Q5: 
82.455  
It is interesting, however, that while the Qur’an depicts the Jews and the 
Polytheists as the most hostile to Muhammad and the believers, in the same verse (5:82) 
it also describes the Christians as the most affectionate to Muhammad and the believers, 
especially those Christians whose lives were devoted mostly to asceticism and learning. 
In his comment on second part of the verse (5:82), “you are sure to find that the closest in 
affection (mawaddatan) towards the believers are those who say, ‘We are Christians,’ for 
there are among them people devoted to learning and ascetics. These people are not given 
to arrogance.” Muqātil interprets mawaddatan “not in terms of love, but in terms of their 
quick response to belief” (wa laysa ya‘nī fī al-ḥubb wa lākin ya‘nī fī sur‘at al-ijābah li al-
īmān).456 Muqātil provides a similar interpretation of Q28:52-3 that emphasizes the 
prompt belief that the Christians quickly showed when they heard the Qur’an.457 Indeed, 
                                                        
453 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/135. 
454 Q5: 51, “You who believe, do not take the Jews and Christians as allies: they are allies only to each 
other. Anyone who takes them as an ally becomes one of them– God does not guide such wrongdoers.” 
455 “You [Prophet] are sure to find that the most hostile to the believers are the Jews and those who 
associate other deities with God; you are sure to find that the closest in affection towards the believers are 
those who say, ‘We are Christians,’ for there are among them people devoted to learning and ascetics. 
These people are not given to arrogance.” 
456 The pages that address this verse and Muqātil’s commens on it are missing from Shiḥātah’s edition. 
Instead, I found them in Farīd’s edition of Muqātil’s commentary.  
457 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/349-50. In this respect, Muqātil understands alladhīna ātaynāhum al-kitāba as those 
upon whom God gave the Gospel (al-Injīl). More specifically, these people are the foutry believing 
Christians (muslimī ahl al-injīl wa hum arba‘ūn rajulan) who, together with Ja‘far ibn Abī Ṭālib, headed to 
Medina to meet the Prophet. 
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there were events in Muhammad’s life that showed how some Christians built a good 
relationship with Muhammad and his followers. When life in Mecca became worse for 
Muhammad’s followers, they migrated first to Abyssinia, before they finally migrated to 
Medina.458 There, the believers were welcome and treated well, and the Abyssinian King 
al-Najāshī (Negus) acknowledged Muhammad’s prophethood. Reciprocally, when 
Muhammad heard that the king died, he commanded his companions to perform prayer 
for the deceased king,459 though it is unclear whether the latter remained in his old 
religion. The Abyssinian king was often depicted as acknowledging Muhammad’s 
prophethood (taṣdīq) and agreeing with the Qur’an’s depiction of Maryam and ‘Īsā in the 
Chapter Maryam recited in front of him.460 
In addition to remarking on their unwarranted pride and their rivalries with the 
Jews, the Qur’an’s criticism toward the Christians targets their neglect of covenant with 
God and their violation of tawḥīd by committing shirk. Q4: 14 mentions, “We also took a 
pledge from those who say, ‘We are Christians,’ but they too forgot some of what they 
were told to remember, so We stirred up enmity and hatred among them until the Day of 
Resurrection, when God will tell them what they have done.” In his commentary on this 
verse, Muqātil maintains that God had made a covenant with the People of Gospel (ahl 
al-injīl), the same as God made with the People of the Torah (ahl al-Tawrāh), that they 
will believe in Muhammad, follow him, and accept his prophethood. Such a covenant 
                                                        
458 The migration to Abyssinia was conducted to escape “[a]n economic boycott imposed on the Muslims 
by the Quraysh (the Prophet’s tribe) [that] caused unbearable financial and social hardships for the former.” 
See Afsaruddin, Early Muslim, 3. 
459 Muḥammad ibn Ismā‛il al-Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī (Beirūt: Dār Ibn Kathīr, 2002), 319-320. 
460 Parrinder, Jesus, 46. 
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was written in the Gospel. But the Christians forgot it. Because of their disbelief and 
neglect of the covenant, Muqātil continues, God created enmity and hatred among their 
different sects, namely the Nestorians, the Mar-Jacobites,461 and the angel-
worshippers.462 These different Christian denominations would be inimical to each other 
until the Day of Judgment.463 God will unfold their rejection of the Prophet as well as 
their rebellion against God in the hereafter. Such rebellion, according to Muqātil, is 
                                                        
461 Trimingham maintains “The Syriac-speaking communities separated from the Byzantine Church 
through a painful process by which they attached themselves to two main lines of interpretation that 
acquired the designations of Monophysite or Jacobite (in Syria) and Dyophysite or Nestorian. The first in 
broad terms was the line that Christians within the Roman sphere took, and the second that of those who 
fell within the Persian sphere.” It is noteworthy that Trimingham underlined the fact that Syriac 
Christianity took two different lines of interpretation depending whether it was under Persian or Roman 
empires. In the first, it was Nestorian, and in the second it was a Monophysite or Jacobite. Thus, Muqātil’s 
term al-Mār Ya‛qūbiyyah is a way to call the Monophysite or Jacobite Christians attributable to Mar Jacob, 
the bishop of Edessa, who played a major role in the organization of the Monophysite Church in Syria and 
Mesopotamia alongside the Imperial Church. See Trimingham’s Christianity, 137, 145, 168. 
462 “The Jews of Jesus’s time were split on their faith in angels: the Essenes not only believed in them, but 
elaborated their roles and categories. On the other hand, the Sadducees denied their existence. Jesus, whose 
ideas were closer to those of the Pharisees on this subject, made frequent mention of angels. In fact, the 
New Testament period is full of references to both angels and demons, indicating a general belief in them 
and their activities among humankind. Apparently, the liveliness of the belief in the spirit world became a 
threat to the young church, where some of its members turned to angel-worship. The New Testament 
specifi cally prohibits the worship of angels (Rev. 19:10, 22:9). In fact, demons may sometimes 
masquerade as angels (2 Cor. 11:14–15). See Nancy M. Tischler, All Things in the Bible: An Encyclopedia 
of the Biblical World (Connecticut & London: Greenwood Press, 2006), 22. Gustav Davidson maintained 
that angels are mentioned frequently enough in both the Old and New Testaments, but they are not named, 
save in two or three instances. Virtually all the named angels in this compilation are culled from sources 
outside Scripture.” See his Dictionary of Angels Including the Fallen Angels (New York: the Free Press, 
1971), ix. 
463 In the commentary, Muqātil mentions three Christian denominations, namely Nestorian (al-Nisṭūriyyah), 
Jacobite or Monophysite (al-Mār-Ya‛qūbiyyah), and Melkite (al-mulkāniyyūn). Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/462-3, 
2/580, 628, 3/800-1. Muqātil’s relatively passionate discussion of Christology in the commentary perhaps 
represents the first, but crude, polemic against the Christians, shaped largely by the Qur’an’s lead. On the 
Christian side, the earliest polemical account of Islam is that of John of Damascus (d. c. 132/750), who was 
brought up in the Umayyad court. To see the development of polemic between Muslims and Christians, see 
Thomas, Early Muslim Polemic. In relation to Arab Christians, Trimingham maintains that “The fifth-
century controversies concerning the nature of Christ mark, though they do not explain, the division of 
Syrian Christians into opposing communions, of which the most defined were the Melkite (Chalcedonian), 
the West Syrian (Monophysite), and the East Syrian (Nestorian). In consequence of these divisions, those 
northern Arab Christians, nomadic and sedentary alike, who fell within the spheres of Byzantium and 
Persia also became distinguished ecclesiastically as Monophysites or Nestorians.” The term Melkites 
“came to be applied to all who remained in communion with Constantinople, whether Syrian or Greek.” 
See his Christianity, 159, 213, 216. 
  
150 
evidenced when the Nestorians said that ‛Īsā was God’ son, the Mar-Jacobites said that 
God is the Messiah son of Maryam,464 and the angel-worshippers said that God is one of 
the three: He is a god, and so were ‛Īsā and Maryam.465  
In his commentary on Q9: 30,466 which spells out explicitly the Christians’ 
violation of tawḥīd and their committing shirk, Muqātil says that when they said that 
“The Messiah is the son of God,” they merely and unjustifiably imitated the Jews who 
earlier said that “Ezra is the son of God.”467 But Muqātil also suggests that the elevation 
of ‛Isā to the rank of divinity by the Christians was also due to their excessive religiosity, 
as shown by his commentary on Q4: 170-172.468 Muqātil interprets “the People of the 
                                                        
464Q5: 17, 72. Parrinder argued, “To say that God is Christ is a statement not found anywhere in the New 
Testament or in the Christian creed… But in the early Christian centuries there arose heresies, such as that 
of Patripassianism, which so identified Christ and God as to suggest that God the Father had suffered on the 
cross. About A.D. 200 Noetus had taught that Christ was God the Father, and therefore that the Father 
himself was born and suffered and died. These views were taken to Rome by Praxeas, of whom Tertullian 
said that 'he drove out prophecy and brought in heresy, he put to flight the Comforter and crucified the 
Father'. The orthodox teaching of the Logos, the Word or 'Son' of God, was a defence against such heretical 
teaching, though it must be admitted that writers in later ages were not always careful enough in their use 
of these titles.”  See Jesus, 133-34. However, as far as the Syrian Christian society is concerned, which 
largely influenced the kind of Christianity the Arabs embraced, “the majority adopted the Monophysite 
dispensation which took no halfway measures about recognizing Christ as God.” Trimingham, Christianity, 
213. 
465 “It has often been thought that the Qur'an denies the Christian teaching of the Trinity, and commentators 
have taken its words to be a rejection of orthodox Christian doctrine. However, it seems more likely that it 
is heretical doctrines that are denied in the Qur'an, and orthodox Christians should agree with most of its 
statements… The Qur'an denies Christian heresies of Adoption, Patripassianism, and Mariolatry. But it 
affirms the Unity, which is at the basis of trinitarian doctrine.” Parrinder, Jesus, 133-37. To understand how 
the Christians understand trinity see Parrinders’ explanations, Jesus, 138-40. Or it is also possible that such 
a Trinitarian Christianity was the one called “Tritheistic heresy” developed in the Monopysite communities 
during the reigns of the Ghassānī Ḥārith ibn Jalaba and his successor Mundhir ibn al-Ḥārith (c. 569). See 
Trimingham, Christianity, 183-4. 
466 “The Jews said, ‘Ezra is the son of God,’ and the Christians said, ‘The Messiah is the son of God’: they 
said this with their own mouths, repeating what earlier disbelievers had said. May God confound them! 
How far astray they have been led!” 
467 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2/167. 
468 “The Messenger has come to you [people] with the truth from your Lord, so believe– that is best for 
you– for even if you disbelieve, all that is in the heavens and the earth still belongs to God, and He is all 
knowing and all wise. People of the Book, do not go to excess in your religion, and do not say anything 
about God except the truth: the Messiah, Jesus, son of Mary, was nothing more than a messenger of God, 
His word, directed to Mary, a spirit from Him. So believe in God and His messengers and do not speak of a 
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Book” (ahl al-kitāb) in this verse as Christians from Najrān, including al-Sayyid and al-
‘Āqib, whom the Qur’an warns not to be so excessive in their religiosity by divinizing 
Jesus and Mary, and not to talk about trinity by making God as the third after Jesus and 
Mary.469 When commenting on Q3: 59, 470  Muqātil explains the reasons for the Christian 
excessive religiosity are due to ‛Īsā’s unusual birth and a number of miracles that God 
had bestowed upon him. In setting out the context for his commentary on the verse, 
Muqātil mentions that the Christian delegates of Najrān came to meet with the Prophet in 
Medina, including al-Sayyid and al-‘Āqib, al-Asqaf, al-Ra’s, Qays and his sons Khalid 
and ‛Amr.471 Their leaders, al-Sayyid and al-‘Āqib, said to the Prophet,  
“O Muhammad, why do you curse and criticize our Lord (ṣāhibanā)?” The 
Prophet replied, “Who is your Lord? “‛Īsā, son of the virgin Maryam. Show us any 
creation that is like him, who was able to bring the dead to life, cure the blind and 
leprous, and made a bird out of soil” [they said this, according to Muqātil, without ever 
mentioning “with God’s Will”]. “Every descendant of Adam has a father, but ‘Īsā does 
not have one. Thus, follow us in that ‘Īsā is God’s son, and only then we will follow you. 
You either make ‘Īsā the son (of God) or make him God (himself).” The Prophet replied, 
“I seek refuge from God, He has no son and there is no other God than He is.”472 
                                                        
‘Trinity’– stop [this], that is better for you– God is only one God, He is far above having a son, everything 
in the heavens and earth belongs to Him and He is the best one to trust. The Messiah would never disdain 
to be a servant of God, nor would the angels who are close to Him. He will gather before Him all those who 
disdain His worship and are arrogant.” 
469 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/424-5. 
470 “In God’s eyes Jesus is just like Adam: He created him from dust, said to him, ‘Be’, and he was.” 
471 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/279-80.Trimingham maintains that “The fact that the people of Najran were the only 
group of Yemenites that treated with Muhammad during "the period of delegations" shows them to have 
been the only considerable body of native Christians in south-west Arabia.” Christianity, 307. 
472 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/280. 
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Despite a long list of criticism, the Qur’an still offers a chance for Jews and 
Christians, as well as other religious communities, to receive God’s reward by beliving in 
one God (tawḥīd) and in the Last Day, and by doing good deeds, as stated in Q2: 62. 
According to Muqātil, this verse was revealed when Salmān al-Fārisī, who came from 
Jundishapur, was converting to Islam. Salmān told the Prophet about the Christian monk 
(rāhib) and his companions who were persistent in their religion, praying and fasting. 
Upon hearing that story, the Prophet immediately said that they would be in hell. But 
revelation soon came to correct the Prophet, stating that as long as they believe, sincerely 
and not hypocritically, in Muhammad and what he taught, believed in one God (tawḥīd) 
having no associate and the Last Day, and did good deeds, their reward is assured before 
God.473 This context of revelation is interesting since it suggests that the Qur’an corrects 
Muhammad’s hasty judgment about people who did not answer his call. This divine 
correction was to advise Muhammad to be more patient and open to possibility that they 
would eventually accept his prophethood and worship God even in their old religions. At 
least, Muhammad had known of such person, that is, King Nergus in Abyssinia, and also 
some thirty two Abyssinian and eight Syrian Christians who, according to Muqātil, held 
‛Īsā’s religion until Muhammad came (wa aqāma unasun minhum ‘alā dīn ‘Īsā--‘alayh 
al-salām--ḥattā adrakū Muḥammadan), and they accordingly believed in him.474 
 Muqātil mentions this group of the believing Christians (muslimū ahl al-Injīl) 
                                                        
473 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/112. 
474 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 4/246. 
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when he was commenting on Q 28: 52-3.475 There were some forty people of ahl al-Injīl 
who came to Medina with Ja‛far ibn Abī Ṭālib, eight of who came from Syria, including 
Bahīrā, Abrahah, al-Ashraf, Durayd, Tammām, Ayman, Idrīs, and Nāfi‛.476 For these 
believing Christians, there were two rewards, one for their preserving Islam—that is, 
tawḥīd—and another for believing in Muhammad when they found him, despite their 
community’s condemnation.477 
The Hypocrites  
Another social element of the Medinan society frequently addressed in the Qur’an 
are the munāfiqūn or hypocrites, that is, a group of people who converted to Islam, yet 
often acted against Islam and Muhammad. The term that points to the hypocrites is 
always mentioned in the plural form, male and female, as munāfiqūn and munāfiqāt. The 
term munāfiqūn appears twenty five times in twenty-five verses, and the term munāfiqāt, 
always accompanying munāfiqūn, appears only five times.478 In many places in the 
Qur’an, the munāfiqūn are put in the same position with either disbelievers (kuffār, 
kāfirūn)479 or polytheists (mushrikūn),480 and are therefore threatened with equally severe 
punishment in the hereafter. The difference between the munāfiqūn, on the one hand, and 
the kuffār and mushrikūn, on the other, is that while the latter two publicly proclaimed 
                                                        
475  “(52) Those to whom We gave the Scripture before believe in it, (53) and, when it is recited to them, 
say, ‘We believe in it, it is the truth from our Lord. Before it came we had already devoted ourselves to 
Him.’ (54) They will be given their rewards twice over because they are steadfast, repel evil with good, 
give to others out of what We have provided for them.” 
476 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/348-350. 
477 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/349. 
478 The verses are: Q29: 11; Q8: 49; Q4: 61, 88, 138, 140, 142, 145; Q33: 1, 12, 24, 48, 60, 73; Q57:13; 
Q63:1, 7, 8; Q 66:9; Q48:6; Q9:64, 67, 68, 73, 101.   
479 Such as in Q4: 138, 140; Q9: 68, 73; Q33: 1, 48; Q66: 9. 
480 Such as in Q33: 73; Q48: 6. 
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their disbelief in Muhammad and the Qur’an, the former, in one way or another, 
professed some sort of submission and acceptance of Muhammad and the Qur’an, despite 
their nominal recognition and many instances of rebellious acts.  
There are a number of descriptions given to the munāfiqūn in the Qur’an. The 
Qur’an describes them as those unwilling to follow what has been revealed to the Prophet 
(Q4: 61), whose conviction is unstable as their belief and disbelief are on and off (Q4: 
138), ridiculing and making fun of revelation (Q4: 140, Q33: 12), deceitful by showing 
off belief absent in their hearts (Q4: 142, Q63: 1), in whose heart there is illness (Q8: 49, 
Q33: 12, 60), and commanding evil and forbidding right (Q9: 67). For these reasons, the 
Qur’an threatens the munāfiqūn with severe punishment (Q9: 68, 101) in hellfire of 
Jahannam (Q4: 140, Q9: 68, 73; Q66: 9), and even the lowest depths of Hell (Q4: 145). 
However, God still gives the munāfqūn a chance to repent, if they will (Q33: 24). 
In his commentary, Muqātil presents a more elaborate and detailed description of 
the munāfiqūn. In doing so, he not only comments on those verses in which the terms that 
refer to hypocrites are found, but also brings in other verses that he sees as relevant. 
Muqātil mentions names, places, and events within which the rebellious acts of the 
munāfiqūn unfolded. By doing so, Muqātil clarifies who these munāfiqūn really were. 
Based on the presentation of the munāfiqūn in both the Qur’an and Muqātil’s 
commentary, the most important characteristic of these people is that they had no trust in 
the Prophet, religiously and politically. Consequently, they were deceitfully two-faced in 
order to avoid possible harms from both Muhammad and his opponents at the same time. 
From a religious perspective, their profession of Islam was only nominal and largely 
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opportunistic, used to serve their temporal interests—such as security of their lives and 
property, or avoiding duties applied to non-Muslims.481 Politically, their conduct was 
against the Prophet, and they were more inclined to support his opponents.  The 
hypocrites attempted to weaken the morale of the believers by exploiting their lowly 
psychological conditions when they had just experienced a defeat in war, discouraging 
the believers’ participation in war, and even cooperating with Muhammad’s opponents. 
One of the main reasons, according to Muqātil’s understanding of Q4: 61, why 
the munāfiqūn did not have a complete trust in the Prophet is that they felt uncertain 
whether Muhammad would finally prevail, politically, over his opponents, be they the 
Arab polytheists or the Jews of Medina. But at the same time, these munāfiqūn were 
cautious that Muhammad would do them any harm if they did not submit to him. This 
split situation had created doubt in their hearts, which accordingly marked the very 
hypocrisy they embraced.482 
 In short, according to Muqātil’s commentary on Q4: 139, since the munāfiqūn 
could not predict the matter of Muhammad (lā yatimmu amr Muḥammad), they had to be 
cautious. While, on the one hand, they professed their embracing of Islam, on the other, 
they kept their alliance with the Jews of Medina and took them as protectors (awliyā’), 
primarily because the Jews had built a coalition with the Meccan polytheists against 
Muhammad too.483 Likewise, in his commentary on Q5: 52, Muqātil deals with the same 
                                                        
481 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 4/337. 
482 Q4: 61, “When they are told, ‘Turn to God’s revelations and the Messenger [for judgement],’ you see 
the hypocrites turn right away from you [Prophet].” Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/385. 
483 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/415. 
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question, in which he mentions that eighty four of the munāfiqūn, such as ‘Abd Allāh ibn 
Ubayy (whom he considers their leader, ra’s al-munāfiqīn), Abu Nāfi‛, and Abū 
Lubābah, made a covenant with the Jews seeking their protection (wilāyat al-yahūd) 
because they were uncertain about what was going to happen tomorrow, and Muhammad 
might not be victorious.484 In his commentary on Q5: 58, Muqātil mentions that the 
munāfiqūn made a deal of loyalty with the Jews, that should the latter be expelled from 
Medina, the munafiqūn would go along with them.485 But the Qur’an dismisses this 
loyalty pledge, suggesting instead that the munāfiqūn were two-faced, and that they were 
neither here nor there, which in the language of the Qur’an is called mudhabdhabīn 
bayna dhālika (Q4: 143).486 
The munāfiqūn of Medina were also in active communication with the polytheists 
of Mecca. In his commentary on Q33: 1, Muqātil provides a context in which he 
understands the verse as related to such a coalition between the munāfiqūn and the 
Meccan polytheists. That is, a group of Medinan hypocrites, such as ‘Abd Allāh ibn 
Ubay, ‛Abd Allāh ibn Sa‛d ibn Abī Sarḥ, Tu‛mah ibn Ubayraq, sent a letter to the leaders 
of Meccan polytheists of the Quraish, such as Abū Sufyān ibn Ḥarb, ‛Ikrimah ibn Abi 
Jahl, and Abū al-A‛war. The letter was an invitation for these Meccan leaders to visit 
Medina and form an alliance against Muhammad. The Medinan hypocrites promised the 
Meccans polytheists that they would rebel against Muhammad, if necessary, so that he 
might follow their pagan religion.  
                                                        
484 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/484. 
485 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/487. 
486 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/417. 
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To that invitation, the Meccan leaders replied that they would only visit Medina if 
the Medinan hypocrites were able to make a pact with Muhammad that would guarantee 
their safety during the visit. The Medinan hypocrites agreed, and they met with 
Muhammad to ask his protection for Abū Sufyān ibn Ḥarb, Abū al-A‛war, and ‛Ikrimah 
ibn Abū Jahl for their upcoming visit to Medina. This was a time when they would play 
their two-faced strategy. To the Meccan polytheists, the hypocrites said that their visit to 
Medina might persuade Muhammad and his followers to come back to their old religion; 
but to Muhammad, when asking his permission, the hypocrites told him that a visit to 
Medina by the Meccan leaders could be a great opportunity for him to invite them to 
Islam.487  
In another point of evidence for their lack of trust and loyalty to the Prophet, some 
munāfiqūn disserted by secretly leaving Medina and went back to Mecca after they had 
migrated to the city. In his commentary on Q4: 88, Muqātil mentions that there were nine 
people who did this, and one of them is Makhramah ibn Zayd al-Qurashī. Upon their 
arrival at Mecca, they wrote to the Prophet, saying that their return to Mecca was not to 
break ties with the Prophet, but was merely because they missed their homeland and their 
family at Mecca.488 
The same lack of trust was also shown by a number of munāfiqūn who resided in 
Mecca and did not migrate to Medina. Muqātil mention their names when he is 
commenting on Q8: 49, such as Qays ibn al-Fākih ibn al-Mughīrah, al-Walīd ibn al-
                                                        
487 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/468-471. 
488 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/394-96. 
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Walīd ibn al-Mughīrah, Qays ibn al-Walīd ibn al-Mughīrah, al-Walīd ibn ‛Utbah ibn 
Rabī‛ah, ‛Alā’ ibn Umayyah ibn Khalaf al-Jumaḥī, and ‛Amr ibn Umayyah ibn Sufyān 
ibn Umayyah. These people might have, at some point, proclaimed their belief in 
Muhammad when he was in Mecca, but opted to remain there when he and other 
believers migrated to Medina. According to Muqātil, their decision to remain in Mecca, 
while they were capable of migrating to Medina, living side by side with Muhammad’s 
opponents, was a sufficient evident of their lack of commitment to the prophet and his 
prophetic mission. When the Meccan disbelievers went out to the Battle of Badr, these 
munāfiqūn went out with them. Knowing that the believers only made up a small number 
of fighters, and were thus very unlikely to achieve victory against the much larger 
number of their Meccan polytheist opponents, these munāfiqūn began to doubt and 
question their newly embraced religion (Islam). Furthermore, they thought Muhammad’s 
companions were deluded by their religion for daring to face a much larger and more 
powerful enemy. As a response to this thinking, God sent down the verse, telling them 
that for whoever trusts God, He will give them victory.489 
The Qur’an, and for this matter Muqātil, often uses a person’s attitude to and 
participation in war for the sake of the religion as a litmus test whether a believer was 
truly sincere or simply a hypocrite. Muqātil would call those who were able to go to war 
but they instead opted to stay home hypocrites. Likewise, he would call hypocrites people 
who made excuses to leave the battle ground, such as Banū Ḥārithah ibn al-Ḥarth and 
                                                        
489 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2/120-121. 
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Banū Salamah ibn Jushum, as indicated in Q33: 13.490 Muqātil also calls munāfiqūn the 
people who, because of the small number of believers, did not believe Muhammad and 
the believers would finally be victorious. Likewise, Muqātil also calls people who 
discouraged others from participating in a war when it was commanded munāfiqūn.491 
Participation in a war was a serious matter. People who were willing to participate in it 
must have had a strong belief in the cause for which the war was waged. People whose 
heart and belief was weak, to say the least, such as those munāfiqūn, would likely opt to 
avoid participating in it,492 or if they happened to participate in one, would go half way 
by leaving the battle ground with many excuses.493 They saw no reason to sacrifice their 
lives for something in which they did not really believe. 
Not only did the munāfiqūn possess weak hearts and weak belief, but they also 
attempted to make other people to distrust the Prophet and the revelation he received. For 
instance, in his commentary on Q2: 214, Muqātil mentions what the munāfiqūn said to 
the believers in relation the Battle of Uḥud, in which the believers suffered a severe loss: 
“Why did you sacrifice your life for something unworthy?”494 “Why did you kill 
yourselves and destroy your property?” Similarly, in commenting on Q3: 142, Muqātil 
mentions what the munāfiqūn said to the believers: “If Muhammad was a real prophet, he 
would not ask for a war.” In response, the believers said that those who died among them 
would enter paradise.495 In many places, Muqātil mentions how the munāfiqūn used the 
                                                        
490 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/478-79. 
491 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/481. 
492 See Q9:73. Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2/182-183. 
493 See Q33:13. Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/478-79. 
494 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/182. 
495 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/304. 
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low points in the believers’ lives, such as the loss in the Battle of Uḥud, to weaken their 
faith and belief so that they go back to their old life with its social and religious 
practices.496 
For the munāfiqūn, “islām” was “surrender” or “submission” in a political sense, 
not “a complete and sincere devotion to God” in the religious sense, as the Qur’an and 
Muhammad would have it. It is in this respect that the Qur’an rejected the Bedouins’s 
claim that they had “surrended” (aslamnā, islāmakum), because there was no faith in 
their surrender. 497 Their submission was simply to save themselves and their property 
from any harm that either Muhammad or his opponents may have inflicted upon them.  
The munāfiqūn came from both Arab and Jewish communities. In his commentary 
on Q2: 9, Muqātil mentions several names of the munāfiqūn from the People of Scripture, 
such as ‛Abd Allāh ibn Ubayy ibn Salūl, Judd ibn Qays, al-Ḥārith ibn ‛Amr, Mugīth ibn 
Qushayr, ‛Amr ibn Zayd.498 With respect to munāfiqūn from the Arab, especially the 
Bedouins (A‛rāb), Muqātil mentions five clans, namely Juhaynah, Mazīnah, Aslam, 
Ghifār and Ashja‛, who lived in between Medina and Mecca.499 The fact that these names 
are mentioned suggests that there was a rather significant number of converts from 
among Arab, and especially the Jews at the time. 
But a chance for repentance is always open for the munāfiqūn. Some of them 
indeed repented, while others remained persistent in their nifāq. Those who repented, did 
                                                        
496 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/309. 
497 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 4/98. 99-100. 
498 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/89. 
499 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2/192. 
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it either publicly or in private. Whichever way they chose, God accepted their repentance. 
Muqātil gave the names of the hypocrites who repented publicly, such as Abu Lubābah 
(Marwan ibn ‘Abd al-Mundhir), Aws ibn Ḥizām, Wadī‛ah ibn Tha‛labah, all were Anṣārī 
(Medinans),500 and those who did it personally, including Mirarah ibn Rabi’ah, Hilāl ibn 
Umayyah, and Ka‛b ibn Mālik.501  
Thus, following Muqātil’s commentary, the major feature of hypocrisy (al-nifāq) 
is doubt (shakk) in the Prophet and the revelation, which was then followed up in action. 
Those who doubted that Muhammad was a true prophet would only submit to his mission 
politically, not religiously. The major consideration of their affiliation with Muhammad 
was politically motivated. If they saw no prospect in their affiliation with Muhammad, 
they would seek it somewhere else. There was no loyalty in such affiliation but to their 
own interests. 
Concluding Remarks 
As a complete commentary on the whole Qur’an, Muqātil’s al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr 
aims at making the Qur’an as comprehensible as possible by clarifying whatever seems 
obscure in it. Acknowledging the complexity of the Qur’an as a text, Muqātil sees that 
interpretation is inevitable and necessary to gain a proper understanding of its teaching. 
To undertake such exegesis, Muqātil develops his hermeneutics that identifies the 
building blocks of the Qur’an, sets out the typology of Qur’anic utterances, emphasizes 
the qur’anic literacy, and shows how education can sustain and disseminate such literacy. 
                                                        
500 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2/193. 
501 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2/202-3. 
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As a result of his exegetical endeavor, Muqātil suggests that the most important 
duty that human beings must fulfill in relation to God is īmān (belief) by upholding 
tawḥīd (the belief in divine unity) and taṣdīq (the belief in prophethood, especially that of 
Muhammad). Consequently, the most serious offense to God is kufr (disbelief) by 
committing the opposites of tawḥīd and taṣdīq, namely shirk and takdhīb, respectively. 
Furthermore, Muqātil understands Islam, the religion that Muhammad preached, actually 
to be the same religion that all prophets before him had preached. Therefore, the Qur’an 
calls all prophets as muslimūn. As such, Islam is the primordial religion. The thread that 
has united this primordial religion is its core teaching of īmān manifested in tawḥīd and 
taṣdīq. The challenges that it faced have generally been similar, the performance of kufr 
in the form of shirk and takdhīb. This perspective has accordingly shaped Muqātil’s 
attitudes in measuring people’s responses to Muhammad’s prophetic mission. 
Since, in his understanding, Islam is the only true religion, Muqātil considers 
other religions human invention and satanic.502 Interestingly, however, the Qur’an itself 
never mentioned the religions it criticized as institutionalized entities. Rather, it discussed 
Judaism or Christianity through their followers, namely yahūd or nasārā, respectively. 
Likewise, the Qur’an calls majūs and ṣābi’ūn religious communities. Like the Qur’an, 
Muqātil only rarely mentioned the religions other than Islam by their proper names when 
he criticized the followers of these religions.503 Sometimes, when mentioning them 
                                                        
502 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 4/246, Muqātil says: fa raja‘a ba‘ḍuhum ‘an dīn ‘Īsā--‘alayh al-salām—wa-btada‘ū al-
naṣrāniyyah (“some of them deviated from ‘Īsā’s religion, and invented Christianity”); 3/119, in which he 
says: fa-l adyān sittatun fa wāḥdun lillāh wa khmastaun li al-shayṭān (“Religion is six. One of them is for 
God, and the rest are for Satan”). 
503 Muqātil did mention terms such as millat al-naṣrāniyyah (3/236, 4/246, 849); dīn al-yahūdiyyah (1/140, 
376, 2/489) 
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positively, Muqātil called the Jews “the People of the Torah” (ahl al-Tawrāh), and 
Christians “the People of the Gospel” (ahl al-Injīl), based on their affiliation with their 
scriptures. This suggests that Muqātil acknowledged the validity of their scriptures and 
that, as long as they followed the teaching of these scriptures, the Jews and Christians 
might remain in the true teachings of their prophets. If sometimes Muqātil makes a 
critical assessment of these religious communities by mentioning their affiliation with 
their scripture, for instance, by using the phrase al-munafiqūn min ahl al-Tawrāh (the 
hypocrites of the People of Scripture), he does this to distinguish between the pious 
among the people of the Bible and those who are not. 
To Muqātil, and the Qur’an alike, God sends all these scriptures. Any tampering 
(taḥrīf) allegedly committed by the followers was committed in relation to their 
understanding or interpretation, and it therefore did not change the nature of these 
scriptures. 504 It means Muqātil acknowledged that the Bible, especially the one that exists 
in his time, was valid. Muqātil’s fierce criticism of the Jews and Christians is because 
they had not been faithful to the bibilical teachings, especially pertaining to tawḥīd and 
tasdīq, in addition a number of legal matters, such as as stoning (rajm) and lex taliones 
(qiṣāṣ). Consequently, as long as the Jews and Christians upheld tawḥīd and 
acknowledged Muhammad’s prophethood, Muqātil did not see any necessity for them to 
convert to Islam; they could follow their own scriptures in terms of legal matters. If they 
                                                        
504 According to Gordon Nickel, “[t]he focus of early Muslim accusations of taḥrīf was not corruption or 
falsification of the text. Rather, the commentators were more concerned about the response of non- 
Muslims—primarily the Jews of Madīna—to the Muslim claims that Muḥammad is a prophet and that the 
recitations he is speaking are from Allah.” See his “Early Muslim Accusations of Taḥrīf, 207. 
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happened to accept Islam, however, they would have to leave their old religions 
altogether and fully practice Islam. 
In terms of the Arab polytheists, Muqātil sees an entirely different treatment that 
the Qur’an offers. They were the only community upon whom Muhammad was allowed 
to impose Islam. After their submission, regardless of their sincerity, the principle that 
“there is no compulsion in religion” must be upheld, although social and political 
arrangement with the People of Scripture, such as the duty to pay jizyah, is in order. 
In relation to the hyporcrites, Muqātil addresses them with highly moralistic 
language, similar to how the Qur’an itself treats them. While admitting that they are part 
of the believers, Muqātil always treats them with harsh criticism as a result of their 
constant rebellious acts against the Prophet and the believers. So harsh is Muqātil’s view 
of the hypocrites that he often positions them on a par with disbelievers or even 
polytheists. But when commenting on Q66: 9,505 Muqātil differentiates between the real 
enemy of Islam and the hypocrites, saying that striving against the disbelievers (kuffār) is 
done with swords, and against the munāfiqīn it is done with words.506 
In terms of religious laws, Muqātil is of the view that every community could 
practice their own religious laws. Socio-political laws, such as how these religious 
communities are to coexist, are another matter and needs another arrangement. This is 
precisely what Muhammad did briefly after his migration to Medina when he was 
ratifying the Constitution of Medina. In this respect, Fred Donner is correct when he 
                                                        
505 “Prophet, strive hard against the disbelievers and the hypocrites. Deal with them sternly. Hell will be 
their home, an evil destination!” 
506 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 4/379. 
  
165 
notes that Muhammad first sought to build an ecumenical society whose members were 
believers from all three-monotheist communities. Likewise, Afsaruddin notes that the 
Constitution of Medina provides not only “a very clear idea of the nature of the polity,” 
but also “of inter-faith relations envisaged in this early period.507 
                                                        
507 See her First Muslims, 4-6. See also Lapidus, History, 23-4. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Tafsīr al-Khams Mi’at Āyah min al-Qur’ān: The Laws of the Qur’an 
 
“…No acts would be accepted without [correct] belief.” 
Muqātil ibn Sulaymān508 
 
 
In his major, narrative commentary, al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr, which I discussed in the 
previous chapter, Muqātil advocates the idea that Islam is based fundamentally on the 
idea of belief (īmān), manifested especially in a pair of principles, namely the belief in 
the unity of god (tawḥīd) and in the validity of Muhammad’s prophetic mandate (taṣdīq). 
Setting up īmān and its two supporting principles--tawḥīd and taṣdīq—as the defining 
features of Islam as an ideal type, Muqātil considers any denial of īmān, especially the 
rejection of tawḥīd and taṣdīq, an act of disbelief (kufr), especially manifested in the 
association of God with creation (shirk) and rejection of Muhammad’s prophethood 
(takdhīb). As such, Muqātil uses īmān and its two supporting principles as identity and 
communal boundary markers between Muslims and non-Muslims during the prophetic 
period in his commentary on the Qur’an. As a unified community marked by their 
adherence of tawḥīd and taṣdīq, Muqātil portrays Muslims as drawing their existential 
identity from their constant, if conflictual, encounters with non-Muslim communities, 
                                                        
508 Muqātil ibn Sulaymān, Kitāb Tafsīr al-Khams Mi’at Āyah min al-Qur’ān, 11: wa lā tuqbal al-a‘māl illā 
bi al-īmān. 
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both polytheist (wathanī) and people of Scripture (kitābī), characterized by varying 
degrees of shirk and takdhīb.509  
In the process of social, political, and religious interaction between Muslims and 
non-Muslims, however, it is not only differences that are underlined; commonalities are 
also identified. The most important and tangible effort to establish coexistence between 
different communities in Medina is perhaps the ratification of the Constitution of Medina 
that acknowledged a common sense of belonging and responsibility as the city’s citizens 
amidst their differences, social and religious.510 With the People of Scripture, Muhammad 
recognized not only their shared, physical space and citizenship, but also their shared 
religious affiliation to the same God as fellow believers. For Muhammad, religious 
conversion of People of Scripture to Islam was not necessary, although it might have 
been desireable to him in the beginning of his relocation to the city.511 Given the 
circumstances, expecting the Jews and Christians to fully follow him seemed to be 
unrealistic, and Muhammad therefore proposed a minimum request: that they would 
acknowledge the legitimacy of his prophetic office while they kept adhering to their 
religious traditions. The Medinan Arabs were treated accordingly on the basis of their 
                                                        
509 David Cook argued that “[f]or the earliest period of Islam relationship between the groups has, at its 
core, been a religious one.” See his “The Beginning of Islam in Syria during the Umayyad Period,” (PhD 
Diss., University of Chicago, 2012), 16-17. 
510 See Frederick M. Denny, “Ummah in the Constitution of Medina,” in Journal of Near Eastern Studies, 
Vol. 36, No. 1 (Jan. 1977), 39-47; Hugh Kennedy, The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates: the Islamic 
Near East from the Sixth to the Eleventh Century (England: Pearson-Longman, 2004), second edition, 34-5. 
However, I see nowhere in the commentary Muqātil mentions about this constitution. 
511 Heribert Busse maintained that Muhammad quickly realized that “[i]t was a hopeless venture to want to 
convert the Jews to Islam,” and hence the change of the direction of prayer from Jerusalem to Kabah in 
Mecca. See his Islam, Judaism, and Christianity: Theological and Historical Affiliations, trans. Allison 
Brown (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1988), 19. Fowden noted early Islam is more receptive to 
converts rather than actively proselytizing, as in the case of Christianity. See his Empire, 5-6. 
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allegiance with the believers, Muslims or People of Scripture. In this respect, distinction 
and commonness are simultaneously recognized, and that allows different identities to 
coexist.  
However, a more rigid opposition was drawn between Muslims and people of 
Mecca, the paragon of polytheism (al-mushrikūn).  Medina, as a geographical location 
and political establishment, is opposed to Mecca, but theologically the former represents 
the community of believers in opposition to disbelivers, though these are ideal types. 
There was a possibility that allegiance with one of the two cities did not guarantee perfect 
adherence to the defining elements of each city, especially their religious view. Muqātil 
seems to suggest that not all of those “surrendered” (the basic meaning of muslims) are 
religiously sincere; some have “surrendered” out of political motivation. In short, the 
Prophet was establishing an alliance with some Arab groups whose adherence to Islam 
was nominal at best.  
As such, the ideal type opposition between Muslims and non-Muslims is actually, 
on closer examination, a graded continuum. The same can be said about the ideal type 
opposition of tawhīd and taṣdīq that represent Muslims, on the one hand, and shirk and 
takdhīb that represents non-Muslims, one the other.  Such opposition, while real, is also a 
continuum, for while distinctions between groups are made, commonality is also 
established. Absolute tawḥīd and taṣdīq, on one extreme, are opposed to shirk and 
takdḥīb, on the other extreme; in between, there is an alledged gradation. Those who 
believed in tawḥīd and taṣdīq, namely the followers of Muhammad, are on one side, and 
those who committed shirk and takdhib, particularly the Meccan idolaters, are on the 
  
169 
other. In between, with relative closeness or remoteness from the two extremes, are those 
who do not conform to the full criteria of believers or disbelivers set by the Qur’an, as in 
the case of the People of Scripture and hypocrites.  
In his legal commentary, Tafsīr al-Khams Mi’at Āyah min al-Qur’ān, Muqātil 
also uses tawḥīd and taṣdīq as the yardstick in deriving the Qur’anic laws. If we can call 
tawḥīd and taṣdīq theology, then, internally, Muqātil’s assertion is that it is fundamental 
for a Muslim to have a correct theology before anything else, including law.512 
Externally, Muqātil uses the same theology to evaluate other religious communities and 
their worth before the Muslim community’s eye. As stated, this theology first and 
foremost serves as Muslim self-identification against other religious communities, pagan 
(wathanī) and scripturist (kitābī) alike.  By the same token, this theology constitutes an 
act of “othering,” for while it defines who can be called true Muslims, it likewise clarifies 
who cannot. Theology draws the communal boundary by the power of inclusion and 
exclusion and brings with it legal consequences. To those defined as Muslims, the 
believers who followed Muhammad’s religious teaching, applied a set of laws different 
from those applied to those who were believers but followed the teachings of the earlier 
prophets—namely the People of Scripture—and those who were disbelievers. Such laws, 
while they targeted both religious and non-religious aspects—such as their political 
status—was manifested largely in the form of sociopolitical setting, such as imposing 
                                                        
512 It appears that the same view is generally held among Muslim legal specialists in which they put the 
knowledge of law as second to the correct theology (ashraf al-‘ulūm ba‘d al-i‘tiqād al-ṣaḥīḥ ma‘rifat al-
aḥkām al-‘amaliyyah). See Badr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Bahādir ibn ‘Abd Allāh al-Shāfi‘ī al-Zarkashī, al-
Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh, ed. ‘Abd al-Qādir ‘Abd Allāh al-‘Āfī and ‘Umar Sulaymān al-Ashqar (al-
Ghardaqah: Dār al-Ṣafwah li al-Ṭibā‘ah wa al-Nashr wa al-Tawzī‘, 1992), 1/12. 
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certain tributary payments on non-Muslims to the Muslim polity, as in the case of the 
People of Scripture, or imposing surrender using peaceful or violent means, as in the case 
of the pagans. With regard to lukewarm Muslims, Muqātil finally admits their status as 
Muslims only after he makes it clear that hypocrisy is a crime almost as serious as shirk, 
but one whose punishment is to be given not in this world but in the hereafter.  
This interreligious perspective on Qur’anic law in Muqātil’s legal commentary is 
the main agenda that I would like to pursue in this chapter.  As I have argued, Muqātil’s 
exegetical thrust is the promotion of imān, especially tawḥīd and taṣdīq, in opposition to 
kufr, especially shirk and takdhīb. This leads him to using these principles as the 
yardstick to define both Muslim and other communities. The next step, then, would be to 
study how Muqātil discusses the legal implications that a theology-based communal 
identity brings about. Apart from topics which deal with internal Muslim affairs, such as 
rituals and other personal as well as public laws, much of Muqātil’s discussion in the 
commentary deals with interreligious affairs as intermarriage, food sharing, and matters 
of peace and war. 
 In order to be consistent with the previous chapter, I will present Muqātil’s views 
on the basis of religious community or people—such as People of Scripture, polytheists, 
and hypocrites—with whom the Muslims were to have relationship. Thus, for instance, 
there would be People of Scripture-related laws, polytheist-related laws, and so forth, 
pertaining to matters such as intermarriage, food sharing, agreements, war, etc. Some 
topics, such as jihād, will be treated as an independent discussion given the relatively 
large attention that Muqātil pays to it, in addition to its close connection to interreligious 
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matters. I will also study some of Muqātil’s peculiar topics that are not normally 
discussed in any legal work by Muslims, such as the doctrine “commanding right and 
forbidding wrong,” and the question of muḥkamāt and mutashābihāt in the Qur’an, which 
all have some bearing on interreligious relations. 
Apart from topics that Muqātil discusses compactly in one place, such as jihād, I 
will gather a number of relevant topical discussions, and make it part of one larger 
discussion on a certain theme. For example, Muqātil deals with the People of Scripture in 
a number of topical discussions, each addressing a specific question pertaining to them. 
In order to gain a fuller picture of Muqātil’s views on People of Scripture in different 
legal questions, I will bring these dispersed topics into one large theme as “People of 
Scripture related laws” that will deal with a variety of questions which Muqātil brings up, 
such as intermarriage, food sharing, war and peace, etc. 
Given that Muqātil’s Tafsīr al-Khams Mi’at Āyah is a legal commentary, one 
might expect that his exposition of the same topics in it would lead to more precise and 
specified legal rulings, compared to his more discursively theological exposition in al-
Tafsīr al-Kabīr. Yet, I shall argue, there is no significant difference in Muqātil’s tone in 
approaching these similar topics in the two commentaries. Methodologically, however, 
there are two notable differences.  
First, Muqātil employs a formulaic style of opening statements in his 
interpretation of Qur’anic verses in his legal commentary, one which is absent in the 
major, narrative commentary, but also present, albeit differently, in his Wujūh. Second, 
the type of supporting ḥadith reports used in the narrative commentary is primarily that of 
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asbāb al-nuzūl that clarify the circumstances within which certain qur’anic verses were 
revealed or within which such verses must be understood. In the legal commentary 
Muqātil uses traditions that clarify the qur’anic statements, although they do not 
necessarily offer more “practical” guidance. Instead, the majority of traditions used in 
this legal commentary seem to be echoing the statements made in the Qur’an that they 
purportedly clarify without further specified explanations. There are, however, few 
traditions that have shaped the legal decisions Muqātil made more decisively than the 
influence of the content of the qur’anic verses themselves. In this respect, such traditions 
bring about nuances that Muqātil’s interpretation of the Qur’an offers. 
Both commentaries remain, to a great extent, theological in character and 
emotionally ethical in tone. Despite its legal orientation, Muqātil’s Tafsīr al-Khams Mi’at 
Āyah is a theologically and morally shaped commentary, nothing like the proper legal 
treatises that later Muslim scholars wrote. To be able to differentiate Muqātil’s legal 
enterprise in his commentary from proper legal works of later Muslim jurists, I will 
undertake a minor comparative study on some of the topics that Muqātil discusses in the 
commentary with that of al-Shāfi‛ī in his work on substantive law, al-Umm.513 
 Description of the commentary 
Just like Muqātil’s narrative commentary, Tafsīr al-Khams Mi’at Āyah min al-
Qur’ān is the first of its kind within Muslim scholarship.514 It is the first qur’anic 
                                                        
513 Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfi‘ī, al-Umm, ed. Rif‘at Fawzī ‘Abd al-Muṭṭalib (al-Manṣūrah: Dār al-Wafā’ 
li al-Ṭibā‘ah wa al-Nashr wa al-Tawzī‘, 2001). 
514 ‘Alī ibn Sulaymān al-‘Ābid, Tafasīr Āyāt al-Ahkām wa Manāhijuhā (Riyāḍ, Saudi Arabia: 2010), 101. 
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commentary whose discussion of law in Islam is inspired by and derived primarily from 
the Qur’an.515 The fact that the Qur’an had been the major, if not primary, source of 
Islamic law in this early period poses a challenge to the views of some scholars who 
upheld that Islamic law at that point in time derived from sources other than the Qur’an 
and the prophetic precedent, and in which the role of the Qur’an, if any, was minor and 
insignificant.516 A number of scholars have, however, criticized the view that undermined 
the important role that the Qur’an played in legal ratification in early Muslim 
community.517  
The commentary begins with a chain of transmission (isnād) identical to that of 
Muqātil’s al-Tafsīr Kabīr.518 The authorities mentioned in this isnād, according to 
Goldfeld, reached the second half of the fifth/eleventh century. Of those authorities, 
                                                        
515 Muqātil’s heavy reliance on the Qur’an in discussing legal topics is in a stark contrast with Mālik in his 
Muwaṭṭa’ who, was contemporary with him, relied more on traditions that convey the Medinan practices. 
See Yasin Dutton, The Origins of Islamic Law: the Qur’an, the Muwaṭṭa’ and Madinan ‛Amal (New Delhi, 
India: Lawman Private Limited, 2000). However, there is one case in which Muqātil does not provide a 
qur’anic basis for his discussion, but merely ḥadīth reports. See “wiping the shoes [in the case of 
purification prior to performing salah]” (Fi al-mash ‘ala al-khuffayn). Muqātil ibn Sulaymān, Āyah min al-
Qur’ān ‘an Muqātil ibn Sulaymān, ed. Isaiah Goldfeld, (Shfaram, Israel: al-Mashriq Press, 1980), 22. 
516 See for instance Joseph Schacht, The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1979). 
517 See Harald Motzki, although he resorts more to a work on ḥadīth rather than a Qur’anic commentary in 
his arguments, that is, the Muṣannaf of the Yemeni ‛Abd al-Razzāq al-Ṣan‛ānī, he was able to show the 
untenability of Schacht’s theses that championed the marginal role of the Qur’an in terms of early 
development of Islamic law. See Harald Motzki, The Origins of Islamic Jurisprudence: Meccan Fiqh 
before the Classical Schools (Leiden, Boston & Koln: Brill, 2002). Likewise, Wael B. al-Hallaq argues 
“that the Qurʾān was a source of Islamic law since the early Meccan period, when the Prophet Muḥammad 
began to receive the Revelation. This conclusion, supported by extensive evidence from the Qurʾān itself, 
compels a modification in the standard narrative about the genesis of Islamic law.” See his “Groundwork of 
the Moral Law: A New Look at the Qur’ān and the Genesis of Sharī‘a,” in Islamic Law and Society 16 
(2009) 239-279. 
518 With the exception of the last two transmitters, al-Qādī Abū Bakr Muḥammad ‘Aqil ibn Zayd al-
Shahrazūri and al-Qāḍī Abu ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī ibn al-Zadalj, the rest of transmitters are the 
same people mentioned in Muqātil’s major narrative commentary; they are successively: ‘Abd al-Khāliq 
ibn al-Ḥasan (d. 962 or 968) related from ‘Abd Allāh ibn Thābit (d. 921) from his father (Thābit ibn 
Ya‛qūb) in the year 857, from al-Hudhayl ibn Habib in the year 808, from Muqātil ibn Sulaymān (d. 767). 
Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 9-11. 
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according to Goldfeld, it was ‘Ubayd Allāh ibn Thābit (d. 921) who gave the commentary 
its final shape (sighat akhirah) by adding a number of ḥadīth reports from Muqātil and 
other authorities; he also added some linguistic explanation from his contemporaries.519 
Meanwhile, the last three names—al-Qāḍī Abū Bakr Muḥammad ‘Āqil ibn Zayd al-
Shahrazūri, al-Qāḍī Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī ibn Zadalj, and Abū 
Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Khāliq ibn al-Ḥasan—were merely transmitters (nuqqāl) of the work 
and did nothing to add to it.520   
The premise of the commentary is to derive qur’anic legal views on the basis of 
identified five hundred verses. The phrase “five hundred verses of the Qur’an” (al-khams 
mi’at ayah min al-Qur’ān) in the commentary’s title is intriguing. It suggests that Muqātil 
believed there are about five hundred legal verses in the Qur’an.521 While this number 
does not receive a consensus among the Muslims, it gains the support of many, if not the 
majority. Muslims have agreed that, as a whole, the number of qur’anic verses is six 
thousand, two hundred “something” (sittat alaf wa mi’ata ayah wa kasr),522 although that 
“something” may be four verses, or ten, or fourteen, or seventeen, or twenty-seven, or 
even thirty six. These differences do not, however, imply that there are more or fewer 
words in the Qur’an if one chooses to adopt one view or another. They merely are the 
                                                        
519 This phenomenon is also found in Muqatil’s narrative commentary. Goldfeld also believed that ‘Abd 
Allāh ibn Thābit was the one who “composed” al-Ashbāh wa al-Naẓā’ir that was also ascribed to Muqātil. 
See Goldfeld, “Introduction,” 8.  
520 Goldfeld, “Introduction,” 7. In one instance, ‘Abd al-Khāliq ibn al-Ḥasan was said to have said, “I found 
in the book of ‘Ubaydallah ibn Thabit…” 
521 My own counting suggests that, disregarding repetition, there are four hundred and seventy nine verses 
mentioned in the commentary. These verses are taken from fifty-nine out of one hundred and fourteen 
chapters of the Qur’ān. 
522 al-‘Ābid, Tafasīr, 45. 
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result of differences in terms of how people understand where a verse starts and where it 
ends. Some view that two qur’anic verses are actually one, while they are two separate 
verses for other people. Despite these different views, the material upon which they are 
based is exactly the same, no less no more.523  
Similar differences also occurred among scholars in terms of identifying the legal 
verses in the Qur’an as a result of their differences in understanding which of the 
Qur’anic verses that have legal implications (āyāt al-aḥkām). Thus, there are scholars 
who said that there are one hundred and fifty āyāt al-aḥkām in the Qur’an; others said 
two hundred verses; and the rest said five hundred.524 Of these different views, the 
number “five hundred” has become one of the most adopted views although not 
unanimously, 525 and that, according to Muhammad al-Khidr ibn al-Husayn, is thanks to 
Muqātil ibn Sulaymān, the first person who identified such a number of the qur’anic legal 
verses and accordingly composed an independent work on it.526 Such different views of 
the number of legal verses in the Qur’an may have been the result of the fact that as 
guidance, every qur’anic verse may have potentially legal consequences or implications 
even though it may not be explicitly legal in its character.527 
The legal verses in the Qur’an are found in both Meccan and Medinan parts of 
revelation. Based on Muqātil’s commentary, however, there are more legal verses in the 
                                                        
523 See al-Suyūṭī, Itqān, 1/232; Muḥammad ‘Abd al-‘Aẓīm al-Zarqānī, Manahil al-‘Irfan fi ‘Ulum al-
Qur’an, ed. Fawwāz Aḥmad Zamarālī (Beirūt: Dār al-Kitāb al-‘Arabī, 1995), 1/277-8; Muḥammad Sālim 
Muḥaysin, Fi Riḥāb al-Qur’ān al-Karīm (Madīnah al-Munawwarah: n. p., 1989), 118-20. 
524 al-‘Ābid, Tafasīr, 46. 
525 Mannā’ al-Qaṭṭān, al-Tashrī‘ wa al-Fiqh fi al-Islām: Tārīkhan wa Manhajan (Cairo: Maktabah Wahbah, 
2001), 68-70. 
526 al-‘Ābid, Tafasīr, 47. 
527 Ibn Daqīq al-‘Īd, Risālat al-Islāḥ, 3/21-22.  
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Medinan chapters (sūrah, pl. suwar) than they are in the Meccan chapters, although the 
number of the Meccan chapters from which these legal verses are derived is greater than 
that of the Medinan chapters.528  
Structure of the Commentary 
Unlike Muqātil’s narrative commentary, Tafsīr al-Khams Mi’at Āyah min al-
Qur’ān is not a commentary on the whole Qur’an. Rather, it is a commentary on 
supposedly legal verses in the Qur’an presented as a series of legal topics. It appears that 
the arrangement of the legal topics is based on the religious priority and the relative 
significance of such topics according to Muqātil’s theological concerns. Thus, after the 
first heading on tafsīr al-ḥalāl wa al-ḥaram (interpretation of the licit and illicit), which 
signifies the very legal character of the commentary, the next heading that follows is 
tafsīr al-īman (interpretation of belief),529 which is theological.  
As such, while the commentary is meant to provide the legal rulings of the 
Qur’an, it pays a great attention to theological questions that became a main concern of 
Muqātil throughout his major commentary. Thus, this commentary, to a certain extent, 
brings forth together Muqātil’s legal and theological concerns. Or, to put it differently, 
Muqātil seems to suggest that legal concerns should be based on valid theological 
concerns. This can be seen in Muqātil’s large framework that is concerned first and 
foremost with the importance of having correct theological views before anything else. 
                                                        
528 Out of fifty-nine qur’anic chapters from which Muqātil cites his legal verses, thirty-seven are Meccan, 
and twenty two are Medinan. However, the number of Medinan legal verses is twice as many as Meccan 
legal verses, three hundred and twenty eight and one hundred and fifty one, respectively. Al-‘Ābid, Tafāsīr, 
51. 
529 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 12. 
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Law or a legal concern, in this respect, comes second to theology, which determines the 
former’s orientation within the latter’s parameters.530  
Muqātil’s Khams Mi’ah deals, successively, with legal topics pertaining to ritual 
(‘ibādāt), to familial (munākahāt), and to social and public affairs (mu‛āmalāt).531 In 
general, the commentary is divided in larger sections of eight abwāb (“chapters”), each 
followed by a series of subheadings, entitled tafsir (“interpretation”). The eight chapters 
consist of (1) abwāb al-ṣalāh (Prayer Chapter), (2) abwāb ṣadaqat al-taṭawwu‛ ma‛a al-
farīḍah (Chapter on Voluntary and Obligatory Alms), (3) abwāb al-siyām wa naskh min 
al-ṣaum al-awwal (Fasting Chapter), (4) abwāb al-maẓālim (Misdeed Chapter), (5) 
abwāb qismat al-mawārīth (Chapter on Inheritance Division), (6) abwāb al-ṭalaq 
(Divorce Chapter), (7) abwāb al-zinā wa ma fīhi al-ḥadd ‘ala man zanā min al-aḥrār wa 
ḥad al-qādhif (Chapter on Adultery and the Punishment for Adulterers, and Those Who 
Accuse Others of Adultery), and (8) abwāb al-jihād (Jihād Chapter). For reasons not 
entirely clear to me, this commentary does not discuss, among other things, any trade-
related topics, which is usually included in any legal treatises by Muslim scholars. It is 
possible that the division and selection of Muqātil’s legal topics is based on what he 
thinks is legally unambiguous in the Qur’an and which is very important in relation to the 
                                                        
530 The fact that very often theology takes precedence over law in Muqātil’s commentary will appear even 
more clearly when I compare it with al-Shāfi‛ī’s al-Umm in some of the cases with which Muqātil deals. 
531 Al-‘Ābid maintains that legal commentaries usually set up their discussion by following the 
chronological arrangement of the qur’anic chapters in the standard muṣḥaf of the Qur’an, from al-Fātiḥah 
to al-Nās. A few exceptions to this rule are Muqātil’s Khams Mi’at and al-Bayḥaqī’s Aḥkām al-Qur’ān of 
al-Shāfi‘ī. See his Tafāsīr, 80. 
  
178 
correct theology that a believer must have; such are the mentioned topics which he 
decides to tackle.532 
As a whole, there are one hundred and sixty one tafsīr subheadings scattered in 
these eight abwāb. Although the majority of these tafsīrs have been systematically 
arranged based on the concerns of each chapter, there are some that seem to be 
misplaced. For example, topics of ritual purification and almsgiving are put together in 
the chapter on prayer (abwāb al-ṣalāh).533 The same can be said of a number of tafsīrs 
related to sin that would have been better if they were placed in the chapter on maẓālim. 
Another case of tafsīrs, such as ones related to pilgrimage and maẓālim, take place in two 
different chapters (abwāb), namely chapter on prayer and chapter on fasting.534 While the 
chapter on inheritance seems to be well arranged, one of its tafsīrs comes in a chapter 
before its proper chapter. Furthermore, there are tafsīrs that could have been put together 
and formed an independent, new chapter, such as tafsīrs on marriage, rather than putting 
them in the chapter on inheritance. Likewise, tafsīrs on ritual purification, pilgrimage, 
and slavery, for instance, could have been given their independent chapters rather than 
                                                        
532 Al-Qaṭṭān, for instance, argues that some of the legal verses in the Qur’an appear explicitly in which the 
room for difference as to their legal character is small, as in the case of the obligation of prayers, alms, and 
fasting, verses on inheritance, the illicitness of adultery/fornication, unlawful murder, etc. Other verses 
suggest legal ramifications but in more implicitly and therefore open to different views and interpretation. 
The more explicit legal verses in the Qur’an usually have more to do with correct theology (bi manzilat al-
‘aqā’id), the abandoning of which would exclude one from the faith. See al-Qaṭṭān, Tahsrī‘, 68.   
533 Muqātil, Khams Mi’ah, 14-52. Generally, any legal works by Muslims would put purification-trelated 
topics prior to chapter on prayers on the chapter of purification (bāb al-ṭahārah). Furthermore, this chapter 
on prayer also discusses some topics related to alms giving which should be part of the next chapter, abwāb 
ṣadaqat al-taṭawwu‘ wa al-farīḍah (chapters on recommended and obligated charities).  
534 For example, “interpretation of combining of ‘umrah and hajj” (tafsīr al-mut‘ah bi al-‘umrah bi al-ḥajj) 
takes place in abwāb al-ṣalāh; Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 35.  
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being blended with other chapters that are unrelated, as in the present arrangement of the 
commentary.  
  In order to grasp better the hybrid character of the commentary, in the sense that 
it is legal as much as theological, and the religious priority upon which the commentary’s 
arrangement is based, let us follow Muqātil’s own explanation on first two tafsīrs that 
seem to serve as an introduction to the commentary. The first is tafsīr al-ḥalāl wa al-
ḥarām ‛an Muqātil ibn Sulaymān al-Khurāsānī (interpretation of the permitted and the 
forbidden from Muqātil ibn Sulaymān al-Khurāsānī). 
 
Muqātil said: ‘On the bridge of Jahannam, there are seven535 arcades 
in which a servant would be questioned, first of all about īmān 
(belief) in God Almighty. If one could pass it perfectly, he is allowed 
to go to the second arcade, and is asked about ṣalāh (prayer). If one 
passes it well, he is allowed to go to the third arcade, and is asked 
about zakāh (alms-giving). If one passes, he is allowed to proceed to 
the fourth arcade and is asked about siyām (fasting). If one passes, he 
is allowed to go to the fifth arcade and is asked about hajj 
(pilgrimage). If one passes, he would be allowed to go to the sixth 
arcade and is asked about ‘umrah (lesser pilgrimage). Once one 
passes this, he would be allowed to go the seventh arcade, and is 
asked about maẓalim (crimes). If one does no wrong to anybody, one 
would be allowed to go to heaven. This is God’s commandment 
[Q89: 14]: “Your Lord is always watchful,” ya‛nī, the angels are 
always watching over the servants on the bridge of Jahannam in these 
seven arcades; they will ask them about these seven matters. Deeds 
(a‛māl) will not be accepted unless [they are accompanied] with 
[correct] belief (īmān).’536 
 
The above passage revolves around the concept of licit and illicit (ḥalāl wa 
ḥarām), which reminds us, specifically, of the first two of Muqātil’s five fundamental 
                                                        
535 It seems there is a typo in the printed commentary in which tis‛ (nine) instead of sab‘ (seven) is written. 
536 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 11. 
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aspects of the Qur’an in his narrative commentary in the previous chapter, namely divine 
commands and prohibitions (amruhū wa nahyuhū).537 Thus, for Muqātil, to understand 
the Qur’an is first and foremost to understand what God commands and allows us to do in 
life, and what He prohibits us from doing. In other words, to deal with the Qur’an is first 
to deal with God’s laws as they are delineated within. Such divine law regulates what is 
commanded and allowed (amruhū) on the one hand, and forbidden (nahyuhū) on the 
other. As such, these two terms are parallel with two other terms that Muqātil introduces 
in this commentary, namely licit (halāl) and illicit (ḥaram). In a way, this legal 
commentary is the realization of two out five fundamental aspects that Muqātil delineates 
in his major commentary. 
This passage then enumerates a number of commands and prohibitions that God 
imposed upon people the adherence of which would lead them to heaven. Divine 
commands in the passage consist of belief, prayer, alms giving, fasting, and pilgrimage; 
while divine prohibitions are couched in a term maẓālim (“crimes”). While all elements 
of these divine commands and prohibitions pertain to legal matter, one—that is, belief 
(īmān)—is more a matter of theology. The fact that belief is mentioned twice in the 
beginning and end of the passage suggests the relative importance that Muqātil puts on it. 
In fact, belief is so central in Muqātil’s view that without it no deeds are valid and a 
person cannot proceed to the next arcade. This, again, shows how in Muqātil’s view 
theology takes precedence upon law. That is to say, acts have no legal value if not 
performed by someone with the correct belief. As such, despite dealing with legal 
                                                        
537 Muqāti, Tafsīr, 1/26. 
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questions in the Qur’an, the tone of Muqātil’s commentary is more theological than 
legal.538  
The centrality of belief or faith in Islam has led Muqātil to tackle it once more in 
the next discussion, which follows his general delineation of the licit and illicit in tafsīr 
al-īmān.539 In this part, Muqātil opens his explanations, saying: “Whoever believes what 
is in the Qur’an, he then believes in God’s commandment.”540 By adducing Q2: 1-3,541 
Muqātil emphasizes that the Qur’an is from Allah, providing guidance for those who fear 
shirk, those who believe that the Qur’an was sent down to Muhammad, those who adhere 
to God’s commandment in terms of what is licit and illicit (yuḥillūna ḥalālahu wa 
yuḥarrimūna ḥarāmah), and those who apply what is in the Qur’an.542  
Muqātil then proceeds to describe what he calls aṣl al-īmān (foundation of faith), 
namely tawḥīd, belief in the Day of Resurrection (ba‛th), belief in angels (malā’ikah), in 
every revelation that God has sent down (kitāb), and in all prophets.543 Afterward, 
Muqātil adduces a ḥadīth that conveys the definitions of īmān, islām, and iḥsān.544 And at 
the closing of the discussion, Muqātil stresses the importance of tawhid as the source of 
all goods (al-khayr kulluhū min al-tawḥīd).545 Muqātil also reiterates his statement in 
tafsīr al-ḥalāl wa al-ḥarām, which precedes tafsīr al-īmān, in terms of the relationship 
                                                        
538 This will become much clearer in my comparison of Muqātil and al-Shāfi‛ī in later section of the 
chapter. 
539 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 12-14.  
540 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 12. 
541 Q.2: 1-3, “(1) Alif Lam Mim, (2) This is the Scripture in which there is no doubt, containing guidance for 
those who are mindful of God, (3) who believe in the unseen, keep up the prayer and give out of what We 
have provided for them.” 
542 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 12. 
543 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 12-13. 
544 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 12. 
545 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 13. 
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between faith (īmān) and deeds (a‛māl), asserting that it is tawḥīd that determines the 
acceptability of any deeds.546 “A mushrik who donated his wealth without īmān, his shirk 
would annul his donation.”547 This view, which connects this commentary to Muqātil’s 
major commentary in which the opposition of tawḥīd and shirk is addressed constantly, 
also suggests that the formulation of law and its application must be built on a solid 
theological foundation, namely a correct belief or faith. It is also this belief that Muqātil 
uses as the main criterion for his interpretation of the legal verses in the Qur’an. 
As I have argued before, the arrangement of legal topics in the commentary 
reflects Muqātil’s religious priority and his larger theological framework. This is further 
vindicated by the topics that immediately follow tafsīr al-ḥalāl wa al-ḥarām and tafsīr al-
īmān, namely abwāb al-ṣalāh (prayer chapter). Obligatory prayers are arguably the most 
important rituals in Islam. In fact, prayers are the pillars of Islamic religion. Islam will 
remain strong as long as Muslims continue to perform prayers. On the contrary, Islam 
will collapse if Muslims abandon them: al-ṣalat ‘imād al-dīn, fa man taraka al-ṣalat 
hadam al-din (“prayer is the pillar of religion. Whosoever abandons it, he destroys 
religion”).548  
The paramount significance of prayer in Islam allows no excuse for a Muslim not 
to perform it. If one could not do it in the properly prescribed ways, she is allowed to 
perform it in any other ways she is capable. Dying, or perhaps insanity and menstruation, 
are the only acceptable reasons for a Muslim to free herself from this obligation. Such a 
                                                        
546 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 14. 
547 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 56. 
548 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 14. 
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topical arrangement in the commentary supports my argument that Muqātil organizes his 
legal material of the Qur’an based on the scale of religious priority as well as his 
theological concerns, and not based on the chronological occurrences of these legal 
verses in the standard muṣḥaf, like the organization al-Wujūh wa al-Naẓā’ir. 
Exegetical Methods  
Throughout the commentary, Muqātil employs a formulaic statement in the 
beginning of each legal topic with which he deals. That is, “In the qur’anic chapter in 
which X is mentioned, God says X, ya‛nī…” (Fī al-sūrah allatī yudhkaru fīhā X qawluhu 
subḥānahū X, ya‛nī…). The first X points to the chosen words—be they names of 
persons, certain phrases—in the chapter, which often serve as the name of the chapter 
itself. The second X points to the wording of the verses being discussed. The term ya‛nī 
(“that is” – roughly meaning) is used to separate qur’anic wordings from that of 
Muqātil’s glossing and interpretation.  
Within each topic, Muqātil collects all relevant verses and interprets them by 
piecing these verses into smaller fragments. To support his commentary on the verses, 
Muqātil provides ḥadīth reports, which originated from the Prophet, Companions, or 
Successors.549 Furthermore, Muqātil also employs his own opinions in much of his 
interpretation. In this regard, his exegetical methods in al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr and Tafsīr al-
Khams Mi’at Āyah are similar except in two respects. 
                                                        
549 Muqātil himself lived at the period where its people—especially its religious scholars—are traditionally 
called “Successors of the Successors” (tābī‛ al-tābi‛īn).  
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 First, if Muqātil frequently provides traditions that specify the background of 
revelation (asbāb al-nuzūl) in an extensive way and generally without the accompanying 
chains of transmission (isnād) in his narrative commentary, in this commentary he 
presents traditions that specify the intended meanings of otherwise general qur’anic 
verses, or those that will direct his legal decisions derived from these verses.550 Second, if 
Muqātil very rarely provides isnāds for traditions that he uses in his major commentary, 
he always provides isnāds for traditions that he uses in this legal commentary.551 
Furthermore, while not all traditions mentioned in his major commentary necessarily 
originate from Muqātil but may be taken from other authorities by his transmitters, as 
their isnāds show, in this commentary Muqātil is always mentioned as part of the chain of 
transmission. Otherwise, Muqātil has been cited as the “speaker” of some views that 
could have been [prophetic] traditions but presented as if they are Muqātil’s personal 
views.552    
The following is a more systematic explanation of Muqātil’s exegetical method in 
his Tafsīr al-Khams Mi’at Āyah min al-Qur’ān. 
                                                        
550 However, the traditions that Muqātil uses to specify the qur’anic messages will prove not as specific 
when compared with those that al-Shāfi‛ī uses in al-Umm, which are really able to specify the general 
qur’anic verses to the extent that the latter produces legal rulings that are not necessarily stated in the 
Qur’an. 
551 The tendency to be more careful with isnād is common among Muslim scholars when they deal with 
legal questions. With regard to qur’anic commentary, Muslim scholars had a more relaxed attitude toward 
isnād as long as the traditions they cited could provide better explanations. This is resonant with Ibn 
Hanbal’s statement that categorized tafsīr, maghāzī and sīrah as disciplines that have no “root” (lā aṣla 
lahā), which, according to scholars, means that they have no chains of transmission. Al-Shāfi‛ī was 
reported to have said that the sound traditions related to tafsīr reported from Ibn ‛Abbās coming directly 
from the Prophet are no more than a hundred pieces. But the actual number of traditions reported from Ibn 
‛Abbās from the Prophet in qur’anic commentaries is larger by far than a hundred pieces. See al-Dhahabī, 
al-Tafsīr wa al-Mufassirūn, 1/115; also Na‘nā‘ah, Isrā’iliyyāt. 
552 Harald Moztki found a similar phenomenon in his study of Abd al-Razzāq’s Muṣannaf. See his The 
Origins of Islamic Jurisprudence. 
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Tafsīr al-Qur’ān bi al-Qur’ān 
One of the characteristics of Muqātil’s exegetical methods in this commentary is 
that he collects all relevant verses to the legal topics he discusses. In doing so, Muqātil 
applies the so-called “interpretation of the Qur’an with the Qur’an” or “parts of the 
Qur’an interpret each other” (tafsīr al-Qur’ān bi al-Qur’ān or al-Qur’ān yufassiru 
ba‛ḍuhu ba‛ḍan). Later Muslim scholars consider this technique the best means of 
qur’anic interpretation.553 Such a technique can only be undertaken if the Qur’an as a 
whole is known to the commentator so that he can relate verses that address the same 
problems but occupy different places in the Qur’an with one another.554 In a way, this is 
an extended application of the crossreferencing method Muqātil used in al-Tafsīr al-
Kabīr. 
                                                        
553 “The fourfold process approved by Ibn Taymiyya offers a discreet methodological idealization of 
exegetical steps. In the order in which they should be followed, these are (1) interpreting the Qur'an by the 
Qur'an, (2) interpreting it by the surma of the prophet Muhammad, (3) interpreting it by the statements of 
his Companions, those of his own generation who had direct access to him, and (4) interpreting it by the 
statements of the Successors, those of the next generation whose access to the Prophet's statements was 
mediated through one or more of the Companions. As is immediately obvious, this is a hermeneutical 
hierarchy, arranged in decreasing order of probative value. It reflects not so much an actual working 
process, at least in this rigidly sequential format, as a means of assessing and establishing the comparative 
worth of particular exegetical views.” See Jane Dammen McAuliffe, “An Introduction to Medieval 
Interpretation of the Qur'an,” in With Reverence for the Word: Medieval Scriptural Exegesis in Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam, ed. Jane Dammen McAuliffe et al (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 311-
19, 315. 
554 This technique of interpretation may refute the thesis that the Qur’an was codified much later that it was 
traditionally believed. Wansbrough, for instance, argued that the Qur’an as it we know it today was not 
codified until the late second/ eighth century or later. However, Muqātil’s commentaries prove that such a 
thesis is no longer tenable. See Fred M. Donner, Narratives of Islamic Origins: the beginnings of Islamic 
historical writings (Princeton, NJ: the Darwin Press, Inc. 1998), 35-63. Emran el-Badawi offers the longest 
range of period within which the Qur’an might have been canonized, but still earlier than the period that 
Wansbrough suggested, namely 610-714, allegedly starting from when Muhammad began to receive 
revelation to when “…‘Abd al-Malik b. Marwān (d. 86/705) and al-Hajjāj b. Yūsuf (d. 95/714) played a 
significant role in standardizing the Qur’ān text as we possess today...” see his “Sectarian Scripture: the 
Qur’ān’s dogmatic re-articulation of the Aramaic Gospel Traditions in the Late Antique Near East (PhD 
Diss., University of Chicago, 2011), 16, 43. 
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An example of this is tafsīr mā umira min wafā’ al-‘ahd fī mā baynahum wa 
bayna al-mushrikīn wa ghayrihim (interpretation of what is commanded in terms of 
fulfilling covenant between the believers and polytheists and other [people]).555 Muqātil 
says, 
In the chapter in which God mentions al-mā’idah [the feast] is God’s saying, 
‘You who believe, fulfil your obligations,’556 that is, your covenants, between you 
and [other] people; and God’s saying in the chapter in which He mentions Banū 
Isrā’īl, “Honor your pledges,’557 that is, the covenants between you and [other] 
people, ‘you will be questioned about your pledges,’ that is, God will question 
those who broke their promises (al-‛ahd) why they did so. And also God’s saying 
in the chapter in which He mentions al-an‛ām [lifestock], ‘keep any promises you 
make in God’s name,’558 that is, the covenant between you and [other] people. 
 
 As seen, in his interpretation of a number of Qur’anic verses he cites for the 
topic—namely Q5: 1, 17:34, and 6:152—Muqātil renders the other party with which the 
believers made an agreement anonymous and general. He simply calls them: “other 
people.” It is not until Muqātil cites Q16: 91-94 that he specifies who these “other 
people” were—polytheists, people of war, and others (al-nās min ahl al-shirk wa ahl al-
ḥarb wa ghayrihim).559 In this respect, Muqātil does not only collect all relevant verses 
but also uses them to explain each other in relation to legal topics being discussed.560 
                                                        
555 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 244-45. 
556 Q5: 1. 
557 Q17: 34. 
558 Q6: 152. Remind me – are you using a particular translation of the Qur’an for your citations of Qur’anic 
material? 
559 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 244. However, Muqātil actually has already specified “other people” as 
polytheists (mushrikūn) in his commentary on Q.5:1 that he first cites. See Tafsīr Muqātil ibn Sulaymān, 
1/448. Indeed, he does not do that in his commentary on the second verse cited [Q17:34), in which the 
glossing he provides is “between you and other people” (fī mā baynakum wa bayna al-nās) without 
specification. Tafsīr Muqātil ibn Sulaymān, 2/530. Curiously, Muqātil actually does not specify who these 
people are in his commentary on Q.16: 91 in his major commentary, but it is his commentary on this verse 
in this legal commentary that specifies who these people are. See Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 2/484.  
560 al-‘Ābid, Tafasīr, 104. 
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Furthermore, not only is collecting all verses relevant to the topics being discussed 
helpful to the commentator in identifying how many times and where in the Qur’an God 
has addressed the same topics, but it is also helpful in clarifying or specifying what is 
only vaguely indicated in certain verses using other verses. The Qur’an thus interprets 
itself, or its parts interpret each other. 
Interpreting the Qur’an with prophetic traditions 
Muqātil also uses traditions—be they from the Prophet, Companions, or 
Successors—to support his interpretation of the Qur’an. There are forty-seven isnāds, 
perfect and defective, in the commentary indicating that the traditions Muqātil cites came 
from the Prophet. As an example for the prophetic traditions with the perfect isnād to the 
Prophet can be found in abwāb al-ṣiyām wa naskh min al-ṣawm al-awwal (chapter on the 
fasting and abrogation of early fasting).561 Of course, as usual, in the beginning of his 
discussion of any topic, Muqātil first mentions Qur’anic verses he deems revelant, and 
sandwiches them with his interpretation.  In this respect, Muqātil cites Q2: 183-184, 185, 
186, and 187.  
In his commentary on Q2: 183-184, Muqātil lays out a context to understand the 
verses. Muqātil maintains that before the obligation of Ramaḍān fasting, the Muslims 
used to fast ‘Āshūrā, that is, on the tenth of the month of Muḥarram. He also states that 
the Ramaḍān fasting was previously obligated to Christians at the time of Jesus (ahl al-
Injīl ummat ‛Īsā).562 Muqātil continues to explain the rules of fasting in early Islam that 
                                                        
561 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 71-77. 
562 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 71. 
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were burdersome to early Muslims. At the time, after the Muslims performed evening 
prayer (al-‛ishā’ al-akhīrah) or they fell asleep before they even performed the evening 
prayer, their fasting started immediately. They could not eat or perform any sexual 
activity. The same rules, according to Muqātil, applied to the People of Gospel at the time 
of Jesus.  Since there were some Companions who fell short of following these rules, 
God then revealed Q2: 186563 and also Q2: 187564 which lifted the burdensome rules. 
From that time on, the Muslims have been allowed to do anything forbidden during the 
daytime of fasting from after sunset until the dawn came. Likewise, Muqātil explains the 
abrogation of Q2: 184565, which obligated all Muslims to fast whenever the Ramaḍān 
came regardless of their hardship, by Q2: 185,566 which offers some easement to those 
who were sick or on a journey to choose whether to fast or not, and if they could not do it 
during the month, they were allowed to replace the missing days at other times.567 After 
commenting on fasting related verses, Muqātil presents eight traditions, two of which are 
                                                        
563 Q.2: 186: “[Prophet], if My servants ask you about Me, I am near. I respond to those who call Me, so let 
them respond to Me, and believe in Me, so that they may be guided.” 
564 Q.2: 187: “You [believers] are permitted to lie with your wives during the night of the fast: they are 
[close] as garments to you, as you are to them. God was aware that you were betraying yourselves, so He 
turned to you in mercy and pardoned you: now you can lie with them– seek what God has ordained for 
you– eat and drink until the white thread of dawn becomes distinct from the black. Then fast until nightfall. 
Do not lie with them during the nights of your devotional retreat in the mosques: these are the bounds set 
by God, so do not go near them. In this way God makes His messages clear to people, that they may guard 
themselves against doing wrong.” 
565 Q.2: 184: “Fast for a specific number of days, but if one of you is ill, or on a journey, on other days 
later. For those who can fast only with extreme difficulty, there is a way to compensate– feed a needy 
person. But if anyone does good of his own accord, it is better for him, and fasting is better for you, if only 
you knew.” 
566 Q.2: 185: “It was in the month of Ramadan that the Qur’an was revealed as guidance for mankind, clear 
messages giving guidance and distinguishing between right and wrong. So any one of you who is present 
that month should fast, and anyone who is ill or on a journey should make up for the lost days by fasting on 
other days later. God wants ease for you, not hardship. He wants you to complete the prescribed period and 
to glorify Him for having guided you, so that you may be thankful.” 
567 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 74-75. 
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from the Prophet.568 The two prophetic traditions laid out the timing of the starting and 
ending of the fasting, and how long it lasts.569 The other six traditions are from the 
Companions, which relate the kind of excuses that allow one not to fast and other excuses 
that ruin one’s fasting and is punishable.570 Muqātil seems to think that these traditions 
offer clear enough explanations that he does not need to add anything to them, but simply 
lays them out following his commentary on fasting-related verses. Methodologically, 
Muqātil shows gradual steps for interpreting the Qur’an, first, by using intratextual 
interpretation and then using prophetic traditions (ḥadīth). Furthermore, Muqātil 
considers the precedents that the Prophet and his Companions set as a model for how the 
Muslims should act.      
Interpreting the Qur’an with traditions from Companions and Successors 
There are seventy-two isnāds in the commentary indicating that Muqātil gains his 
information from the Companions, and twenty-two isnād from the Sucessors.571 Muqātil 
                                                        
568 The isnād of first of prophetic tradition runs as follows: Muqātil Nāfi‛  Ibn ‛Umar the Prophet, 
while the isnād for the second is MuqātilMuḥammad al-MunkadirJābir ibn ‛Abd Allāhthe Prophet. 
See Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 76. 
569 The two prophetic traditions relate the length of fasting of either thirty or twenty nine days, and that the 
beginning and end of fasting is by witnessing hilāl.  
570 Two traditions (one from ‘Amr ibn Shu‘ayb’s grandfather, and another from Abū al-Dardā’) suggest that 
for some justified reason, such travel, one may opt to fast or not, just as the Prophet did. One tradition from 
‘Amr ibn Shu‘ayb’s grandfather relates the story of a man who deliberately had a sexual intercourse with 
his wife in the month of Ramaḍān, to whom the Prophet told to choose, for expiation of his violation, 
whether to free a slave, or slaughter a sacrificial animal, or fast in two consecutive months, or feed sixty 
poor Muslims, and replace the day he was missing due to the sexual intercourse. One tradition from Ibn 
‘Umar that allows a pregnant and nursing woman not to fast, fearing for their baby, but she will have to 
feed one poor Muslim everyday without having to replace the missing day. The last tradition from Anas ibn 
Mālik that he was skipping fasting due to age and did that without having to replace the missing days until 
he died. See Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 76-7. 
571 I need to give a caveat in this regard. There could be more traditions Muqātil uses in the commentary 
but they are not given their due isnāds. Some of the Companion whose traditions Muqātil uses are: Ibn 
‛Abbās (19x), Ibn Mas‛ūd (11x), ‛Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib (9x), ‛Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb (8x), Ibn ‛Umar (4x), Abū 
al-Dardā’ (3x), Abū Bakr (2x), ‛Utmān ibn ‛Affān (2x), Abū Hurayrah (2x), Anas ibn Mālik (2x), and 
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uses the traditions from both Companions and Successors to clarify and specify the 
general explanation given by the Qur’an, similar to the way he uses traditions from the 
Prophet. Frequently these traditions supply the Qur’an with real cases alledgedly 
occurred among the early Muslim society. As such, these traditions are the 
exemplification or realization of potential cases that the Qur’an is addressing but not in 
detail. It is Muqātil’s habit in the commentary that he never discusses any traditions he 
uses. What he does is he simply lays them out, assuming that they provide clear 
explanations as to how Muslim should act on certain occasions. 
Tafsir al-Qur’an bi al-ra’y 
For an obvious reason, Muqātil’s personal views determined the last shape of his 
commentary. Not only are his views present in his commentary through his textual 
glossing on the fragments of qur’anic verses, but also in his selection and arrangement of 
material from other authorities. There are, however, views in the commentary that, while 
attributed to Muqātil, seem likely to have originated from older authorities, especially the 
Prophet. Attributed to Muqātil, these views convey information that can only be derived 
from revelation, and hence are not within the realm of personal opinions. The direct 
attribution to Muqātil and the absence of accompnying isnāds have made such views 
Muqātil’s although the very content they relate suggets this is unlikely. In his study on al-
Ṣan‛ānī, Motzki found out that there are places in which ‘Aṭā’, a Successor and one of al-
Ṣan‛ānī authorities, gives his seemingly personal views, and only in some other instances 
                                                        
others. Of the Successors, Muqātil receives his information from Aṭā’ ibn Abī Rabāḥ (9x), Ibrāhīm al-
Nakha‛ī (4x), al-Ḍahhāk, Mujāhid, Ṭāwus, Ibn Sīrīn, Bishr ibn Tayyim, and others. 
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does Motzki learn that ‛Aṭā’ actually knows a prophetic tradition that supports his 
view.572 Thus, it is possible that Muqātil rephrases traditions, which he learned from other 
authorities, in more or less his own renditions. This phenomenon may indicate Muqātil’s 
less rigid attitude with regard to isnād, or a possibility that at some point, including 
during Muqātil’s time, citing prophetic traditions did not have to be verbatim, as long as 
the originally prophetic meanings is preserved.  
An example of this is tafsīr ṣifat a‛māl al-mu’minin wa mā a‛adda Allah ‘Azza wa 
Jalla lahum fī a‛mālihim (interpretation of characteristics of the believers’ deeds and the 
rewards God has prepared for them). “Muqātil said, ‘Whoever performs a four-raka‛at-
prayer after ‛ishā’ in late night (al-‘ishā’ al-ākhirah) in which taslīm separates [between 
‛ishā’ and the four raka‛āt prayer] and he does not talk in between, for him a reward 
similar to [the prayer performed] in the laylat al-qadar.’”573 The view attributed to 
Muqātil in terms of the reward of a ritual practice seems to be something that only the 
Prophet could know, for it is not something that allows for personal opinion, but 
something of tawqīf, God’s discretion communicated through his prophet.574 Ibn Abī 
Shaybah (d. 235/849) mentioned a number of similar traditions as that attributed to 
                                                        
572 See Motzki, Origins. 
573 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 255. 
574 Although such a ḥadīth is mawqūf in the sense that its transmission does not show that it comes from the 
Prophet, its content makes it in the category of marfū’, as if it comes from the Prophet, as stated by Ibn 
Ḥajar al-‘Asqalānī. He said that there are ḥadīths whose content allow no room for personal opinions or 
that it is not an explanation of the language nor of the understanding of the content; rather, the content deals 
with matters such as narratives of the past, e..g., genesis, stories of the prophets, the prediction of the 
future, the conditions of the Day of Judgement, the reward of any rituals, the punishment for any sins. 
Knowledge of such matters cannot be invented but should be derived from the teaching of the Prophet 
himself. See his Nuzhat al-Naẓar fī Tawḍīḥ Nukhbat al-Fikar fī Muṣtṭalaḥ Ahl al-Athar, ed. ‘Abd Allāh ibn 
Ḍayf Allāh al-Raḥīlī (Riyāḍ: Fahrasat Maktabat al-Malik Fahd al-Waṭaniyyah, 2001), 133-4. 
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Muqātil whose chains of transmission either end with a Companion—such as Ibn ‘Umar 
and ‘Ā’ishah—or a Successor—such as Mujāḥid.575  
There are more cases in the commentary that attached some views to Muqātil but 
they likely originated from older authorities, including the Prophet. For instance, a well-
known ḥadīth on gradation of acts that Muslims must perform in relation to forbidding 
wrong but presented as Muqātil’s view in the commentary.576 Because Muqātil does not 
relate such views to authorities before him, we will never be sure unless we know of 
well-known traditions in circulation, which advocate the same views as Muqātil. Thus, 
for the time being, I will assume that everything couched as qāla Muqātil (“Muqātil 
said”) represents Muqātil’s views.  
Textual glossing 
Like in his major and narrative commentary al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr, Muqātil also uses 
textual glossing or paraphrasing method in this legal commentary. In this respect, he 
pieces qur’anic verses into smaller fragments—be they words or phrases—and provides 
his glossing in the form of synonyms, clarifying statements, or parallels.  
Such a textual glossing is constantly present throughout the commentary amidst 
other exegetical methods. Not only does he employ this method to clarify the intended 
meaning of qur’anic utterances, but also, perhaps as importantantly, he does it to 
emphasize his point of views. Muqātil seems to transpire to make his readers not to think 
                                                        
575 Abū Bakr ‘Abd Allāh ibn Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm Abū Shaybah al-‘Absī, al-Muṣannaf, ed. Abū 
Muḥammad Usāmah ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Muḥammad (Cairo: al-Fārūq al-Ḥadīthah li al-Ṭibā‘ah wa al-Nashr, 
2007), 281-2. 
576 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 279-280. 
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differently from the way he does in understanding the Qur’an for he explains almost any 
words or phrases in the Qur’an that they may understand differently. 
Asbāb al-nuzūl 
In his al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr, Muqātil employs a great amount of reports that 
illuminate the circumstances of revelation, traditionally called asbāb al-nuzūl. So 
extensive is Muqātil’ use of such reports that his commentary appears to be a narrative 
work or storytelling book. However, asbāb al-nuzūl reports have a great impact on 
understanding the Qur’an not only because they brings light on the circumstances within 
which its fragments were revealed or how they should be understood, but also because 
they are able to transport the readers of Muqātil’s commentary to a foreign space and 
time of the past. Thus, Muqātil’s commentary feeds not only readers’ intellectual faculty 
but also their sensual as well as emotional faculties, for they are situated as experiencing 
the process of revelation itself.  
In his legal commentary, Muqātil also uses similar material, although not as 
extensively as he did in his major commentary.577 But similar to usages in al-Tafsīr al-
Kabīr, in his use of these narrative materials Muqātil generally does not provide the 
accompanying isnāḍs. Given the provenance of these narratives as inherited traditions, 
Muqātil must have learned them from other and an older authority, for it is the only way 
in which asbāb al-nuzūl material passed across generations of Muslims.  
                                                        
577 The use of narrative material in both commentaries is not accompanied by isnāds. 
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Unlike other acts of interpretation of the Qur’an, asbāb al-nuzūl reports cannot be 
invented anew by generations after the prophetic period. They are inherited.578 Since 
these asbāb al-nuzūl reports are part of riwāyah,579 that is, transmitted knowledge, and 
not dirāyah, that is, learned knowledge, the later generations’ possession of that 
knowledge must have gone through relatively long processes of transmission, thus 
involving a relative great number of people of different times. In Muqātil’s time, such a 
transmission had travelled across at least two generations, that is, the generation of the 
Prophet and Companions, and of the Successors (tābi‛ūn). Ideally, therefore, Muqātil’s 
use of asbāb al-nuzūl reports should provide chains of transmission that declare the 
authorities from which he received information. However, this is not the case. Therefore, 
the readers of Muqātil’s commentary are left without the possibility of probing the 
reliability of the reports he uses, and they can only accept what Muqātil provides them 
with and attempt to evaluate whether his use of such reports makes sense within the 
context of qur’anic verses upon which Muqātil is commenting.  
Despite being the legacy of the past, differences abound when it comes to asbāb 
al-nuzūl. Of such differences is which of these reports is assigned to which qur’anic 
verses. Thus, the legacy of the past does not pertain only to these asbāb al-nuzūl reports, 
but also to differences in assigning them to certain qur’anic verses. Such differences 
suggest that the use of asbāb al-nuzūl is first and foremost exegetical. It is the attempt of 
                                                        
578 Al-Wāḥidi, however, suggests that one of the reasons why he wrote his Asbāb al-Nuzūl is because 
people of his time had deliberately invented such reports to support their opinions. See Abū al-Ḥasan ‘Alī 
Aḥmad al-Wāhīdī al-Nīsābūrī, Asbāb Nuzūl al-Qur’ān, ed. Al-Sayyid Aḥmad Saqar (nc., n.p., n.y.), 5-6. 
579 Roslan Abdul-Rahim, “Naskh al-Qur’an: A Theological and Juridical Reconsideration of the Theory of 
Abrogation and Its Impact on Qur’anic Exegesis,” (PhD Diss, Temple University, 2011), 79. 
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early Muslims to understand parts of revelation by anchoring them to certain moments in 
the Prophet's life.580 For instance, the Companions of the Prophet, namely Mu'awiyah and 
Abū Dhar al-Giffārī, had different views with regard to the addresses of Q9: 34. 
According to Mu'awiyah, the verse was revealed in relation to the People of Scripture; 
Abū Dhar thought that it was for them as much as for Muslims.581 This suggests that the 
connection between an asbāb report and a particular verse is not necessarily readily 
identifiable; rather, the process of such connection is exegetical, and hence is discursive. 
In this case, al-Wāḥidī suggests that connecting an asbāb report with particular revelatory 
moment and qur’anic verses is an exegetical endeavor, especially among the Companions 
of the Prophet and also the exegetes of the Qur’an. 
Wansbrough maintains that asbāb al-nuzūl reports fit well with legal concerns. In 
fact, “the mention of the occasion of revelation is essentially halakhic.”582 If reports of 
occasions of revelation take place in a haggadic commentary, such as Muqātil’s al-Tafsīr 
al-Kabīr, their function is “exclusively anecdotal, and may provide the narrative 
framework for an extended interpretation.”583 There are some cases, however, where the 
asbāb reports appear in haggadic exegesis whose purpose seems to be halakhic, as in the 
case of Sufyān al-Thawrī’s commentary as well as Muqātil’s.584 As a result, Wansbrough 
distinguished such reports into a cause (sabab) of revelation and a report (khabar) about 
                                                        
580 Al-Wāḥidī, Asbāb, 132. That is why, in Wansbrough’s view, tafsīr traditions are “to demonstrate the 
Hijazi origins of Islam.” Quranic Studies, 79. 
581 Al-Wāḥidī, Asbāb, 243. 
582 Wansbrough, Quranic Studies, 143. 
583 Wansbrough, Quranic Studies, 141, 143. 
584 Wansbrough, Quranic Studies, 142. 
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it.585 Positing that the occasion of revelation is the characteristic of halakhic exegesis, 
Wanbrough argued that its present in the haggadic exegesis was a symptom of its 
underdevelopment.586 However, my findings partially go against Wansbrough’s thesis, 
for while asbāb al-nuzūl reports take place in Muqātil’s legal commentary, their number 
is by far smaller than those found in Muqātil’s narrative commentary, and Muqātil’s legal 
exegesis therefore must be credited more to other elements, such as the use of traditions, 
prophetic or otherwise.587  
In this respect, I agree with Andrew Rippin who argues that asbāb al-nuzūl 
reports may well serve as the narrative context for revelation, and not necessarily 
exclusively legal in character.588 In fact, asbāb al-nuzūl reports may serve both goals 
mentioned together; these goals are not necessarily mutually exclusive. In this case, 
Muqātil best represents an exegetical enterprise that employs asbāb al-nuzūl reports for 
different purposes, legal or otherwise, in his qur’anic commentaries. Muqātil’s 
commentaries prove that asbāb al-nuzūl reports are helpful in illuminating the historical 
and cultural circumstances of revelation in general, including not only the legal aspect of 
the Qur’an, but also the entirety of its discourse. Suggesting that asbāb al-nuzūl reports 
serve better legal concerns is not always true if we consider some early legal scholars and 
                                                        
585 Wansbrough, Quranic Studies, 142. 
586 Wansbrough, Quranic Studies, 141. 
587 It is odd that while he argued that the use of asbāb reports is particularly for halakhic purposes, 
Wansbrough called Muqātil’s al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr haggadic in which these reports were still underdeveloped. 
Furthermore, while Muqātil’s Khams Mi’at is a legal commentary, Wansbrough considered it a 
commentary in which “the halakhic theme had priority over the scriptural evidence marshalled in its 
support” and whose style “is unmistakably haggadic, characterized by the serial repetition of explicative 
elements and by a profusion of anecdote.” Quranic Studies,170-1. 
588 See Andrew Rippin, “The Exegetical Genre "asbāb al-nuzūl": A Bibliographical and Terminological 
Survey,” in Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, Vol. 48, No. 1 
(1985): 1-15. 
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their work, including Muqātil and al-Shāfi‛ī, the latter of which I will discuss later. In 
fact, it is the knowledge and use of prophetic traditions other than those asbāb al-nuzūl 
reports, which have shaped legal rulings of scholars like al-Shāfi‛ī more than his 
knowledge and use of asbāb al-nuzūl reports.  
Other and much later legal scholars, e.g. maqāṣidī scholars, may have resorted 
more to using asbāb reports, not only to establish a chronology of revelation but also to 
derive the spirit of Islam in their promulgation of legal rulings. In this respect, asbāb al-
nuzūl reports are one of the best windows to understand why the Prophet or his 
Companions did what they did. But my point is that asbāb al-nuzūl reports are not only 
limited to legal needs but, more than that, to understanding the Qur’an as a whole. 
Therefore, the idea that legal commentaries can only emerge after the narrative ones, as 
Wansbrough’s sequential scheme of tafsīr development would suggest, is not necessarily 
true for the two can possible develop simultaneously, using asbāb al-nuzūl reports.589 
Narrative and legal aspects of understanding the Qur’an can develop in tandem.590   
                                                        
589 Wansbrough had actually acknowledged the possibility of a simultaneous development of different 
types of exegesis, although he did this in relation to the haggadic and the masoteric. Quranic Studies, 146. 
590 Karen Bauer argues that while Wansbrough, in his Quranic Studies, lays out the chronological as well as 
typological development of tafsīr as haggadic (narrative), halakhic (legal), masoteric (lexical), rhetorical 
and allegorical, his “main inconsistency is that he does not provide much evidence for the chronological 
element of his argument. Muqātil is used as the primary example for both haggadic and halakhic exegesis, 
and no evidence is provided to indicate that Muqātil’s ‘legal’ work of exegesis was written significantly 
later than his ‘narrative’ work.” Likewise, Bauer maintains, the typological categorization also suffers a 
deep flaw in “that elements of all these typologies can be found in all works.” See her “Introduction” to 
Aims, Methods, and Contexts of Qur’anic Exegesis, 5-6. Consequently, as Michael E. Pregill argued, 
Wansbrough’s proposed literary and stylistic criteria cannot reliably demonstrate the dating of exegesis 
works. See his “Methodologies for the Dating of Exegetical Works and Traditions: Can the Lost Tafsīr of 
Kalbī be Recovered from Tafsīr Ibn ‘Abbās (also known as al-Wāḍiḥ)?” in Aims, Methods, and Contexts of 
Qur’anic Exegesis (2nd/8th – 9th/15th c.) (London: Oxford University Press in association with the Institute 
of Ismaili Studies, (2013), pp. 393-453, 408.   
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Naskh al-Qur’ān 
Abrogation (naskh) in the Qur’an applies exclusively to verses related to law.591 
Generally, it applies to contradictory texts that cannot be harmonized.592 It deals with the 
sequence of revelation of qur’anic verses in which those sent down later cancel or annul 
the legal implications of others revealed earlier.593 Thus, naskh al-Qur’ān is the function 
of the chronology of revelation in which later revelation influences the working of legal 
implications of earlier revelation. Nonetheless, determining the chronology of the 
qur’anic texts is a difficult task, and it is generally based on the testimonies of the 
Companions of the Prophet. Their testimonies are fundamental in this regard.594  
 In relation to time, the abrogation process was limited only to the prophetic 
period (zamān al-risālah), and as such, it could only be decided by God through his 
Prophet (shāri‛),595 and nobody else, not even the Companions, especially in the Sunnī 
perspective, is imbued with authority to declare an abrogation event that is not traceable 
to the Prophet. Abrogation cannot be based on ijtihād, but must be reported from the 
                                                        
591 Abdul-Rahim, “Naskh,” 281.  
592 Wael B. Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunnī Uṣūl al-Fiqh 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 68. In al-‘Asqalānī’s scheme, naskh is the second 
mechanism to use when there are contradictory religious texts. The first mechanism is the unification of 
those contradictory texts (al-jam‘ in amkana). If this fails, the alternative is naskh. If that also fails, making 
preference among the contradictory texts available (al-tarjīh in ta‘ayyana) is the next step. But if tarjīh is 
also not possible, the last resort is allowing the right to choose to act on one of the contradictory texts (al-
tawaqquf ‘alā al-‘amal bi aḥad al-ḥadīthayn). See al-‘Asqalānī, Nuzhat, 97. 
593 General discussion of naskh by Muslim scholars identifies three modes of abrogation: the first is naskh 
al-ḥukm wa al-tilāwah, that is, those qur’anic verses that had been removed from the memory of the 
Prophet and the Muslims since the prophetic period; second is naskh al-tilāwah dūna l-ḥukm, that is, the 
removal of qur’anic verses but the retention of their applicable legal implications; third is naskh al-ḥukm 
dūna l-tilāwah, that is, the abrogation of legal implications of earlier revealed qur’anic verses with later 
verses while retaining their recitaton. As far as the Qur’an is concerned, Muqātil’s commentaries included, 
it is the third mode of abrogation that is being discussed. See Andrew Rippin, “Abrogation,” EI3. 
594 Hallaq, History, 70. 
595 Zayd, Naskh, 1/279, 107. 
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Prophet. Therefore, Musṭafā Zayd argues, any claim of abrogation that does not provide 
any sound isnād to the prophetic period was unwarranted, and hence should be rejected 
immediately. Likewise, Zayd maintains, any claim of naskh that was not related to the 
Prophet or his Companions reporting from him in a sound, continuous way was 
groundless and not worth accepting.596 
Muqātil mentions a number of abrogation cases in his commentary.597 An 
example of abrogation in the commentary takes place in tafsīr mā ḥurrima min nikāḥ al-
mut‛ah (interpretation of the prohibition of temporary marriage).598 In this respect, 
Muqātil maintains that temporary marriage was used to be permitted by the Prophet only 
for a very short period (three days), based on Q4: 24, but then was forbidden and 
abrogated by Q5: 102 and 4: 12. 
Prominent Topical Legal Discussions  
In the previous chapter, I have argued that the thread of Muqātil’s exegetical 
enterprise of the Qur’an revolves around propagating īmān with its two supporting 
principles, tawḥīd and taṣdīq. Therefore, following qur’anic polemics against its 
                                                        
596 Zayd, ]Naskh, 1/12. 
597 Some of Muqātil’s cases of abrogation in his al-Tafsīr al-kabīr, however, do not fit the proper definition 
of naskh as complete replacement of one legal ruling of qur’anic verses with another from other verses. 
Instead, they only represent “specification” of more general legal rulings. Not until al-Shāfi‘ī, who 
specified the definition of naskh as it is now understood and made it part of his notion of bayān, early 
Muslims understood naskh in its general, linguistic meaning as “removing something with something else.” 
As such, they employed naskh to delimitation of the unlimited (taqyīd al-muṭlaq), specifying the general 
(takhṣiṣ al-‘ām), explanation of the obscure (bayān al-mubham wa al-mujmal), as well as the alteration of a 
religious law with another (raf‘ al-ḥukm al-shar‘ī bi dalīl shar‘ī muta’akhkhir ‘anhu). In his major 
commentary, Muqātil mentions fourty four cases of abrogation, sixteen of which are verses abrogated by 
the “Sword Verse” (Q9:29). Of these cases, only three verses to which the proper definition of naskh 
applied. The rest of Muqātil’s cases are not events of abrogation as understood by legal scholars 
(uṣūliyyūn). See Shiḥātah, Tafsīr, 5/155-184. Also Zayd, Naskh.  
598 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 159. 
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opponents, Muqātil is engaged intensively with those whom he sees as deviating from 
monotheistic religion of Islam, namely the polytheists of Arabia, especially the Meccans, 
as well as the People of Scripture. 
In most cases, Muqātil makes religious difference trump all other considerations 
in building relations with other religious communities. Despite the prominent role of 
religious difference in determining his attitude towards these communities, however, 
Muqātil also takes mundane reasons into consideration when deciding the kinds of 
relationship that Muslims may build with other people. In his commentary, Muqātil 
appears to hold the view that the relative presence of hostility among non-Muslims 
against the freedom of preaching and practicing Islam in its early period had played an 
important role in shaping the Qur’an’s view of non-Muslims. In fact, it can be argued 
that, in Muqātil’s understanding, it is non-Muslim hostility toward the nascent Muslim 
community, both in Mecca in relation to polytheists and in Medina in relation to Jews, 
which first triggered the responses of the Prophet, even before his consideration of 
religious differences.  
In the following pages I will discuss some prominent topics in the commentary 
that deal with how Muqātil envisions different relational scenarios between Muslims and 
non-Muslims (Meccan Pagans, People of Scripture, and other) in both peaceful and war 
situations, as well as within internal Muslim community, especially in relation to the 
rebellious Muslims (hypocrites). Furthermore, I will delineate Muqātil’s attempts at 
finding a minimalist common ground for a viable, interreligious coexistence of these 
different communities. In addition, I will also discuss a number of particular topics, 
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namely jihād, al-amr bi al-ma‛ruf wa al-nahy ‛an al-munkar, and muḥkamāt al-qur’ān, 
whose relation to the interreligious affairs may seem unclear but it is vital.  
The polytheist-related laws 
The Meccan, or generally Arab, polytheists are among the primary targets of 
Muhammad and the revelation of the Qur’an. In the Qur’an and, likewise, in Muqātil’s 
commentary, the polytheists (mushrikūn) are depicted not only refuting Muhammad’s 
mission but also obstructing it with different scenarios: secret plots, open fights, etc. As 
such, the climate appeared highly hostile in terms of the relationship between the 
believers and the polytheists to the extent that the two are mutually exclusive. As a 
continuum, the Muslims and the polytheists stood at the two different ends of it.  
It seems, however, that there had been attempts—especially by Muhammad—to 
bridge this stalemate situation on both religious and political grounds. The phenomenon 
of the so-called “Satanic verses” in the Qur’an (53:19-20)—in which the revelation that 
Muhammad received approved of the gods that the polytheists worshipped—was a 
manifestation of Muhammad’s great desire to accommodate his people’s religious 
tradition that he was unknowingly receptive to—what the Qur’an (22:52) says as—the 
satanic voice as if it was revelation from God.599 Politically, the Truce of Ḥudaibiyyah in 
628 was ratified between Muhammad and the Meccans, which proved to be a turning 
point, especially for Muhammad and the believers, in which the two opponents were now 
                                                        
599 See Yohannnan Friedman, Tolerance and Coercion in Islam: Interfaith Relations in the Muslim 
Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 28-34. Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/132, 680; 4/162, 884. 
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on equal footing.600 It is likely this Truce of Ḥudaybiyyah that Muqātil meant when he 
was talking about making an agreement with the disbelievers in this commentary.601 
After the conquest of Mecca in 630, however, Muqātil seems to suggest that the attitude 
of the Qur’an and Muhammad toward Arab polytheists had changed dramatically, in 
which the possibility of building a peace treaty with the polytheists diminished 
completely. The only choice left to the Arab polytheists was either to accept Islam or to 
be fought against. This is when Muhammad was imposing Islam on the Arab people, 
whose submission had a great impact on how other religious communities were to be 
dealt with. Muqātil maintains that after the whole of the Arab people had converted to 
Islam, no compulsion of religion was allowed. With regard to non-Muslims, including the 
People of Scripture (Jews and Christians) and other communities such as Zoroastrians, 
Sabians, and others, received different policies in terms of their religious and political 
rights. In general, the Islamic policies on non-Muslims treated them as one of two 
statuses: either as ahl al-kitāb or ahl al-dhimmah, each of which determines the extent of 
                                                        
600 Ibn Ishāq saw the Truce of Ḥudaybiyyah as the greatest victory of Islam. “Some of Muhammad’s 
advisers thought this agreement’s provision was humiliating, but Muhammad saw it as a small price to pay 
for having the Meccans deal with him as an equal and recognize his status as the leader of Islam. 
Muhammad finally had the prestige and recognition he both desired and required if he was to convince 
other chiefs to join him.” Furthermore, “[t]he agreement permitted all the tribes of the region the freedom 
to make alliances with either side. This implied, as Muhammad saw it, that all prior alliances were no 
longer in force or, at least, that the tribes were now free to change sides or remain neutral. If they joined an 
alliance, the general truce applied to them for ten years.” In fact, following the ratification of the 
agreement, as stated by Ibn Isḥāq, “double as many or more than double as many entered Islam as ever 
before.” Thus, “[i]n one deft stroke Muhammad had altered the political power balance in the region. The 
powerful alliance of the Quraish, the Jewish tribes of Kheibar, and the large bedouin tribes of Ghatafan and 
Fazarah that had so effectively opposed Muhammad was formally dissolved by the truce. Muhammad 
could now deal with each opponent separately without having to worry that the other’s allies would come 
to their aid. His strategy of divide and conquer had provided Muhammad with a long-awaited opportunity.” 
See Gabriel, Muhammad, 150-1. See also Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2/377-8; 4/67. 
601 See Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2/165. 
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their religious and political rights.602 The ahl al-kitāb status offers non-Muslims more 
rights and possible relational scenarios with Muslims, religious and political, and it 
automatically includes the rights assigned in the ahl al-dhimmah status, but not the other 
way around. The ahl al-dhimmah status specifically aims at building political relations 
with non-Muslims whose religious denominations were not directly mentioned in the 
Qur’an, and they therefore did not enjoy certain interreligious rights that ahl al-kitāb 
possessed, such as intermarriage with Muslims. What the ahl al-dhimmah had was 
political relations with Muslims, especially with regard to political protection and 
agreements, including protection for their religious freedom. In the end, the definition of 
ahl al-kitāb and ahl al-dhimmah, and who are included in each, which will play a pivotal 
role in determining the implications of the the terms, as it will become clearer throughout 
the comparison of Muqātil’s and al-Shāfi‘ī’s views in this respect in the next pages.  
There are six tafsīrs in the commentary that deal with polytheists. Two of them 
are related to peace agreement making; another two pertain to intermarriage, and the last 
two tafsīrs address the conduct of war and spoil distribution. From these tafsīrs, it will be 
known that while some socio-political arrangement may be made between the Muslims 
and the polytheists, there are some social affairs, such as intermarriage, that cannot be 
undertaken primarily for the reason of religious difference. Unlike with kitābīs, in terms 
                                                        
602 In later parts of this chapter, I will discuss more the legal ramifications that non-Muslims may have with 
regard to their status as ahl al-kitāb or ahl al-dhimmah. The term ahl al-kitāb refers to Jewish or Christian 
communities, or those who had some sort of affiliation with them, who may conduct some relations with 
the Muslims such as intermarriage and food sharing, as well as political agreements. The term ahl al-
dhimmah, however, refers to non-Muslims who were not ahl al-kitāb but may have some political 
arrangement with the Muslims. The two terms for non-Muslims represent a scholarly attempt to cope with 
the fact that Muslims would have to deal with non-Muslims in their ever-expanding rule in its early period. 
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of a peace agreement, although the period within which it might be ratified was limited to 
the time of Hudaybiyyah and before the conquest of Mecca, as long as Muqātil is 
concerned, once it is agreed on, the Qur’an counsels the Muslims to respect it if it is 
made with good intention. 
Different paths of relation-building with Polytheists 
Peace agreement 
In relation to possible coexistence between Muslims and polytheists, Muqātil 
provides two tafsīr headings in his commentary, namely “interpretation of the command 
to fulfill the agreement between the believers and the polytheists and other people,” 
(tafsīr mā umira min wafā’ l-‘ahd fī mā baynahum wa bayna al-mushrikīn wa 
ghayrihim)603 and “interpretation of the command of what Muslims should do in terms of 
a betrayal of agreement by the polytheists” (tafsīr mā umira al-muslimūn an yaf‛alū min 
naqḍ al-‘ahd min al-mushrikīn).604  
In the first of the two, Muqātil adduces a number of qur’anic verses, namely 
Q5:1,605 Q17:34,606 and Q16:91-94,607 which convey God’s command to believers to be 
                                                        
603 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 244-45. 
604 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 245-46. 
605 Q5: 1, “You who believe, fulfil your obligations…” 
606 Q17: 34, “…Honor your pledges: you will be questioned about your pledges.” 
607 Q16: 91-94, “[91] Fulfill any pledge you make in God’s name and do not break oaths after you have 
sworn them, for you have made God your surety: God knows everything you do. [92] Do not use your 
oaths to deceive each other– like a woman who unravels the thread she has firmly spun– just because one 
party may be more numerous than another. God tests you with this, and on the Day of the Resurrection He 
will make clear to you those things you differed about. [93] If God so willed, He would have made you all 
one people, but He leaves to stray whoever He will and guides whoever He will. You will be questioned 
about your deeds. [94] Do not use your oaths to deceive each other lest any foot should slip after being 
firmly placed and lest you should taste the penalty for having hindered others from the path of God, and 
suffer terrible torment.” 
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loyal to any agreements they made with other people, including ahl al-shirk and ahl al-
ḥarb (people who are at war with Muslims), and other.608 If the two parties kept their 
words in terms of the agreement, no justification whatsoever was given to the believers to 
betray it, even if the Muslims were the majority.609 In Muqātil’s view, God deliberately 
created differences among His creations as a test to be accounted for in the hereafter. Had 
he willed, he would have made the believers and the polytheists into one (religious) 
community, namely Islam (millat al-islām waḥdah).610 Consequently, Muqātil sees any 
violation of an agreement as a serious offense leading to severe punishment. As long as 
such an agreement was made with good intention and without deceit, Muqātil urges that 
it has to be honored, and the Muslims were counseled to be loyal and self-controlled.  
In second tafsīr that discusses the possibility of polytheists to violate the 
agreement made with the Prophet and the believers, Muqātil cites Q2: 194,611 in which 
God gave assurance that if the Polytheists did betray the agreement, God would protect 
the Prophet and the believers. The verse, according to Muqātil, was revealed at the time 
when the Prophet and the believers were heading toward Mecca to perform a minor 
pilgrimage (muḥrimīn bi ‛umrah) made in 629, a year after the ratification of the Truce of 
Ḥudaybiyyah in 628, and one year before the conquest of Mecca in 630.  
In the two tafsīrs that discuss a peace agreement with the Meccan polytheists 
above, Muqātil provides an important guideline as to how Muslims should act vis-à-vis 
                                                        
608 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 244. 
609 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 245. 
610 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 245. 
611 Q2: 194, “A sacred month for a sacred month: violation of sanctity [calls for] fair retribution. So if 
anyone commits aggression against you, attack him as he attacked you, but be mindful of God, and know 
that He is with those who are mindful of Him.” 
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other communities. More importantly, the community being exemplified here is the most 
extremely hostile to the Prophet and the Muslims, and its guideline therefore paves an 
easier path for the believers to imagining what they can do with other communities that 
are less harmful than the Meccans, although they are different religiously, as in the case 
of the People of Scripture (ahl al-kitāb) and non-Muslim other than the Jews and 
Christians (ahl al-dhimmah).  
Thus, putting aside religious differences, Muqātil advocates for a vision of the 
Qur’an that allows peaceful coexistence for Muslims and other people through a mutual 
treaty that is honest and just. Such a qur’anic vision is translated through its warning on 
the Muslims to be self-controlled and loyal to any treaty once it is made. The Qur’an 
forbids Muslims to contemplate any betrayal even when they have become majority. It 
also prohibits Muslims to initiate war, but commands them to defend themselves if war 
has to occur. The fact the Qur’an allows the Prophet and Muslims to make a peaceful 
treaty with polytheists (al-mushrikūn) and people of war (ahl al-ḥarb), arguably the most 
hostile of all, makes it much easier for Muslims to envision the same with other 
communities who posed a lesser or no threat at all. However, the Qur’an is also at the 
forefront in underlining the condition that such agreement should be made with good 
intention and justice to all parties involved.  
However, this vision of peaceful coexistence through treaty was only one phase in 
terms of the relations between Muslim and non-Muslims of Mecca, especially prior and 
up to the establishment of the Hudaybiyyah Treaty.612 Following the conquest of Mecca 
                                                        
612 In relation to the Ḥudaybiyyah treaty, see Gabriel, Muhammad, 150-152, 166, 167. 
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in 630, Muhammad imposed Islam to the whole Arabs and made different policies for 
People of Scripture and and other non-Muslims, such as Zoroastrians, who lived in 
Arabia. For these non-Muslims, Muhammad allowed them to retain their religions, but 
required from them the payment of jizyah (poll tax) as a token for political submission. In 
this regard, Muqātil says that there is no compulsion over anyone in terms of religion 
after the submission of the Arabs (ba‘d islām al-‘arab) as long as they pay jizyah (idhā 
aqarrū bi al-jizyah).613 
Interreligious Marriage with polytheists 
Two consecutive tafsīrs in Muqātil’s commentary address interreligious marriage 
between Muslims and non-Muslims. They are “interpretation of what is prohibited to 
marry kitābī fornicators and polytheist female slaves (walā’id)” (tafsīr mā ḥurrima min 
nikāḥ al-zawānī min ahl al-kitāb wa min walā’id mushrikī al-’Arab)614 and 
“interpretation of the prohibition to marry polytheist females and non-kitābī females” 
(tafsīr mā ḥurrima min tazwīj al-mushrikāt wa ghayr ahl al-kitāb).615 Since these two 
                                                        
613 Muqātil says that in the beginning, the Prophet only accepted jizyah from ahl al-kitāb. When the Arabs 
surrendered, willingy or unwillingly, the Prophet accepted kharaj from non-ahl al-kitāb. However, after his 
invitation to the people of Hajar through their leader, al-Mundhir ibn Sāwā, the Prophet accepted from 
jizyah from all those who rejected Islam, be they ahl al-kitāb proper—such as Jews and Christians—and 
other people, such as Zoroastrians. The fact that the Prophet had accepted jizyah from non ahl al-kitāb, e.i. 
Zoroastrians (majūs ahl hajar), had had stirred up problems among the hypocrites, for in their knowledge 
the prophet was allowed to accept jizyah only from ahl al-kitāb. See Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/213-14. 
614 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 160. In his al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr, commenting on Q42:3, Muqātil maintains that a 
kitābī fornicator should marry only a female fornicator, be she from ahl al-kitāb or al-‘arab, that is walā’id 
who committed fornication publicly for payment (yaznīna bi al-ajri ‘alāniyatan). In other words, these 
walā’id are prostitutes. Muqātil mentions nine of such walā’id, including Umm Sharīk jāriyah of ‘Amr ibn 
‘Umayr al-Makhzūmī, Umm Mahzūl jāriyah of Ibn Abī al-Sā’ib ibn ‘Ānid, Sharīfah jāriyah of Zum‘ah ibn 
al-Aswad, Jalālah jāriyah of Suhayl ibn ‘Amr, Qarībah jāriyah of Hishām ibn ‘Amr, Farashī jāriyah of 
‘Abd Allāh ibn Khaṭl, Umm ‘Ulayṭ jāriyah of Ṣafwān ibn Umayyah, Ḥannah al-Qibṭiyyah jāriyah of al-‘Āṣ 
ibn Wā’il, Umaymah jāriyah of ‘Abd Allāh ibn Ubayy, Masīkah bint Umayyah jāriyah of ‘Abd Allāh ibn 
Nufayl. See Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/182-3. 
615 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 161-62. 
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tafsīrs also discuss People of Scripture, some overlap is expected when I discuss the 
topics again in dealing them. Furthermore, most of Muqātil’s discussion in these two 
tafsīrs focused more on the kitābī females than on the polytheist female slaves about 
whom Muqātil provides almost no discussion. 
In “interpretation of the prohibition to marry kitābī adulteresses and polytheist 
female slaves (walā’id),” Muqātil mentions Q24: 3,616 and explains the context of its 
revelation. When Muhammad’s Meccan followers migrated to Medina, they found their 
lives so modest, with their property and family left in Mecca. Meanwhile, some of kitābī 
women and Arab polytheist walā’id solicited a well-paid sexual service as prostitutes. On 
their houses’ doors, they put a sign showing their available service, like the ones used by 
veterinarians, says Muqātil. These prostitutes were among the most prosperous people in 
Medina. The poor Meccans consulted the Prophet on whether it would be better for them 
to marry these women so that they might take advantage of their financial situation, but 
leave them after they were better off economically. In the wake of this, a revelation came 
prohibiting such an idea of marrying unchaste women.617 These adulteresses—kitābī and 
‛Arab walā’id—should only be married to people like them, adulterers. Thus, Muqātil 
assigns the reason for prohibiting marriage to polytheist female slaves (walā’id) to the 
fact that they, like some of their kitābī females’ counterparts, are unchaste.  
                                                        
616 Q24:3, “The adulterer is only [fit] to marry an adulteress or an idolatress, and the adulteress is only [fit] 
to marry an adulterer or an idolater: such behavior is forbidden to believers.” 
617 See Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/182-3. 
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In “interpretation of the permission to marry free kitābī women,”618 however, 
Muqātil explains that prohibition of marrying kitābī females does not apply to all of 
them, but only to those who publicly or secretly unchaste. Citing Q5: 5,619 Muqātil 
maintains that believers may indeed be married to free and respectful kitābī women. 
Thus, in Muqātil’s view, there are two traits that kitābī women should possess in order 
for a Muslim to be able to marry her: chastity (‛afāfif) and freedom (ḥarā’ir). Although 
this tafsīr does not deal directly with polytheists, like the earlier tafsīr in which kitābī 
women and polytheists walā’id are dealt with, it may shed light on why Muqātil supports 
the prohibition of marrying polytheist walā’id. Muqātil explains that to be marriageable 
by a Muslim, kitābī women must be chaste and free. At least one of these traits—that is, 
freedom—is not in polytheist walā’id’s possession, and the lack of freedom may put her 
in a vurnerable position in relation to chastity. Thus, Muqātil’s minimal discussion of 
polytheist walā’id in the tafsīr suggests that he has taken it for granted that these female 
slaves do not fulfill even the minimum condition to be marriageable to a Muslim. 
Therefore, Muqātil simply neglects them.  
But a further implication may be drawn from Muqātil’s discussion of permitted 
marriage with chaste and free kitābī female by Muslims: that is that the prohibition of 
intermarriage with polytheists, males and females alike is due to the belief aspect, in 
which they do not uphold tawḥīd, the very defining trait of Islam and one on which 
                                                        
618 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 167-8. 
619 Q5: 5, “Today all good things have been made lawful for you. The food of the People of the Book is 
lawful for you as your food is lawful for them. So are chaste, believing women as well as chaste women of 
the people who were given the Scripture before you, as long as you have given them their bride-gifts and 
married them, not taking them as lovers or secret mistresses. The deeds of anyone who rejects faith will 
come to nothing, and in the Hereafter he will be one of the losers.” 
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Muqātil has always insisted in propagating. Taking this into consideration, there is no 
chance, in Muqātil’s view, that such interreligious marriage between Muslims and 
polytheists would ever happen. In this case, unlike in the case of agreements for peaceful 
coexistence mentioned earlier, consideration of religious difference seems to trump any 
other considerations. Within Muqātil’s theological framework, interreligious marriage 
between Muslims and polytheists is out of consideration, because the latter’s religious 
view does not pass his litmus test, which is monotheism. 
Muqātil’s view on the prohibition of interreligious marriage between Muslims and 
polytheists finds more vindication in his “interpretation of what is prohibited from being 
married to female-polytheists and non-kitābī women” (tafsīr mā ḥurrima min tazwīj al-
mushrikāt wa ghayr ahl al-kitāb).620 In this respect, Muqātil mentions one verse, that is, 
Q2:221.621  If in the case of polytheist walā’id, the prohibition of intermarriage is based 
on blatant promulgation of adultery by these female slaves who practiced some sort of 
prostitution, in the present context, the Qur’an bases its prohibition of such intermarriage 
more explicitly on a religious basis. The Qur’an states that a Muslim man cannot be 
married to a non-kitābī, polytheist women until they have acknowledged tawḥīd. A slave, 
but believing, woman is much better than even a free non-kitābī, polytheist woman. In 
the same vein, Muqātil asserts that a Muslim woman cannot be married to a polytheist 
male although he is of the People of Scripture, until he acknowledges tawḥīd. It is 
                                                        
620 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 161-2. 
621 Q2:221: “Do not marry idolatresses until they believe: a believing slave woman is certainly better than 
an idolatress, even though she may please you. And do not give your women in marriage to idolaters until 
they believe: a believing slave is certainly better than an idolater, even though he may please you. Such 
people call [you] to the Fire, [while God calls [you] to the Garden and forgiveness by His leave. He makes 
His messages clear to people, so that they may bear them in mind].” 
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ambiguous what Muqātil really means in this respect: whether a kitābī male should 
embrace Islam, or simply to acknowledge tawḥīd, while retaining his old religion, to be 
able to marry a Muslim female.622 What is clear is that Muqātil opens to a possibility that 
a polytheist may be of the People of Scripture (kitābi) or pagan (wathanī). Since Muqātil 
conditions the possible intermarriage between non-Muslim male and a Muslim female on 
the admission of tawḥīd, it is likely sufficient for kitābī male to marry a Muslim female 
by declaring his upholding of tawḥīd while retaining his old religion (Judaism and 
Christinity). When it comes to wathanī male, however, it appears that he has to renounce 
his old religious belief altogether and to embrace Islam before he can marry a Muslim 
female. In this context, religious belief plays a determining role in the possibility for 
intermarriage. Muqātil, therefore, argues that a believing male slave is much better for a 
Muslim female. Likewise, a Muslim man cannot marry non-kitābī, polytheist females, 
but he is allowed to marry kitābī women who are free and respectable.623 
The tafsīrs on interreligious marriage show that, despite the qur’anic vision of 
peaceful coexistence between different people, including those with religious differences, 
Muqātil sees that not all social relations and contracts between Muslims and non-
Muslims are always possible. Interreligious marriage is a case in point in which, based on 
his understanding of the Qur’an, Muqātil does not allow a marriage between Muslims, 
                                                        
622 With regard to the kitābī male, it is unclear whether Muqātil is suggesting that he needs only to declare 
his admission of the unity of God, or whether he has to embrace Islam to be able to marry a Muslim female. 
It is possible that the first option would be sufficient for a kitābī male to marry a Muslim female by 
acknowledging tawḥīd that will remove the shirk predication from himself. This, however, suggests that in 
addition to the religious consideration, there was a gender aspect to the question of intermarriage, which I 
will address when I am dealing with People of Scripture later. 
623 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 161-2. 
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male and female, with polytheists, nor between a Muslim female with a non-Muslim 
kitābī male, until he admits tawḥīd. Muqātil, however, sees permissible a marriage 
between a Muslim male with kitābī women if the latter are free and respectable. Muqātil 
does put more limitations on Muslim females than on Muslim males in terms of 
interreligious marriage, about which he does not provide any reasoning.624 
It is Muqātil’s view, based certainly on his understanding of the qur’anic point of 
view that both People of Scripture and Arab pagans are, in one way or another, all 
polytheists. These two groups of people either violated tawḥīd or taṣdīq, or both, by their 
worshipping other gods (shirk), with or without God, and refusing to accept 
Muhammad’s prophethood (takdhīb). In this respect, Muqātil sometimes uses nuanced 
terms such as “kitābī polytheist” (mushrik min ahl al-kitāb), or non-kitābī, polytheist 
woman (mushrikah min ghayr ahl al-kitāb). These terms suggest that polytheists may be 
members of People of Scripture and also of Arab pagans.625 But this is not all completely 
unexpected from Muqātil whose insistent propagation of tawḥīd has equipped him with 
fierce criticism to both Arab pagans and People of Scripture whom he charges with some 
sort of polytheism, in addition to their refusal of his prophethood (takdhīb).  
In war with polytheists 
The last two tafsīrs in the commentary that I would like to discuss in relation to 
polytheists are war-related matters. These are “interpretation of what God has previously 
                                                        
624 See Kecia Ali, Sexual Ethics & Islam: Feminist Reflections on Qur’an, Hadith, and Jurisprudence 
(Oxford: Oneworld, 2006), 13-23.  
625 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 162. 
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tightened upon Muslims with regard to fighting against polytheists but then relaxed” 
(tafsīr mā kāna shaddada Allāh ‛alā l-muslimīn min qitāl al-mushrikīn thumma 
rakhkhaṣa)626 and “interpretation of the division of booty gained from war against the 
polytheists” (tafsīr qismat al-qismah min fay’ al-mushrikīn min ahl al-ḥarb).627 
The former deals with how Muslims should face the enemy. In this respect, 
Muqātil adduces a number of qur’anic verses, namely Q8: 15-16,628 65-66,629 Q3: 155,630 
and Q9: 25.631 Q8: 15-16 conveys God’s command on the believers to be steadfast in 
their participation in the war and enduring whatever consequences it may have on them, 
and to never escape from the battleground. In Q8: 65-66, God prescribed the ratio of the 
believers’ army and the enemy’s whom they have to defeat in the first verse (8:65), but 
then abrogated in the second (8:66). Previously, God commanded, and indeed assured, 
that twenty people of steadfast believers should be able to face, and indeed defeat, two 
hundred of the enemy’s army, or a hundred to defeat a thousand. Thus, during the battle 
of Badr, one believer should fight against ten disbelievers. Although the believers came 
                                                        
626 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 269-70. 
627 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 271-72. 
628 Q8:  15-16, “[15] Believers, when you meet the disbelievers in battle, never turn your backs on them: 
[16] if anyone does so on such a day– unless manoeuvring to fight or to join a fighting group– he incurs the 
wrath of God, and Hell will be his home, a wretched destination!” 
629 Q8: 65-66, “[65] Prophet, urge the believers to fight: if there are twenty of you who are steadfast, they 
will overcome two hundred, and a hundred of you, if steadfast, will overcome a thousand of the 
disbelievers, for they are people who do not understand. [66] But God has lightened your burden for now, 
knowing that there is weakness in you– a steadfast hundred of you will defeat two hundred and a steadfast 
thousand of you will defeat two thousand, by God’s permission: God is with the steadfast.” 
630 Q3: 155, “As for those of you who turned away on the day the two armies met in battle, it was Satan 
who caused them to slip, through some of their actions. God has now pardoned them: God is most 
forgiving and forbearing.” 
631 Q9: 25, “God has helped you [believers] on many battlefields, even on the day of the Battle of Hunayn. 
You were well pleased with your large numbers, but they were of no use to you: the earth seemed to close 
in on you despite its spaciousness, and you turned tail and fled.” 
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up victorious in the battle of Badr, God knew that the prescribed ratio between the 
combatants of the two warring parties, in which a believer had to face ten enemies, could 
be of a great burden to the believers which would accordingly lead to their defeat. 
Muqātil maintains that Q8: 66 was revealed after the Battle of Uḥud in which the 
believers suffered a major defeat.632 In this respect, God abrogated Q8: 65 with Q8: 66 by 
narrowing the difference in terms of the number of combatants of the believers and the 
enemy, from one tenth to a half. This abrogation, according to Muqātil, is the easement 
that God gave the believers after a more burdensome obligation (rukhṣah ba‘d al-
tashdīd). Muqātil, however, is quick to suggest, by mentioning Q9: 25, that the number of 
combatants alone is not sufficient determinant for either victory or defeat, for while the 
believers were so numerous during the Battle of Ḥunayn, they suffered an uexpected 
defeat, because their confidence, especially in their number, had led to their 
negligence.633 
In “interpretation of the division of booty gained from a war against the 
polytheists,” Muqātil discusses how war gain should be distributed. In this regard, 
Muqātil adduces Q8: 41.634 Muqātil explains that at the time of the Prophet, Muslims 
used to set aside one fifth of the booty, which was then further divided into four. The first 
one fourth was for the Prophet and his relatives, in which each received the same amount; 
the second one fourth was for the orphans; the third was for the poor, and the fourth was 
                                                        
632 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 270. 
633 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 270. 
634 Q8: 41, “Know that one-fifth of your battle gains belongs to God and the Messenger, to close relatives 
and orphans, to the needy and travellers, if you believe in God and the revelation We sent down to Our 
servant on the day of the decision, the day when the two forces met in battle. God has power over all 
things.” 
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for ibn al-sabīl. The rest of the booty was to be distributed to Muslims according to their 
relative contribution and participation in the war.635 After the Prophet died, Abū Bakr 
took back the portion for the Prophet’s relatives and allocated it to the cause of sabīl 
Allāh. When ‛Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib came to Abū Bakr requesting the share for the Prophet’s 
relatives, which they used to receive during the Prophet’s time, Abū Bakr told him that he 
heard that ‘Ā’ishah (his daughter and a wife of the Prophet) had heard the Prophet 
saying: “The Prophet does not leave inheritance.” ‛Alī then came to meet ‛Āishah, 
confirming what Abū Bakr just told him. “Did you hear the Messenger of God saying that 
the Prophet does not leave inheritance?” “Yes,” replied ‛Ā’ishah. ‛Ali complied. Since 
then, Abu Bakr, ‛Umar, and ‛Alī distributed what used to be the portion of the Prophet’s 
relatives for the cause of sabīl Allāh, along with the shares of the orphans, the poor, and 
ibn sabīl.636  
Although the two tafsīrs on war with polytheists are not related directly to the 
question of religious or non-religious considerations in the promulgation of law, the two 
cases that they convey communicate the change of legal rulings that occurred in early 
Islam. The change in the ratio between the Muslim combatants and the polytheist enemy 
in war, for instance, is a legal change that later Muslim scholars called abrogation.637 In 
this regard, it is the case of abrogation of the Qur’an by the Qur’an. But Muqātil does not 
call such a legal change with the term naskh (abrogation) although in many other cases he 
does use the term for similar changes. Instead, Muqātil casually calls it rukhṣah ba‛d al-
                                                        
635 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 271. 
636 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 271-72. 
637 See Rippin, “Abrogation,” EI3. 
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tashdīd (“easement after tightening”).638 This may suggest that during Muqātil’s lifetime 
the term abrogation (naskh) was not yet well defined as a technical, legal term. The 
fluidity of the term naskh may also provide the reason why Muqātil refers to some cases 
in his commentary as abrogation while they are actually cases of specification (takhṣīṣ) in 
which some new legal rulings do not completely alter the older ones but only partially 
modify them. If Musṭafā Zayd is correct, it was decades later with al-Shāfi‛ī that the 
definition of abrogation was refined and its parameters identified.639 
There was second legal change regarding the division of battlegain from the one 
prescribed in Q8: 41 and applied during the Prophet’s lifetime to a new one after the 
Prophet’s death. This was based on ‘Ā’ishah’s report of the Prophet’s saying, and was 
stipulated at the time of Abū Bakr as Caliph. It also communicates a case of abrogation of 
the Qur’an by the Sunnah. While Muqātil does not call this legal change abrogation, later 
Muslim scholars debated whether the Qur’an can abrogate the Sunnah, and vice versa.640  
                                                        
638 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 270. 
639 Al-Shāfi‘ī, however, did not deliberately put theoretical explanation on the difference between naskh, on 
the one hand, and takhṣīṣ al-‘ām or taqyīd al-mutlaq, on the other. What he did was to put forth examples 
for each case of the three from which differences can be drawn. This is what Muhammad Abū Zahrah 
understood from his reading of al-Shāfi‘ī’s Risālah. From al-Shāfi‘ī’s explication, it was concluded that 
naskh could happen only when a law was previously applied before it was removed totally and was 
replaced by a new one (raf’ hukm al-nass ba’da an yakuna thabitan). However, if some legal replacement 
only partially changes the old one, and not in its totality, such a case can only be called takhṣīṣ al-‘ām 
(specification of the general). Al-Ṭabari, for instance, clearly followed al-Shāfi‘ī’s suit by stating that naskh 
only occurred when the old, applied law was removed by a new one. If such replacement was only 
partial—such as suggesting exception (istihna’), takhsis al-‘am (specifying the general)—it was not naskh. 
Al-Ṭabari, however, did not provide a definition of naskh but merely explained it by providing examples, 
similar to that done by al-Shāfi‘ī. It was an Andalusian traditionist, Abu ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Ḥazm, 
who came after after al-Ṭabari, who first gave naskh a formal definition. After Ibn Ḥazm, an Egyptian 
grammarian, Abu Ja‘far al-Naḥḥās offered a linguistic as well as legal definition of naskh. Afterward, al-
Jaṣṣāṣ added that naskh sometime occurred only on the recitation while the law remained applicable (fī al-
tilāwah ma‘a baqā’ al-ḥukm), or occurred only on the law while the recitation (or the verses) remained (fī 
al-ḥukm ma‘a baqā’ al-tilāwah). See Zayd, Naskh, 1/75-108. Also al-Ṭabarī, Jāmi‘, 2/4235. 
640 See J. Burton, "Nask̲h̲." Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, 
C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W. P. Heinrichs. Brill Online, 2014. Reference. Boston University. 04 June 
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Furthermore, the last two cases in relation to the war against polytheists suggest 
that the Qur’an anticipates all possibilities with regard to how believers should build 
relationship with other people, including in both peaceful and conflict situations. Such 
anticipation underlies the importance of agreement making as an important instrument for 
social order within which all different elements of society may live a normal life. At 
some point, however, especially after the establishment of the Hudaybiyyah treaty and 
the conquest of Mecca in 630, the agreement-making between Muhammad and the Arab 
polytheists seems to be halted, and he began to impose Islam on them. A different set of 
policies were made with regard to other non-Muslims living in Arabia, including the 
Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians by which they were allowed to practice their beliefs 
while required to pay jizyah as a token of political submission. 
People of Scripture-related laws  
People of Scripture (ahl al-kitāb) have a special status within Islamic point of 
view simply because of their possession of scripture. Despite qur’anic criticism of some 
of their alledgedly polytheistic practice641 and their rejection of Muhammad’s 
prophethood, the Qur’an treats them differently from those Arab pagans who worshipped 
idols and possessed no scripture. Of course there were Jews of Medina who followed 
                                                        
2014 http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/naskh-SIM_5832 First 
appeared online: 2012. 
641 The only polytheistic practice of which the Qur’an accuses the Jews is their alleged statement that 
‛Uzayr is son of God. Another polytheistic scandal that the Qur’an mentions occurred at the time of Mūṣā 
by their predecessors, not the Jews of Muhammad’s time. Other than this, qur’anic ciriticism against the 
Jews is due to persistent rejection of Muhammad’s prophethood by some of them, or qur’anic reminder of 
their predecessor’s persistent transgression against God’s law as well as their stubborn ungratefulness to 
what they had received from God. 
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Muhammad and became Muslims, as Muqātil mentions in al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr.642 
Notwithstanding, Muqātil himself does not seem to require non-Muslim conversion to 
Islam, as long as they were willing to uphold tawḥīd and recognize Muhammad’s claim 
of prophethood, while being faithful to their own scriptures. This, however, does not 
deny the fact that, given his persistent advocacy of tawḥīd and taṣdīq, in Muqātil’s view 
such conversion would be desireable.  
What Muqātil implies throughout his major commentary, al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr, is 
that the Qur’an’s minimalist invitation to People of Scripture is to believe in 
Muhammad’s mission as a part of a long prophetic chain while they kept practicing the 
teachings of their own scriptures, in which tawḥīd constituted the fundamental teaching. 
The problem with People of Scripture, especially with regard to the Jews, in Muqātil’s 
view, is that while they refused to believe in Muhammad, they were also unfaithful to 
their own scriptures. In the case of Christians, in addition to their similar rejection of 
Muhammad’s prophethood, they practiced Trinitarian polytheism by which they elevated 
Jesus into divinity claiming him as the son of God and the third of the three. All these 
sins that the People of Scripture committed had made them one of the main targets of 
qur’anic criticism, as Muqātil mentions in his al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr. 
                                                        
642 In several places, Muqātil mentions “‘Abd Allāh ibn Salām and his companions”—such as Usayd ibn 
Zayd, Asad ibn Ka‘b, Salām ibn Qays, and others—as the represntatives of Jewish converts. See Muqātil, 
Tafsīr, 1/81, 87, 90, 120, 135, 139-40, 179, 264, 268, 285, and many more. ‘Abd Allāh ibn Salām was “a 
Jew of Medīna, belonging to the Banū Ḳaynuḳāʿ and originally called al-Ḥusayn… Muḥammad gave him 
the name of ʿAbd Allāh when he embraced Islam. This conversion is said to have taken place immediately 
after Muḥammad’s arrival at Medīna, or, according to others, when Muḥammad was still in Mecca.” See J. 
Horovitz, “ʿAbd Allāh b. Salām.” Encyclopaedia of Islam. 
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In the light of this Qur’anic criticism, how then does Muqātil explain some of the 
Qur’an’s policies that allow the Muslims to have certain encounters with the People of 
Scripture?  To shed light on this question, I will discuss a number of civil and political 
interrelations that the Qur’an prescribes with regard to the Muslims and the People of 
Scripture. 
Interreligious marriage with the People of Scripture  
There are three tafsīrs in Muqātil commentary that address interreligious marriage 
with People of Scripture, namely “interpretation of the prohibition to marry kitābī 
adulteresses and polytheist female slaves” (tafsīr mā ḥurrima min nikāḥ al-zawānī min 
ahl al-kitāb wa min walā’id mushrikī al-‘Arab ),643 “interpretation of the permission to 
marry free kitābī women” (tafsīr mā uḥilla min tazwīj ḥarā’ir ahl al-kitāb),644 and 
“interpretation of God’s prohibition of causing damage in divorcing wives” (tafsīr mā 
nahā Allāh ‘Azza wa Jalla ‘anhu min al-iḍrār fi ṭalāq al-nisā’).645 Since I have already 
discussed the first of the three tafsīrs, namely “interpretation of the prohibition to marry 
kitābī adulteresses and polytheist female slaves,” in the following I will deal only with 
the last two tafsīrs. 
Earlier, I stated that Muqātil sees that intermarriage with kitābī females is 
permissible if they are free (ḥarā’ir) and chaste (‘afāfif). If a kitābi female is a slave or 
she is known, either privately or publicly, as unchaste, then she is not marriageable to a 
                                                        
643 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 160. See Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/182-3. I have discussed this tafsīr when I was 
discussing intermarriage with polytheists above. 
644 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 167-8. 
645 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 183-5. 
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believer. Muqātil discusses the permissibility of intermarriage with a free kitābī female in 
his “interpretation of the permission to marry free kitābī women.”646 In this regard, 
Muqātil mentions Q5: 5 to support the idea of interreligious marriage between a Muslim 
male and a kitābī woman, whether she is a Jew or a Christian.647 Apart from mentioning 
the condition of chastity and freedom, Muqātil seems to accept, albeit critically, that these 
kitābī women were upholding tawḥīd. For when the Qur’an states that whosoever 
disbelieves in tawḥīd will be losers in the hereafter, these kitābī women, according to 
Muqātil, responded that they, too, believed in tawḥīd, for had God not been pleased with 
what they were, He would not have allowed the Muslims to marry them.648 
Concomitant to the question of interreligious marriage with People of Scripture, 
although its heading seems unassuming at first, is “interpretation of God’s prohibition of 
causing damage in divorcing wives”649 in which, at the very end of the discussion and in 
a very short statement, Muqātil maintains that a free Muslim man and his kitābī 
wive(s),650 be they Jews or Christians, or his slave wife, have no mutual inheritance 
rights; neither do a free woman and her slave husband.651 In this respect, Muqātil 
maintains that mixed marriages, one interreligious and another intersocial group, hinder 
the rights for mutual inheritance of the couples. While such mixed marriages are legally 
                                                        
646 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 167-8. 
647 Q5: 5, “Today all good things have been made lawful for you. The food of the People of the Book is 
lawful for you as your food is lawful for them. So are chaste, believing, women as well as chaste women of 
the people who were given the Scripture before you, as long as you have given them their bride-gifts and 
married them, not taking them as lovers or secret mistresses. The deeds of anyone who rejects faith will 
come to nothing, and in the Hereafter he will be one of the losers.” 
648 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 167. 
649 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 183-5. 
650 Muqātil allows polygamy with kitābī women. See Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 168. 
651 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 184. 
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valid, they produce another legal consequence in terms of the couple’s rights to inherit 
each other upon their demise. Thus, while permitted, intermarriage with kitābi women 
suggests a hierarchy or inequality between the Muslim groom and the kitābī bride, 
seemingly on the basis of religious difference. Likewise, “intermarriage” between a free 
believer with her slave also suggests a similar hierarchy or inequality but more on the 
ground of social standing of the bride and the groom. In all cases, religious or social 
standing difference brings a legal consequence in the diminishing of mutual inheritance 
rights of the couples. 
Like Muqātil, al-Shāfi‛ī also discusses intermarriage with the People of Scripture 
in his al-Umm, although with much more detailed, yet also limiting. In “detestation [for 
marrying] kitābī women of the people of war” (karāhiyat nisā’ ahl al-kitāb al-ḥarbiyyāt), 
al-Shāfi‛ī says that God has made the women of ahl al-kitāb licit for Muslims to marry, 
so is their food to consume.652 In this respect, al-Shāfi‛ī maintains that the kitābī women 
whom the Muslims may wed are those belonging to the well-known People of Scripture, 
namely the people of the Torah and Gospels (ahl al-Tawrāh wa al-Injīl). 653 While 
excluding Zoroastrians, al-Shāfi‛ī regards Sabians and Samaritans as part of Jews and 
Christians, and, as long as they follow the fundamental teaching of ahl al-kitāb, their 
women are marriageable to Muslims.654  
In “Arab Christians” (Naṣārā’l ‛Arab), al-Shāfi‛ī rules out the possibility of 
Muslims marrying Arab Christian women, because he does not regard them as ahl al-
                                                        
652 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 5/655. 
653 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 5/655, 6/16-17. 
654 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 6/17. 
  
222 
kitāb proper. Al-Shāfi‛ī maintains that the original religion of these Arab Christians was 
ḥanīfiyyah, but they went astray by worshipping idols.655 Adducing a number of 
traditions, al-Shāfi‛ī asserts that it is only the children of Israel to whom God had sent the 
Torah and Gospel who are ahl al-kitāb, while non-Israelite people, despite their 
embracing the religions of ahl al-kitāb, are not. Moreover, basing specifically on 
traditions from ‛Umar ibn Khaṭṭāb and ‛Ālī ibn Abī Ṭālib, al-Shāfi‛ī maintains that Arab 
Christians may be treated as protected people (dhimmīs) from whom jizyah is taken, but 
their women are not licit for Muslims. In this case, the legal status of the Arab Christians 
is similar to that of the Zoroastrians.656  In this respect, al-Shāfi‛ī differentiates two types 
of non-Muslims dhimmīs (protected people), namely, first, people whose slaughtering 
was licit and their women were marriageable to Muslims (ahl al-kitāb, including Jews, 
Christians, Sabians, and Samaritans), and second, people whose slaughtering was illicit 
and whose women were unmarriageable for Muslims, but from whom jizyah was 
accepted (ahl al-dhimmah, including Zoroastrians).657  
While Muqātil does not discuss in detail the identity of ahl al-kitāb and ahl al-
dhimmah, he appears to equally distinguish between ahl al-kitāb, who are marriagble to 
the believers and whose slaughtered animal is consumeable and whose jizyah is accepted, 
and ahl al-dhimmah from which only their jizyah is accepted. While Muqātil is of the 
view that Muhammad was allowed to impose Islam on the Arabs, he does not include 
those Arabs who had embraced the religions of the People of Scripture, including the 
                                                        
655 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 6/17. 
656 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 5/690-691. 
657 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 5/691. 
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Christians of Najrān. In addition, provided his inclusive definition of the People of 
Scripture, Muqātil appears to hold the view that Arab Christians are People of Scripture 
whose women are marriageable to Muslims and their slaughtered animals are 
consumeable to them. In this respect, Muqātil holds different views from al-Shāfi‛ī whose 
definition of People of Scripture is ethnically limited to the Israelite, thus excluding other 
people despite their embracing the former’s religions. 
In general, the Qur’an deals with the question of intermarriage in three verses, 
namely Q2:221, 60:10, and 5:5.658  The first verse (2:221) prohibits intermarriage with 
polytheists, men and women; the second (60:10) has been understood to convey the same 
message, although an emphasis is made in relation to that a believing women is not to be 
married to polytheists (athough the term that the Qur’an uses in this respect is kuffār, 
instead of mushrikūn); the third (5: 5) allows Muslims to marry free kitābī women 
(muḥṣanāt), but does not explicitly prohibits giving Muslim women in marriage to kitābī 
men. Thus, while there is no question pertaining to the prohibition of intermarriage with 
polytheists, which applies to both Muslim males and females, some question may arise as 
to why it is only Muslim men who can marry kitābī women, but not Muslim women 
marry kitābī men. Despite the lack of explicit prohibition in the Qur’an for a Muslim 
woman to marry a kitābī man, “this possibility is firmly and unanimously rejected in the 
                                                        
658 Friedmann, Tolerance, 161. 
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books of tradition and law.”659 A possible answer might be found in the way Muqātil and 
al-Shāfi‛ī explains some of these intermarriage verses. 
Understanding Q5:5, Muqātil maintains that intermarriage with polytheists is 
entirely prohibited, although a Muslim may marry a kitābī woman, one who is free and 
chaste. However, Muqātil argues, Muslim women are prohibited to marry all polytheists, 
kitābī or otherwise, until they acknowledged tawḥīd.660 Up to this point, the ambiguity of 
Muqātil’s requirement for non-Muslim males to acknowledge tawḥīd in order to marry 
Muslim females, may lead to different interpretations. On one hand, such 
acknowledgement of tawḥīd may suggests that those non-Muslim males and prospective 
husbands to Muslim females should embrace Islam and become members of 
Muhammad’s community; on the other, acknowledging tawḥīd may suggest that these 
non-Muslim males may retain their old faiths while emphasizing their adherence to 
divine unity. As such, kitābī, namely Jewish and Christian, males may wed Muslim 
females as long as they can prove their admission of tawḥīd. Muqātil, however, also 
maintains that a polytheist may come from the People of Scripture (mushrik min ahl al-
kitāb) or Arab pagan (wathanī). For Muqātil, they all, in one way or another, had 
deviated from pure monotheism (shirk) and reject Muhammad’s prophethood (takdhīb). 
It is perhaps for this reason that Muqātil requires acknowledgment of tawḥīd as a 
condition for a kitābī male to be able to marry a Muslim female. Muqātil does not, 
                                                        
659 Friedmann, Tolerance, 161. Kecia Ali disagrees with Friedmann in that a marriage between a Muslim 
female and a kitābī non-Muslim female rather is assumed to be forbidden by the vast majority of thinkers 
rather than being explicitly rejected. See her Sexual Ethics, 13-23. 
660 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 161-2.  
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however, provide any reasons why the stigma of polytheism apllies only to kitābī men 
and not kitābī women in this regard. 
If the wordings of the three interreligious marriage verses are compared, it is 
found that when the law applies to both sexes, the Qur’an explicitly uses terms pertaining 
to both sexes: wa lā tankiḥū al-mushrikāt ḥattā yu’minna…wa lā tunkiḥū al-mushrikīna 
ḥattā yu’minū, mu’minah-mushrikah, mu’min-mushrik (Q2:221); lā hunna ḥillun 
lahum wa lā hum yaḥillūna lahunna (Q60:10). However, there are no such explicit terms 
for both sexes in Q5:5. Instead, it is only the kitābī women who are explicitly mentioned 
in the verses as those who are licitly able to be married by Muslim men: wa al-muḥṣanāt 
min alladhīna ūtū al-kitāba min qablikum. Kitābī men as possible husbands for Muslim 
women are not mentioned. The absence of kitābī men in the verse may have suggested 
that God does not include them as ones who are marriageable to Muslim women. 
Linguistically, if it is the masculine plural pronoun (jam‛ mudhakkar) that is used 
in Arabic, and for that matter in the Qur’an, there is possibility that the message applies 
to both male and female, unless there is an indication to the contrary. However, if it is a 
feminine plural pronoun (jam‛ mu’annath) that is being used, the message generally 
applies only to a female audience. Since it is the feminine plural pronoun (muḥṣanāt min 
alladhīna ūtū al-kitāba min qablikum) that is mentioned, as the women who are licit for 
Muslims to marry, it can only suggest that Muslim men can marry kitābī women, but 
Muslim women cannot marry kitābī men. This is perhaps one of the reasons why Muslim 
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scholars understood Q5:5 as permitting intermarriage only between Muslim men and 
kitābī women, but not the other way around.661  
Some scholars have speculated on possible answers for the question why Muslim 
scholars unanimously reject the idea of Muslim women marrying kitābī men. Some of 
these answers can be found in gender and religious difference assumptions. Both 
assumptions relate to the question of superiority: superiority of male over female (in this 
case, a husband over a wife), and of Islam over other religions. Muslims believe that 
husbands are the leaders of the family who have the power to navigate and make the final 
decisions as to where it will go. As such, husbands have an important position that will 
determine the situation of their families, including their wives and children. At the same 
time, Muslims also believe that Islam is superior to all other religions (al-Islām ya‛lū wa 
lā yu‛lā ‛alayhi).  According to Friedmann, it is the motif of Muslim exaltedness that 
serves as the main reason for prohibiting Muslim women from wedding infidel 
husbands.662 In fact, the idea of Muslim exaltedness is the background for numerous 
shar‛ī regulations concerning the dhimmīs.663 Friedmann maintains that “[t]he fact that 
intermarriage is permitted only to Muslim men, in turn, gives social expression to the 
                                                        
661 Q5:5 can be divided into three distinct parts based on its registers: male-plural with regard to food share 
(uḥilla lakum al-ṭayyibāt…), female-plural with regard to women, including Muslim and non-Muslim 
kitābī, who are marriageable to Muslims (wa al-muḥṣanāt min al-mu’mināt wa al-muḥṣanāt min alldhīna 
ūtū al-kitāb min qablikum…), and male-singular, the message of which applies for generality (wa man 
yakfur bi al-īmān fa-qad ḥabiṭa ‘amaluhu…). However, Muqātil himself relates the last part of this verse, 
with its singular-male register, to the kitābī women’s response that had God not been pleased with them he 
would have not allowed Muslims to marry them. See footnote 127, and Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 167. 
662 Friedmann, Tolerance, 35. See also his Ch. Five, section 1. 
663 Friedmann, Tolerance, 39. 
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superiority of Muslims over the People of Scripture, affinities notwithstanding.”664 
Furthermore, Friedman argues that 
A marriage of a Muslim woman to a non-Muslim man would result in an 
unacceptable incongruity between the superiority which the woman should enjoy 
by virtue of being Muslim, and her unavoidable wifely subservience to her infidel 
husband. In terms of Islamic law, such a marriage would involve an extreme lack 
of kafā’a, that is of compatibility between husband and wife, which requires that a 
woman not marry a man lower in status than herself.665 
 
Thus, the permission for a Muslim to take kitābī Muslim women in matrimony 
and the prohibition for a Muslim woman to wed a non-Muslim is closely related to the 
idea of exaltedness of Islam over other religions and the superiority of men over women 
in the family. Since men are imagined to have more authority than women in the 
household, Muslim women cannot marry kitābī men that would put her in a vulnerable 
position, including in protecting the sanctity of her religion that is believed to be superior 
over her kitābī husband’s.666 By their faith, Muslim women are deemed superior over 
their kitābī husbands.  A very telling tradition from Ibn ‛Abbās may well describe this 
situation: “God sent Muḥammad with the truth to make it prevail over all religions(s). 
Our religion is the best of religions and our faith stands above [all other] faiths. Our men 
are above their women, but their men are not to be above our women.”667 
 Rashīd Riḍā, however, argues that Q5:5 is actually silent when it comes to 
possible intermarriage between a non-Muslim [kitābī] man and a Muslim woman. 
Nonetheless, Riḍā also argues that such intermarriage has been prohibited, based not on 
                                                        
664 Freidenreich, “Five Questions about Non-Muslim Meat,” p. 86. 
665 Friedmann, Tolerance, 161-2. 
666 See for instance Muḥammad Rasḥīd Riḍā, Tafsir al-Qur’ānal-Karīm (al-Manār), 2/351. 
667 Friedmann, Tolerance, 173. 
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the statement of the Qur’an, but more on the Sunnah and consensus.668 Al-Ṭabari also 
holds the same opinion. Although he does not independently discuss the question of 
intermarriage between non-Muslim [kitābī] men and Muslim women, al-Ṭabarī mentions 
a number of traditions suggesting the prohibition of such intermarriage. For instance, he 
mentions a tradition from ‛Umar saying: “a Muslim male may marry a Christian female, 
but a Christian male may not marry a Muslim female”; another is a prophetic tradition, 
saying: “We may marry kitābī women, but they [kitābī men] may not marry our 
women.”669 Thus, Muqātil, Riḍā and al-Ṭabarī are among scholars whose definition of 
People of Scripture is most inclusive, embracing whoever is affiliated to Judaism and 
Christianity, with no regard to race or time of their conversion. In fact, al-Ṭabarī 
criticized al-Shāfi‛ī who defined ahl al-kitāb as limited only to Banū Isrā’īl and their 
descedants.670 Riḍā in particular is a scholar who views intermarriage between Muslims 
and non-Muslims as positive medium for channeling the message of Islam. Riḍā, 
however, following the lead of his mentor, Muḥammad ‘Abduh, agrees with the 
consensus that intermarriage between a non-Muslim [kitābī] male and a Muslim female is 
prohibited, when he could have actually opted to allow such intermarriage had he based 
his view on his understanding of Q5:5 alone. 
                                                        
668 Riḍā, Manār, 2/351. 
669 al-Ṭabarī, Jāmi‛,4/366-367. 
670 Al-Ṭabarī, Jāmi‛, 9/589. 
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Kitābī slaughtering 
In terms of the meat prepared by the People of Scripture, Muqātil devotes only 
one place to discuss it, namely “interpretation of the permission for Muslims to consume 
the slaughtered animals by ahl al-kitāb” (tafsīr mā uḥilla li al-muslimīn min dhabā’iḥ ahl 
al-kitāb).671 Muqātil has taken it for granted that slaughtering done by the People of 
Scripture is licit for Muslims to consume. Indeed, that is how he understands Q5:5 to 
which he is referring when he justifies his view in this regard: Muslims are allowed to 
marry kitābī women and also to consume their prepared meat. Unlike al-Shāfi‛ī whose 
definition of People of Scripture is very specific to the Israelites, Muqātil has no apparent 
problem to include as broad people as possible to be members of People of Scripture, as 
long as there is a good evidence for their religious affiliatioan with them (man dakhala fī 
dīnihim min ghayrihim), even their slaves (walā’id).672 
 Muqātil’s inclusive definition of the people whose prepared meat is consumable 
to Muslims is even assuring when he explains the circumstances within which Q5:5 was 
revealed. According to Muqātil, this verse was revealed in order to respond to the alleged 
caution that early Muslims had when it came not only to the marriageability of kitābī 
women but also to the edibility of their prepared meat. By saying that, Muqātil asserts 
that not only God has permitted Muslims to marry kitābī women, but that He has also 
allowed them to consume the meat prepared by the People of Scripture and by whosoever 
affiliated with them and their religions, including their slaves.673 
                                                        
671 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 250. 
672 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 250. 
673 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 250.  
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Muqātil’s views in this regard are in relative contrast to those of al-Shāfi‛ī whose 
stricter criteria in defining the People of Scripture and how they perform their 
slaughtering have created more limitation. Similar to his discussion on intermarriage with 
the People of Scripture, al-Shāfi‛ī devotes a considerable space to discuss food and meat 
prepared by the People of Scripture. 
In “chapter on the slaughtering of people of Scripture” (bāb al-dhabā’iḥ ahl al-
kitāb), al-Shāfi’ī says that God has made the food of ahl al-kitāb, including their 
slaughtered animals, licit for Muslims to consume.674 However, al-Shāfi‛ī also argues that 
ahl al-kitāb’s slaughtering is licit only if it is named after God and not after something 
else, including Jesus.675 In “slaughtering of the Arab Christians” (dhabā’iḥ Naṣārā’l 
‛Arab), al-Shāfi‛ī again considers Arab Christians not the People of Scripture proper, 
basing his view on traditions from both ‛Umar and ‛Ālī. These two traditions, according 
to al-Shāfi‛ī, suggest that Arab Christians did not properly follow the religious laws of 
ahl al-kitāb, including in their slaughtering. They also suggest that, by definition, ahl al-
kitāb are those who were originally given the scripture, namely Banū Isrā’īl and their 
descendants. 676 As a consequence, in al-Shāfi‛ī’s view, non-Israelites who embraced the 
Israelites’ religion(s), especially after the revelation of the Qur’ān, are not People of 
Scripture. If such non-Israelite people embraced ahl al-kitāb’s religion before the 
revelation of the Qur’an and made a peaceful agreement (hudnah) with the Muslims, such 
as Banū Taghlib, they might be treated like the People of Scripture only in relation to 
                                                        
674 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 3/603. 
675 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 3/603. 
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jizyah. In this respect, these people are treated more as ahl al-dhimmah (protected 
people), but whose slaughtering is illicit for Muslims to consume. In al-Shāfi‘ī’s view, 
slaughtering and jizyah have different laws (wa ma‛nā al-dhabā’iḥ ma‛nan ghayr ma‛nā 
al-jizyah).677 In this case, the legal status of the Christians of Banū Taghlib, and other 
Arab Christians in general, is similar to that of the Zoroastrians.678 In his response to the 
interlocutors who brought forth a tradition from to Ibn ‛Abbās in which the latter was 
reported to have said that the Arab Christians’ slaughtering, based on Q5:51, 679 is licit, 
al-Shāfi‛ī argues that following the traditions from ‛Umar and ‛Alī is preferable in this 
respect.680 
It is interesting, however, that while he narrows down the scope of the People of 
Scripture to include merely the Israelites, al-Shāfi‛ī regards Sabians and Samaritans as 
members of the Israelites. He says that whosoever among Sabians and Samaritans (min 
al-ṣābi’īn wa’l sāmurrah), embraces the Jewish or Christian religion, his slaughtered 
animals are consumable regardless of his religious denomination.681 To vindicate his 
view, al-Shāfi‛ī adduces a tradition from ‛Umar to that effect. The same does not apply, 
however, to Zoroastrians, whose slaughtered animals are not consumeable by Muslims, 
even if in the process of slaughtering they mention God’s name.682 
                                                        
677 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 3/605. 
678 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 3/605. 
679 Q5:51, [“You who believe, do not take the Jews and Christians as allies:”] “they are allies only to each 
other. Anyone who takes them as an ally becomes one of them.” 
680 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 3/605. Al-Shāfi‘ī’s chosen views in this regard suggest that he based his legal 
decisions very heavily on the available traditions from early generation of Muslims which he had stratified 
hierarchically based on his understanding of the relative authority that these early Muslims had in setting 
legal precedent. In this respect, ‘Umar and ‘Alī based traditions are prioritized over that of Ibn ‘Abbās.  
681 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 5/670-671. 
682 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 5/671. 
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A broad discussion of food, including its edibility and with whom it is shared, by 
scholars suggests how it may serve as a powerful medium for expressing communal 
identity. Fredenreich argues “many of the choices individuals make regarding which food 
to eat and which food to avoid relate to their senses of identity.”683 Not only does the 
discourse about foreigners and their food does relate to issues of communal identity, but 
it also relates to proper ordering of human society in general: “how and why We differ 
from Them, how and where the lines between Us and Them are drawn, how members of 
Our group ought to interact with and, indeed, imagine Them.”684  
In terms of Qur’anic dietary laws, however, Fredenreich finds it interesting that 
the Qur’an permits food sharing with Jews and Christians, stated in Q5:5, something that 
is atypical in his study, Foreigners and their Food. Thus, while some of these foreigners’ 
food was inconsumable for Muslims, thus marking the difference between them, the 
permission for food sharing suggests “We and They share crucial attributes in 
common.”685 In fact, with regard to People of Scripture, “Qur'an 5.5 does not use dietary 
law as a means of distinguishing Us from Them. Rather, this verse uses the permission 
for food sharing with the Jews and Christians to “articulate a fundamental similarity 
between those who accept the divine revelation that is the Qur'an and those who received 
earlier revelations.”686 
                                                        
683 David M. Fredenreich, Foreigners and Their Food: Constructing Otherness in Jewish, Christian, and 
Islamic Law (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 4; also his "Five Questions about Non-
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Oriente Moderno 90 (2010): 85-104. 
684 Fredenreich, Foreigners, 180. 
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From the standpoint of the Qur’an’s worldview, “holiness is not exclusive to Us.” 
Unlike the Jewish and Christian perspectives, which see other religious communities as 
diametrically “not Us” or “anti-Us”, the Qur’an and thus the Muslim scholars define 
Islam and other people based on both commonality and difference they have in various 
degrees.687 Their relative distinction between each other was not based on strict 
opposition, but on the idea of spectrum where difference and similarity are gained 
gradually. At one point, such a distinction is blurred.688 “The permission of food 
exchange across the border between believers and People of the Book symbolically 
reflects this blurriness and the affinity that binds all those who have shared the 
metaphorical table that is God's revelation.”689 
As such, Q5:5 is central not only for the laws in terms of food exchange with the 
People of Scripture but also in relation to intermarriage with them. But these two aspects 
of the verse’s message potentially lead to two opposing understandings.690 Gordon 
Newby, for instance, has understood the verse as conveying “the desire to integrate Jews 
into the nascent Islamic community.” Friedmann, however, offers a very different 
understanding of Q5:5, which is more undermining than reconciliatory to the People of 
                                                        
687 However, Sunnīs and Shī'is hold two different conceptions of the relationship between Muslims and 
People of Scripture: “the former, emphasizing likeness, locate Jews and Christians somewhere in the 
middle of a spectrum whose poles are marked by Muslims and idolaters, while the latter emphasize 
unlikeness so as to place Scripturists very close to the idolatrous end of the spectrum.” These differences 
are result of different emphasis that each of the two in terms of the People of Scripture. The Sunnīs 
underline the fact that, despite their shortcomings, the Jews and Christians are fellow receivers of God 
revelation, and hence share a degree of common values with Muslims. On the contrary, Shī‛is highlight 
more the fact that while the People of Scripture have received early revelation from God they have however 
failed to adhere to it, and hence excluding them from the community of true believers. See Fredenreich, 
Foreigners, 131, 182-3. 
688 Fredenreich, Foreigners, 142. 
689 Fredenreich, Foreigners, 142. 
690 Fredenreich, Foreigners, 140-141. 
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Scripture.  Rejecting the understanding of some Muslim scholars that the “permission to 
wed kitābī women was a gesture honoring the people of the book,” Friedmann argues 
that, according to the predominant view, the permission to wed kitābī women is a symbol 
of Islamic superiority.  
This understanding, according to Friedmann, was vindicated by the traditional 
dating that the promulgation of Q5:5 came at a time when the dominance of Islam in the 
peninsula was assured and the relations with the Jews of Arabia were at their lowest 
possible point. Had it been meant to honoring the People of Scripture it would have been 
given during the first two years of the Prophet’s sojourn in Medina when the Prophet was 
attempting to conciliate the People of Scripture by adopting certain rituals associated with 
the Jewish (and Christian) tradition.691 Friedmann recognizes, however, that his 
explanation of the verse in light of lslamic superiority fails to account for the permission 
to consider Jewish and Christian food as equivalent to that of believers, a permission that 
expresses a measure of equality between these traditions rather than the subservience of 
Jews and Christians to the newly dominant Muslims.692  
In light of these two opposing views with regard to Q5:5, Fredenreich maintains 
that both Newby’s and Friedman’s views are possible, for the verse accommodates these 
opposing views. On one hand, Q5:5 sugggets that the People of Scripture are part of the 
holy community of believers in a certain respect, and yet are inferior to the Qur'an's 
                                                        
691 Friedmann maintains that Q5:5 was revealed a very late of the Medinan period, if not the latest, part of 
the revelation. It was, according to some tradition, revealed during the Prophet’s last pilgrimage (ḥajjat al-
wadā‛) in the year 10 A.H./632 A.D. If this traditional dating is accepted, Friedmann argues that permission 
to wed Jewish and Christian women was granted after the “break with the Jews,” that is, after the Prophet 
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believers in other respects. The People of Scripture were like the Muslims but were also 
unlike them.693 The Jews and Christians were like the Muslims because they were all 
given scriptures, yet they were inferior because the Jews and the Christians were 
unfaithful to their scripture. The commonality of these three monotheistic religions has 
allowed their followers to share food and intermarry. Yet the inferiority of the People of 
Scripture has accrued them jizyah, and only partially permitted intermarriage, in which 
Muslim males may marry kitābī females, but kitābī males may not marry Muslim 
females. In the meantime, polytheists are totally out of the equation. “Idolaters … are 
inferior even to Muslim slaves and therefore are utterly unsuitable for marriage to a 
Muslim.”694 
The hypocrite-related laws 
The tone of Muqātil’s discussion of hyprocrites is generally theological and 
admonitionary rather than legal. His language is very close to the language of the Qur’an, 
which critically addresses the innerworking of hypocrisy as a moral and religious 
defiance. None of the topics within which Muqātil deals with the hypocrites is concerned 
with the legal status of the hypocrites within the larger Muslim community. This is in 
stark contrast to al-Shāfi‛ī’s discussion of the hyporctites that insists on the legal status of 
these people as fellow Muslims, nothwistanding their alledgedly religious insincerity. As 
such, al-Shāfi‛ī seems to relegate the hypocrites’ sinful acts as irrelevant to their legality 
as legitimate Muslims for, in his view, their religious defiance is up to God to judge in 
                                                        
693 Fredenreich, Foreigners, 141. 
694 Fredenreich, Foreigners, 141. 
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the hereafter. While Muqātil does not explicitly express his view of the legal status of the 
hypocrites as fellow Muslims in this legal commentary, he does indicate that while he has 
constantly been critical of the hypocrites, he finally acknowledges their legal status as 
Muslims, albeit reluctantly. 
There are at least three headings in Muqātil’s commentary that deal with 
hypocrtites, namely “interpretation of the command on hypocrites that their wealth and 
children are not to destract them from performing prayers” (tafsīr mā umira al-munafiqūn 
an lā tulhīhim amwāluhum wa lā awlāduhum ‘an al-ṣalāh),695 “interpretation of a person 
who is stingy in relation to zakāh and seeing it as unobligatory along with the awaiting 
punishment” (tafsīr alladhī yabkhalu bi al-zakāh wa alladhī la yarāhu wājiban wa mā 
u‛idda lahū),696 and “interpretation of God’s prohibiting the Prophet from praying for the 
hypocrites when they die” (tafsīr mā nahā Allāh ‘Azza wa Jalla al-Nabī Ṣalla Allāhu 
‘alayh wa Sallam an yuṣalliya ‘alā al-munafiqīn idhā mātū).697  
In “the interpretation of the command on hypocrites that their wealth and children 
are not to destract them from performing prayers,” Muqātil adduces Q63:9,698 which 
reminds those whom Muqātil calls “the hypocrites who have believed” (al-munāfiqīn 
alladīna āmanū) not to be distracted by their property and children from performing the 
obligatary prayers. Interpreting another verse he cites, namely Q4: 142,699 Muqātil 
                                                        
695 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 43-4. 
696 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 49-52. 
697 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 277-8. 
698 Q63: 9, “Believers, do not let your wealth and your children distract you from remembering God: those 
who do so will be the ones who lose.” 
699 Q4: 142, “…When they stand up to pray, they do so sluggishly, showing off in front of people, and 
remember God only a little…” 
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maintains that being overwhelmed by worldly affairs, the hypocrites neglect prayers, and 
if even they perform them, they do so only reluctantly, simply to show off to their fellow 
Muslims that they are part of the group.  These are the reasons why God, as stated in yet 
another groups of verses that Muqātil invokes (Q107:4-7), condemns the hypocrites.700 
In “the interpretation of a person who is stingy in relation to alms-giving and who 
sees it not as an obligation, and the awaiting punishment,”701 Muqātil addresses other 
hypocrites’ defiance in relation to the obligation of paying alms giving. In this respect, he 
mentions a number of verses, namely Q63:9-11,702 47:38,703 3:180,704 and 9:34-35705 
which in general threaten those who withhold their wealth and avoid paying alms with 
the awaiting punishment in hell. Furthermore, Muqātil criticizes another aspect of 
hypocrisy upon which he has previously touched, namely riyā’—that is the hypocrites’ 
propensity to perform religious obligation for the sake of showing off to their fellow 
Muslims in order to secure their membership within Muslim community. Apart from 
                                                        
700 Q107: 4-7, “So woe to those who pray; but are heedless of their prayer; those who are all show, and 
forbid common kindnesses.” 
701 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 49-52. 
702 Q63: 9-11, “[9] Believers, do not let your wealth and your children distract you from remembering God: 
those who do so will be the ones who lose. [10] Give out of what We have provided for you, before death 
comes to one of you and he says, ‘My Lord, if You would only reprieve me for a little while, I would give 
in charity and become one of the righteous.’ [11] God does not reprieve a soul when its turn comes: God is 
fully aware of what you do.” 
703 Q47: 38, “though now you are called upon to give [a little] for the sake of God, some of you are 
grudging. Whoever is grudging is so only towards himself: God is the source of wealth and you are the 
needy ones. He will substitute other people for you if you turn away, and they will not be like you.” 
704 Q3: 180, “Those who are miserly with what God has granted them out of His grace should not think that 
it is good for them; on the contrary, it is bad for them. Whatever they meanly withhold will be hung around 
their necks on the Day of Resurrection. It is God who will inherit the heavens and earth: God is well aware 
of everything you do.” 
705 Q9: 34-35, “[34] Believers, many rabbis and monks wrongfully consume people’s possessions and turn 
people away from God’s path. [Prophet], tell those who hoard gold and silver instead of giving in God’s 
cause that they will have a grievous punishment: [35] on the Day it is heated up in Hell’s Fire and used to 
brand their foreheads, sides, and backs, they will be told, ‘This is what you hoarded up for yourselves! Now 
feel the pain of what you hoarded!’” 
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quoting Q18:110706 that counsels the believers to adhere to their faith for the sake of God 
only, Muqātil also employs a tradition that equates riyā’ with shirk. Since the hypocrites’ 
performance of religious duties is intended to serve other than God, they are now accused 
of associating God with creation. Such is the tone of God’s message in the qudsī 
prophetic tradition: 707 “I am the best company. Whosoever associates someone with me 
in anything he does, I abandon it altogether and will not accept it, except that it is done 
only for me.”708 
As a consequence of the hyporcrites’ association with polytheism, God has 
prohibited the Prophet to pray for them upon their demise. Quoting Q9:84, 709 Muqātil 
mentions the reasons behind such prohibition in “the interpretation of God’s prohibiting 
the Prophet to perform prayer over deceased hypocrites.” In it, Muqātil argues that, being 
defiant in relation to religious obligations, the hypocrites have actually rejected tawḥīd 
and taṣdīq, which relegates them somehow outside the pale of the believing community. 
Muqātil, however, soon qualifies this indictment by maintaining that God’s prohibition to 
pray for the deceased hypocrites applies only to the Prophet. Fellow Muslims must pray 
for them upon their demise even if the hypocrites are grave sinners (min ahl al-
kabā’ir).710 To support his view, Muqātil quotes ‘Aṭā’ ibn Abī Rabāḥ, saying: “If you do 
not pray for the grave sinners of your coreligionists, do you consider them as following 
                                                        
706 Q18: 110, “…Anyone who fears to meet his Lord should do good deeds and give no one a share in the 
worship due to his Lord.” 
707 A qudsī prophetic tradition is a report transmitted from the Prophet yet its redaction is deemed to be 
God’s Himself rather than of the Prophet. 
708 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 260-1. 
709 Q9: 84, “Do not hold prayers for any of them if they die, and do not stand by their graves: they 
disbelieved in God and His Messenger and died rebellious.” 
710 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 278. 
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other religion?” Moreover, Muqātil also mentions another reported view of ‛Aṭā’ that 
performing prayer over the deceased of the people of qiblah (al-ṣalāt ‘alā kulli man māta 
min ahl al-qiblah) is part of the sunnah.711 
As such, Muqātil’s discussion of hypocrites focused more on the traits of 
hipocrisy and the awaiting punishment in the hereafter. Assuming it in a spectrum of 
belief and disbelief, in whose two extreme ends stand the Muslims and the polytheists, 
Muqātil seems to put the hypocrites in the middle sharing some traits with the polytheists 
but yet remain within the realm of the believing community. Muqātil’s criticism of the 
hypocrites, however, seems so ambiguous that he actually almost relegates them into the 
realm of polytheism. Muqātil appears to discredit the hypocrites as being worse than 
grave sinners (ahl al-kabā’ir) because of their rejection of the mandatory nature of 
religious obligations. In such a perspective, while grave sinners may not perform 
obligations incumbent upon them, they, however, still believe that such obligations are 
mandatory. The hypocrites, on the contrary, reject even that, by their disbelief in God and 
his messenger, stated in Q9:84.  
Muqātil appears to be struggling to defining the place of hypocrites within the 
community of believers. His concern with the inner working of hypocrisy has led him to 
his ambiguous categorization of the hypocrites, which is neutralized only by his 
employing of ‛Āṭā’ ibn Rabah’s views that the hypocrites are also part of the community 
of believers. Muqātil’s focused attention to the working of intention and secret of heart of 
                                                        
711 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 278. In this respect, “the people of qiblah” is used as an equivalent of the 
believers of Muslims. 
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the hypocrites is not shared by a legal scholar proper such as al-Shāfi‛ī who considers it 
irrelevant in his discussion of the legal status of the hypocrites.712 It is to al-Shāfi‛ī’s 
discussion of the hypocrites that we turn now. 
In several places in al-Umm, al-Shāfi‛ī keeps reiterating the difference between 
two types of polytheism, committed by some of the People of Scripture and that by the 
Arab pagans, along with their legal implications in relation to intermarriage, food, 
inheritance, and war. Thus, if he often discusses together the People of Scripture (ahl al-
kitāb) and polytheists (al-mushrikūn), al-Shāfi‘ī highly frequently intertwines his 
discussion of the hypocrites (al-munāfiqūn) with the believers (al-muslimūn or al-
mu’minūn). 
Citing Q63:1-3, 713 al-Shāfi‛ī argues that whosoever admits belief, despite his 
hidden idolatry or his continued act of disbelief, he has to be treated as a believer, and his 
life is therefore protected. 714   In a such manner, any conduct of disbelief can only be 
categorized as mere rebellion or violation (kufr jahdin  wa ta‛tīlin ), yet insufficient to be 
categorized as apostasy. Al-Shāfi‛ī argues that God and the Prophet actually know that 
the hypocrites are lying when they pronounce their belief and that they use their vow of 
belief merely to protect their lives, as indicated in Q63:3.715 That is actually the point 
why they, according to al-Shāfi‘ī, are called hypocrites (al-nifāq) in the Qur’an: they 
                                                        
712 This is parallel to al-Shāfi‘ī’s discussion of love for wives as irrelevant to al-qism bayna al-zawjāt. 
713 Q63: 1-3: “1 When the hypocrites come to you [Prophet], they say, ‘We bear witness that you are the 
Messenger of God.’ God knows that you truly are His Messenger and He bears witness that the hypocrites 
are liars––2 they use their oaths as a cover and so bar others from God’s way: what they have been doing is 
truly evil––3 because they professed faith and then rejected it, so their hearts have been sealed and they do 
not understand.” 
714 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 7/395. 
715 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 7/395. 
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proclaim belief but they commit acts of disbelief. This is precisely what Q9:74716 
conveys. For this reason, the Qur’an threats them with the lowest level of hell in 
Q4:145.717  
In this world, al-Shāfi‘ī argued, God commands the Prophet and Muslims to treat 
hypocrites according to what they acknowledged and showed publicly, for only God 
knows the secret of the hearts (sarā’ir) and only God knows their lies. The hypocrites’ 
admission of belief, albeit nominally and tendentiously, is sufficient to guarantee the 
protection of their lives. God’s punishment awaits them only in the hereafter. Likewise, 
the Prophet states that external admission and showing of belief guarantees the protection 
of life. Consequently, for the sake of their proclaimed belief, hypocrites must be treated 
as any other Muslims, and all laws that apply to Muslims in general apply to them, such 
as in marriage, inheritance and other laws.718 Therefore, al-Shāfi‛ī is of the view that the 
Prophet rules according what is externally visible, since nobody can really know what is 
hidden inside one’s heart. Consequently, al-Shāfi‛ī does not allow supposition (ẓann, pl. 
ẓunūn) to be the basis law or legal rulings; every law based on supposition is 
automatically annulled.719  
When it comes to belief, al-Shāfi‘ī maintains, only God knows what is in people’s 
hearts. This, according to al-Shāfi‛ī, suggests that human beings cannot judge but on what 
they can see and hear externally (lam yu‛ṭa aḥadun min banī Ādam an yaḥkuma ‛alā 
                                                        
716 Q9: 74, “They swear by God that they did not, but they certainly did speak words of defiance and 
became defiant after having submitted…” 
717 Q4:145, “The hypocrites will be in the lowest depths of Hell, and you will find no one to help them.” 
718 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 7/395. 
719 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 7/396. 
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ghayr ẓāhir).720 Even when committing serious crimes, such as informing the enemy of 
the secret of Muslims, the hypocrites are not punishable by death for their embracing 
Islam has accorded them protection of their lives.721 Death can be inflicted upon those 
who proclaim Islam but commit one of these three crimes: murder, fornicating while 
being married, and apostasy.722  
Al-Shāfi‛ī also argues that a person cannot be killed on an assumption that he is a 
disbeliever, except if there is an extreme fear of danger that such person may pose.723 A 
person’s admission of belief should be accepted as true, despite his showing of repeated 
signs of disbelief. If this is what happens, al-Shāfi‛ī recommends that he is to be punished 
at the discretion of the judge (yu‛azzar).724 To underscore the importance of respecting 
what is externally shown in terms of belief, al-Shāfi‛ī suggests an extreme case: that as 
long as a person shows his Islam, although in reality he might have embraced other 
religions—Judaism, Christianity, or Zoroastrianism—or held some kind of disbelief, his 
                                                        
720 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 6/120. 
721 Al-Shāfi‛ī mentions a tradition in which Ḥaṭib ibn Abī Balta‛ah was reported to have written and sent a 
letter to the Meccan polytheists through a female messenger who was later caught by ‛Alī, Miqdād and al-
Zubayr. When brought before the Prophet, Ḥāṭib explained the reason why he commited such treason. It 
was neither because of his doubt about Islam nor aiming at disbelief, but more as a way to win support 
from some of the Meccans among whom he did not have relatives. The prophet accepted Ḥāṭib’s excuses, 
primarily due to his good track record and contribution to early development of Islam by participating in 
the battle of Badr. When ‛Umar insisted to the Prophet that he would kill Ḥāṭib as a hypocrite, the Prophet 
told him that God has forgiven those who participated in the battle of Badr. Based on this tradition, al-
Shāfi‛ī argues that Islam protects a hypocrite based on his external acknowledgement of belief, not what is 
really in his heart (sarā’ir) for it is only God who knows the latter. When asked if such treason happens 
again in the future, whether the imam should punish the perpetrator (al-amr bi ‛uqūbat man fa‛alahū) or 
just leave him like the Prophet did, al-Shāfi‛ī distinguishes between ‘uqubāt and ḥudūd. If ḥudūd are to be 
applied as they are, ‛uqūbāt may be left to the discretion of the imām’s ijtihād. See Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 
5/605-611. 
722 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 5/609. 
723 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 7/398. 
724 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 7/398. 
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life should be spared.725 If that person shows a clear affiliation with disbelief or with a 
certain religion, he is then given a chance to repent (ustutība). If he does show the signs 
of repentance, the law of Islam applies to him. But if he insists on his disbelief, he is to be 
killed at the time he is unwilling to proclaim belief.726  
In relation to Q9:48, in which God prohibits the Prophet not to pray over deceased 
hypocrites, al-Shāfi‛ī does not tackle this question in al-Umm, but I found his view on the 
same topic in Aḥkām al-Qur’ān, a work that compiles al-Shāfi‘ī’s exegetical views of the 
Qur’an.727 This is dealt with in the heading  “the reason of God’s prohibiting His Prophet 
from praying for deceased hypocrites and the absence of the Prophet’s prohibition to [his 
followers] to pray for the deceased hypocrites” (Sabab nahy Allāh nabiyyahu ‛an ṣalātihi 
‛alā man māta min al-munāfiqīn, wa ‛adamu man‛i al-nabī ghayrahū min al-ṣalāh 
‛alayhim). In it, al-Shāfi‛ī argues that God prohibits the Prophet from performing prayer 
for a deceased hypocrite because the nature of the prophet’s prayer is different from other 
people’s prayer. The Prophet’s prayer is able to expiate one’s sins. Thus, if the Prophet 
prays for a deceased hypocrite, his sins would be all forgiven. This cannot happen 
because God has promised hypocrites severe punishment in the hereafter. For that, God 
prevents the Prophet from asking forgiveness for the hypocrites, as it would jeopardize 
                                                        
725 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 7/399. 
726 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 7/399. 
727 The work seems to have been a collection of what otherwise would be al-Shāfi‛ī’s scattered 
interpretation of the Qur’an, especially in relation to its legal aspect. The collection was undertaken by Abū 
Bakr Aḥmad b. al-Ḥusayn b. ‛Alī b. ‛Abd Allāh b. Mūsā al-Bayhaqī al-Nīsābūrī (d. 458), who was also an 
author of a certain al-Sunan al-Kubrā. See Aḥkām al-Qur’ān (Cairo: Maktabat al-Khānjī, n. y.). However, 
the title Aḥkām al-Qur’ān, as one of al-Shāfi‛ī’s work is mentioned in his al-Risālah, when he discusses 
abrogation. See al-Risālah, ed. Aḥmad Muḥammad Shākir (Beirūt: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, n.y.), 145.  
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God’s upcoming punishment for them.728 However, the Prophet himself never prevented 
his followers from conducting prayers for the hypocrites. In fact, al-Shāfi‛ī maintains, the 
Prophet had never fought against a hypocrite since the revelation of Q9:48.729 As such, 
God’s prohibition on the Prophet from praying for the deceased hypocrites applies only 
to him and not to Muslims in general. This reinforces the idea that hypocrisy is to be 
judged in the hereafter, while external admission of Islam to be accepted as a proper 
token of membership in the community of believers. 
At this point, some contrast can be grasped from how Muqātil and al-Shāfi‛ī deal 
with the question of hypocrisy. If Muqātil is focused more on inner working of hypocrisy 
related to the intention and what transpires in people’s hearts, al-Shāfi‛ī pays more 
attention to what people admit and show externally. If Muqātil deals with hypocrisy on a 
moral and theological level, al-Shāfi‛ī approaches it from a noticeably legal perspective. 
Consequently, while Muqātil’s categorization of the hypocrites in relation to the believers 
and polytheists is largely ambiguous, al-Shāfi‛ī’s view clearly states that the hypocrites 
stand within the communal boundaries between belief and disbelief. On the spectrum of 
belief and disbelief, within al-Shāfi‘ī’s perspective, the hyprocrites are perfectly within 
the realm of belief as legitimate Muslims. For al-Shāfi‛ī, judging people’s belief should 
be based on the outer manifestation of that belief in the forms of statements and practices 
(al-ḥukm ‛alā al-ẓāhir min al-qawl wa al-fi‛l). It is only God who has knowledge of 
secrets of the heart (sarā’ir).730 Meanwhile, Muqātil is more concerned with the 
                                                        
728 Al-Shāfi‘ī, Aḥkām, 1/297. 
729 Al-Shāfi‘ī, Aḥkām, 1/297. 
730 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 2/573. 
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theological and moral aspect of belief rather than legal one. Thus, while in the end he 
finally acknowledges the hypocrites’ legal status as Muslims, Muqātil is very clear to 
show that legality must be built on the strong foundation of correct theology, especially 
in relation to tawḥīd and taṣdīq. 
Jihād related laws 
Muqātil allots a relatively large space for discussing jihād. He in fact provides an 
independent chapter on jihād (abwāb al-jihād), consisting of nine tafsīrs, namely of (1) 
the virtues of the mujahidin, (2) the heavenly rewards for those participating in jihad, 
martyrs or otherwise, (3) the conditions of the soul of martyrs in the path of God, (4) 
being steadfast in the path of God, (5) abrogation of God’s tighter command in relation to 
the ratio of Muslim army and the polytheist enemy in a war by a more relaxed one, (6) 
division of battlegains, (7) dishonesty in taking a share of the battlegains, (8) fighting 
people of Scripture until they pay jizyah, and (9) fighting against the oppressive among 
the believers.  
The cursory glance, only five of the nine tafsīrs on jihād seem to be properly 
legal, while the rest appear to be more a theological admonition. In the first four tafsīrs, 
Muqātil addresses more the theological aspect of jihād laying out the encouragement and 
rewards that God has promised for believers so that they are eager to participate in jihād. 
The last five tafsīrs reflect better the legal aspect of jihād, explaining technicalities of 
war, the newly prescribed ratio with regard to the number of combatants between the 
Muslim army and the enemy, the division of battlegain, and a set of different rules in 
fighting People of Scripture and polytheists.   
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In his general explanation of jihād obligation, Muqātil adduces eight verses of 
three Qur’anic chapters, namely: Q2:216,731 Q22:39-40,732 and Q61:4,733 10-13.734 
Muqātil provides an historical overview of how the command of jihād had developed. 
During the Meccan period, he says, God had commanded the Prophet and believers to 
uphold tawḥīd, perform prayers, and pay almsgiving, although, at the time, it was not yet 
well regulated. While the early Meccan believers suffered any kinds of oppression by 
Meccan polytheists, God forbade them to fight back (qitāl). After the Prophet and his 
followers migrated to Medina (hijrah), God commanded other religious obligations (sā’ir 
al-farā’iḍ) and allowed the believers to fight back if necessary (udhina lahum fī al-qitāl), 
as explained in Q22:39-40. When accordingly God made the fight an obligation, the 
believers felt some burden was being put on them (Q2:216). In this regard, according to 
Muqātil, God persuaded the believers that while they disliked the idea of fighting against 
polytheists, it was actually good for them, for it led them to victory, spoils, and 
martyrdom (fatḥan wa ghanīmatan wa shahādatan). Likewise, they might prefer the idea 
of sitting at home avoiding jihād, but it was actually bad for them, because they got 
                                                        
731 Q2: 216, “Fighting is ordained for you, though you dislike it. You may dislike something although it is 
good for you, or like something although it is bad for you: God knows and you do not.’” 
732 Q22: 39-40, “[39] Those who have been attacked are permitted to take up arms because they have been 
wronged– God has the power to help them– [40] those who have been driven unjustly from their homes 
only for saying, ‘Our Lord is God.’ If God did not repel some people by means of others, many 
monasteries, churches, synagogues, and mosques, where God’s name is much invoked, would have been 
destroyed. God is sure to help those who help His cause– God is strong and mighty.” 
733 Q61: 4, “God truly loves those who fight in solid lines for His cause, like a well-compacted wall.” 
734 Q61: 10-13, “[10] You who believe, shall I show you a bargain that will save you from painful torment? 
[11] Have faith in God and His Messenger and struggle for His cause with your possessions and your 
persons––that is better for you, if only you knew– [12] and He will forgive your sins, admit you into 
Gardens graced with flowing streams, into pleasant dwellings in the Gardens of Eternity. That is the 
supreme triumph. [13] And He will give you something else that will really please you: His help and an 
imminent breakthrough. [Prophet], give the faithful the good news.” 
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nothing: neither victory nor spoils. In Q61:4, God encouraged the believers to participate 
in jihād against polytheists for the sake of obeying Him, and in Q61:10-13,735 God put 
jihād the third after the command of upholding tawḥīd and taṣdīq. In other words, the 
Qur’an suggests that the undertaking of jihād is meant to serve the realization of belief in 
the oneness of God and the messengership of Muhammad. Likewise, in his commentary, 
Muqātil relates the command of jihād immediately to tawḥīd and taṣdīq, in the sense that 
its undertaking is meant to serving these two principles of belief. The trinity of tawḥīd, 
taṣdīq and jihād bring with it divine promises both here in this world and in the 
hereafter.736 
After this introduction, Muqātil then proceeds to the first—of nine—tafsīr, 
namely “interpretation of God’s favor of those participating in jihād over those who are 
not” (tafsīr mā faḍḍal Allāh al-mujāhidīn min al-mu’minīn ‘alā l-qā’idīn).737 Citing 
Q4:95-6,738 Muqātil explains that believers who participate in jihād are higher in rank 
before God than those who do not, unless they have legitimate reasons for not doing so. 
In the second tafsīr, “interpretation of what the participants of jihāḍ share, whether they 
survive or fall as martyrs, in the hereafter” (tafsīr mā ashraka al-qātil wa al-maqtūl min 
                                                        
735 Q61: 10-13: “You who believe, shall I show you a bargain that will save you from painful torment? [10] 
Have faith in God and His Messenger and struggle for His cause with your possessions and your persons—
that is better for you, if only you knew–[11] and He will forgive your sins, admit you into Gardens graced 
with flowing streams, into pleasant dwellings in the Gardens of Eternity. That is the supreme triumph [12]. 
And He will give you something else that will really please you: His help and an imminent breakthrough. 
[Prophet], give the faithful the good news” [13]. 
736 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 264-65. 
737 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 266. 
738 Q4: 95-96: “Those believers who stay at home, apart from those with an incapacity, are not equal to 
those who commit themselves and their possessions to striving in God’s way. God has raised such people 
to a rank above those who stay at home– although He has promised all believers a good reward, those who 
strive are favored with a tremendous reward above those who stay at home [95]---high ranks conferred by 
Him, as well as forgiveness, and mercy: God is most forgiving and merciful [96].” 
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al-mujāhidīn fi al-ākhirah), 739 Muqātil maintains that all of them will be rewarded with 
paradise, promised in Q9:111740 and 4:74.741 In the third tafsīr, “interpretation of the 
conditions of the souls of those falling as martyrs during their participation for “God’s 
Cause” (tafsīr arwāḥ al-shuhadā’ min al mujāhidīn fī sabīl Allāh),742 Muqātil adduces 
Q2:154 and 3:169-170, explaining that they are actually alive and well-provisioned by 
God in heaven. In fact, these martyrs’ souls asked God to bring them alive again so that 
they are able to participate in another battle and receive such a great reward. In the fourth 
tafsīrs, “interpretation of resilience in participating in God’s Cause” (tafsīr al-murābiṭ fī 
sabīl Allāh),743 Muqātil brings forth Q3:200 that conveys God’s counsel for the 
participants of jihād to be steadfast and resilient in in their fighting against polytheists 
until the latter renounce shirk and embrace Islam, for the sake of Allah. 
In the fifth tafsīr, “interpretation of God’s more relaxing ruling for Muslims in 
fighting against polytheists” (tafsīr mā kāna Allāh ‘Azza wa Jalla shaddada ‘alā l-
muslimīn min qitāl al-mushrikīn thumma rakhkhaṣa),744 Muqātil explains how the old 
ratio in terms of the number of enemies that a Muslim fighter should face is replaced by 
the new and more relaxed one. Before this abrogation, the ratio stipulated between 
Muslim combatants and the enemy was one tenth; in the language of the Qur’an, twenty 
                                                        
739 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 266-7. 
740Q9: 111: “God has purchased the persons and possessions of the believers in return for the Garden– they 
fight in God’s way: they kill and are killed– this is a true promise given by Him in the Torah, the Gospel, 
and the Qur’an. Who could be more faithful to his promise than God? So be happy with the bargain you 
have made: that is the supreme triumph.” 
741 Q4: 74: “Let those of you who are willing to trade the life of this world for the life to come, fight in 
God’s way. To anyone who fights in God’s way, whether killed or victorious, We shall give a great 
reward.” 
742 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 267-8. 
743 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 269. 
744 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 269-70. 
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Muslims should face two hundred polytheists, or a hundred Muslims against a thousand 
polytheists (Q8:65). This ratio of combatants occurred during the battle of Badr, and the 
victory that the Muslims gained then has made this battle legendary. God knew that such 
a ratio was quite burdensome for Muslims, and may lead to their defeat in the future if 
such a number was maintained. The believers did suffer loss in the next battle of Uḥud, 
although the number of Muslim combatants might have contributed less to such defeat 
than the negligence of the Muslim army in following the plan. God then abrogated Q8:65, 
in which the one-tenth ratios of combatants were established, with Q8:66. In this later 
verse, the new ratio between Muslim combatants and the enemy is established at a half, 
that is, a hundred Muslims are against two hundred polytheists, or a thousand Muslims 
against two thousand polytheists. In this respect, Muqātil uses two exegetical tools in 
interpreting the Qur’an: the use of asbāb al-nuzūl report and abrogation (naskh) for 
deriving legal pronouncement of the Qur’an. 
In the sixth tafsīr, “interpretation of the division of booty gained from fighting 
against polytheists that are at war with Muslims” (tafsīr qismat al-qismah min fay’ al-
mushrikīn min ahl al-ḥarb),745 Muqātil describes the legal change in terms of how 
battlegain should be divided during the Prophet’s life and after his passing. During the 
Prophet’s lifetime, the division was regulated in Q8:\41, by which the Muslims used to 
separate one fifth of the battlegain (ghanīmah). This one fith was accordingly divided 
into four portions: one portion was for God, the Prophet and his family, one portion for 
orphans, another for the poor, and the rest for travellers who became the guests of 
                                                        
745 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 271-2.  
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Muslims (ibn al-sabīl). With regard to the first portion, God’s share was given to the 
Prophet and his relatives, in which everyone received the same amount. After the Prophet 
died, however, Abū Bakr took back the portion given to the Prophet’s family, and made it 
God’s portion (sabīl Allāh). Abū Bakr based his decision on what ‘Ā’ishah, his daughter 
and one of the Prophet’s wives, had heard from the Prophet: that a prophet did not leave 
inhertitance. In this respect, Muqātil seems to suggest that the Qur’anic injunction of 
battlegain division was abrogated by a prophetic tradition, something that later became a 
matter of debate among the Muslim scholars as to whether the Qur’an and the prophetic 
tradition can abrogate each other. 
The seventh tafsīr deals similarly with battlegain, but not with a legal aspect of it; 
rather it conveys the threat of punishment in the hereafter for those who dishonestly take 
something from it. Thus, in “interpretation on a person who dishonestly takes something 
from the battle gain (tafsīr mā ‘alā man yaghillu min al-ghanīmah),746 citing Q3:161-3, 
Muqātil warns that whosoever takes something illegally from the battlegain would bear 
the consequence in the Day of Judgment by carrying what he had stolen on his neck. 
The eighth tafsīr, “interpretation of the command on Muslims to fight against 
People of Scripture until they acknowledge paying poll tax” (tafsīr amr al-muslimīn min 
qitāl ahl al-kitab hatta yuqirru bi al-kharaj),747 deals with the rulings on fighting against 
                                                        
746 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 272-3. 
747 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 273. There is a typo in the printed commentary, in which what is supposed to be 
jizyah was written as kharaj. 
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People of Scripture. Citing Q: 29,748 Muqātil explains that there are two options available 
to the People of Scripture, to be fought in war, or to submit and pay jizyah.  
In the last tafsīr, Muqātil explains God’s command in relation to fighting agains 
domestic rebellion. In “interpretation of the command given to Muslims to fight rebellion 
among the believers” (tafsīr mā umira al-muslimūn min qitāl ahl al-baghy min al-
mu’minīn),749 Muqātil adduces Q49:9-10,750 verses which teach Muslims how to resolve 
internal conflict among Muslims. These verses were, according to Muqātil, related to the 
conflict between the ‛Aws and Khazraj tribes among the Anṣār of Medina. These two 
tribes had been at war with each other in numerous places. God wanted the Prophet to 
make peace between the two and arbitrate them with justice. If one of the two insisted on 
the fight, the Prophet and the body of believers should take on that group until it 
submitted to peace arbitration. Social order has to be maintained collectively, and any 
potential disruption thus needs to be stopped immediately. 
Based on the above discussion, there are two sets of rulings on jihād that Muqātil 
delineates based on the nature of the enemy. If the enemy is People of Scripture, they 
have two options available, paying jizyah or fighting. However, if the enemy is 
polytheist, Arab polytheists specifically, the choice is to embrace Islam or be killed. 
                                                        
748 Q.9: 29: “Fight those of the People of the Book who do not [truly] believe in God and the Last Day, who 
do not forbid what God and His Messenger have forbidden, who do not obey the rule of justice, until they 
pay the tax and agree to submit.” 
749 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 273-4. 
750 Q.49: 9-10: “If two groups of the believers fight, you [believers] should try to reconcile them; if one of 
them is [clearly] oppressing the other, fight the oppressors until they submit to God’s command, then make 
a just and even-handed reconciliation between the two of them: God loves those who are even-handed [9]. 
The believers are brothers, so make peace between your two brothers and be mindful of God, so that you 
may be given mercy [10].” 
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Internal conflict within the Muslim community must first be overcome with an offer of 
peace arbitration. If one of the two conflicting parties insists on the conflict, the Prophet 
and the Muslims are commanded to take on that party until they surrender. In this respect, 
Muqātil is consistent in stating that for the People of Scripture, conversion was not 
required as long as they were willing to live peacefully politically under the Muslim 
government by paying jizyah while they retained their own faiths. Conversely, the Arab 
polytheists had to convert if they did not want to fight.   
Jihād is also one of the topics that al-Shāfi‛ī spends a great, even extensive, space 
to discuss. Put alongside other headings in al-Umm within which al-Shāfi‛ī also deals 
with jihād, the kitāb al-jihād wa al-jizyah alone, which specifically addresses the question 
of jihād, runs about one hundred and seventeen pages, and encompasses about forty three 
subheadings. The amount of space that al-Shāfi‛ī provides for the discussion of jihād and 
other related matters suggests the relative importance of this topic to his conception of 
Islam and Muslim community, especially in relation to other religious communities. 
Much of al-Shāfi‛ī’s discussion of jihād is situating this obligation within the historical 
development of Islam and its relations with other religious communities.751 
                                                        
751 Al-Shāfi‘ī was said to be the first who has offered a solution to the controversy among early Muslim 
scholars whether jihād was universal and on whom such obligation fell. Bonner argues that the classical 
doctrine of fard ‘ala l-kifaya (collective obligation) first expressed by al-Shafi‘i, became widely (though 
not universally) accepted. This doctrine provided some resolution to tensions that had been breeding among 
various contending parties that included the imam/caliph and other representatives of the Islamic state, who 
needed to mobilize armies so as to defend and, where possible, expand the territory of Islam.” Furthermore, 
Bonner argues that the discussion of jihād was found in the works of early Muslim scholars who lived in 
frontier provinces or places that had become sites of warfare against the external enemies of Islam, such as 
Syria, North Africa, Spain, and Central Asia (including Khurāsān from which Muqātil came). Meanwhile, 
scholars who came from places where encounters with enemy and warfare were rare, such as Arabia 
(including Mecca and Medina), and ‘Iraq, they were generally silent about jihād. As a case in point, Bonner 
gives an example of two different recensions of Mālik’s al-Muwaṭṭa’. The Muwatta' of Malik in the 
recension of Yahya al-Masmudi, who died in Cordova in 234/848 has a chapter on jihād (kitāb al-jihād). In 
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Al-Shāfi‛ī traces the general, historical development of jihād within early Muslim 
community, from when it was something permitted until when it became an obligation. 
During the Meccan period, when the nascent Muslim community was weak 
(mustaḍ‛afīn), they were not yet permitted to launch jihād. Instead, the Muslims were 
given chances to migrate to a new place where they could practice their religious belief 
freely. The first emigration of Muslims was to Abyssinia. Following the conversion of 
some Medinan people, the Prophet and early Meccan Muslims were invited to Medina. 
Not long, the command for migration (hijrah) was given, by which the Prophet and his 
followers went to Medina. It was after this migration to Medina that the permission for 
jihād came. 752  
After God permitted jihād, the Prophet soon waged war against polytheists, which 
amounted to victory and attracted many more Meccans to embrace Islam. The Prophet 
gained more and more of a following. For that reason, jihād was made obligatory after it 
had previously only been permitted (ba‛d idh kāna ibāḥatan),753 as commanded in 
Q2:216; 9:111; 2:244; 22:78; 47:4; 9:39, 9:41, 9:42, 12, 121, 81; 61:4, and 4:75. At the 
same time, however, this command of jihād had made the life of the Muslims who 
remained in Mecca more difficult as they faced more oppression by the polytheists. In 
response, the Prophet sent to the Meccan Muslims a messenger telling them that God had 
                                                        
another recension of the great Iraqi jurist al-Shaybanī, there is “a short chapter on siyar [the literary genre 
that outlines law or conduct of war] and otherwise nothing at all about jihad. Notable for its absence is the 
material that we find in Yahya’s recension of Malik’s Muwatta', on exhortation, reward, martyrdom, and so 
on.” Michael Bonner, Jihad in Islamic History: Doctrines and Practice (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 2006), especially 97-117. 
752 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 5/364 
753 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 5/367. 
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made migration a way out and made it obligatory for those capable of doing so. Those 
who, for different reasons, were unable to migrate, they did not have to do it. Thus, 
according to the Sunnah of the Prophet, hijrah was obligatory for those capable for doing 
so and especially those who were persecuted because of their religion.754 However, if 
some of the Muslims feared nothing of such persecution and were able to protect their 
religion, hijrah was not obligatory to them. In this respect, the Prophet allowed some 
Muslims, including his uncle, al-‛Abbāṣ ibn ‛Abd al-Muṭṭalib, to remain in Mecca.755 
Given the situation of Meccan Muslims who were prone to persecution, the 
obligation of jihād as an offensive war was, according to al-Shāfi‘ī, then abrogated by 
another verse (Q2:193) forbidding war against polytheists unless they initiated it and 
Muslims were to defend themselves.756 Since then jihād has become an obligation but 
more as defensive measure. Jihād was a collective obligation. Thus, if there were 
members of community who did it, the rest were freed from the obligation.757 
Nonetheless, those participating in jihād attained more virtues than those staying at home. 
For the sake of “division of labor,” however, not all Muslims necessarily went to jihād, as 
there were domestic affairs to be taken care of. Al-Shāfi‘ī’s legally sober approach to 
jihād was able to create the need for such a division of labor, implying that not all citizens 
have to go to war. Since it is a collective obligation, choosing not participate in war is a 
legitimate option. Muqātil’s theological and ethical approach to jihād creates an 
                                                        
754 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 5/365. 
755 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 5/365. Some said that the presence of some Muslims, such as al-‘Abbās in Mecca 
had been used to monitor and spy the movement of the Meccan polytheists in their opposition against 
Muhammad and his followers in Medina. See Gabriel, Muhammad. 
756 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 5/365. 
757 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 5/384. 
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impression that avoiding jihād is condemnable and is allowed only with legitimate 
excuses. Consequently, Muqātil appears to have thought of jihād an individual, rather 
than collective, obligation in which each able adult must participate.758 
Jihād, according to al-Shāfi‛ī, was to be conducted against the nearest enemy 
whose threat to the Muslim community was imminent. Fighting against an enemy living 
in a rather far place was permitted if their threat was more alarming to the Muslim 
community. Once the Muslims were plunged in a war, they could not run away from the 
battlefield except for tactical reasons that empower the Muslim army.759 Those who leave 
the battle ground commit sins, the only repentance for which is to asking God’s 
forgiveness; there is no known expiator (kaffārah) for such a breach.760  
Al-Shāfi‛ī maintains that God has promised the Prophet that He will make His 
religion prevail. In the same manner, the Prophet had promised his followers that Persia 
and Rome would be conquered.761 Therefore, Abū Bakr was confident when he received 
the mandate to lead the Muslim polity after the Prophet’s passing. And under ‛Umar, 
‛Irāq and Fāris were completely conquered.762 God has made His religion the ḥaqq, and 
the rest that differs from it were bāṭil. God had also made it clear that the summation of 
shirk was two religions: the religion of People of Scripture and the religion of unlettered 
people. With regard to the People of Scripture, the Prophet gave them two options: to 
surrender—that is to embrace Islam—or pay jizyah. But for the unlettered people of the 
                                                        
758 As such, Muqātil’s view of jihād as an individual obligation is similar to his Syrian counterparts such as 
Makḥūl. Bonner, Jihad, 105. 
759 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 5/392. 
760 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 5/393. 
761 Muqātil also mentions the same view using a prophetic tradition in his al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr.  
762 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 5/398. 
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Arabs, their choice was practically to embrace Islam, the rejection of which would lead to 
their being killed.763 Thus, with regard to those whom he considered polytheists, 
regardlss of what type, and what to do with them, al-Shāfi‘ī held similar views as 
Muqātil. Both consider People of Scripture and Arab polytheists and offer two different 
treatments of these two communities. 
Before the advent of Muhammad, some of Arab tribes embraced the religion[s] of 
People of Scripture, and in Yemen they lived with each other. From such people, the 
Prophet accepted jizyah. This prophetic practice shows that jizyah was taken on the basis 
of religious considerations, not genealogical ones.764 Al-Shāfi‛ī maintains that the well-
known ahl al-kitāb were Jews and Christians. Both communities were descendants of the 
Banū Isrā’īl.765 Zoroastrians, while they embraced a religion that was different from that 
of the polytheists and from those of the ahl al-kitāb, can be grouped with the latter as 
People of Scripture.766 For even Jews and Christians of ahl al-kitāb also had religious 
differences. This was supported by the precedent set by three Rightly-guided Caliphs—
Abū Bakr, ‛Umar, and ‛Ālī—who took jizyah from the Zoroastrians.767 Ālī was even 
reported to say that the Prophet, followed then by Abū Bakr and ‛Umar, also took jizyah 
from the Zoroastrians.768 Based on this, al-Shāfī’ī concludes that Zoroastrians were ahl 
al-kitāb, and jizyah was taken only from ahl al-kitāb, primarily for religious reasons.769  
                                                        
763 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 5/398-399. 
764 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 5/405. 
765 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 5/405. 
766 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 5/405-406. 
767 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 5/407. 
768 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 5/407. 
769 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 5/407. 
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It was said that ‛Umar initially did not take jizyah from Zoroastrians until he heard from 
‛Abd al-Raḥmān ibn ‛Awf that the Prophet took jizyah from Zoroastrians of Hajar,770 and 
that ‛Abd al-Raḥmān once heard the Prophet saying that Zoroatrians were to be treated as 
ahl al-kitāb in relation to jizyah.771 Al-Shāfi‛ī also mentions a report that ‛Uthmān also 
took jizyah from the Berbers.772 
Any polytheists, Arab or non-Arab, who did not embrace the religion of ahl- al-
kitāb prior to the coming of Islam should be fought against until they became a Muslim, 
and no jizyah was to be taken from them.773 Likewise, polytheists who embraced the 
religion of the ahl al-kitāb after the revelation of the Furqān, their affiliation with the ahl 
al-kitāb did not prevent them from being fought against until they became Muslims.774 As 
such, al-Shāfi‛ī holds the view that jizyah is accepted only from those embracing kitābī 
religions and whose parents were also of those religions prior to the revelation of the 
Qur’an.775 Thus, Arab polytheists who embraced either Judaism or Christianity or 
Zoroastrianism after the coming of Muhammad would remained “polytheists” and were 
treated as such.776  Thus, jizyah was taken from those who had heard the calling of Islam, 
                                                        
770 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 5/408. 
771 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 5/408-9. 
772 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 5/409. It has become one of al-Shāfi‘ī’s methods that when he found different 
views on certain subjects he would choose to follow the views of senior companions of the Prophet, 
especially the four rightly-guided Caliphs (Abū Bakr, ‘Umar, ‘Uthmān, and ‘Alī). In short, he stratified 
hierarchically the views of early Muslim generations based on his understanding of their relative authority 
over one another. 
773 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 5/410. 
774 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 5/410-411. 
775 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 5/436. 
776 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 5/436. 
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yet insisted on their parents’ religions of ahl al-kitāb and ignored the true religion.777  The 
amount of jizyah to be taken annually was one dinar in average.778 
Bilād al-Islām, according al-Shāfi‛ī, could be a home only for Muslims or non-
Muslims having an agreement with the Muslims.779 In terms of an agreement made 
between Muslims and polytheists, it has to be maintained for the sake of obeying God 
(ṭā‛atan li Allāh).780 No vows were made for disobeying God, and therefore any 
agreement made in violation of God’s law was regarded annulled.781 Thus, it is only vows 
made and agreement concluded to obey God and not to disobey Him that was to be 
maintained and fulfilled.782  
God’s command to fight against polytheists until they embrace Islam, and to fight 
against the kitābī until they embraced Islam or paid jizyah, was mandated only if 
Muslims were capable for doing so. If the Muslims did not have the capability, they were 
allowed to make a peace treaty with non-Muslims,783 even if Muslims received nothing 
from such agreement.784 However, such an agreement should only be temporary. Once 
Muslims were capable of fighting against polytheists, they must do so. For fighting 
against polytheists, until they embraced Islam or against ahl al-kitāb until they paid 
jizyah, was an obligation.785  
                                                        
777 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 5/412. 
778 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 5/423-424. 
779 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 5/436. 
780 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 5/438. 
781 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 5/441. 
782 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 5/441. 
783 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 5/450. 
784 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 5/451. 
785 Al-Shāfi‛ī, al-Umm, 5/453. 
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Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong  
The doctrine “commanding right and forbidding wrong” is often closely related to 
the question of jihād. In particular, scholars frequently linked “forbidding wrong” to holy 
war. “Others invert the relationship, considering holy war to be a part of forbidding 
wrong.” 786 Not only among scholars, the same perception is shared by common Muslims 
who view commanding right and, especially, forbidding wrong as tied to violence, such 
as that invoked by the idea of jihād. While Muqātil’s view of jihād is clear, in which he 
espouses the idea of jihād as an individual obligation, Muqātil’s highly ethical approach 
toward the doctrine of “commanding right and forbidding wrong,” however, seems to 
evoke more careful moral considerations than advocacy for violence or war. In Muqātil’s 
view, the undertaking of “commanding right and forbidding wrong” must be executed 
with the ethically best possible ways.  
Muqātil discusses commanding right and forbidding wrong in only one heading in 
the Tafsīr al-Khams Mi’at Āyah, namely “interpretation of the command in terms 
commanding right and forbidding wrong and of being patient over any trouble in its 
undertaking” (tafsīr mā umira min al-amr bi al-ma‛rūf wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar wa al-
ṣabr ‘alā al-adhā fī amrihimā).787 It is intriguing that Muqātil links this doctrine, fair and 
square, to his exegetical thrust with regard to the Qur’an manifested in the opposition of 
tawḥīd and shirk. Commanding right and forbidding wrong, to Muqātil, is another way to 
                                                        
786 Michael Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 490. 
787 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 278-80. 
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say commanding tawhīd and forbidding shirk. Muqātil’s understanding of the doctrine is 
based on his interpretation of Q31:13, 17-18 that read,  
‘‘My son, do not attribute any partners to God: attributing partners to Him is a 
terrible wrong [13].’ ‘‘Keep up the prayer, my son; command what is right; forbid 
what is wrong; bear anything that happens to you steadfastly: these are things to 
be aspired to [17]. Do not turn your nose up at people, nor walk about the place 
arrogantly, for God does not love arrogant or boastful people [18].” 
 
Muqātil interprets the term al-ma‘rūf and al-munkar in Q31:17 as tawḥīd and al- 
shirk, respectively. If the message of the other part of these verses is taken into 
consideration, the undertaking of the doctrine should be done in the best ethical ways 
(Q31:18). Muqātil’s citing of other verses—namely Q17:37788 and 31:19789—furthermore 
suggests that ethics or morality is fundamentally important in commanding right and 
forbidding wrong. The noted emphasis on the necessity of joining commanding right and 
forbidding wrong with ethics is manifested in Muqātil’s invocation of another verse in his 
discussion of the doctrine, namely Q5:2, which reads, ‘…help one another to do what is 
right and good; do not help one another towards sin and hostility. Be mindful of God, for 
His punishment is severe.’ 
Afterward, Muqātil paraphrases a famous prophetic tradition, which lays out three 
acts a believer must perform in the face of witnessing an abominable action (munkar), 
namely—in descending order of strength—by an act, verbal statement, or rejection in 
heart. The redaction of the tradition suggests that the sequence of the threefold acts of 
                                                        
788Q17: 37, ‘Do not strut arrogantly about the earth: you cannot break it open, nor match the mountains in 
height.” 
789 Q31: 19, ‘Go at a moderate pace and lower your voice, for the ugliest of all voices is the braying of 
asses.’ 
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rejecting the munkar indicates the relative quality of a believer’s faith in a descending 
order. A believer’s ability to act when witnessing an act of munkar is better than when he 
merely offers a verbal statement, and even much better than when he merely rejects such 
an act of munkar in his heart without doing anything to stop it. Therefore, the rejection of 
a munkar in one’s heart is considered the weakest manifestation of belief.790 
Since the threefold attitudes—acts, verbal statement, and rejection in heart—
reflect the quality of one’s belief, Muslims generally feel encouraged to do their best in 
performing such an obligation. In this regard, acting to stop an act of munkar is 
preferable over the other two lesser options. In reality, this reason has been used as 
justification by some Muslims to do whatever they can, including the use of violence, to 
stop any wrongdoing they find in society. 791   
Muqātil, however, offers a different perspective in this respect, which potentially 
mitigates the possibly counterproductive effect of rejecting munkar, especially when 
violent ways are resorted to or prioritized. Propagating the undertaking of “commanding 
right and forbidding wrong” in the best ethical ways, Muqātil advocates a non-violent 
approach. In this regard, he seems to adopt Ibn Mas‛ūd’s views that he quotes. Muqātil 
mentions that when asked by a group of people whether a person who does not command 
right and forbid wrong is perished, Ibn Mas‘ūd’s response was negative. Instead, Ibn 
Mas‛ūd told them that perished is someone who does not know what commanding right 
                                                        
790 “Muqātil says: ‘Reject munkar by doing [something] if you are able, or say [something]. If you are 
unable [to reject it by doing or saying something], then reject it with your heart, and that is the weakest 
[manifestation of] belief’” (qāla Muqātil: ankir al-munkar, immā taf‘al in qadarta wa imam taqūlu. Fa in 
lam taqdir ‘alayhi, fa ankir bi qalbikawa dhālika aḍ‘af al-īmān). Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 279.  
791 Cook provides a great amount of instances in his Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong, in which 
some Muslims had resorted to violence in their effots to forbid wrong throughout history. 
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and forbidding wrong are; that is, a person who does not know what the wrong is and 
thus does not reject it in his heart.792 What is striking in Muqātil’s citation of Ibn 
Mas‘ūd’s view is that contrary to the well-accepted notion of threefold act tradition in 
terms of rejecting munkar, which prioritizes act over speech and silent response by heart, 
it instead promotes what is considered the weakest manifestation of belief—namely, the 
rejection of munkar in one’s heart—as the most meaningful and important response in 
facing any abominable acts. Rejecting munkar by heart requires the necessary knowledge 
of right and wrong by every individual believer. It is, in other words, an educated and 
responsible response, potentially in contrast to that poorly informed and destructive 
response that ignite violence, expressed either through speech or act. 
While Muqātil’s chosen preference might seem indifferent to what is transpiring 
in real life, it can be well understood by looking at what such a passive attitude 
prerequisites. That is, in order for every individual believer to reject an act of munkar in 
his heart, he must possess knowledge of right and wrong. Such knowledge requires 
education. If every individual believer has been well educated in terms of right and 
wrong, he is well expected to act according to that knowledge. If the knowledge of right 
and wrong is translated into reality by every individual believer, it means that there is no 
need for people to stop an act of munkar for there is no one commits it. In other words, 
Muqātil’s vision of commanding right and forbidding wrong aims at a preventive rather 
than a curative measure.  
                                                        
792 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 279-80. 
  
263 
Muqātil’s use of Ibn Mas‛ūd’s view following the ‘threefold act’ tradition could 
be his smart way to neutralize the possible zealotry that a believer may show in order to 
demonstrate the best quality of his faith when witnessing an act of munkar, including 
using violence to stop it.  By stating—with Ibn Mas‛ūd—that what is more important—
than an act or verbal statement to engage in an event of munkar—is the possession of 
knowledge of right and wrong by a believer, Muqātil is indirectly arguing against the 
notion that rejecting an act of munkar in heart is the weakest manifestation of belief. On 
the contrary, he appears to argue, such rejection of munkar in heart might well be the 
noblest act that a believer may take when witnessing a wrongdoing, reflecting his 
knowledge of right and wrong. Just as theology or correct belief leads anything else in 
one’s life, Muqātil’s preferred way to combat wrongdoings is individual knowledge of 
right and wrong. And similar to his view of jihād as an individual obligation, Muqātil 
also sees commanding right and forbidding wrong as an individual obligation as well. 
As idealist, if not utopist, as Muqātil’s vision of commanding right and forbidding 
wrong may be, there at least three lessons that we can learn from the way Muqātil 
perceives the doctrine. First, he argues for the importance of creating an environment in 
which every individual has a good chance to possess a solid knowledge of right and 
wrong, so that he is able to act on that knowledge and live a virtous life accordingly. This 
reminds us of how he underlines the importance of education for qur’anic literacy in al-
Tafsīr al-Kabīr. Second, since the obligation is individual knowing of right and wrong, 
every person is responsible for attaining the required knowledge. If a person has to 
participate in commanding right and forbidding wrong he must do so in the best ethical 
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ways. Third, the focus of commanding right and forbidding wrong is primarily 
commanding tawḥīd and forbidding shirk, arguably the most fundamental tenets of Islam. 
If the most important aspect of commanding right and forbidding wrong—that is, 
commanding tawḥīḍ and forbidding shirk—must be undertaken with utmost ethical ways, 
any other matters must be carried out in the same manner. 
Another possible explanation as to why Muqātil chooses to adopt a non-violent 
approach with regard to commanding right and forbidding wrong is his possible 
discontent with the adversity that a violent approach to commanding right and forbidding 
wrong has produced. Cook provides a number of examples where individuals or groups 
of people chose upfront approaches to undertake this command, from verbal to physical, 
which ended up with their being punished by the existing rulers or even killed. In 
Muqātil’s own time, Jahm Ibn Ṣafwān, who was often mentioned in the sources as 
Muqātil’s opponent in theological debate, was rebelling against the government for the 
sake of commanding right and forbidding wrong, and was killed.793  
In the early Islamic period, it was not uncommon, as shown by biographical 
dictionary literature, for the state and rulers to be the targets of ‘commanding right and 
forbidding wrong.’794  However, some scholars, such as Khaṭṭābī (d. 388/998), went as 
far to minimize the interaction with the rulers despite one’s knowledge of the latter’s 
depravity. In fact, Abū Ḥanīfah (d. 150/767), Muqātil’s contemporary, held a similar 
opinion to that of Muqātil. Despite his view that the duty of commanding right and 
                                                        
793 Cook, Commanding, 477. 
794 Cook, Commanding, 476. 
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forbidding wrong “might in principle make rebellion mandatory,” Abū Ḥanīfah seeks to 
override this alarming implication by invoking the likely costs of such action.”795 
Furthermore, Ibn Mas‛ūd who happened to be the authority from whom Muqātil derives 
his civilian and non-violent approach is also mentioned by Cook as someone who was 
very careful and cautious in dealing with forbidding wrong that may lead to mistake and 
violence.796 This shows that while theologically uncompromising with regard to the 
upholding of tawḥīd and condemnation of shirk, the very essence of commanding right 
and forbidding wrong in his view, Muqātil does not condone the use of violence in its 
promotion. While theologically uncompromising, Muqātil opts to realize his theological 
visions in ethically pacifist way, as reflected in his understanding of the doctrine 
“commanding right and forbidding wrong” that realizes the very theological concern of 
his, namely “commanding tawḥīd and forbidding shirk. 
It may appear that there is some contradiction in Muqātil’s attitude toward jihād, 
closely associated with violence and war, on one hand, and his attitude toward 
commanding right and forbidding wrong, which advocates a pacifist method, on the 
other, as both are, to Muqātil, individual obligations. Possible explanations might be 
derived from the fact that Muqātil has perceived jihād as a defensive measure against 
hostile enemy that initiated any violent attacks toward Muslim community.797 Jihād is, in 
                                                        
795 Cook, Commanding, 477-8. 
796 Cook, Commanding, 481. 
797 However, Muqātil also offers the alternative meanings of jihād as primarily civilized acts, other than 
merely physical fighting, as long as they are performed for the sake of God’s cause. In this sense, Muqātil’s 
pacifism began as a ctiticism, or at least an avoidance, of war. Duane Cady argues that “[c]ontemporary 
versions of pacifism often begin as criticisms of war. Such is also the case in the history of pacifist thought. 
And just as contemporary pacifism arises within a pervasively warist context, so the idea of pacifism 
emerges within the broad and deep warism of ancient cultures.” Furthermore, Cady also maintained that 
  
266 
other words, a Qur’anic response for the early believers to defend themselves in 
practicing their faith against any violence that their enemy had inflicted upon them. As 
such, jihād is situated in war situation, which must involve some sorts of violence. On the 
other hand, commanding right and forbidding wrong, especially in Muqātil’s preventive 
understanding, is to be carried out in a normal situation where all efforts to be made that 
every individual has access to knowledge of right and wrong, tawhīd and shirk, and 
posses an ability to live accordingly. Or, Muqātil’s alleged contradictory visions with 
regard to jihād and commanding right and forbidding wrong is the result of disparity 
between the idea and reality, the envisioned or imagined and the fact. In general, 
however, Muqātil’s aspiration is the establishment of order and peaceful coexistence 
between different communities. This he has demonstrated through his approval for 
devising agreement with non-Muslims, his argument that the imposition of Islam is 
limited only to the Arab polytheists of Muhammad’s contemporary, his inclusive 
definition of the People of Scripture that the political concession of jizyah can be applied 
to as broadly people as possible, his minimum requirement for kitābi non-Muslims to 
uphold tawḥīd and acknowledge Muhammad’s prophethood (taṣdīq) without their 
conversion, his vision in commanding right and forbidding wrong, and, finally, his 
                                                        
pacifism is a continuum “pointing to the range of legitimately pacifist views united by the common 
convictions” in rejecting war and in its commitment to non-violence. See From Warism to Pacifism: A 
Moral Continuum (Philadelphia: Tempe University Press, 2010), 1-2, xix, xviii. If Cady did not subscribe 
to the notions of just-war theory and argued that “war is by its nature morally wrong,” Andrew Fiala 
offered what he called “practical pacifism,” which “is not absolute pacifism; it does not reject violence in 
all cases. Rather, it develops out of the idea that sometimes war may be justified, even as it questions 
whether any given war is in fact a just one.” But while Fiala claimed that the pragmatist approach to peace 
he adopted is “uniquely American,” his views are largely similar to those Muqātil endorsed, especially with 
regard to the importance of education for values inculcation, individual responsibility, and non-violent 
approaches. See Practical Pacifism (New York: Algora Publishing, 2004), 1, 10. Cady, Warism, xvi, xix. 
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conception of muḥkamāt al-Qur’ān that offers a very valuable common ground, at least, 
for the three monotheistic traditions: Jewish, Christian, and Islamic communities, by 
invoking fundamental teachings that God has revealed to all of these people in their 
scriptures. It is to this topic of muḥkamāt al-Qur’ān that I will now turn. 
Muḥkamāt al-Qur’ān: fundamental techings of the Qur’an 
 Muqātil’s conception of muḥkamāt al-Qur’ān is the summation of his theological 
views, of his exegetical endeavor, and of his vision for interreligious relations. The 
muḥkamāt delineates Muqātil’s theology, which centers on the upholding of tawḥīd and 
taṣdīq and the total submission to divine command. It also reflects the priorities that he 
sets in his exegetical project by first underscoring the importance of having a correct 
theology before anything else, a theology that insists on the upholding of divine unity and 
the acknowledgement of Muhammad’s prophethood. If this theology has been upheld, it 
is only then possible to discuss the rest, especially in terms of human relations. And 
fittingly, the muḥkamāt provides such a hierarchical arrangement for Muqātil to set out 
the theology that has led his exegetical project and to lay out the framework within which 
the believing communities—Muhammad’s followers and the People of Scripture—with 
their different traditions may coexist under the aegist of the one God according to the 
teachings of the prophets and scriptures that God has sent. 
Furthermore, Muqātil’s conception of muḥkamāt is unlike what has been widely 
accepted among Muslim scholars, both in content and method. Substantively, there are 
some reports in later works that attribute similar views to older generation of Muslims 
among the companions of the Prophet, but Muqātil is certainly the first whose extant 
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works mention these views. Methodologically, Muqātil’s conception of muḥkamāt is the 
first that offers a clear definition of what it is, while the mainstream scholarship on this 
subject has been open ended at best, and confusing at worst. Muqātil’s clear formulation 
of muḥkamāt has a fundamental impact on opening more exegetical possibilities.  It also 
contributes to determining which fundamentals of islām as the primordial “religion” (dīn) 
are nonnegotiable and which variables are subject to particularities. In order to 
understand the dynamic and complexity of scholarship on muḥkamāt, discussion must 
start by tracing how the term is used in the Qur’an. 
Scholarly discussion of muḥkamāt starts with Q3:7: “It is He who has sent this 
Scripture down to you [Prophet]. Some of its verses are definite in meaning (muḥkamāt)–
these are the cornerstones of the Scripture–and others are ambiguous (mutashābihāt). The 
perverse at heart eagerly pursue the ambiguities in their attempt to make trouble and to 
pin down a specific meaning of their own: only God knows the true meaning. Those 
firmly grounded in knowledge say, ‘We believe in it: it is all from our Lord’–only those 
with real perception will take heed.” 
Based on this verse, Muslim scholars are of the view that the Qur’an consists of 
two major types of verses: muḥkamāt (sing. muḥkam) and mutashābihāt (sing. 
mutashābih). They have, however, differed from each other not only in identifying which 
verses in the Qur’an are muḥkamāt and which are mutashābihāt, but also, and more 
importantly, in defining the two.798 Especially for the mutashābihāt, scholars have more 
                                                        
798 Al-Daḥḥāk, Tafsīr al-Ḍaḥḥāk, ed. Muḥammad Shukrī Aḥmad al-Zāwītī (Cairo: Dār al-Salām, 1999), 
104. Ṣubḥī al-Ṣāliḥ, Mabāhith fī ‛Ulūm al-Qur’ān (Beirūt: Dār al-‛Ilm li al-Malāyīn, 1977), 282; see also 
Muḥammad ‛Abd al-Mun‛im al-Qay‛ī, al-Aṣlānī fī ‛Ulūm al-Qur’ān, pp. 48-59 (al-Maktabah al-Shāmilah). 
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points on which they differ, depending on how they recited parts of the verse. The first 
mode of recitation is this: wa mā ya‘lamu ta’wīlahū illā Allāhu wa al-rāsikhūna fī al-
‘ilm; yaqūlūna āmannā bihī kullun min ‘indi rabbinā (“nobody knows its meaning but 
God and those firmly grounded in knowledge; they [who are firmly grounded in 
knowledge] say, ‘We believe in it: it is all from our Lord’”). The second mode of 
recitation is this: wa mā ya‘lamu ta’wīlahū illā Allāhu; wa al-rāsikhūna fī al-‘ilm 
yaqūlūna āmannā bihī kullun min ‘indi rabbinā (“Only God knows the true meaning. 
Those firmly grounded in knowledge say, ‘We believe in it: it is all from our Lord’”). If 
the first mode of recitation is chosen, it means that not only God but scholars are able to 
know the meaning of such mutashābihāt verses; but if the second mode of recitation is 
chosen, it suggests that only God knows the meaning of the mutashābihāt verses, while 
the scholars simply believe in them as revelation from God regardless of their true 
meanings. 799 In addition, these different modes of recitation have an implication in 
defining the two terms—muḥkamāt and mutashābihāt—and in identifying which qur’anic 
verses belong to either of the two. In the following I will mention a number of views 
representative of the scholarly differences in this respect. 
Qur’an commentators of the second/eighth century. Mujāhid (d. 102/720) 
viewed the muḥkamāt as those verses in which God rules with regard to the lawful, 
unlawful, and others, and the mutashābihāt as those verses that vindicate one another.800 
                                                        
799 Jalāl al-Dīn ‛Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Abū Bakr al-Suyūṭī, al-Itqān fī ‛Ulūm al-Qur’ān (Saudi Arabia: 
Markaz al-Dirāsat al-Qur’āniyyah, n.y.), 4/1335. 
800 Mujāhid Ibn Jabr, Tafsīr al-Imām Mujāhid ibn Jabr, ed. Muḥammad ‛Abd al-Salām Abū al-Nīl (Naṣr 
City: Dār al-Fikr al-Islāmī al-Ḥadīthah, 1989), 248. 
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It appears that Mujāhid was of the view that scholars are able to know the meanings of 
mutashābihāt. Al-Ḍaḥḥāk (d. 105/723) understood muḥkam as those verses that abrogate 
other verses (nāsikh), and mutashābih as those verses that are abrogated by other verses 
(mansūkh). Since the knowledge of abrogation—that is, which verses are abrogating and 
which ones are abrogated—is so important, al-Ḍaḥḥāk saw that, apart from God, scholars 
must be able to know the meaning of the mutashābih, which accordingly leads them to 
knowing events of abrogation.801 Sufyān al-Thawrī (161/777) held a similar view as that 
of al-Ḍaḥḥāk that the muḥkamāt are al-nāsikh and the mutashābihāt are al-mansūkh.802 
Consequently, al-Thawrī viewed that scholars are able to know the meaning of the 
mutashābihāt, for such knowledge is required for their understanding of the abrogation 
cases.  
Qur’an commentators of the third/ninth century. Al-Farrā’ (d. 207/822) 
understood muḥkamāt as those which explained the lawful and unlawful, and which were 
not abrogated; they were three verses of the al-An‛ām [Q6: 151-153]. The mutashābihāt 
are alif-lām-mīm-ṣād, alif-lām-rā, alif-lām-mīm-rā; these letters had been obscured to the 
Jews who sought to find out the fate of Muhammad’s community based on numerical 
interpretation (hisāb al-jummal). When they could not get what they wanted, they 
rejected Muhammad.803 Al-Farrā’s definition and identification of muḥkamāt and 
mutashābihāt are closely similar to that of Muqātil that I will discuss later. According to 
                                                        
801 al-Ḍaḥḥāk, Tafsīr, 105-6. 
802 Sufyān al-Thawrī, Tafsīr Suyān al-Thawrī, ed. Abū ‛Abd Allāh Sufyāb ibn Sa‛īd ibn Masrūq al-Thawrī 
al-Kūfī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‛Ilmiyyah, 1983), 75. 
803 Abū Zakariyyā Yaḥyā ibn Ziyād al-Farrā’, Ma‛ānī al-Qur’ān (Beirut: ‛Ālam al-Kutub, 1983), 1/190. 
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al-Farrā’s understanding, only God knows the meaning of the mutashābihāt.804 ‛Abd al-
Razzāq al-Ṣan‛ānī (d. 211/826) only defined al-muḥkam as those verses which are acted 
upon, such as verses on inheritance and on war (qitāl),805 and mutashābihāt as those 
verses which resemble each other in terms of the lawful and unlawful and they are similar 
to each other.806 ‘Abd al-Razzāq’s definition is very general and it will likely lead to an 
open ended identification of which verses belong to which. But his definition suggests 
that he chooses the first mode of recitation implying that scholars are able to know the 
meanings of the mutashābihāt. 
Qur’an commentators of the fourth/tenth century. Al-Ṭabarī (d. 320/932) saw 
muḥkamāt as those verses whose rulings are clear and detailed, and which offer 
convincing evidence with regard to the lawful and unlawful, promise and threat, reward 
and punishment, command and prohibition, narrative and metaphor, exhortation and 
lesson, and others.807 Mutashābihāt, on the other hand, are those verses whose recitation 
is similar to each other but whose meanings are different.808 Al-Tabarī stressed that God 
had deliberately explained some of qur’anic verses clearly and they become the 
fundamentals of the scripture, the pillar of the community and of the religion, a sanctuary 
for everything obligated with regard to Islamic teachings; other groups of verses were 
similar in recitation but different in their meanings.809 Afterward, al-Ṭabarī mentioned 
                                                        
804 Al-Farrā’, Ma‘ānī, 1/191. 
805 ‛Abd al-Razzāq ibn Hammām al-Ṣan‛ānī, Tafsīr al-Qur’ān, ed. Muṣṭafā Muslim Muḥammad (Riyāḍ: 
Maktabat al-Rushd, 1989), 1/115 [1/382], [1/438, 3/207]. 
806 ‛Abd al-Razzāq, Tafsīr al-Qur’ān, 3/129. 
807 al-Ṭabarī, Jāmi‛, 6/170. 
808 Al-Ṭabarī, Jāmi‛, 6/173. 
809 Al-Ṭabarī, Jāmi‛, 6/174. 
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different scholarly views with regard to muḥkamāt and mutashābihāt. Some scholar said 
that al-muḥkamāt were those that were acted upon, abrogating, and whose rulings are 
operational; al-mutashābihāt, on the contrary, were those verses that are not acted upon 
and are abrograted. Al-Ṭabarī also mentioned a reported view of Ibn ‛Abbās that the āyāt 
mūḥkamāt are three verses of the al-An‛ām (Q6:151-153) and those of the al-Isrā’ 
(Q17:23-39).810 He also referred to another reported view of Ibn ‛Abbās that al-
muḥkamāt are those verses that were abrogating, the lawful and the unlawful, ḥuḍūd and 
farā’iḍ, what are believed in and acted upon; al-mutashabihāt are those who are 
abrogated, whose construction is inverted (muqaddamuhu wa mu’akhkharuhu), 
metaphors and oaths (amthāluhū wa aqsāmuhū), and those verses which are believed in 
but not acted upon.811 The remaining views that al-Ṭabarī mentioned, either from the 
reported views of the Companions or Followers, stated that al-muḥkamāt are those 
abrogating, believed in and acted upon, and the al-mustashābihāt are those abrogated, 
belived in but not acted upon.812 
Ibn Abī Ḥātim (d. 327/938) referred to the reported view Ibn ‛Abbās in his 
definition of al-muḥkamāt as the abrogating verses which also deal with the lawful and 
unlawful, ḥudūd and farā’iḍ, which are believed in and acted upon. He also mentioned 
the reported view of Ibn ‛Abbās that al-muḥkamāt were the last three verses of the al-
An‛ām (Q6:151-3), or that they are the three verses of the al-An‛ām and some verses of 
                                                        
810 Al-Ṭabarī, Jāmi‛, 6/174. 
811 Al-Ṭabarī, Jāmi‛, 6/175. 
812 Al-Ṭabarī, Jāmi‛, 6/175-76. 
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the al-Isrā’ (Q17:23-39).813 But he also mentioned the reported views of ‛Ikrimah, 
Mujāhid, Qatādah, al-Ḍaḥḥāk, Muqātil ibn Ḥayyān, al-Rabī‛ ibn Anas, and al-Suddī who 
all said that al-muḥkam is the one that is acted upon.814 Ibn Abī Ḥātim offered an 
explanation as to why the muḥkamāt is called the “mother of the scrtipture.” Two of the 
three views he mentioned maintained that it is called so because they are written in all 
scriptures and accepted by the followers of all religions.815 In terms of al-mutashābihāt, 
Ibn Abī Ḥātim mentioned four views. The first is the reported view of Ibn ‛Abbāṣ that 
they are the abrogated, whose construction is inverted (muqaddamuhu wa 
mu’akhkharuhu), metaphors and oaths (amthāluhu wa aqsāmuhu), and the ones to be 
believed in but not acted upon.816 The second view is of Mujāhid who said that 
mutashābihāt are verses that are similar to one another.817  The third was Muqātil’s view 
that they are four sets of the mysterious letters: alif-lām-mīm, alif-lām-mīm-ṣāḍ, alif-lām-
mīm-rā, and alif-lām-rā.818 The last view is of Muḥammad ibn Isḥāq who said that 
mutashābihāt are the verses in which God did not explain His words in detail as He did in 
the muḥkamāt, and thus are obscure in people’s mind.819 
                                                        
813 Ibn Abī Ḥātim, Tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-‛Aẓīm, ed. As‛ad Muḥammad Ṭayyib (Riyāḍ: Maktabah Nizār 
Muṣṭafā al-Bāz, 1997), 592. 
814 Ibn Abī Ḥātim, Tafsīr, 592. 
815 Ibn Abī Ḥātim, Tafsīr, 593. 
816 Ibn Abī Ḥātim, Tafsīr, 593. 
817 Ibn Abī Ḥātim, Tafsīr, 593. 
818 Ibn Abī Ḥātim, Tafsīr, 594. It is interesting here to note that it is unclear which Muqātil Ibn Abī Hātim 
was referring to. Ibn Abī Ḥātim was very critical of Muqātil in the biographical dictionaries. But the view 
of al-mutashābihāt he mentioned belonged only to Muqātil ibn Sulaymān. However, Ibn Abī Ḥātim 
seemed to obscure which Muqātil he actually meant. Before, when he mentioned Muqātil ibn Ḥayyān, he 
did so with the latter’s full name. But when referring to the view of mutashābihāt as the four sets of the 
mysterious letters, he simply mentioned Muqātil, which could be Muqātil ibn Ḥayyān or ibn Sulaymān. 
However, the view that mutashābihāt consists of these four sets of mysterious letters belonged to Muqātil 
ibn Sulaymān. 
819 Ibn Abī Ḥātim, Tafsīr, 594. 
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Based on these representative exegetes, some remarks can be made as follows: (1) 
some of the second/eight century exegetes, in this case Mujāhid and al-Ḍaḥḥāk, were of 
the view that scholars are able to know the meanings of mutashābihāt, and their 
definition of muḥkamāt stressed its relation with the question of legal matters such as 
lawful-/unlawfulness and abrogation. Their definition of both terms is straightforward but 
also general. Muqātil who came from the same period would offer an entirely different 
set of views in this regard. (2) Some of the third/ninth century exegetes, in this case al-
Farrā’ and al-Ṣan‘ānī, showed some partial similarity in defining more clearly the 
muḥkamāt but also partial, but stark, difference in terms of the definition of the 
mutashābihāt and the possibility of scholars for knowing the latter’s meanings. Of the 
two, al-Farrā’’s is the closest to Muqātil’s definition of the two terms and in his 
identification of which verses belong to which. In general, their discussion of the subject 
matter is quite straightforward. (3) The fourth/tenth century exegetes, in this case al-
Ṭabarī and Ibn Abī Ḥātim, showed a new tendency of being encyclopaedic in their 
discussion of the subject matter. Not only did they express their own views in terms of 
muḥkamāt and mutashābihāt, they also mentioned the views of other scholars. 
Consequently, it is not entirely clear which of those views that best represent their own. 
While al-Ṭabarī offered his own definitions of the two terms, they are very general and 
open-ended. But he mentioned Ibn ‘Abbāṣ’ view of the muḥkamāt which is close to that 
of Muqātil. Ibn Abī Ḥātim, who did not offer his own definition, referred to Ibn ‘Abbās’ 
view of the muḥkamāt similar to that of Muqātil, and cited Muqātil’s view, among other, 
with regard to the mutashābihāt.     
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Muqātil’s muḥkamāt 
Muqātil’s straightforward and simple concept of al-muḥkamāt has a significant 
implication for his exegetical endeavor and for envisioning a common ground for 
interreligious relations. Since his view of al-muḥkamāt depends in part on the definition 
of its paired opposite, I will briefly discuss muqātil’s view of al-mutashābihāt. 
Muqātil does not mention his conception of the mutashābihāt in his legal 
commentary. Rather, he discussed it in his major commentary, al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr. 
Muqātil is of the view that the mutashābihāt consist only of four sets of the mysterious 
letters, namely alif-lām-mīm, alif-lām-mīm-ṣād, alif-lām-mīm-rā, and alif-lām-rā. 820  Of 
twenty-nine chapters in which the mysterious letters take place, there are only thirteen 
chapters in which one of these four sets become their openings.821 Muqātil’s decision to 
take only these four sets of mysterious letters as the mutashābihāt in the Qur’an was 
based on a tradition in which the Prophet recited these four sets of the mysterious letters 
to the Jews about whose meanings they admitted to be confused, although they hinted at 
the fact that these letters represented the numerical account with regard to the length of 
period in which Muhammad’s community would last.822 
Muqātil suggests that only God knows the meanings of these four sets of letters, 
and every attempt to pursue them through interpretation would prove futile. Furthermore, 
                                                        
820 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/264. 
821 Alif-lam-mim occurs 6 times in 6 different chapters: Q2, 3, 29, 30, 31, 32; alif-lam-mim-sad occurs once 
in Q7; alif-lam-ra occurs 5 times in Q10, 11, 12, 14, 15, and alif-lam-mim-ra occurs once in Q13. 
822 Tafsīr Muqātil ibn Sulaymān, 1/87. Al-Farrā’ offered a similar narrative background in relation to 
mutashābihāt in which a group of Jews attempted to predict the fate of Muhammad’s community, but his 
identified mutashābihāt consist only of three sets of the mysterious letters--alif-lām-mīm-ṣād, alif-lām-rā, 
alif-lām-mīm-rā—lacking alif-lām-mīm, the fourth in Muqātil’s view.   
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any attempts at interpretation might instead lead to excuses for disbelief, just like what 
the Jews did. Therefore, in his commentary, Muqātil never interpreted these four sets of 
letters. In the meantime, Muqātil does not consider the other ten sets of mysterious 
letters, which open other sixteen qur’anic chapters, mutashābihāt. Since these ten sets of 
letters are accessible to interpretation, we therefore expect Muqātil to interpret them in 
his commentary. Nonetheless, Muqātil has an inconsistent attitude toward these ten set of 
mysterious letters in the sixteen chapters of the Qur’an. Sometimes he offers 
interpretation on some of them; sometimes he just passes them over without 
explanation.823 
Similar to his conception of the mutashābihāt, Muqātil is quite straightforward in 
offering his conception of the muḥkamāt. In “interpretation of muḥkamāt verses and 
interpretation of what is revealed at the end of the “Cow” Chapter” (tafsir al-āyāt al-
muḥkamāt wa tafsīr mā unzila fi ākhir al-Baqarah),824 Muqātil argues that the muḥkāmāt 
are Q6:151-3, namely: 
“Say, ‘Come! I will tell you what your Lord has really forbidden you. Do not 
ascribe anything as a partner to Him; be good to your parents; do not kill your 
children in fear of poverty’– We will provide for you and for them–‘ stay well 
away from committing obscenities, whether openly or in secret; do not take the 
                                                        
823 For instance, Muqatil provides an interpretation for kāf-hā-yā-‘ain-ṣād that opens the beginning of Q.19 
as standing for God’s attributes: Kāfin-Hādin-‘Ālim-Ṣādiq. Muqātil also interprets hā-mīm in Q41 as mā 
hamma fī al-lawh al-maḥfūẓ ya‛nī mā quḍiya fi al-amr, “something that is decided in the “Protected 
Tablet”; the same set of letters (hā-mīm) also occurs in five other chapters—Q40, 43, 44, 45, 46—and is 
understood to have the same meaning. Muqātil also comments on qāf, a single letter that opens Q50 as 
“the green emerald mountain that permeates the earth and serves as the mother of all mountains out of 
which they emerged”. Likewise, he offers an explanation for nūn, another single letter opening Q68 as “the 
whale that lives in the sea under the lowest earth”. However, Muqatil just passes over ṭā-hā (Q20), ṭā-sīn 
(Q27), ṭā-sīn-mīm (Q26, 28), yā-sīn (Q36), ḥa-mīm-‘ain-sīn-qāf (Q42), and ṣād (Q38). The fact that 
Muqātil sometimes offers interpretation to some of these letters suggests that they are indeed not part of 
what he considers mutashābihat, which he consistently passes over without any comments. See Muqātil, 
Tafsīr, 2/620, 4/109, 403. 
824 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 275-77. 
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life God has made sacred, except by right. This is what He commands you to do: 
perhaps you will use your reason [151]. Stay well away from the property of 
orphans, except with the best [intentions], until they come of age; give full 
measure and weight, according to justice’– We do not burden any soul with more 
than it can bear–‘ when you speak, be just, even if it concerns a relative; keep any 
promises you make in God’s name. This is what He commands you to do, so that 
you may take heed’ [152] [T]his is My path, leading straight, so follow it, and do 
not follow other ways: they will lead you away from it–‘This is what He 
commands you to do, so that you may refrain from wrongdoing’ [153]. 
 
These are the muḥkamāt verses according to Muqātil. They are muḥkamāt because 
they have never been and will never be abrogated, thus remaining always applicable. 
Furthermore, they exist in all scriptures that God had sent to different people through 
their prophets. All forbidden—and for that matter commanded—acts mentioned in them 
apply to all children of Adam, all human beings. These verses and the message they 
contain are the mother or root of all scriptures (hunna umm al-kitāb ya‛nī aṣl al-kitāb).825 
The reason that they are called “the mother of all revelation” is because they are written 
in the Protected Tablet (al-lauḥ al-maḥfūẓ) and in all scriptures.826  
Thus, for Muqātil, these verses are muḥkamāt not because their meanings are 
clear, but because the message they bring forth is perenennially valid and applicable at all 
times and places. This is demonstrated by the fact that the same tenets that exist in these 
verses can also be found in early scriptures that God had revealed to previous prophets. 
As such, the principles contained in Q6:151-153 have been carried out in the line of 
prophetic mission up to Muhammad, written in different scriptures, including the Qur’an. 
They have never been abrogated by anything. If anything, they may abrogate anything 
                                                        
825 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 275. Wansbrough translated umm al-kitāb as divine archetype of scripture, and 
aṣl al-kitāb as nucleus of scripture. See his Quranic Studies, 153. 
826 Muqātil, Khams Mi’at, 275. 
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else that contradicts their fundamental message, although nowhere does Muqātil state 
explicitly that these verses are potentially abrogating other verses. Muqātil only states 
that the muḥkamāt (Q6: 151-153) are never abrogated and exist in all scriptures. In an 
indirect way, Muqātil’s concept of the muḥkamāt possesses an abrogating power as 
Muslim scholars have suggested when they offered their definition of this term, although 
this abrogation does not override the mutashābihāt, at least the mutashābihāt according 
to Muqātil’s understanding. These muḥkamāt verses constitute the fundamental messages 
that God sent to humanity. They are unchanging elements of God’s revelation and a 
thread that ties all (valid) religions together. 
In a closer look, Muqātil’s version of the muḥkamāt echoes the very famous 
biblical Ten Commandments, thus offering the so-called “Qur’anic Decalogue”.827 In 
fact, the close association of these qur’anic passages to those of the Torah had been 
pointed to by Ka‛b Ibn al-Aḥbār who said that these were the very first revelation in the 
Torah.828 Also of paramount importance with regard to Muqātil’s exegetical concern is 
that the very first point offered in these muḥkamāt is the prohibition of shirk, that is, 
associating any partner to God. These two facts underline the predominant elements in 
Muqātil’s commentary, not only in relation to his exegetical thread which persistently 
propagating tawḥīd, but also his emphasized attention to interreligious relations, with 
both polytheists and especially People of Scripture. This shows how Muqātil has 
persistently attempted to locate Muhammad and Islam within a larger, religious 
                                                        
827 See Wansbrough, Quranic Studies. 
828 Al-Tha‘labī, al-Kashf wa al-Bayān, ed. Abū Muḥammad Ibn ‛Ashūr (Beirut: Dār Iḥyā’ al-Turāth al-
‛Arabī, 2002), 4/205. 
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environment of the seventh century Arabia. In a way, Muqātil’s approach suggests that 
Islam, and the Qur’an for that matter, did not come in vacuum but in a onstantly active 
dialogue with existing traditions. In fact, it is only within these sociocultural and religious 
contexts that the values of Islam can be better discerned. It is therefore understandable 
why Muqātil has used a lot materials related to the past narratives that belong mostly to 
the ahl al-kitāb, and he in fact puts these past narratives (khabar al-awwalīn) as one of 
five aspects of the Qur’an that his exegetical project is constantly aiming and addressing. 
Muqātil’s conception of the muḥkamāt is perhaps not new. There are reports, 
mentioned above, that attributed the same view to Ibn ‛Abbāṣ. Some of other resports 
added parallel passages to the al-Isrā’ chapter of the Qur’an (Q17:23-39), which is also 
attributed to Ibn ‛Abbās.829 But Muqātil’s presentation of the view is certainly new. The 
fact that Muslim scholars have been indecisive in determining their views of both 
muḥkamāt and mutashābihāt among the plethora of opinions is telling something about 
Muqātil’s ingenuity in his independent mind. Muqātil’s conception of the mutashābihāt 
has opened the widest possibility for interpreting the Qur’an as he limits the unattainable 
to only four sets of the mysterious letters, whose knowledge belongs only to God. The 
rest of the Qur’an therefore is subject to interpretation. His conception of the muḥkamāt 
is largely informed by his vision for finding a common ground that would facilitate the 
                                                        
829 Al-Tha‘labī, al-Kashf, 4/205: “Ibn ‘Abbās said, ‘These [Q.6: 151-2] are the āyāt muḥkamāt that are not 
abrogated by anything in all books and they are all prohibited for all children of Adam, and they are the 
mother of books; whoever acts on them would enter paradise, but whoever neglects them would enter 
hell.’” See also Abū Manṣūr Muḥammad Ibn Muḥammad ibn Maḥmūd al-Māturīdī, Ta’wīlāt Ahl al-
Sunnah, ed. Majdī Basallum (Beirūt: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 2005), 4/318. In his commentary, al-
Baghawī mentions another group of verse as muḥkamāt, that is, Q17: 23-39, whose content is indeed 
relatively identical. al-Baghawī, Tafsīr, 2/8. 
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interreligious relations between different traditions, especially the followers of 
Muhammad and the People of Scripture, Jews and Christians. Muqātil’s reverence toward 
their scriptures overrode his fierce criticism toward the followers of non-Islamic 
religions. This led subsequently to his legal pragmatism to find some justification for 
peaceful coexistence.  
Concluding Remarks 
Muqātil’s exegetical thrust, which is highly theological, proves to be the guiding 
principle in his legal decisions. His opposition between īmān (belief) and kufr (disbelief), 
along with their two supporting principles tawḥīd and taṣdīq as opposed to shirk and 
takdhīb, constitutes the yardstick by which he derives laws from the Qur’an. Muqātil 
appears to argue that a correct theology is fundamental, coming before anything else, 
including the criterion for legal decisions. So paramount is theology in his framework 
that sometimes Muqātil’s judgment, as in the case of the hypocrites, was more 
theological than legal when he is supposed to talk about law. Muqātil’s theological 
preoccupation in doing law is can be more clearly grasped when he is compared to how 
al-Shāfi‘ī, a great jurist, devised his legal decisions, despite the similarly theological 
inclinations of the two.  
However, Muqātil is also legally pragmatist. His strong vision for interreligious 
relations, for instance, has led him to allowing a peace agreement to be made between the 
believers and disbelievers, and he counsels the Muslims to be loyal to such an agreement 
once it is made in good intention. Furthermore, Muqātil’s definition of the People of 
Scripture is most inclusive, which applies to as broad groups of people as possible as long 
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as they have some sort of religious affiliation with the People of Scripture. Muqātil 
upholds the principle that there is no compulsion in religion, for the only people who 
could be forced into Islam was the Arab polytheists of Muhammad’s time. Following 
their surrender to Muhammad, no other people can be forced to embrace Islam. His quest 
for a common ground for interreligious encounters is best fulfilled through his conception 
of the muḥkamāt as the perennially permanent message that all scriptures shared. 
While theologically uncompromising, Muqātil’s legal pragmatism has shaped him 
to be ethically pacifist, or the other way around, his ethical pacifism had led him to be 
legally a pragmatist. This is demonstrated in his conception of commanding good and 
forbidding wrong (al-amr bi al-ma‘rūf wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar) whose very essence is 
commanding tawḥīd and taṣdīq and forbidding shirk and takdhīb. The doctrine of 
commanding good and forbidding wrong consists of the very theology that has concerned 
Muqātil and has become his exegetical thrust throughout his commentary. Yet in its 
performance, Muqātil does not condone any violence. Instead, his view of how to execute 
the commanding good and forbidding wrong is very idealist, if not utopist, in that it 
envisions an environment in which every individual would have access to a good 
education to know what is good and wrong so that everyone may perform only good 
deeds and refrain from doing the contrary. There might be an impression of contradiction 
between Muqātil’s advocacy of pacifist undertaking of commanding right and forbidding 
wrong, on one hand, and his views with regard to jihād. But such a contradiction fades 
once it is understood that Muqātil considers jihād as a defensive measure against a hostile 
enemy that has used different kinds of means, including violence, to stop the early 
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believers from practicing their faith. Thus, jihād is a qur’anic response in war or conflict 
situations that allows the believers to take a defensive measure against all opressions, 
while the doctrine commanding right and forbidding wrong is envisioned to be carried 
out in a normal situation and more as a preventive than curative measure. As such, while 
theologically uncompromising, Muqātil is legally pragmatist and ethically pacifist. It is, 
indeed, a very rare combination in one person.
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CHAPTER THREE 
Al-Wujūh wa al-Naẓā’ir fī al-Qur’ān al-Karīm: One Qur’an, Different Faces 
 
 
“One does not really understand the Qur’an, 
 until he sees different meanings in it.” 
Muqātil ibn Sulaymān (by eleveating it to the Prophet)830 
 
 
Al-wujūh wa al-naẓā’ir is a genre of commentary on the Qur’an that registers 
polysemic words in the Qur’an, provides meanings that these words possess, and shows 
the qur’anic verses, as a matter of exemplification, in which these words point to 
particular meanings. Generally, the examples given are not exhaustive, but merely 
provide a hint as to the context, linguistic or otherwise, that would lead to signifying a 
qur’anic word with a certain meaning among other meanings it may suggest. It is unclear, 
however, whether these words’ meanings are part of a traditional pool, in the sense that a 
particular word has been and will be understood in the same way.831 Generally, authors of 
wujūh work did not mention why certain qur’anic words are polysemic or where they 
learned that such words have such meanings. Nonetheless, there is a noticeable pattern 
that later scholars of wujūh built on their predecessors, both in terms of their selection of 
entries and in the meanings attached to them. It appears, however, that modification 
                                                        
830 Muqātil ibn Sulaymān, al-Wujūh wa al-Naẓā’ir fī al-Qur’ān, 11: Lā yakūn al-rajūl faqīhan kull al-fiqh 
ḥattā yarā li al-Qur’ān wujūhan kathīrah. 
831 al-Suyūṭī, al-Itqān fī ‛Ulūm al-Qur’ān (al-Madīnah al-Munawwarah: Majma‛ al-Malik Fahd li Ṭibā‛at 
al-Muṣḥaf al-Sharīf, 1426 H), 3/976-7. 
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abounds, not only in terms of the arrangement of such entries in their own works but also 
in the range of meanings that they give to these words. 
There is good evidence to suggest that al-wujūh wa al-naẓā’ir is a cumulative 
result of diverse exegetical endeavors to understand the Qur’an by the prophet, his 
companions, their sucessors, and possibly also later gerneration of scholars. In other 
words, al-wujūh wa al-naẓā’ir is an area in which an interpreter plays a major role in 
determining the context and accordingly the meaning of a word in the Qur’an. In his 
Taḥṣīl, al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī states that the multiplicity of a word’s meaning is the result 
of interpretive endeavor by the commentators of the Qur’an.832 The same view is 
expressed by Ibn al-Jawzī.833 
If an interpreter’s authority is highly respected, it is possible that his assigned 
meanings of words will become a precedent that other scholars embrace. Yet it is equally 
possible that the same signification will be contested by other scholars, if they think they 
have better alternatives to offer. As such, al-wujūh wa al-naẓā’ir is interpretive in nature. 
It is not uncommon, therefore, to find scholars criticizing other scholars in terms of their 
selection of words or the meanings given to them. For instance, one scholar might 
consider a particular qur’anic word polysemic, while another scholar argues that that 
particular word only has one meaning.  
                                                        
832 Al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, Taḥṣīl Naẓā’ir al-Qur’ān, ed. Ḥusnī Naṣr Zaydān (Cairo: Maktabah ‛Imād, 
1969), 19. 
833 Ibn al-Jawzī shows the interpretive nature of wujūh works by constantly stating a formulaic utterance 
when he is about to introduce an entry and its assigned, multiple meanings: wa dhakara ahl al-tafsīr anna x 
fī al-Qur’ān ‛alā wajh/awjuh, “the specialist of tafsīr mentioned that x in the Qur’an has x senses”. See 
Jamāl al-Dīn Abū al-Faraj ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ibn al-Jawzī, Nuzhat al-A‘yun al-Nawāẓir fī ‘Ilm al-Wujūh wa 
al-Naẓā’ir, ed. Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Karīm Kāẓim al-Rāḍī (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-Risālah, 1987), 85, 87, 88, 
90, etc. 
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Muqātil’s al-Wujūh wa al-Naẓā’ir suggests his endless imaginative and 
interpretive power.834 For instance, Muqātil is able to enumerate seventeen meanings for 
the term al-hudā (guidance) in the Qur’an, depending on the particular context in which it 
arises. Such a multiplicity in terms of a word’s meaning is almost unimaginable without 
recognition that interpretation is necessary in order to understand the Qur’an properly. In 
this case, the context of language use plays a pivotal role in constructing meaning. In 
other words, meanings are largely a function of context.835 
I have argued in the previous chapters that Muqātil’s two other commentaries are 
highly theological, revolving around the opposition of īmān, manifested in tawḥīd and 
taṣdīq, and kufr, materialized in shirk and takdhīb. Such an opposition also serves as 
Muqātil’s exegetical thrust in these two commentaries. It is noteworthy that Muqātil’s al-
Wujūh wa al-Naẓā’ir is also highly theological, positing the same opposition between the 
propagation of belief by acknowledging the unity of God and the legitimacy of 
                                                        
834 Muqātil Ibn Sulaymān, al-Wujūh wa al-Naẓā’ir fī al-Qur’ān al-Karīm, ed. Ḥatim Ṣāliḥ al-Ḍāmin 
(Dubai: Markaz Jum’at al-Majid li al-Thaqafah  wa al-Turath: 2006). In the introduction of this book, the 
editor, al-Ḍāmin, argues that another work, entitled al-Asbāh wa al-Naẓā’ir fī al-Qur’ān al-Karīm, which 
‛Abd Allāh Maḥmūd Shiḥātah ascribed to Muqātil, is more likely the work of another scholar, Hārūn ibn 
Mūsā. Al-Ḍāmin provides four arguments for this view. First, the manuscripts upon which Shiḥātah 
prepared his edition resembled more the work of Hārūn ibn Mūsa (d. 170 H). Second, the correct version of 
Muqātil’s Wujūh was transmitted by Abū Ṣāliḥ al-Hudhayl ibn Ḥabīb who transmitted two other Muqātil 
commentaries, al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr and Tafsīr al-Khams Mi’at Āyah min al-Qur’ān, which I have studied in 
the previous chapters. Meanwhile, Hārūn ibn Mūsā’s Wujūh was transmitted by Abū Naṣr Maṭrūḥ ibn 
Muḥammad ibn Shākir al-Qaḍā‛ī al-Miṣrī (d. 271 H). Third, al-Zarkashī and al-Suyuṭī mentioned that in in 
the beginning of Muqātil’s Wujūh there is a tradition that is present in the correct version of Muqātil’s work 
but is absent Hārūn ibn Mūsā’s. Fourth, the organization of the content of the correct version of Muqātil’s 
Wujūh is different from that published as al-Ashbāh wa al-Nāẓā’ir. Besides, al-Ḍāmin himself edited Hārūn 
ibn Mūsā’s Wujūh in 1988 before he prepared the edition of Muqātil’s Wujūh. See Hārūn ibn Mūṣā, al-
Wujūh wa al-Nāẓā’ir fī al-Qur’ān al-Karīm, ed. Ḥātim al-Ṣaliḥ al-Ḍāmin (Baghdād: Dā’irat al-Āthār wa al-
Turāth, 1988), and also Muqātil ibn Sulaymān, al-Ashbāh wa al-Nāẓā’ir fī al-Qur’ān al-Karīm, ed. ‛Abd 
Allāh Maḥmūd Shiḥātah (Cairo: al-Ḥay’ah al-Miṣriyyah al-‛Āmmah li al-Kitāb, 1975). 
835 For debates between literalism and contextualism with regard to meanings, see Vyvyan Evans, What 
Words Mean (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
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Muhammad’s prophethood and the condemnation of disbelief, especially in associating 
God with creation and rejecting Muhammad’s claim of prophethood. Muqatil’s highly 
theological focus has informed not only his chosen entries but also his organization of 
those entries in the commentary. More than just a commentary on polysemic words in the 
Qur’an, al-Wujūh wa al-Naẓā’ir is thus an extension of Muqātil’s exegetical thrust that 
addresses the non-negotiable elements of Islam, namely tawḥīd and taṣdīq, as he did 
earlier in al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr and Tafsīr al-Khams Mi’at Āyah. Nonetheless, there are a 
number of entries that Muqātil lists in the work that appear to be less theological or even 
neutral, but he has included them primarily because they are, in his view, polysemic. 
In this chapter, I will briefly investigate the development of al-wujūh wa al-
naẓā’ir as a distinct genre of qur’anic exegesis, elaborate on Muqātil’s al-Wujūh wa al-
Naẓā’ir fī al-Qur’ān al-Karīm, and, finally, scrutinize theologically loaded words that 
Muqātil enumerates in the commentary by explicating their closely interrelated meanings. 
I hope that I will thus be able to demonstrate Muqātil’s contribution and pioneering 
undertaking in this genre of qur’anic exegesis as well as show how his commentary 
serves as yet another channel through which he conveys his theological concerns within 
the entirety of his exegetical enterprise.  
Al-Wujūh wa al-Naẓā’ir as a genre of qur’anic commentary 
The study of polysemic words and the multiplicity of words’ meanings in the 
Muslim scholarship has been undertaken in the field of both linguistics (‛ilm al-lughah) 
and the commentary on the Qur’an (al-tafsīr). While in ‛ilm al-lughah the phenomenon 
of words’ multiple meanings is studied within the framework of the use of Arabic 
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language in general, in al-tafsīr the same phenomenon is studied exclusively within the 
qur’anic use of those words, known as al-wujūh wa al-naẓā’ir.836 Of the two, al-wujūh 
wa al-naẓā’ir emerged earlier.837 
Although the earliest extant work on al-wujūh wa al-naẓā’ir came from the 
second/eighth century, namely Muqātil’s al-Wujūh wa al-Naẓā’ir, sources mention that 
the early ideas and activities pertaining to al-wujūh wa al-naẓā’ir had emerged during the 
period of the Companions of the Prophet. One oft-mentioned anecdote pertaining to the 
presence of polysemic words in the Qur’an is a dialogue between ‛Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib and 
Ibn ‛Abbāṣ, when the former was about to send the latter to meet with the Khawārij, the 
early Muslim extremists, argue with them, and rebuke their views. To do so, ‛Alī was 
advising Ibn ‛Abbās to use the Sunnah (prophetic tradition) rather than the Qur’an 
because the latter bore multiple meanings (fa innahū ḥammāl dhū wujūh).838 In terms of 
works on al-wujūh wa al-naẓā’ir, the are a number of names that frequently show up to 
which such works are attributed, such as ‛Ikrimah (d. 105/723) mawlā Ibn ‛Abbāṣ and 
‛Alī ibn Abī Ṭalḥah (d. 143/760), who lived during the period of the successors. These 
two works allegedly contained the transmitted knowledge from Ibn ‛Abbāṣ, but neither 
has survived.839 This anecdote and the allusion to early wujūh works show that the seed 
of activities or, at least, ideas pertaining to al-wujūh wa al-naẓā’ir had began very early 
                                                        
836 Musṭafā Afandī Ḥājj Khalīfah (d. 1067), Kashf al-Zunūn ‘an Asāmī al-Kutub wa al-Funūn (Beirut: Dār 
Ihyā’ al-Turāth al-‘Arabī, ny.), 2001. Muhammad Abdus Sattar, “Wujuh al-Qur’an: A Branch of Tafsir 
Literature,” in Islamic Studies, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Summer 1978), 137-152. 
837 Salwā Muḥammad al-‛Awwā, al-Wujūh wa al-Naẓā’ir fī al-Qur’ān al-Karīm (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 
1998), 18. See also Hindun Shalabī, al-Taṣārīf: Tafsīr al-Qur’ān fīmā Ishtabahat Asmā’uhu wa Taṣarrafat 
Ma‛ānīhi (Tunisia: al-Sharikat al-Tūnisiyyah li al-Tawzī‛, 1979), 10, and also al-Radi, Nuzhat, 35. 
838 Al-‛Awwā, al-Wujūh,19. 
839 Al-‛Awwā, al-Wujūh,19; Ibn al-Jawzī, Nuzhat, 82.  
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in the Muslim scholarship, or at least that how later Muslim scholars projected such 
activity back. 
Ibn al-Jawzī (d. 597/1200) mentions a number of scholars who authored works on 
wujūh, including Muqātil ibn Sulaymān (d. 150/767), Muhammad ibn al-Sā’ib al-Kalbī 
(d. 146/763), Hārūn ibn Mūsā (d. 170/786), Abū al-Faḍl al-‛Abbāṣ ibn al-Faḍl al-Anṣārī 
(d. 186/802), Abū Bakr ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Naqqāsh (d. 351/962), Abū ‛Abd 
Allāh al-Ḥusayn ibn Muḥammad al-Dāmighānī (d. 478/1085), Abū ‛Alī al-Bannā’ (d. 
471/1078), and Ibn al-Jawzī’s own teacher, Abū al-Ḥasan ‛Alī ibn ‛Ubayd Allāh al-
Zāghūnī (d. 527/1132). Following the mentioning of these eight scholars, Ibn al-Jawzī 
asserts that he knows of nobody else who has authored a book on the subject (wa lā 
a‛lamu aḥadan jama‛a al-wujūh wa al-naẓā’ir siwā hā’ulā’).840 Of those scholars 
mentioned, only the works of Muqātil, Hārūn ibn Mūsā,841 and al-Dāmighānī842 survive 
to the present.843  
The first formal definition of al-wujūh wa al-naẓā’ir was given by Ibn al-Jawzī, 
and it since then has become the standard definition for this discipline. Ibn al-Jawzī 
defined al-wujūh wa al-naẓā’ir as, 
                                                        
840 Ibn al-Jawzī, Nuzhat, 82-3. It seems however that Ibn al-Jawzī did not have access to the work of Yaḥyā 
ibn Sallām (d. 200 H/815), al-Taṣārīf. Like Hārūn ibn Mūsā’s work, Ibn Sallām’s al-Taṣārīf is almost 
identical with Muqātil’s al-Wujūh wa al-Naẓā’ir. It is possible that, due to their contemporaneity, Ibn 
Sallām might have actually transmitted Muqātil’s wujūh, as in the case of Ibn Mūsā. In Ibn Sallām’s 
Taṣārīf, however, nowhere is Muqātil mentioned. Shalābī suggested that the similarity between Muqātil’s 
and Ibn Sallām’s wujūh was because they might have studied with the same teacher in Baṣrah. See al-
Taṣārīf, 48. 
841 Hārūn ibn Mūṣā, al-Wujūh wa al-Nāẓā’ir fī al-Qur’ān al-Karīm, ed. Ḥātim al-Ṣaliḥ al-Ḍāmin (Baghdād: 
Dā’irat al-Āthār wa al-Turāth, 1988). 
842 Abū ‛Abd Allāh al-Ḥusayn ibn Muḥammad al-Dāmighānī, al-Wujūh wa al-Naẓā’ir li Alfāẓ Kitāb Allāh 
al-‛Azīz, ed. ‛Arabī ‛Abd al-Ḥamīd ‛Alī (Beirut, Lebanon: Dār al-Kutub al-‛Ilmiyyah, n. y.). 
843 ‛Abd al-‛Āl Sālim Mukrim, al-Mushtarak al-Lafẓī fī Ḍaw’ Gharīb al-Qur’ān al-Karīm (Cairo: Ālam al-
Kutub, 2009), 36-7. 
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an takun al-kalimat wāḥidah, dukirat fī mawāḍi‛ min al-Qur’ān ‛alā lafz wāḥid, 
wa ḥarakat wāḥidah, wa urīda bi kulli makān ma‛nā ghayr al-ākhar, fa lafẓu 
kulli kalimatin dhukirat fī mawḍ‛in naẓīrun li lafẓ al-kalimat al-madhkūrah fī 
al-mawḍi‛ al-ākhar, wa tafsīr kulli kalimatin bi ma‛nan ghayr ma‛nā al-ākhar 
huwa al-wujūh. Fa idhan al-naẓā’ir: ism li al-alfāẓ, wa al-wujūh: ism li al-
ma‛ānī... “the same word, mentioned in different places in the Qur’an in the 
same form, and the same vocalization, but each with different meaning from 
one another; thus, a word mentioned in one place is an equivalent for another 
mentioned in another place, and the interpretation of each word that results in a 
different senses. As such, al-naẓā’ir: is a name for the words, and al-wujūh: is a 
name for the meanings.” 844   
Ibn al-Jawzī’s definition, however, suffers a defect in that it required that the 
polysemic words, to be part of al-wujūh wa al-naẓā’ir, should have the same 
vocalizations (‛alā ḥarakah wāhidah). This requirement has made Ibn al-Jawzī’s 
definition of al-Wujūh wa al-Naẓā’ir unreflective of what really happened in the field. Be 
that as it may, it is intriguing that scholars critical of Ibn al-Jawzī’s definition have not 
addressed this innacuracy, but have mistakenly dwelt instead on discussing the accuracy 
of using the terms wujūh and naẓā’ir for the purpose of studying the multiplicity of 
words’ meanings.845   
Most scholars agree with Ibn al-Jawzī that the terms wujūh and naẓā’ir to point to 
meanings and words respectively, but they disagree with him that the polysemic words 
should possess the same vocalization (‛ala ḥarakat wāḥidah).846 Such a requirement, with 
regard to the vocalization, has never been entirely fulfilled in the majority of entries 
                                                        
844 Ibn al-Jawzī, Nuzhat, 83. 
845 See Shalabī, al-Taṣārīf, 17-23. 
846 Shalabī is partially correct when she maintains that in the wujūh work a term whose meaning is multiple 
does not always have the same vocalizations, since the same term might be used in a variety of its 
derivative forms. However, I slightly disagree with Shalabī when she regards a word and its derivatives as 
different words. I argue that a word and its derivatives remain the same word (‛alā lafẓ wāḥid) but whose 
vocalizations are different due to the derivational process. See her introduction to Taṣārīf, 24. 
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registered in all wujūh works, especially in that of Muqātil and even in Ibn al-Jawzī’s 
own work. What really happens is that some words may experience a derivational 
transformation, which affects their vocalizations. Take for instance the word al-hudā. In 
its use in the Qur’an, the word al-hudā may transform into yahdī, hadaynā, muhtadūn, 
hād, uhdū, yahtadūn, ihtadā, tahtadī, ihdi, and hudnā. As seen, the vocalizations of these 
derivatives are different due to that derivational process, yet all of them share the same 
triadic root that forms the peculiar mark of all Arabic words, namely h-d-y. For this 
reason, Ibn al-Jawzī’s requirement of ḥarakat wāḥidah cannot apply indiscriminately to 
all cases. It is true that there are words that remain the same in all of their appearances in 
the Qur’an, such as ummah, imam, etc. but their number is much smaller than those that 
experience a derivational transformation. The requirement of ḥarakah wāḥidah in Ibn al-
Jawzī’s definition is therefore unapplicable and should be omitted so that Ibn al-Jawzī’s 
definition applies to all cases of al-wujūh wa al-naẓā’ir. At the same time, a word and its 
derivatives should be regarded as the same (lafẓ wāḥid) because they share the same root, 
despite their different derivative forms.  
From a number of existing wujūh works, it is known that there was no fixed 
number of entries that a work on wujūh should incorporate. The interpretive nature of al-
wujūh wa al-naẓā’ir perhaps plays a major role in causing the fluctuating number of 
entries in different wujūh works. Muqātil’s work contains 170 entries; Hārūn ibn Mūsā’s 
208 entries; Yaḥyā ibn Sallām’s 115 entries, al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī (d. 320/932) 81 
entries; al-Dāmighānī’s 534 entries, and Ibn al-Jawzī’s 324 entries. In terms of the 
organization principles of entries, early wujūh works seemed to arrange them randomly. 
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This is true in the case of the works of Muqātil, Ibn Mūsā, Ibn Sallām, and al-Tirmidhī, 
although in Muqātil’s work his theological concerns appear to have played some role in 
his arrangement of the entries.  From the fifth/eleventh century onward, however, the 
wujūh works have organized their entries alphabetically by their roots. This applies to the 
work of al-Dāmighānī and Ibn al-Jawzī, among others. 
Most of early wujūh authors—such as Muqātil, Ibn Mūsā, Ibn Sallām, and al-
Tirmidhī—did not provide any introductory remarks that explain the reasons why they 
felt the need to compose such works and why they organized their entries the way they 
did. These early authors simply enumerated their entries, assigning a range of meanings 
to each and showing where in the Qur’an such meanings appear. It was only from the 
fifth/eleventh century on that the authors of wujūh began to provide introductions, albeit 
very short ones, to their works. The earliest to do this were al-Dāmighānī and Ibn al-
Jawzī. Al-Dāmighānī explained that what had motivated him to write his al-Wujūh wa al-
Naẓā’ir li Alfāẓ Kitāb Allāh al-‛Azīz was the need for a comprehensive work in qur’anic 
polysemy after he noticed that the earlier and existing wujūh works, especially that of 
Muqātil, had neglected a lot of entries with multiple meanings that they should have 
incorporated. Al-Dāmighānī arranged his entries alphabetically in order to make them 
easier for his readers to study and to help the students memorize them. 847  
 Ibn al-Jawzī also mentioned the need to revise the existing wujūh works from 
their alleged inaccuracies and mistakes as what had motivated him to write his own 
                                                        
847 Abū ‛Abd Allāh al-Ḥusayn ibn Muḥammad al-Dāmighānī, al-Wujūh wa al-Naẓā’ir li Alfāẓ Kitāb Allāh 
al-‛Azīz, ed. ‛Arabī ‛Abd al-Ḥamīd ‛Alī (Beirut, Lebanon: Dār al-Kutub al-‛Ilmiyyah, n. y.), 37. 
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wujūh, namely Nuzhat al-A‛yun al-Nawāẓir fī ‛Ilm al-Wujūh wa al-Naẓā’ir. Ibn al-Jawzī 
was amazed by the fact that later scholars followed uncritically what their predecessors 
had done, and simply transfered what their predecessors had written into their own 
works. The first important step that Ibn al-Jawzī took toward such revision was providing 
the definition of al-wujūh wa al-naẓā’ir as he understood it. He stated that al-wujūh wa 
al-naẓā’ir was concerned with the multiplicity of meanings that a word bears as a 
consequence of its use in a number of different places in the Qur’an. The qur’anic use of 
a word in one place offers a meaning different from the one offered by its equivalent 
(naẓīr) in another place. The authors of wujūh wanted to inform their audience that 
certain words in the Qur’an and their equivalents have a range of different meanings. 
Some of these scholars had, however, made a mistake, according to Ibn al-Jawzī, when 
they incorporated certain words in their works that actually offered one and the same 
meaning throughout the Qur’an. The examples of such words are al-balad (a country), al-
qaryah (a village), al-madīnah (a city), al-rajul (a person), and al-insān (a human being). 
These words, according to Ibn al-Jawzī, are not polysemic. Furthermore, some of these 
scholars of wujūh also made a mistake in grouping some words that, at first glance, 
seemed similar, but they are actually different and unrelated to one another. For instance, 
in bāb al-dhurriyyah, they grouped entries such as dharnī, tadhrūḥ al-riyāh, and mithqāl 
dharrah, and in bāb al-ribā, they listed entries such as akhdhah rābiyah, ribbiyyūn, 
  
293 
rabā’ibukum, and jannat birabwah.848 For this reason, Ibn al-Jawzī organized his entries 
alphabetically by the same root that a word and its equivalent shared.849 
Muqātil’s al-Wujūh wa al-Naẓā’ir fī al-Qur’ān al-‛Aẓīm 
Despite its title, in which the term tafsīr is lacking, Muqātil’s al-Wujūh wa al-
Naẓā’ir suggests very strongly the unavoidability of interpretation when it comes to 
understanding the Qur’an. For in its core, this work deals with how the same words or 
phrases, used in different places in the Qur’an, yield a number of different meanings. The 
fluidity of meaning is such that the idea of conventional meaning is almost obsolete; 
instead, commentarial or contextual meaning—or, perhaps more aptly, contextually 
commentarial meaning—takes center stage. Knowledge of this aspect of the Qur’an is 
indispensable for those intending to understand the Qur’an. Hence Muqatil’s opening 
statement in the commentary, allegedly quoting a tradition, says, “A person is not really 
understanding the Qur’an until he sees in it different senses,” Lā yakūn al-rajul faqīhan 
kulla al-fiqh ḥattā yarā li al-Qur’ān wujūhan kathīrah.850 
The majority of Muqātil’s entries are single words. There are, however, some 
entries that consist of a pair of words, often opposional, such as al-mustawda‛ wa al-
                                                        
848 The words—dharnī (leave me alone), tadhrūḥ (flows), and dharrah (atom)—that put under bāb al-
dhurriyyah (offspring chapter) have been thought of as having the same root, namely dh-r-r, while they are 
actually unrelated to one another. Their different meanings are not the result of the different contexts of 
usage, but rather because they, from the very beginning, are different words. The same applies to the 
words--rābiyah, ribbiyyūn, rabā’ibukum, and birabwah—put under bāb al-ribā; they are not the same word 
that share the same root (r-b-w), but they are really different words with different meanings, despite their 
having a similar constituting root. One condition of polysemy is that one and the same word, as well as 
their derivatives, will have different meanings depending on its contexts of use. 
849 Ibn al-Jawzī, Nuzhat, 81-84. 
850 Muqātil, al-Wujūh, 19. Sources mentioned that this tradition was transmitted from Abū al-Dardā’. This 
tradition was not found in kutub al-ṣiḥāh, but mention in Ibn Sa‛d’s al-Tabaqāt. As such, it is treated more 
as Abū al-Dardā’’s saying rather than a prophetic tradition. Shalabī, Taṣārīf, 26-27. 
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mustaqar, al-ḥasanah wa al-sayyi’ah, etc.; some others are phrases, such as al-amr bi al-
ma‛rūf wa al-nahy ‛an al-munkar, mā bayna aydīhim wa ma khalfahum, etc.851 The work 
begins with the entry al-hudā, followed by al-kufr, al-shirk, sawā’, until it finally ends 
with fawqā. At first sight, Muqātil’s arrangement of the entries seems random.852 Further 
observation suggests that his arrangement of those entries may have been partly governed 
                                                        
851 According to Shalabi’s counting, there are 185 words in Muqātil’s Wujūh. See Taṣārīf, 29. 
852 I disagree with al-‛Awwā who posited that Muqātil organizes his entries on the basis of their 
chronological occurrence in the standard ‛Uthmānī Muṣḥaf. While al-‛Awwā’s claim may be correct in 
some cases, there are a great number of anomalies that do not conform to her scheme. To take as an 
example, the term al-hudā, which is put as the first entry in the commentary is not the first word, of all 
entries, that occurs in the Qur’an. If the Opening chapter (al-Fātiḥah) is the first chapter of the Qur’an, 
some of the terms that occur in it should be mentioned in the beginning of the commentary had Muqātil 
arranged his entries on the chronology of their occurrence in the ‛Uthmānī Muṣḥaf. Instead, the terms such 
as al-‛ālamīn (no. 158), yawm (no. 83), al-ṣirāṭ (no. 73), al-ḍalāl (no. 81), which are parts of this opening 
chapter, do not occupy the first places in the Wujūh. A similar case happens with how Muqātil presents the 
verses in which his entries take place. While most places he mentions these verses based on their 
chronology of the chapters in which they take place in the qur’anic muṣḥaf, he does not consistently do 
that. For example, for the second meaning of al-hudā, namely dīn al-islām, Muqātil mentions the following 
verses: Q22:67, 2:120, 3:73, 6:71, consecutively. Or, for the seventh meaning of al-ẓālimīn, namely al-
sāriqīn, he mentions Q12:75 and then Q5:38-9. Likewise, Shalabī had attempted to identify Ibn Sallām’s 
organization method for his entries in al-Taṣārīf. Ibn Sallām’s al-Taṣārīf is highly similar to Muqātil’s 
Wujūh to the extent that, according to Shalabī, one appears to be a copy of the other. Since an alphabetical 
ordering seemed unlikely, Shalabī first tried to trace Ibn Sallām’s ordering to the chronological appearance 
of his entries in the standard Muṣḥaf of the Qur’ān. While she was able to show, defectively I would argue, 
that the ordering of some early entries—hudā, al-kufr, al-maraḍ, al-fasād, and  al-mashy—is based on their 
chronological occurrence in the Qur’an, that is, Q2: 2, 6, 10, 11, and 20 respectively, she soon realized that 
she could not go further with the same method to explain the next entries. Even for these early entries, 
Shalabī had already skipped al-shirk, which took third place, after al-hudā and al-kufr, and perhaps 
unknowingly skipped al-īmān and sawā’, which took fourth and fifth place before al-maraḍ. In short, she 
gave up the method as inapplicable. Afterward, she attempted another method based on the family 
resemblance (miḥwar) between the entries, such as sū’, al-ḥasanah, al-sayyi’ah, and al-ḥusnā. But this too 
did not stand, and she had to give it up. Finally, she assumed that there might have been some tampering to 
the original ordering of the work’s entries. For, she argued, it is only logical to imagine that the author 
would work out his entries based on the chronological order of the Muṣhaf, starting from early words 
taking places in early chapters to be confronted with their equivalents in later chapters. However, Shalabī 
finally acknowledged that it was all a conjecture. See al-Taṣārīf, p. 61-2. See al-‛Awwā, al-Wujūh, 24. 
Muqātil, Wujūh, 20, 81. Shalabī, Taṣārīf, 61-2. 
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by his theological preoccupation, although it is far from being systematic.853 The same 
theological reason, however, has largely governed Muqātil’s choice of entries.854  
Every entry (naẓīr, pl. naẓā’ir) has multiple meanings (wujūh), ranging from 2 to 
17.855 For every meaning assigned, Muqātil provides the evidence of qur’anic verses in 
which the words and their derivatives appear, although on a number of occasions he does 
not mention all of the relevant verses, only indicating their existence by stating wa 
naḥwuḥū kathīr (and there are many other similar cases in the Qur’an). Very often, 
Muqātil provides clarifying commentaries following any verses he mentions.  
Consider, for example, the entry al-shirk.856 Muqātil assigns three meanings or 
senses (wujūh) to this term as it is used in the Qur’an. First, al-shirk means associating 
                                                        
853 One of the more systematic ways of organizing entries is alphabetical method, known in Arabic as 
mu‘jam. At Muqātil’s time, however, the activity of creating a dictionary (mu‛jam) had not started yet. 
Before it became the technical terms for dictionary in the fourth/tenth century, the first use of the term 
mu‛jam to suggest that the content of a book was organized alphabetically was known in the third/ninth 
century. Scholars of ḥadith, for instance, used the term mu‘jam as the title of their biographical dictionaries 
of the companions of the Prophet, such as Mu‛jam al-Ṣaḥābah and Mu‛jam al-Suyūkh.  See Muḥammad 
Ḥusayn Āl Yāsīn, al-Dirāsāt al-Lughawiyyah ‛inda al-‛Arab ilā Nihāyat al-Qarn al-Thālith (Beirut, 
Lebanon: Dār Maktabat al-Ḥayāh, 1980), 220-21. 
854 Muqātil’s theological priorities seem to have played a more major role in his selection of the entries 
rather than in his organization of them in the Wujūh. It is tempting sometimes to call Muqātil’s organization 
of the entries as random, for he has been more haphazard than consistent in following, say, his theological 
priorities, in ordering his entries. For example, Muqātil puts three of arguably the most theologically loaded 
terms—namely, al-hudā, al-kufr, and al-shirk—in the top of of his list. But he then put theologically less 
significant words such as sawā’, al-maraḍ, al-fasād, al-mashy, and al-libās. Afterward, theologically 
central terms follow, including al-sū’, al-ḥasanah wa al-sayyi’ah, and a-jannah, only to be followed by al-
khizy and bā’ū, which are theologically less prominent. But then, once again, theologically loaded terms 
come, such as al-raḥmah and al-furqān, only, once again, to be followed by neutral terms, such as particles 
falawlā and lqmmā. The inconsistency in his ordering of these entries makes it difficult to say with 
certainty as to whether it is a random organization or an organization with a certain logic behind it. But 
whatever the answer is has litlle bearing whatsoever in understanding Muqātil’s Wujūh. Moreover, given 
his highly selected words that focus on theology and also the relatively small size of his work, it does not 
matter how Muqātil arranges his entries in his commentary, for they all carry a relatively equal weight in 
relation to his fundamentally theological message. See Muqātil, Wujūh, 20-44.   
855 Of 170 entries, 39 have 2 meanings, 40 have 3 meanings, 33 have 4 meanings, 23 have 5 meanings, 11 
have 6 meanings, 5 have 7 meanings, 4 have 8 meanings, 3 have 9 meanings, 3 have 10 meanings, 5 have 
11 meanings, and the last four has 13, 14, 16, and 17 meanings, respectively. 
856 Muqātil, Wujūh, 26-7. 
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God with another as if they were equals. To support the assigned meaning, Muqātil 
mentions Q4:36, “join nothing with Him,” meaning ‘do not put other as equal with Him.’ 
He also adduces Q4:84 and 116, “God does not forgive the joining of partners with 
Him,” that is that who treats other as equal with Him. In addition, Muqātil also cites 
Q5:72, “If anyone associates others with God, God will forbid him from the Garden,” 
that is those who put others as equals to God, He will forbid them from the Garden when 
they die. Finally, he points to Q9: 3, “God and His Messenger are released from [treaty] 
obligations to the idolaters,” that is those who put others as equal to God. Yet, indicating 
that, he does not exhaust the all of the verses in which al-shirk takes place and offers the 
same meaning, Muqātil states that there are many more similar cases in the Qur’an (wa 
naḥwuhū kathīr). 
Second, al-shirk means a specified act of obedience to something other than God, 
which is not categorized as a form of worship. To justify this meaning, Muqātil resorts to 
Q7:190, “and yet when He gives them a good child they ascribe some of what He has 
granted them to others,” that is they [the parents, in this case Adam and Eve] have made 
Iblīs an associate for God by obeying the latter’s suggestion in naming their child, which 
is not a form of worship. Likewise, Muqātil mentions Q14:22, which relays Iblīs’ own 
statement, “I reject the way you associated me before,” with God in obedience. Third, al-
shirk means insincere performance of deeds (shirk al-riyā’). In this respect, Muqātil cites 
Q18:110, “Anyone who fears to meet his Lord should do good deeds and give no one a 
share in the worship due to his Lord,” among his creation, [meaning] they will not 
dedicate their deeds to other than God. 
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Muqātil’s commentary is quite straightforward and simple. In fact, his 
presentation of the entries is formulaic: “the word x has x senses: first… second… etc.” 
This mode of interpretation and presentation runs formulaically throughout the 
commentary. The work is entirely an explanation of what a word or a pair of words or a 
phrase means in those different qur’anic uses. There is nothing peculiar methodologically 
that we can learn from this commentary, and not much can be said about it, except that it 
advocates the idea that a word’s meaning is, in most part, not inherent in the lexicon itself 
but rather is shaped by the context within which it takes place. Lexical meaning is thus 
contextual and hence is flexible as well as expansive. What would prove so fundamental, 
however, is the hermeneutical consequence of this wujuh wa naẓā’ir genre for 
understanding the qur’anic discourse which, despite its status as scripture, allows and 
uses flexibility as its discursive power. The idea that the same words or phrases can have 
different meanings in the Qur’an is almost unthinkable for some who tend to seek 
certainty and follow some sort of literalist approach in their understanding of this 
scripture.  
Yet, while the wujūh offers such flexibility of words’ meanings, Muqātil’s 
commentary seems to suggest that once such a range of meanings have been discovered it 
is exhaustive. Put it differently, hypothetically, the qur’anic word’s meanings are flexible 
and contextual, but practically, when such possibilities of meaning have been uncovered, 
no new meanings could be invented. This inventory of meanings should then be 
preserved, or memorized if necessary, for one to understand what this and other words 
mean in the Qur’an. As such, the Wujuh posits that flexibility of meaning that it offers 
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applies only to certain period of time, following which such a flexibility stops and 
everything that is produced during this flexible moment would become riwāyah, semantic 
legacy to be passed down through generations. New meanings of the same words may be 
invented in the future only if the structural use of language in general and the words in 
particular have experienced some changes. In a way, the working of this wujuh genre is 
similar to that of a dictionary, which provides a repertoire of how lexicons can be used; 
changes are possible if the language community demands it. Similarly, Muqatil’s Wujuh 
could be used as a dictionary or a manual to know how certain qur’anic words are used 
and the meanings that come with those uses. Playing with such a tension is not new to 
Muqātil, for his general attitude in his whole hermeneutical project has been dealing with 
tension.857 It appears that Muqātil uses binary oppositions to see how far two extremes 
can stand against each other only to lead him toward a certain measure of pragmatism 
that makes relation between the two ends of the spectrum possible in some degree. In a 
way, Muqātil is inclined toward making an ideal type that will help him analyzing the 
reality and seek possibilities or breakthroughs in between. The very example of Muqātil’s 
binary opposition is his exegetical thrust, which contrasts belief and disbelief, along with 
                                                        
857 The perpetuation of tension is not uncommon in Muqatil’s overall exegetical enterprise. This is apparent 
in his treatment of the People of Scripture, for instance. While theologically Muqatil had been fiercely 
critical of their committing shirk and dismissive of their religions as satanic, yet he still allowed some 
social, political, and economic relationship with them, such as intermarriage, food consumption, etc. 
Similarly, tension also takes place between Muqatil’s theologically fierce criticism of the disbelievers and 
his recommendation to the Muslims to keep any agreement or covenant that are agreed upon by the two 
parties, the believers and the disbelievers, unless the latter violated them. Such a tension was also shown in 
a number of terms that Muqatil used, such as mushrik min ahl al-kitab (the polytheist among the People of 
the Book), al-munafiqun alladhina amanu (the believing hypocrites), etc. Despite his fierce criticism to the 
People of Scripture as committing shirk, Muqatil was still seeking to build a common ground (kalimat 
sawa’) between the believers and the People of Scripture so that these three religious communities can 
agree with each other and thus are able to coexist. 
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their oppositional constitutents--tawḥīd versus shirk and taṣdīq versus takdhīb. While he 
has been fiercely critical of the People of Scripture as committing not only shirk 
(associating God with creation in worship) but also takdhīb (refusal to belief in 
Muhammad’s prophethood), to the extent that it is almost irreconciliable with the strict 
monotheism of Islam that he envisions, Muqātil has made concerted efforts to find areas 
within which these religious communities can interact with other. One prominent 
example of these efforts is how he attempts to offer the Qur’anic Decalogue as the 
common ground for interreligious relations in his conception of the muḥkamāt al-Qur’ān, 
as I discussed in the previous chapter. 
Since Muqātil does not mention the reason for the composition of his work and 
for his arrangement of the entries, we may derive some insights from other similar works 
in order to understand Muqātil and his work. Some scholars of al-wujūh wa al-naẓā’ir 
have mentioned that the wujūh works were designed to educate people about the presence 
of polysemic words in the Qur’an. The same view might have served as a motivation for 
Muqātil. All materials with which Muqātil works in his Wujūh are also present in his 
major commentary. His readers, however, will not be able to easily identify his ideas in 
terms of qur’anic polysemic words in his major commentary if Muqātil does not 
specifically draw their attention to this matter by composing an independent work just for 
that purpose. Muqātil’s major commentary addresses the whole Qur’an, and it will 
therefore be a great task for his readers to grasp everthing that he offers in it. As such, not 
all ideas that Muqātil advocates can be effectively communicated through his major 
commentary alone. Some of them will be lost in the shuffle. In fact, it is rather difficult to 
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ascertain whether Muqātil consistently advocates the idea of polysemy in the Qur’an if 
we only read his major commentary, regardless of the fact that he frequently signifies 
different words to mean, for instance, tawḥīd or shirk, in addition to their conventional 
meanings. Furthermore, it is still not an easy matter to trace back Muqātil’s views on 
qur’anic polysemy in his major commentary even after we know of his Wujūh. Thus, by 
composing his Wujūh, not only does Muqātil state more boldly his view in relation to 
polysemic words in the Qur’an, but he also makes it easier for his readers to study those 
words in an independent work written just for that purpose. Regardless, the readers of 
Muqātil’s Wujūh may still be in need for seeking further clarification in his major 
commentary of what he has considered polysemic words in the Qur’an in order to situate 
them within the totality of qur’anic discourse. 
The majority of Muqātil’s entries in the Wujūh are theologically charged. An 
entry is categorized as theologically charged when it, in one way or another, offers a 
meaning related to the central concepts of īmān and kufr, including their supporting 
principles such as tawḥīd, taṣdīq, shirk, and takdhīb. Otherwise, it is treated as a neutral 
word, whose relation to these central concepts in Muqātil’s exegetical endeavor is 
indirect at best. Of 170, 111 entries are theological (65.29%), and 59 words are neutral 
(34.71%), and 11 are particles. Muqātil may have included these neutral entries primarily 
because they, in his view, are polysemic. This does not mean to suggest, however, that 
such neutral terms are not important. They are parts and make up the totality of qur’anic 
discourse. Furthermore, it is partly due to the stark contrast between these neutral words 
and the other entries that a conclusion is drawn that Muqātil’s Wujūh is highly 
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theological, serving yet as another extension of his theological concerns communicated 
through his narrative and legal commentaries.  
Of 111 prime words that are related to belief and disbelief, 54 radiate positive 
connotations (48.65%), 38 send negative connotations (34.23%), and 19 bring forth a 
mixed message (17.12%). Among those words with a positive radiance are al-hudā,858 al-
raḥmah,859 al-dhikr,860 al-ṭahūr,861 al-khayr,862 al-nūr,863 and al-ḥaqq.864 Those with a 
negative connotations, among other, are al-kufr,865 al-shirk,866 al-sū’,867 al-fitnah,868 al-
ẓālimīn,869 al-ithm,870 and al-fisq.871 The terms which send mixed connotations include 
al-ḥasanah wa al-sayyi’ah,872 al-amr bi al-ma‛rūf wa al-nahy ‛an al-munkar,873 al-
                                                        
858 Al-hudā’s meanings of this category are: al-bayān, dīn al-Islām, al-īmān, rusulan wa kutuban, al-
rashād, amr Muḥammad SAW, al-Qur’ān, al-Tawrāh, al-ḥujjah, al-tawḥīd, and al-ilhām.   
859 Al-Raḥmah’s meanings are: dīn al-Islām, al-jannah, al-nubuwwah, al-Qur’ān, and al-īmān. 
860 Al-dhikr’s meanings are: al-ṭā‛ah wa al-‛amal, al-dhikr bi al-lisān, al-dhikr bi al-qulūb, al-wa‛ẓ, al-
waḥy, al-Qur’ān, al-Tawrāh, al-Lauḥ al-Maḥfūẓ, al-bayān, al-ṣalawāt al-khams, and ṣalāt al-‛aṣr. 
861 Al-ṭahūr’s meanings are: al-ṭahūr min al-dhunūb, al-ṭahūr min al-shirk, ṭahūr al-qalb min al-raybah, al-
ṭahūr min al-fāhishah wa al-ithm, and aḥallu. 
862 Al-khayr’s meanings are:  al-īmān and al-islām. 
863 Al-nūr’s meanings are: dīn al-Islām, al-īmān, al-hudā, al-ḍaw’ alladī yu‛tī Allāh ‛Azza wa Jalla al-
mu’minīn ‛alā sl-ṣirāṭ yawm al-qiyāmah, bayān al-ḥalāl wa al-ḥarām wa al-aḥkām wa al-mawā‛iẓ allatī fī 
al-Tawrāh, bayān al-ḥalāl wa al-ḥarām wa al-aḥkām wa al-mawā‛iẓ allatī fī al-Qur’ān, ḍaw’ al-rabb 
‛Azza wa Jalla.  
864 Al-ḥaqq’s meanings are: huwa Allāh Ta‛ālā, a-Qur’ān, al-Islām, al-‛adl, al-tawḥīd, al-ṣidq, al-ḥaqq 
bi‛aynihi alladhī laysa bi bāṭil. 
865 Al-kufr’s meanings are:  al-kufr bi tawḥīd Allāh ‛Azza wa Jalla wa al-inkār lahu, kufr al-juḥūd, al-kufr 
bi al-ni‛mah. 
866 Al-shirk’s meanings are: al-ishrāk bi Allāh ‛Azza wa Jalla ya‛dilu bihi ghayrahu, al-shirk bi al-ṭā‛ah 
min ghayr ‛ibādah, al-shirk fī al-a‛māl shirk al-riyā’. 
867 Al-sū’s meanings are: al-‛adhāb, al-shirk, al-dhanb min al-mu’min. 
868 Al-fitnah’s meanings are: al-shirk, al-kufr, al-‛adhāb fī al-dunyā, al-ḍalālah. 
869 Al-ẓālimīn’s meanings are: al-mushrikīn, al-muslim alladhī yaẓlimu nafsahu bi dhanbin yuṣībuhu min 
ghayr shirk, yaḍurrūn wa yanquṣūn anfusahum min ghayr shirk, yaẓlimūn anfusahum bi al-shirk wa al-
takdhīb, yajḥadūn. 
870 Al-ithm’s meanings are: al-shirk, al-ma‛ṣīyah, al-dhanb. 
871 Al-fisq’s meanings are: al-ma‛ṣiyah wa huwa al-kufr bi al-nabī wa lima jā’a bihi, al-ma‛ṣiyah fī tark al-
tawḥīd wa huwa al-shirk, al-ma‛ṣiyah wa dhālika fī ghayr shirk wa lā kufr. 
872 The meanings of al-ḥasanah wa al-sayyi’ah are: al-tawḥīd wa al-shirk, al-‛āfiyah wa al-‛adhāb fi al-
dunyā. 
873 The meanings of al-amr bi al-ma‛rūf wa al-nahy ‛an al-munkar are: al-tawḥīd wa al-shirk, ittibā‛ al-
nabī SAW wa al-taṣdīq bihi wa al-takdhīb bihi. 
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ẓulumāt wa al-nūr,874 awwal,875 al-akh,876 al-sabīl,877 and ummah.878 More specifically, 
27 words (about one fourth of the total theologically-charged words) possess meanings 
that explicitly mention keywords related to theological concepts, such as tawḥīd, shirk, 
kufr, īmān, and islām; 11 entries mention scripture and prophecy, 15 terms point to 
eschatological matter in relatively pessimistic and dark ways, 8 terms address religious 
communities critically, and 6 terms deal with conflict and polemic.     
It is suprising, however, to find out that some theologically central terms, such as 
al-islām and al-īmān, are missing in Muqātil’s Wujūh, while they are frequently 
mentioned in his major commentary as meanings assigned to other terms. Other authors 
of wujūh who wrote their work after Muqātil always mentioned these two terms. The 
terms al-islām and al-īmān are mentioned as two separate entries, for example, in Hārūn 
ibn Mūsā’s Wujūh. In it, al-islām is assigned two meanings, namely al-ikhlāṣ and al-
iqrār; while al-īmān is assigned four meanings, including al-iqrār bi al-lisān min ghayr 
taṣdīq, al-taṣdīq, al-tawḥīd, and īmānān fī shirk.879 By scrutinizing the verses that Ibn 
Mūsā uses as evidence in which the terms al-islām and al-īmān, along with their 
derivatives, take place, we can find those meanings similarly assigned to these two terms 
                                                        
874 The meanings of al-ẓulumāt wa al-nūr are: al-shirk wa al-īmān. 
875 The meanings of awwal are: awwalu man kafara bi al-nabī SAW min al-yahūd ‛alā ‛ahdihi, awwalu 
man āmana bi Allāh min ahli Makkah, awwal al-mu’minīn bi anna Allāh Ázza wa Jalla lā yurā fī al-dunyā, 
awwalu man āmana min Banī Isrā’īl li Mūsā wa Hārūn. 
876 The meanings of al-akh are: al-akh fī al-dīn wa al-walāyah fī al-shirk, al-akh fī dīn al-Islām wa al-
walāyah. 
877 The meanings of al-sabīl are: al-ṭā‛ah li Allāh Ta‛ālā, al-balāgh, al-dīn, al-hudā, ḥujjah, ṭarīq al-hudā, 
‛udwān, sabīlan ya‛nī bi ṭā‛atihi, ithm, millah. 
878 The meanings of ummah are: millah, imāman fī al-khayr, al-umam al-khāliyah wa ghayruhum, ummat 
Muḥammad SAW wa al-muslimīn khāṣṣah, ummat Muḥammad al-kuffār minhum khāṣṣah. 
879 Hārūn ibn Mūsā, Wujūh, 123, 125-6. 
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in Muqātil’s major commentary.880 The question, then, is why these theologically loaded 
terms are not mentioned in Muqātil’s Wujūh given the theological nature of his work. We 
probably will never know the answer, whether Muqātil himself overlooked those entries, 
or his extant extant work does not include everything that he wrote, or he does not 
                                                        
880 We can compare how the terms al-islām and al-īmān discussed by Hārūn ibn Mūsā in his Wujūh and 
how Muqātil dealt with them in his al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr, but not in his Wujūh. Ibn Mūsā assigned two 
meanings to al-islām, namely al-ikhlāṣ and al-iqrār. For the verse meaning (al-ikhlāṣ), he provided Q2: 
131,112; 3:20, and 31:22, and for the second meaning of al-islām he adduced Q3: 83, 49: 14, and 9: 74. Let 
us see how Muqātil comments on the verses that Ibn Mūsā mentioned and in which the word islām occurs. 
In Q2: 112 (aslama wajhahū li Allāh ya‘nī akhlaṣa dīnahū li Allāh), 2:131 (aslim = akhliṣ, aslamtu ya‘nī 
akhlaṣtu), Q3:20 (aslamtu wajhī li Allāh = akhlaṣtu dīnī li Allāh), and 31:22 (wa man yuslim wajhahū ilā 
Allāh = man yukhliṣ dīnahū li Allāh) Thus, like Ibn Mūsā who interprets al-islām as al-ikhlāṣ in all four 
verses he adduced, Muqātil did the same. Now, let us see how Muqātil comments on the three verses in 
which al-islām, in Ibn Mūsā’s Wujūh, means al-iqrār: Q3: 83 (in this case, Muqātil passed the the word 
aslama in the verse uncommented; but his comments on Q3: 82 and 84 suggests that he interprets al-islām 
as al-iqrār), 49: 14 (aslamā: aqrarnā bi al-lisān), 9:74 (ba‘da islāmihim = ba‘da iqrārihim bi al-īmān). So, 
if Ibn Mūsā assigned al-iqrār as the second meaning of al-islām, Muqātil did the same in the verses that 
Ibn Mūsā used to justify the meaning. This shows that while the entry al-islām is missing from Muqātil’s 
Wujūh, he actually has dealt with it in his major commentary, and assigned the same meanings to the word 
as other authors of wujūh, especially Ibn Mūsā, did. The same applies to the term al-īmān, which is also 
missing from Muqātil’s Wujūh, but whose multiple meanings can be found in his major commentary. See 
Ibn Mūsā, Wujūh, 122. See Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/1131-2, 140, 267-8; 2/437; 1/287-8; 4/98; 2/183. In terms of 
the term al-īmān, Ibn Mūsā assigned four meanings to it, including al-iqrār bi al-lisān min ghayr taṣdīq, al-
taṣdīq, al-tawḥīd, and īmānan fi shirk. For the first meaning of al-īmān, namely al-iqrār bi al-lisān min 
ghayr taṣdīq, Ibn Mūsā justified it by mentioning Q63:3, 9; 57:16; 60:13. In his comment on Q63: 3, 
Muqātil mentions nifāq, that is acknowledging something without really believing it (aqarrū thumma 
kafarū); in terms of Q63: 9, Muqātil interprets āmānū as aqarrū, that is an acknowledgment made by the 
hypocrites, which means without real belief; likewise, when commenting on 57:16, Muqātil interprets 
alladhīna amanū as aqarrū  bi al-lisān, an acknowledgement made by the hypocrites. In terms of Q60:13, 
Muqātil does not mention any acknowledgment without belief literally, but he indicates, through the 
narrative that he unfolds, that there were some poor Muslims that, for the sake of gaining food from the 
Jews, told them the “secrets” of the Muslims so that they might become friends. As a result, the Jews 
persuaded them to abandon Islam. For the second meaning, al-taṣdīq, Ibn Mūsā adduced Q98: 7 and 48: 5. 
In his comment on 98: 7, Muqātil interprets alladhīna āmanū as people who really believed because they 
performed good deeds and will be rewarded by God; on 48:5 Muqātil comments that al-mu’minīn wa al-
mu’mināt as those believed in Islam (bi al-islām), meaning that they really believed (taṣdīq). Suffice it to 
say that while Muqātil’s commentary on the verses that Ibn Mūsā used as justification for the meanings he 
assigned to the both al-islām and al-īmān suggest that he also advocates that the two terms are polysemic, it 
is not always easy to detect that. This vindicates my point that Muqātil’s Wujūh is of great help to the 
students of the Qur’an’s interpretation because they can now recognize polysemy in the Qur’an with great 
ease, rather than if they have to scrutinize it through Muqātil’s major commentary. See Ibn Mūsā, Wujūh, 
125-6. Muqātil, Tafsīr, 4/337, 341, 242-3, 307; 4/781.  
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consider the terms al-islām and al-īmān polysemic.881 What is certain, however, is that 
Muqātil’s Wujūh, as it survives today, does not exhaust all the polysemic words in the 
Qur’an, regardless of the fact that he may have dealt with them in his major 
commentary.882 
Theologically Loaded Words: Muqātil, Exegesis, and Theology 
Since I have argued for the theological orientation of Muqātil’ Wujūh, my next 
step is to discuss more thoroughly Muqātil’s theological preoccupation in this 
commentary by studying some of his entries that I see as representative for picturing his 
exegetical thrust as well as his theological concerns. In so doing, I will not discuss those 
terms that I consider neutral or non-theological. Left to work only with the theologically 
charged entries, I will scale them hierarchically based on whether they offer meanings 
that explicitly mention keywords such as tawḥīd, īmān, kufr, tawḥīd, shirk, taṣdīq, 
takdhīb, islām, Qur’ān, and so forth. In addition, to be consistent with my topical 
discussion of Muqātil’s two other commentaries in the previous chapters, I will select 
theologically charged entries related to Muqātil’s opposition between īmān and kufr, 
along with their principal elements—that is, the opposition between tawḥīd and shirk and 
                                                        
881 However, I would argue that neglect on the part of Muqātil to include the term al-islām and al-īmān is 
unlikely given the significance of the the two terms in his theological framework. Likewise, the possibility 
that he does not consider the two terms polysemic, and hence excluding them from his Wujūh is also less 
likely since he treats them as polysemic in his major commentary. The alternative left is that these two 
central terms are missing from his Wujūh probably because Muqātil’s extant Wujūh does not include 
everything that he once wrote.  
882 Another possibility why the terms al-islām and al-īmān are missing from the Wujūh is because Muqātil 
may have intentionally excluded them from it, for the primary reason that he fears his readers woud not 
take the idea of īmān and islām seriously by thinking that it is acceptable to admit īmān or islām without 
really believing in it. This is a possible misunderstanding of the polysemic īmān and islām that could 
happen, and if it does, it will run counter to his exegetical task to propagate īmān and islām against kufr. 
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between taṣdīq and takdhīb—entries with interreligious bearings, entries related to 
commanding right and forbidding wrong, and, finally, jihād. Because Muqātil’s Wujūh is 
generally very brief and straightforward, I will have to refer to his other commentaries in 
order to bring forth Muqātil’s full understanding of the entries with which he, in one way 
or another, has dealt in a more elaborate way. Moreover, such cross-referencing is to 
show whether Muqātil is consistent in his views of some of the subject matters that he 
espouses in his exegetical endeavor. 
Three Primary Entries: al-hudā, al-kufr, and al-shirk.  
In his less systematic ordering of entries in the Wujūh, Muqātil put three entries 
that are arguably the most theologically charged in his top list, namely al-hudā 
(guidance), al-kufr (disbelief), and shirk (associating God with creation). Each of these 
terms comprises meanings that are directly related to Muqātil’s theological concerns in 
his exegetical project, that is, the propagation of belief and condemnation of disbelief. 
Together, these three terms thus best represent Muqātil’s exegetical thrust, and this may 
explain why they take place in the beginning of the commentary, apart from the fact that 
the term al-islām and īmān, which would potentially be other central terms in his 
exegetical framework, are missing from the Wujūh. 
There is a good reason for Muqātil to put al-hudā in the first place.883 It is 
arguably the most comprehensive term in the Wujūh that best explain God’s revelation, 
by sending prophets and scriptures, in order to guide human beings. As such, the term al-
                                                        
883 Muqātil, Wujūh, 20-25. 
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hudā represents well Muqātil’s exegetical mission in explaining the Qur’an as guidance 
for believers to fully submit to God, by obeying His commands and prohibitions, 
communicated through His prophets and scriptures—especially Muhammad and the 
Qur’an. 
Muqātil assigns seventeen meanings to al-hudā, the most of all entries that he 
includes in the Wujūh. Of seventeen, eleven of those meanings are most relevant to 
Muqātil’s theological concerns, namely al-bayān, dīn al-islām, al-īmān, rusulan wa 
kutuban, al-rashād, amr Muḥammad SAW, al-Qur’ān, al-Tawrāh, al-ḥujjah, al-tawḥīd, 
and sunnah.884 The multiple meanings assigned to al-hudā explain almost every 
necessary element of the fundamental teachings of the Qur’an. Al-hudā is described as a 
“clear statement” (bayān) from God for the true religion (dīn al-islām) in order for human 
beings to believe (al-īmān). Such a clear statement is sent by God through his messengers 
and written in scriptures (rusulan wa kutuban) providing a straight path (al-rashād). 
Among those messengers of God is Muhammad, to whom the Qur’an was sent.  The 
Qur’an validates the truth of other scriptures before it (Tawrāh). These messengers and 
scriptures are evidence (ḥujjah) on the Oneness of God (tawḥīd) who has sent them all. 
Since tawḥīd has been the trodden path of all prophets (sunnah), people should follow 
them in that path. 
To the second term, al-kufr, Muqātil assigns four meanings, but only three 
concern us here, namely al-kufr bi tawḥīd Allāh ‛Azza wa Jalla wa al-inkār bihi (disbelief 
in and rejection of the Oneness of God), kufr al-juḥūd (rebellious disbelief), and al-kufr 
                                                        
884 The other meanings of al-hudā are dā‛iyan, ma‛rifah, al-istirjā’, lā yaṣluḥ, al-ilhām, and hudnā = tubnā. 
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bi al-ni‛mah (ungratefulness).885 With these meanings, Muqātil differentiates three types 
of disbelief (kufr). The most serious offence is failure to acknowledge tawḥīd. According 
to Muqātil’s interpretation of Q2:6, which he uses to support this meaning of al-kufr, it 
was the Meccan polytheists who rejected tawḥīd, for this verse was revealed to address 
them.886 In the second verse (Q47:32) that Muqātil mentions, however, the same 
accusation of rejecting tawḥīd was also leveled against the Jews. In this verse, not only 
were the Jews depicted as rejecting tawḥīd but they were also presented as preventing 
people from following God’s way, in addition to opposing the Prophet Muḥammad after 
it was explained in the Torah that he was a prophet and messenger. 887 Together, the Arab 
polytheists and the Jews were accused of committing shirk and takdhīb. 
The second type of kufr is disbelief out of defiance (kufr al-juḥūd). Such a 
disbelief manifested in the denial of Muḥammad’s prophethood and of the Ka‘bah as the 
qiblah (direction for prayers). In all cases that Muqātil adduces, the perpetrators of kufr 
al-juḥūd were the Jews. The Jews’ denial of Muḥammad’s prophethood is mentioned in 
Q2:89 and 6:20. In relation to Q2:89, Muqātil states that prior to Muhammad’s 
messengership, the Jews used to implore God for victory by mentioning Muhammad in 
their prayers—that is, by praying in the name of the coming prophet—when they faced 
their enemy—that is, the Arab pagans including Juhaynah, Mazīnah, Banī ‛Adhrah, Asad, 
and Ghaṭafān—in war, chanting: “O God, we ask you, in the name of the Prophet whom 
                                                        
885 The last meaning of al-kufr is al-barā’ah (free of association, free of responsibility). Muqātil, Wujūh, 
25-6. 
886 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/88. 
887 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 4/50. 
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we found in our Scripture and whom you will send in the end of time, to make us 
victorious over them.” When Muhammad was sent and he was not of the Israelites, the 
Jews rejected him.888 In this respect, the accusation of kufr against the Jews is more as a 
rebellious disbelief with regard to accepting Muhammad’s prophethood (taṣdīq), but of 
disbelief in terms of tawḥīd. It is only because the Jews refuted to believe in Muhammad 
as the promised prophet (takdhīb). 
In his commentary on Q6:20, in the major commentary, Muqātil maintains that 
the verse was revealed following an exchange between the kuffār Quraysh and 
Muḥammad, in which they told him that they had asked the People of Scripture about 
him. The People of Scripture told the Qurayshī kuffār that there was no mention of 
Muḥammad in their scripture. Muqātil however argues that the Qur’an asserts that they 
knew Muḥammad as well as they knew their children.889 The Jews’ denial of the Ka‛bah 
as qiblah is mentioned in Q2:146 and 3:97. Commenting on the former of the two, 
Muqātil mentions a conversation between some Jews and Muhammad, in which the 
former asked him why he circumambulated a built stone. As a response, the Prophet said 
that they should have known that circumambulation around Ka‛bah is ḥaqq and it was 
written in both Torah and Gospel; but the Jews hid the truth of what is written in scripture 
and they became defiant.890 In his commentary on Q3:97, Muqātil exhorts that whosoever 
among the people of religions (ahl al-adyān) denies (kafara) the Ka‛bah and therefore 
                                                        
888 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/122. 
889 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/553-54. 
890 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/147-48. 
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does not perform the pilgrimage obligation, he has disbelieved (faqad kafara).891 In this 
respect, Muqātil seems to accuse the Jews of having been unfaithful to both Ibrāhim, their 
patriarch, who had built the Ka‘bah and performed pilgrimage, and to their scripture, 
which had prophesized the coming of Muhammad in the end of time. 
The last type of kufr is being ungrateful for the grace that a person has received 
from God or from fellow human beings (al-kufr bi al-ni‛mah). To support this meaning, 
Muqātil adduces several verses: Q2:152, 26:19, 27:40, and 31:12. In his commentary on 
Q2:152 in al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr, Muqātil maintains that the grace that God has bestowed 
upon human beings was mentioned in Q2:151, that is, the prophethood of Muhammad, 
reciting to and teaching them the Qur’an, cleansing them from committing shirk and kufr, 
teaching them what is allowed and prohibited (ḥikmah), and teaching everything that they 
did not know.892 Commenting on Q26:19, Muqātil relates the term kufr to the 
ungratefulness that the Pharaoh leveled against Mūsā after the former had taken care of 
him.893 Muqātil relates Q27:40 to the story of Sulaymān who was attempting to transfer 
Queen Sheba’s throne to his kingdom, assisted by a Jew who had the ability to do so in a 
blink of eye. The instant transfer of the throne was a divine trial testing whether 
Sulaymān would be thankful because he now had the throne, or would be unthankful, 
simply because the person who transferred it was lower than he was as a king and 
prophet.894 In terms of Q31:12, Muqātil relates it to the story of Luqmān, whom God had 
                                                        
891 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/297. 
892 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/150. 
893 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/260. 
894 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/308. 
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given knowledge and understanding one level below prophethood (al-‘ilm wa al-fahm 
min ghayr nubuwwah) so that he was thankful to God by worshipping Him alone (fa 
yuwaḥḥidahū).895 Thus, disbelief (kufr), according to Muqātil, is of three kinds: rejection 
of tawḥīd, denial of the truth of prophethood and other religious teachings (takdhīb), and 
being ungrateful. 
The last of the top three entries in Muqātil’s Wujūh is al-shirk. Muqātil assigns 3 
meanings to it, namely al-ishrāk bi Allāh ‛Azza wa Jalla yu‛dalu bihi ghayruhu 
(associating God with creations as if they are equals), al-shirk fī al-ṭā‛ah min ghayr 
‛ibādah (obeying that other than God but not as worship), and al-shirk fī al-a‛māl shirk 
al-riyā’ (performing deeds by expecting the appreciation of those other than God).896 
Muqātil’s threefold shirk is parallel to his threefold kufr, I just discussed above. The first 
manifestation of shirk is associating God by posing an equal to Him (al-ishrāk bi Allāh 
yu‘dalu bihi ghayruhu). In support of his claim, Muqātil cites Q4:36, 48, 116; 5:72, and 
9:3. Explaining Q4:36, Muqātil says that the verse was addressing People of Scripture 
who did not worship God alone (ya‘budūn Allāh fī ghayr ikhlāṣ). In this respect, God 
forbade them from associating God with His creation.897 Q5:72, according to Muqātil, 
was addressing the Najrānī Christians who professed that “God is the Messiah, son of 
Maryam;” whosoever professed this and died with such belief, he argues, was forbidden 
from paradise.898 In his commentary on Q9:3, Muqātil relates the verse to the Meccan 
                                                        
895 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/434. 
896 Muqātil, Wujūh, 26-27.  
897 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/371-2. 
898 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/494. 
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polytheists who, following the cancelation of the Ḥudaybiyyah treaty, had no peace 
agreement with the Prophet. First, the Qur’an told Muhammad to ask them to repent and 
worship God alone. The Meccan polytheists were given 50 days to do that; otherwise 
they would be fought against. If, however, they asked protection from the Prophet, he 
must grant them that so that they might hear the Qur’an. If after hearing the Qur’an they 
refused to accept its teaching, that protection should be cancelled and they had to be 
fought against because they did not uphold tawḥīd.899 In this respect, Muqātil accuses the 
People of Scripture of committing shirk by associating Him with creation, such as the 
divinization of ‘Īsā. The Meccan polytheists did the same, but they were given chance to 
repent and uphold tawḥīd before they were fought against if they refused to do it. This is 
consistent with Muqātil’s view in other commentaries that the Arab pagans were the only 
people upon whom the Prophet imposed Islam. The People of Scripture, while they had 
been fiercely criticized for their alleged shirk, were given a different treatment, a political 
one, by paying jizyah while retaining their faith. 
The second type of shirk is being obedient to something or someone other than 
God without worshipping it (al-shirk fī al-ṭā‛ah min ghayr ‛ibādah). For this meaning, 
Muqātil cites Q7:190 and 14:22. With regard to Q14:22, Muqātil interprets ashraktumūni 
as something associated with God in terms of obedience.900 Q7:90 is related to the story 
of when Ādam’s wife, Ḥawwā’, was pregnant with their first child. An Iblīs, called al-
Ḥārith, who had changed his appearance, approached and told her that what was in her 
                                                        
899 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2/156-8. 
900 Muqātil, Wujūh, 27. 
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stomach could be a beast. When her pregnancy got even bigger and much heavier, the 
same Iblīs approached her again asking about her condition. Ḥawwā’ told him that she 
was afraid if his prediction was correct that she was carrying a beast, for it was so 
difficult for her to stand up after she sat down. Iblīs then told her to pray to God so that 
their child became a human like their parents. But Iblīs also asked that if the prayer did 
work, she would name her child after his name. She agreed. Ādam and Ḥawwā’ prayed to 
God and promised Him if their child was born sound and perfect they would be so 
grateful to Him. When the baby was born, sound and perfect, Iblīs approached Ādam to 
tell her to name the baby after him, namely ‛Abd al-Ḥārith. Ādam agreed. But not long 
after, the baby died.  It is the obedience to Iblīs’ advice, without necessarily worshipping 
him, which the verse was actually addressing.901 Thus, this type of obedience-based shirk 
points specifically to following the Satan’s temptation while the perpetrator continues to 
worship God. 
The last kind of shirk is the performance of deeds expecting not only God’s 
reward but also praise from fellow human beings (al-shirk fī al-a‛māl shirk al-riyā’). To 
vindicate this meaning, Muqātil uses Q18:110 as a support. In his major commentary, 
Muqātil unfolds the narrative that illuminates the revelation of this verse. He says that it 
was revealed in relation to Jundub ibn Zuhayr al-Azdī al-‘Āmirī who told the Prophet that 
he did everything for the sake of Allāh; however, when someone praised him for what he 
had done, he liked it, too. In response, the Prophet told him that God would not receive 
                                                        
901 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2/79-80. 
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any deeds performed insincerely for Him by expecting appreciation from others.902 Thus, 
shirk al-riyā’ is a religious offence that happens when someone still expects reward and 
praise from that other tha God in doing anything in his life. 
Thus, the thread that links the three terms al-hudā, al-kufr, and al-shirk is the 
propagation of pure motnotheism (tawḥīd), and the condemnation of rejecting it (kufr), by 
bringing a partner to God (shirk). The term al-hudā offers a range of meanings that 
together lay out the fundamental elements of God’s guidance to human beings. It points 
to clear statement (al-bayān) in the form prophethood and scripture that provides human 
beings with a straight path (al-rashād), namely dīn al-Islām, whose ultimate goal is 
tawḥīd. Rejecting this ultimate goal (tawḥīd) outright is the most serious offence of kufr, 
as is rejecting the medium through which tawḥīd is communicated, namely prophets and 
scriptures. For human beings to be ungrateful to God, who has provided guidance is also 
an act of kufr, although of a lesser degree. Worshiping God, but at the same time also 
worshiping another deity is an act of shirk, comparable in its offense with an act of kufr, 
since the two are basically a rejection of tawḥīd.  
Likewise, obeying that other than God, which in Muqātil’s example is obeying 
Iblīs’ advice, leads to violating God’s rules and is also an act of shirk. The same applies 
to expecting appreciation from other than God in doing deeds; it is also an act of shirk, 
albeit of lower degree. These typologies of kufr and shirk, in addition to elaborate 
meanings of al-hudā, suggest that Muqātil advocates a strictest form of monotheism. As 
strict as his vision of monotheism (tawḥīd) is, it is prone to violation. Muqātil has 
                                                        
902 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2/605. 
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therefore set up layers of potential violations against such an idealistic monotheism, from 
the most minor to the most serious. Graded hierarchically, an act of kufr encompasses 
rejection of tawḥīd, rejection of prophecy and scripture, and ungratefulness. Similarly, an 
act of shirk manifests in associating God with His creation, unlawful obedience to other 
than Him, and insincerity in performing deeds. Thus, if in other commentaries Muqātil 
has expressed more clearly the two more serious violations of kufr and shirk, namely 
rejecting tawhīd and taṣdīq, in the Wujūh he clearly points to his threefold typology for 
both kufr and shirk, the third of each being ungratefulness (al-kufr bi al-ni‘mah) and 
expectation of reward or praise from others (shirk al-riyā’). 
Secondary Entries: Semantic Web 
Muqātil’s entries in the Wujūh are interrelated with each other semantically. Not 
only do these entries serve as meanings of the other, but their meanings are also 
entangled with each other. This suggests that these words form some sort of semantic 
web that vindicate one another as unity. The interconnection between the primary and the 
secondary entries as well as their meanings show not only the semantic density of those 
words but also the theological load that Muqātil imposes on them to support the highly 
theological orientation of his exegetical endeavors.  
Thus, each of the three key entries—al-hudā, al-kufr, al-shirk—and some of their 
meanings also appear as one of the meanings assigned to other words, which I call 
secondary entries.903 Al-hudā, for instance, is one of the meanings of terms such as al-
                                                        
903 The primary words here are al-hudā, al-kufr, and al-shirk, which occupied the first three places of the 
commentary. They are considered primary primarily because their assigned meanings are the most 
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mashy,904 al-sabīl,905 and al-nūr.906 Al-kufr is also communicated through terms such as 
al-fitnah,907 al-ḥarb,908 al-fisq,909 and ḍalāl.910 There are even more words, the meaning 
of which entails al-shirk, than those pointing to al-hudā and al-kufr, including al-sū’,911 
al-sayyi’ah,912 al-sayyi’āt,913 al-ẓulm,914 al-ẓālimīn,915 al-ẓulumāt,916 al-ithm, 917 al-
fitnah,918 al-munkar,919 and al-fisq.920 Tawḥīd itself, while it is not an entry in the 
commentary, becomes one of the meanings of entries such as u‛budū,921 ittaqū,922 al-
ḥaqq,923 and ma‛rūf.924  
Among the meanings of the key entries that are also conveyed through secondary 
entries are, for instance, those of al-hudā, such as dīn al-islām, al-īmān, and al-Qur’ān. 
Four entries in the commentary have dīn al-islām as one of their meanings;925 four entries 
have al-īmān as one of their meanings,926 and seven entries mean, among others, al-
                                                        
encompassing of what constitutes Muqātil’s exegetical thrust. Other entries are secondary words whose 
meanings include one of these primary words or the assigned meanings of these primary words. 
904 Muqātil, Wujūh, 31. 
905 Muqātil, Wujūh, 193. 
906 Muqātil, Wujūh, 132. 
907 Muqātil, Wujūh, 63. 
908 Muqātil, Wujūh, 150. 
909 Muqātil, Wujūh, 208. 
910 Muqātil, Wujūh, 126. 
911 Muqātil, Wujūh, 34. 
912 Muqātil, Wujūh, 35. 
913 Muqātil, Wujūh, 143. 
914 Muqātil, Wujūh, 81. 
915 Muqātil, Wujūh, 79, 80. 
916 Muqātil, Wujūh, 78. 
917 Muqātil, Wujūh, 139. 
918 Muqātil, Wujūh, 63. 
919 Muqātil, Wujūh, 75. 
920 Muqātil, Wujūh, 208. 
921 Muqātil, Wujūh, 117. 
922 Muqātil, Wujūh, 175. 
923 Muqātil, Wujūh, 184. 
924 Muqātil, Wujūh, 75. 
925 These entries are: al-ḥaqq, al-nūr, al-khayr, and al-raḥmah. 
926 They are al-khayr, al-ṣalāḥ, al-raḥmah, and al-nūr. 
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Qur’ān.927 Similar cases occur with the meanings of the other two key entries, namely al-
kufr and al-shirk, although in a much lower rate.  
Tawḥīd-Shirk Opposition: Word’s Families 
A number of entries in the Wujūh consist not of single words, but of a pair of 
(sometimes opposing) words and phrases. The examples of entries with a pair of words 
are al-ḥasanah wa al-sayyi’ah, al-ẓulumāt wa al-nūr, and mustaqarr wa mustawda‘. The 
entries in the form of phrases are of two kinds: verbal, such as faraḍa, u‛budū, 
yamudduhum, and so forth; and nominal, such as al-amr bi al-ma‛rūf wa al-nahy ‛an al-
munkar and mā bayna aydīhim wa mā khalfahum. Of these “compound” entries, there are 
three whose words are in a binary opposition and one of whose meanings contrast tawḥīd 
and shirk, or taṣdīq and takdhīb, which have served as Muqātil’s exegetical thrust and his 
major theological concern. These entries are al-ḥasanah wa al-sayyi’ah, al-ẓulumāt wa 
al-nūr, and al-amr bi al-ma‛rūf wa al-nahy ‛an al-munkar. Such a binary opposition 
helps Muqātil not only underline the weight of message that he wants to communicate but 
also leads him to seek further alternatives if such opposition ends with deadlock that may 
paralyze normal life order. 
In general, the opposition of these two pairs of terms can be summed up as an 
opposition between īmān and kufr. While there is an entry for al-kufr in the commentary, 
the opposing entry al-īmān is missing. Consequently, the opposition of imān and kufr is 
                                                        
927 Other entries one of whose meanings is al-Qur’an are: al-ḥaqq, al-furqān, al-raḥmah, al-nūr, al-najm, 
al-dhikr, and al-mā’. 
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now represented by their supporting principles, namely tawḥīd and taṣdīq against shirk 
and takdhīb, respectively. 
As a general rule, as long as Muqātil’s commentaries are concerned, the concept 
of īmān (belief), with its two supporting principles tawḥīd and taṣdīq, refers to only one 
kind of belief: acknowledgement of the oneness of God and acceptance of Muhammad’s 
prophetic mandate. The concept of īmān (belief) suggests a totality of mental and 
performative acts. This is despite the fact that Muqātil considers the term al-īmān 
polysemic, which includes the meaning “admission without belief” (al-iqrār bi lā 
taṣdīq)—held by hypocrites—and “belief amidst disbelief” (īmānān fī kufr)—held by 
polytheists who believed not only in God, but also in other gods.928 These two of four 
possible meanings of al-īmān in the Qur’an do not conform to Muqātil’s vision of belief. 
In other words, admission without belief and belief amidst disbelief are two incorrect 
manifestations of belief. The same happens with the term al-islām, which is also 
polysemic, including sincere submission, but also nominal submission for certain 
interests, political or otherwise. It is possible that one of the main reasons why Muqātil 
does not mention al-īmān and al-islām as entries in the Wujūh is because he does not 
want his readers to take the correct understanding and performance of these two concepts 
lightly. Perhaps he fears that if he lists these two terms with its polysemic and 
contradictory meanings in the Wujūh they will be counterproductive to his own 
theological mission in advocating pure monotheism against the slightest inclination of 
                                                        
928 See footnote no. 50 above. 
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disbelief and associanism. To put it differently, he wants to appear uncompromising with 
regard to correct theology.929 
On the contrary, with regard to the concept of kufr (disbelief), with its two 
supporting principles shirk and takdhīb, Muqātil suggests that it is of different degrees, 
which gives a way to possibilities of a total or partial enactment. The concept of kufr, for 
instance, is described as being of three types: al-kufr bi tawḥīd Allāh, kufr al-juḥūd, and 
al-kufr bi al-ni‛mah.930 Likewise, the concept of shirk is distinguished into three kinds: 
al-ishrāk bi Allāh ‛Azza wa Jalla yu‛dalu bihi ghayruhu, al-shirk fī al-ṭā‛ah min ghayr 
‛ibādah, and al-shirk fī al-a‛māl shirk al-riyā’.931 This may suggest that while he 
disapproves any of these violations, he wants to show some leniency by showing that not 
all violations are of the same degree, and that they are above all rectifiable if the 
perpetrators are willing to learn from Islamic teachings.  
The rejection of tawḥīd (al-kufr bi tawḥīd Allāh), arguably the most serious 
religious offense of all, is equal with the first type of shirk, namely al-ishrāk bi Allāh 
‛Azza wa Jalla yu‛dalu bihi ghayruhu, that is worshiping another deity as an equal to 
God. Only a pure polytheist may commit such an offense. Rebellious disbelief (kufr al-
juḥūd) is more likely equated with association without worship (al-shirk fī al-ṭā‛ah min 
ghayr ‛ibādah). Muqātil’s explanation of kufr al-juḥūd, on one hand, suggests that it is 
the rejection of Muhammad’s prophethood either as a whole or by rejecting part of his 
                                                        
929 I consider this speculation another possibility why the terms of al-īmān and al-islām are missing from 
the Wujūh, in addition to the possibility that the extant manuscripts of Muqātil’s Wujūh, as argued earlier, 
do not exhaust everything that he once wrote. 
930 Muqātil, al-Wujūh wa al-Naẓā’ir, p. 25.  
931 Muqātil, al-Wujūh wa al-Naẓā’ir, p. 26-27.  
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teachings or decisions. His explanation of al-shirk fī al-ṭā‛ah min ghayr ‛ibādah, which 
refers to the event where Ādam and Ḥawwā’ named their newly born after Iblīs, on the 
other, suggests that while worshiping the one and only God is maintained, some 
obedience may be given to those other than him. In this case, Muqātil’s condemnation of 
the Christians who treated their religious leadership as “lords,” which implies obedience 
to things different from what God has actually stipulated, for instance, may be set as an 
example. A monotheist, a polytheist, or even a Muslim who is called a hypocrite 
(munāfiq) may all commit such a religious crime. Being ungrateful (al-kufr bi al-ni‛mah), 
the third kind of kufr, is more or less on a par with insincerity of acts (al-shirk fī al-a‛māl 
shirk al-riyā’), and is the third kind of shirk. Such a violation may be perpetrated by a 
polytheist, obviously, a monotheist, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, including 
hypocrites within the Muslim community. 
 Thus, it is important to follow Muqātil’s detailed distinction of a range of 
religious offenses when we attempt to apply those concepts. The Jews of Muhammad’s 
contemporaries, for instance, may have worshiped the one and only God, as the 
accusation of their divinizing of ‛Uzayr932 seems to point to their ancestors,933 but their 
                                                        
932 Muqātil mentions ‘Uzayr (ibn Sharḥiyā) as a citizen of Babel among those whom Bukhtanaṣar 
(Nebukadnezar) captured. He lived after the elevation of ‘Īsā, and was one of the learned among the 
Israelites. On the story of ‘Uzayr who was given a chance to witness, like Ibrāhīm, how God would 
resurrect creation from death, see Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/216-8.  
933 In his commentary on Q3:65, which addresses the dispute between Jews and Christians each claiming to 
be more worthy as Ibrāhīm’s successors, Muqātil mentions that some of the Jewish and Christian leaders of 
Najrān accused Muhammad, with his prophetic calling, of being someone whom wanted to be treated as a 
“lord” just like the Jews treated ‘Uzayr, or Christians treated ‘Isā. Muhammad’s response was, according to 
Muqātil, that he did not invite them to anything except to worship God alone without associating him with 
anything. Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/282-3, 581.  Muqātil suggests more clearly that the divinization occurred in the 
past when he is commenting Q7:163, in which God told Muhammad to ask the people of a village, called 
Aylah, two day travel through sea from from Medina to Syria. In the past, during the time of Dāwūd, the 
people of this village were transfigured (musikhū) into monkeys (qiradah). Muhammad was to ask, whether 
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rejection of Muhammad’s prophethood and the obedience of some of the Jews to their 
leadership in their rejection have made them commit kufr al-juḥūd and al-shirk fī al-ṭā‛ah 
min ghayr ‛ibādah. They did not, however, commit al-kufr bi tawḥīd Allāh. A different 
understanding may apply to the Christians of Muhammad’s time who, according to 
Muqātil, worshiped ‛Isā as an equal to God, and thus were categorized as committing al-
kufr bi al-tawḥīd, and also kufr al-juḥūd for their rejection of Muhammad’s prophethood. 
The Arab appeared to have committed all three kinds of disbelief, al-kufr bi al-tawḥīd, 
kufr al-juḥūd, and al-shirk fī al-ṭā‛ah min ghayr ‛ibādah. In the meantime, al-kufr bi al-
ni‛mah and al-shirk fī al-a‛māl shirk al-riyā’ appear to be permeating the whole spectrum 
of religious communities, from polytheist to monotheist, Muslim and non-Muslim alike. 
As such, the Wujūh emphasizes, if not adds, more important points that otherwise would 
be unrecognizeable in Muqātil’s major commentary. The detailed distinction between 
different kinds of kufr and shirk is not easily detected if we read Muqātil’s commentary 
in al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr. Instead, we will gain the impression that Muqātil generalized any 
violation of īmān as either kufr or shirk. Thus, like Muqātil’s legal commentary, the 
Wujūh contributes more nuances to the general views that Muqātil has expressed 
throughout his commentary on the Qur’an in al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr.  
In order to understand well how these oppositional entries communicate Muqātil’s 
exegetical thrust with regard to belief and disbelief, I will not only deal with them but 
                                                        
God had transfigured them into monkeys and pigs, because they said, “We are God’s children and His 
beloved; God would not punish us in ths world nor in the hereafter because we are the offspring of His best 
friend Ibrāhīm and of Isrā’īl and of God’s Speech Mūsā and of His Son ‘Uzayr; thus, We are God’s 
children.” Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2/70.   
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also with more entries which are their derivatives. With regard to the oppositional entry 
al-ḥasanah wa al-sayyi’ah, there are two entries that share the same root ḥ-s-n with the 
former, namely al-ḥusnā and ḥasanan, and there are two derivative entries for the latter, 
namely al-sū’ and al-sayyi’āt. In relation to the oppositional entry al-ẓulumāt wa al-nūr, 
there are three other entries sharing the same root ẓ-l-m with the first, namely al-ẓulumāt, 
al-ẓālimīn, and al-ẓulm, and there is one derivative entry for the second, namely al-nār. 
Finally, for the oppositional entry al-amr bi al-ma‘rūf wa al-nahy ‛an al-munkar, there 
are two entries that may support its meanings, namely al-amr and al-ma‘rūf.  
In general, all oppositional entries and their derivatives here mentioned support, 
in some of their meanings, Muqātil’s exegetical and theological thrusts in terms 
propagating īmān, especially with regard to upholding tawḥīd and taṣdīq, and 
condemning shirk, especially the abandoning of shirk and takdhīb. Moreover, this binary 
opposition strengthens even further the message that Muqātil intends to communicate by 
contrasting two extreme positions: īmān versus kufr, tawḥīd versus shirk, and taṣdīq 
versus takdhīb. At some points, Muqātil relates īmān, with its two constituting elements, 
with the good reward that God had promised for its upholders, especially in the hereafter, 
and kufr, also with its two constituting elements, with the punishment that awaits its 
perpetrators in hellfire.  
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Al-ḥasanah wa al-sayyi’ah and their derivatives 
Muqātil assigns five meanings to a pair of opposional al-ḥasanah wa al-sayyi’ah 
(“good” and “bad”), all of which are a series of oppositions.934 These five meanings refer 
to five different domains, namely (1) warfare: al-naṣr wa al-ghanīmah (victory and spoil) 
for al-ḥasanah, and al-qatl wa al-hazīmah (murder and defeat) for al-sayyi’ah; (2) 
theology: al-tawḥīd and al-shirk; (3) nature: kathrat al-maṭar wa al-khisb (plenty of rain 
and fertility) and qillat al-maṭar (lack of rain); (4) living condition: al-‛āfiyah 
(prosperous life) and al-‘adhāb fī al-dunyā (excruating life), and (5) interpersonal 
relation: al-‛afw wa qawl al-ma‛rūf (forgiveness and good word) and al-qawl al-qabīḥ wa 
al-adhā (inappropriate and harassing words). Of five, only one that concerns us here, 
namely the meaning of al-ḥasanah wa al-sayyi’ah in the domain of theology, that is, al-
tawḥīd and al-shirk, which serves as the thrust of Muqātil’s exegetical endeavors. 
According to Muqātil, al-ḥasanah wa al-sayyi’ah means al-tawḥīd and al-shirk in 
Q6:160, 27:89-90, and 28:84. Q6:160 maintains that the reward of all deeds, good and 
bad, will be given in the hereafter. Whoever comes into the hereafter with al-ḥasanah, 
that is, tawḥīd and good deeds (al-‛amal al-ṣāliḥ) will receive ten times as much, and 
whowever comes in the hereafter with al-sayyi’ah, ya‛nī al-shirk will be repaid only with 
its equivalent. The reward for shirk as the most serious religious offense is hellfire, which 
is the gravest punishment.935  Q27:89-90 convey a similar message: whoever comes in 
the hereafter with al-ḥasanah, ya‛nī lā ilāha illa Allāh (“there is no god but God”), the 
                                                        
934 Muqātil, Wujūh, p. 35-36. 
935 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/599.  
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verbal pronouncement of tawḥīd, will receive a better recompense and be secure from the 
terrors of that Day; but whoever comes with al-sayyi’ah, that is, shirk will be cast face 
downwards into the Fire.936 Q28:84 similarly states that whoever comes into the hereafter 
with al-ḥasanah, that is, kalimat al-ikhlāṣ (statement of true devotion to God, namely 
tawḥīd), which is lā ilāha illa Allāh waḥdahū lā sharīka lahu, will receive a better 
reward; but whoever comes in with shirk will not be recompesed but for what he used to 
do. The reward for shirk is hellfire; there is no more serious offense than shirk, as there is 
no greater punishment than hellfire.937 Together, the qur’anic verses that Muqātil 
mentions to support his assigned meaning to al-ḥasanah wa al-sayyi’ah as pointing to 
tawḥīd and shirk suggest that those who uphold tawḥīd will be receiving a multiplied 
reward in the hereafter, while those who committed shirk on earth will be punished only 
with an equal weight of punishment, although it happens to be the gravest one, hellfire.  
What stands out of Muqātil’s interpretation of al-ḥasanah wa al-sayyi’ah as 
tawḥīd wa al-shirk is that he always is able to find a way to assign the theological 
significance that he is advocating to a pair of words that stand directly in opposition to 
each other to the extent that such an opposition emboldens the weight of message he is 
attempting to communicate. Furthermore, the meaning al-tawḥīd wa al-shirk given to al-
ḥasanah wa al-sayyi’ah is the most consequential of all meanings Muqātil assigns to the 
pair as it is related to the ultimate fate of human beings in the hereafter, while the other 
four meanings pertain solely to the worldly affairs: warfare, nature, living conditions, and 
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interpersonal relations. Furthermore, while al-ḥasanah wa al-sayyi’ah have multiple 
meanings, Muqātil has strongly assigned the pair their theological meaning throughout 
his major commentary to vindicate his larger exegetical task in propagating īmān and 
condemning kufr, including propagation of tawḥīd and condemnation of shirk. 
Derivatives of al-ḥasanah: al-ḥusnā and ḥasanan 
Muqātil’s Wujūh provides two entries that are derivatives of al-ḥasanah, namely 
al-ḥusnā and ḥasanan, as it also mentions two other entries derivative of al-sayyi’ah, 
namely al-sū’ and al-sayyi’āt. It is curious whether these derivatives support the 
meanings of the principal entries (al-ḥasanah and al-sayyi’ah), especially with regard to 
their theological meanings related to the opposition of tawḥīd and shirk. 
Al-ḥusnā is assigned three meanings, including al-jannah (paradise), al-banīn 
(children), and al-khayr (goodness).938 Of the three, al-jannah seems to be the relevant 
meaning of al-ḥusnā to our discussion. Muqātil maintains that al-ḥusnā means paradise 
in five verses, namely Q10: 26, 21: 101, 53: 31, 55: 60, and 92: 6. Q10: 26 promises 
those who uphold tawhīd (li alladhīna aḥsanū) paradise (al-ḥusnā).939 Q21: 101 states 
that those for whom God have decreed Paradise (al-ḥusnā)—namely ‛Īsā, ‛Uzayr, 
Maryam, and angels940—will be kept far from Hell. This verse, according to Muqātil, was 
intended to counter the argument of some Meccan polytheists of Banū Sahm, especially 
                                                        
938 Muqātil, Wujūh, 36-37. 
939 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2/236. 
940 It is interesting that the names Muqātil mentions here are those figures who, he believes, had been 
divinized and worshipped by different groups of people. Muqātil’s mentioning of these names is to argue 
for their being parts of God’s creation who have worshipped him as servants (muqirrun lahū bi al-
‘ubūdiyyah). In fact, these figures had been so celebrated in the Qur’an and in previous scriptures because 
of their total devotion to God. See Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/463, 581; 2/640, 3/75, 4/926, etc.  
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Ibn al-Za‛barā, who confronted the Prophet when he told them that they and the idols 
they worshipped would become the fuel of Jahannam. Ibn al-Za‛barā questioned the 
Prophet whether that punishment applied only to them or to other people who worshipped 
similar deities. The Prophet told them that all of them would be in Jahannam. In response, 
Ibn al-Za‛barā argued that they were fine with that as long as ‛Īsā and his mother 
Maryam, whom the Prophet respected and were worshipped by the Christians, as well as 
‛Uzayr and angels who were similarly worshiped by people [the Jews], would be with 
them in Jahannam. It was to deny their claim that Q21:101 was revealed, arguing instead 
that ‛Īsā, ‛Uzayr, Maryam, and angels have been promised paradise.941 God’s promising 
them paradise suggests that they are God’s creation, just like any other creation that 
deserves to be entering it. Q53:31 threatens those who have committed shirk (asā’ū bimā 
‛amilū), in this case by worshipping angels and expecting their intercession, with 
punishment, and it promises those who uphold tawḥīd (aḥsanū) paradise.942 Q55:60 
similarly emphasizes that the reward for the people of tawḥīd (jazā’ al-iḥsān ya‛nī jazā’ 
ahl al-tawḥīd) is nothing but paradise (illā al-iḥsān) in the hereafter.943 Thus, in all of 
these verses, Muqātil interprets al-ḥusnā as paradise, the promised reward for aḥsanū, 
that is, those who upheld tawḥīd during their lives in the world. There is a close 
connection between the meaning of al-ḥasanah as tawḥīd and the meaning of al-ḥusnā as 
jannah as the reward for upholding tawḥīd. Furthermore, Muqātil appears to create an 
irony, especially for other religious communities, by putting ‛Īsā, ‛Uzayr, Maryam, and 
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943 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 4/204. 
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angels as parts of those promised with paradise because of their total devotion to God by 
upholding tawḥīd, while people worshipped them as divinities in addition to God, who 
urged them to worship Him alone. 
Another derivative of al-ḥasanah, ḥasanan has three meanings, namely haqqan 
(truth), muḥtasiban (expecting God’s reward), and al-jannah (paradise).944 Ḥasanan 
means truth in two verses, Q2:83 and 20:86; Muqātil interprets the term ḥasanan in 
Q2:83, revealed in relation the Jews of Mūsā’s contemporaries, as telling people the truth 
about Muhammad [with regard to his legitimacy for prophethood], and ḥasanan in 20:86 
as mere truth, God’s true promise. 945 Here, Muqātil associates the meaning of ḥasanan 
with truth in general, and especially the truth of Muhammad’s prophethood (taṣdīq) 
which constitute another element of īmān, in addition to tawḥīd. As such, the root ḥ-s-n 
incorporates both meanings of tawḥīd and taṣdīq that Muqātil has consistently advocating 
throughout his major commentaries against two constituting elements of kufr, namely 
shirk and takdhīb. 
Ḥasanan means expecting God’s reward (muḥtasiban) in Q2:245, 57:11, and 
64:17. Q2:245 was revealed, according to Muqātil, in relation to Abū al-Daḥdāh, who 
gave the better garden of the two that he had hoping for the better reward in paradise.946 
Q57: 11 communicates a similar message that, according to Muqātil, was revealed in 
relation to the same Abū al-Daḥdāḥ.947 Q64:17 states that besides multiplying the reward 
                                                        
944 Muqātil, Wujūh, 45-46. 
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947 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 4/239. 
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of charity, God will also forgive the giver’s sin, for God is grateful (shakūr) for what they 
did.948 Thus, the meaning muḥtasiban seems to go against the tendency among some 
people who believed in Muhammad’s teachings. But they sometimes expected rewards, 
such as praise, from ther fellow human beings when they performed good deeds, as I 
discussed in relation to shirk al-riyā’ above. The last meaning of ḥasanan, namely 
paradise (al-jannah), appears in Q28:61. The verse, which according to Muqātil 
addressed the Meccan disbelievers, mentions paradise as eternal and a better reward to be 
pursued than the temporary nature of the this world.949 This meaning is similar to one of 
the meanings of al-ḥusnā: paradise. As such, much of the meanings derived from al-
ḥasanah is closely associated with tawḥīd and taṣdīq as well as the reward for their 
performance, namely paradise. This further vindicates Muqātil’s signification of term al-
ḥasanah as the opposition to al-sayyi’ah. As a whole, Muqātil’s interpretation of al-
ḥasanah and its derivatives lines up between the upholding of tawḥīd and taṣdīq 
(constituting īmān), as the truth, and the reward that awaits in the hereafter, the paradise. 
In short, tawḥīd leads to goodness (al-khayr).   
Derivatives of al-sayyi’ah: al-sū’ and al-sayyi’āt 
Al-sū’ (“bad”) has eleven meanings, namely shiddah (distress), ‘aqran 
(slaughter), al-zinā (adultery), al-baraṣ (leprosy), al-‘adhāb (punishment), al-shirk 
(associating God with creation), al-shatm (cursing), bi’sa (the worst), al-dhanb min al-
mu’min (the believer’s sin), al-ḍurr (hardship), al-qatl wa al-hazīmah (murder and 
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defeat).950 All of these meanings send negative connotations. For the purpose of our 
study, one is most relevant—that is, al-shirk—and three others which are closely related 
to al-shirk, namely al-shiddah, al-‛adhāb, and bi’sa. 
Al-sū’ means al-shirk in Q16:28 and 30:10. The two verses assert that disbelievers 
who committed shirk would be punished in the Jahannam, despite their denial of both 
offense and its punishment.951 The three supporting meanings of al-sū’, namely al-
shiddah (distress), al‛adhāb (punishment), and bi’sa (the worst reward), in general refer 
to the severity of such punishment (al‛adhāb) that those who committed shirk would 
receive in the worst (bi’sa) abode, that is, the Jahannam (sū’ al-dār, ya‛nī sharr al-dār 
jahannam).952 As such, al-sū’ offers meanings that tie together shirk and the grievous 
punishment that awaits its perpetrators in the hereafter. This is in a stark contrast to al-
ḥasanah and its derivatives, which refer to the upholding of tawḥīd and the reward that 
awaits believers in paradise. In short, shirk only brings evil in all its manifestations. 
The last derivative of al-sayyi’ah is al-sayyi’āt. It has five meanings, namely al-
shirk (associating God with creation), al-‛adhāb (punishment), al-ḍurr (hardship), al-
sharr (evil), and ityān al-fāḥishah fi adbār al-rijāl (anal sex between men). Some of the 
meanings of al-sayyi’āt are similar to those of al-sū’ discussed above, especially al-shirk, 
al-‛adhāb, al-ḍurr, and al-sharr. These meanings equally suggest the close association of 
shirk and the severe punishment that it entails in the hereafter. As such, the meanings of 
al-sayyi’ah and its derivatives offer a stark contrast to those Muqātil assigns to al-
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ḥasanah and its derivatives. The general significance that we may gain from from al-
ḥasanah wa al-sayyi’ah along with their derivatives is the opposition of tawḥīd and shirk 
along with reward and punishment that each leads to. In short, these two opposing terms 
communicate well Muqātil’s theological concerns that have undergirded his exegetical 
endeavors.     
Al-ẓulumāt wa al-nūr and their derivatives 
Another pair of oppositions that points to tawḥīd and shirk, or rather shirk and 
tawḥīd, is al-ẓulumāt wa al-nūr. This entry has two meanings; first is al-shirk 
(associating God with creation) and al-īmān (belief or faith), and, second is al-layl (night) 
and al-nahār (noon).953 It appears that of the two meanings only one is relevant to our 
current discussion, namely al-shirk and al-īmān, although the second meaning may well 
imply that shirk is dark—expressed by the idea of night (layl)—and īmān is bright—
suggested by the idea of noon (nahār).  
Muqātil mentions three verses where al-ẓulumāt wa al-nūr takes place and whose 
meaning is al-shirk and al-īmān; that is, Q2:257, 33:43, and 14:5. Q2:257 states that God 
is the ally of those who believe: He brings them out of the depths of darkness and into the 
light, ya‛nī from al-shirk to al-īmān, by sending Muhammad as a messenger. But those 
who disbelieved—the Jews—their ally was al-ṭāghūt, or Ka‘b ibn al-Ashraf, who brought 
people in the light of believing in Muhammad prior to his mission, to the darkness that is 
rejecting him (kufr bihī) after he was sent. Consequently, they would be the inhibitants of 
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the Fire and there they will remain.954 Q33: 43, revealed to the Medinan Anṣār (Helpers), 
states that God forgives them and He also orders the angels to ask forgiveness for them in 
order for Him to bring them out from al-shirk to al-īmān.955 Q14: 5 retells the story of 
Mūsā whom God sent with His signs or miracles in order to lead his people from al-shirk 
to al-īmān by reminding them of the punishment inflicted upon past nations, but also of 
God’s grace which had saved them from the grievous torment that Fir‛aun inflicted upon 
them.956  
Thus, al-ẓulumāt wa al-nūr refers to al-shirk to al-īmān. The movement from al-
shirk to al-īmān is possible only through God’s will, undertaken through the sending of 
prophets who would provide human beings with guidance. On the contrary, the 
disbelievers whose ally was al-ṭāghūt led people from al-īmān to shirk or kufr. Here, the 
opposition is between al-īmān and either shirk or kufr. As I explained before, belief (al-
īmān) is always presented as one totality, while its opposite, disbelief, is always 
distinguished, whether it is in the form of al-shirk and al-kufr.957 Furthermore, Muqātil 
distinguishes each of al-shirk and al-kufr into three different kinds from the most serious, 
religious offense to the lesser one; for kufr (disbelief), the threefold distinction is: total 
disbelief, rebellious disbelief, and ungratefulness; for shirk (associanism), the threefold 
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distinction is: total associonism, obeying creation without worship, and expecting reward 
from fellow human beings. On the contrary, when presenting the idea of belief (īmān) 
and islām (submission to God), Muqātil appears to be insisting that there is only one 
correct way of belief and submission, and that is by upholding tawḥīd (strict monotheism) 
and taṣdīq (accepting Muhammad’s prophethood). That is why, apart from a possibility 
that the extant manuscripts of Muqātil’s Wujūh did not include everything that he had 
actually written, I also posit that Muqātil might have intentionally excluded the two terms 
al-īmān and al-islām to anticipate misunderstanding of the polysemicity of the two terms, 
which also suggests insincere belief and submission, in addition to sincere belief and 
submission.    
Derivatives of al-ẓulumāt: al-ẓulumāt, al-ẓālimīn, al-ẓulm 
There are three entries in Muqātil’s Wujūh that are derivatives of al-ẓulumāt, 
namely al-ẓulumāt, al-ẓālimīn, and al-ẓulm, based on the order of their appearance in the 
commentary. Al-ẓulumāt has two meanings: al-ahwāl (terror or horror) and threefold 
property (thalath khiṣāl).958 The two meanings of al-ẓulumāt, however, appear to be not 
too relevant to our discussion of Muqātil’s exegetical and theological concerns. But if we 
may understand something from the two meanings of al-ẓulumāt here and their relation to 
the metaphoric use of al-zulumāt to refer to al-shirk or al-kufr, it is perhaps the 
connotation of deep darkness and terror or horror that such an offense entails that the 
Qur’an intends to communicate to its audience. The obscurity and danger of al-shirk and 
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al-kufr are then contrasted with the pleasant and clear quality of light al-nūr not only in 
itself but also in its effect to other entities that surround it. Thus, true belief is depicted 
not only as having a clear foundation but also as bringing advantages to its holder.  
The next derivative of al-ẓulumāt is al-ẓālimīn. It has seven meanings: polytheists 
(al-mushrikīn), a Muslim who wrongs himself with a sin other than shirk (al-muslim 
alladhī yaẓlimu nafsahū bi dhanbin yuṣībuhū min ghayr shirk), those who wrong other 
people (alladhīna yaẓlimūn al-nās), those who commit a wrongdoing other than shirk 
(yaḍurrūna wa yanquṣūna anfusahum min ghayr shirk), those who commit a wrongdoing 
in the form of shirk and takdhīb (yaẓlimūna anfusahum bi al-shirk wa al-takdhīb), those 
who reject/rebel (yajḥadūn), and thieves (al-sāriqīn).959 In general, these meanings can be 
categorized into shirk and non-shirk. Our focus of discussion is on the meanings related 
to shirk and kufr, namely al-mushrikīn, yaẓlimūna anfusahum bi al-shirk wa al-takdhīb 
and yajhadūn. 
Al-ẓālimīn means al-mushrikīn in Q7:44, 11:18, 76:31, and many other verses. 
Q7:44 describes a dialogue between the inhibitants of paradise and of hell in which the 
former tell the latter that they are receiving what God has promised them when they lived 
in the world, and ask the latter whether God’s promise to them is equally true. The 
inhibitants of hell confirm that it is indeed true. In the midst of it, an angel announces that 
God’s curse is upon the polytheists.960 Likewise, Q11:18 also states that God’s curse is 
upon those polytheists who made up a lie that Allāh has an associate (bi anna ma‛ahū 
                                                        
959 Muqātil, Wujūh, 79-81. 
960 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2/38. 
  
333 
sharīkan).961 Q76:31 asserts that God admits whomsoever He wills into paradise, but as 
for polytheists He has prepared for them a painful punishment.962 These verses show that 
in these sense of polytheists, al-ẓālimīn generates the idea that polytheism is cursed and 
finally is leading to punishment in hell. This reminds us of the meanings of al-sayy’ah 
and its derivatives that associate closely between polytheism or disbelief with punishment 
in hell. 
Al-ẓālimīn means yaẓlimūna anfusahum bi al-shirk wa al-takdhīb (those who 
commit a wrongdoing in the form of shirk and takdhīb) in Q43: 76. The verse argues that 
God never wronged all disbelievers, in the sense that His punishment is well founded, 
that is, due to their refusal to believe (li kufrihim wa takdhībihim).963 This meaning of al-
ẓālimīn is also reminiscent of the meanings of al-sayyi’ah and its derivatives, which point 
to shirk, and takdhīb, the two constituting elements of kufr (disbelief) that Muqātil has 
persistently attempted to condemn. 
The last derivative of al-ẓulumāt in Muqātil’s Wujūh is al-ẓulm. It has four 
meanings, namely polytheism (al-shirk), a person’s wrongdoing other than shirk (ẓulm 
al-‛abd nafsahū bi dhanbin yuṣībuhū min ghayr shirk), that which wrongs other people 
(alladḥī yaẓlim al-nās), and reduction (al-naqṣ). Of four, only one concerns us here, that 
is, al-shirk. Al-ẓulm means al-shirk in Q6:82 and 31:13. Q6:82 was in a context Ibrāhīm 
told his people that only those who worshipped the one and only God and did not mix 
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their faith with idolatry would be secure, because they are rightly guided.964 In Q31:13, 
while he passes the term al-ẓulm without any comment, Muqātil does suggest that it is 
related to the prohibition of associating God with others.965 This meaning of al-ẓālimīn 
indicates that polytheism is a misguided act that leads to further wrongdoings and finally 
to punishment. That is why Ibrāhīm told his people that, unlike monotheism, polytheism 
does not confer security (al-amn). On the contrary, as the meanings of other derivatives 
of al-ẓulumāt demonstrate, polytheism is cursed and is finally rewarded with punishment 
in hell. 
Derivatives of al-nūr: al-nār 
There is only one entry in Muqātil’s Wujūh that is derivative of al-nūr, namely al-
nār. It has three meanings, namely light (al-nūr), mathalun ḍarabahū Allāh ‛Azza wa 
Jalla li ijtimā’ al-Yahūd ‛alā ‘adāwat al-nabī SAW (a metaphor that God made with 
regard to the Jewish conspiracy against the Prophet Muhammad), and burning fire (al-nār 
allatī taḥriqu).966 In all cases to which Muqātil refers, the term al-nār in the Qur’an offers 
more negative connotations than the term al-nūr that is always positive in its meanings.  
Al-nār means light (al-nūr) in three places in the Qur’an: 20:10, 27:7, and 28:29. 
In Q20:10, Muqātil interprets the fire (al-nār) that Mūsā saw in the Sacred Land as the 
light of God (nūr rabb al-‘ālamīn).967 Likewise, in Q27:7, which also tells the same story 
of Mūsā seeing fire (al-nār), Muqātil interprets it as the light of God (nūr rabb al-
                                                        
964 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/572-73. 
965 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/434. 
966 Muqātil, Wujūh, 215-16. 
967 Muqātl, Tafsīr, 3/22. 
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‘izzah).968 In Q28:29, which also deals with the same event that Mūsā saw fire, Muqātil 
interprets it as the light in the Sacred Land (al-nūr bi arḍ al-muqaddasah).969 In all three 
verses, the fire (al-nār) is the one that Mūsā saw, and Muqātil has interpreted it as the 
light of God in the Sacred Land. As such, the fire represents the light of God, a metaphor 
of God’s guidance closely associated with Him, which eventually will lead Mūsā to a 
series of great events up to the freedom that the Israelites gained from slavery of the 
Pharaoh until they reclaimed the Sacred Land. In short, al-nār in the sense of nūr al-rabb 
is a liberating light of guidance. 
Al-nār means the Jewish conspiracy against the Prophet, appearing in Q5:64. The 
verse denies the statement of the Jews, such as Ibn Ṣūriyā and Finḥāṣ, that God is tight-
fisted by not giving them ample provision. Instead, the Qur’an argues that God’s hands 
are open wide: He gives as He pleases. But God, indeed, held up their provision after 
they made lawful what God had made unlawful, that is when they commited shirk and 
bribery to incluence legal decisions, upon which their pious and scholars were silent. 
Furthermore, Muqātil maintains that the revelation of the Qur’an—especially those 
pertaining to the matter of rajm (stoning), al-dimā’ (blood feud), and na‘t Muḥammad 
(the description of Muhammad in the Torah) would increase defiance and insolence in 
many of them, especially the Jews of Banū al-Naḍīr. Consequently, God planted hatred 
among the Jews and Christians until the Day of Resurrection by which they hated one 
another. As a result, when they set up a conspiracy against the Prophet, God would put it 
                                                        
968 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/296. 
969 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/343. 
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out.970 Thus, this meaning suggests the idea of takdhīb, that is, rejection of Muhammad’s 
prophethood. In this regard, unlike in the case of Mūsā that is guiding and liberating, al-
nār means something that is flaming and dangerous. It is a burning light in the breasts of 
the Jews (and the Christians) to stop Muhammad’s mission, in part because they objected 
some of the teachings, which were written in their own scripture, that Muhammad wanted 
to reestablish, including stoning and blood feud money. Accordingly, they denied that 
Muhammad was ever mentioned in their scripture. Thus, pointing to a negative meaning, 
the fire in this case is a conspiracy against Muhammad’s prophetical mission, which is 
another way to say takdhīb, that is, refusal to believe in Muhammad. When related to a 
protagonist, fire means guiding light; but when it is associated with antagonists, it is a 
burning rage and rejection, including that of Muhammad’s prophethood. 
Al-nār means burning fire in Q2:24, 66:10, and 85:5. In Q2:24 it is stated that this 
fire is hellfire prepared for the disebelivers who rejected tawḥīd (u‛iddat li al-kāfirīn).971 
In 66:10, Muqātil maintains, the disbelievers for whom the fire was prepared were the 
wives of the Prophets Nūḥ and Lūṭ who betrayed their husbands in terms of faith. 
Consequently, they too would be thrown into the hellfire, despite their being the wives of 
prophets. This verse, Muqātil argues, was to remind ‛Ā’ishah and Ḥafṣah, two of the 
Prophet Muhammad’s wives, of the consequences that they might face if they protested 
against the Prophet’s decisions (bi taẓahurihimā ‛alā al-nabī). If they kept doing so, they 
might well be thrown into hellfire despite the fact that they are the Prophet’s wives.972 In 
                                                        
970 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/490. 
971 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/94. 
972 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 4/379. 
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this respect, fire offers a literal meaning pointing to the hellfire, in contrast to the fire in 
the case of Mūsā and Jewish conspiracy, which is metaphorical of guidance and rejection, 
respectively. But in all cases, fire is associated with the prophets as protagonists—Mūsā 
and Muhammad—in relation their prophetical task, both in public and domestic domain. 
But both protagonists, i.e., the prophets, and the antagonists, namely the Jews and the 
rebellious wives of the prophets, shape the intended meanings of fire. In general, the 
meanings of al-nār in this case suggest a more negative meaning than a positive one, and, 
as such, it is rather counterproductive to the meanings of al-nūr that is always positive, as 
the opposition of al-ẓulumāt. 
Al-amr bi al-ma‘rūf wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar  
The last oppositional entry, related to the opposition of tawḥīd and shirk and of 
taṣdīq and takdhīb, is al-amr bi al-ma‘rūf wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar (commanding right 
and forbidding wrong). Muqātil assigns this phrase two meanings: first, al-amr bi al-
tawḥīd wa al-nahy ‛an al-shirk (commanding tawḥīd and forbidding shirk), and second, 
al-amr bi ittibā‘ al-nabī SAW wa al-taṣdīq bihī wa al-nahy ‘an al-takdhīb bihī 
(commanding the following and acceptance of the Prophet and forbidding the rejection of 
him).973  
The first meaning, al-amr bi al-tawḥīd wa al-nahy ‛an al-shirk (commanding 
tawḥīd and forbidding shirk) occurs, according to Muqātil, in Q3:110, 9:112, 31:13 and 
17. Q3:110 was revealed in relation to the Medinan Jews who told some of the Muslims, 
                                                        
973 Muqātil, Wujūh, 74-75. 
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including ‛Abd Allāh ibn Mas‛ūd, Mu‛ādh ibn Jabal, and Sālim mawlā Abū Ḥudhayfah, 
that their religion (Judaism) was better than that of the Muslims. In response, the verse 
argues that the Muslim community is the best community singled out for humanity 
commanding the people to al-īmān and forbiding them from shirk, in addition to its 
upholding tawhīd. The verse also advises the Jews to believe in Muhammad and the truth 
that he brought. Still, only a few Jews believed, and the majority remained sinners.974 
Q9:112 mentions those who are promised paradise, namely those who repent from their 
sins, those who uphold tawḥīd, those who fast, those who perform the obligatory prayers, 
those who command belief in tawhīd and forbid shirk, and those who maintain God’s 
limits. These are the recipients of the good news of paradise.975 Curiously, Muqātil 
mentions Q31:13 as an evidence for the meaning of the phrase al-amr bi al-ma‛rūf wa al-
nahy ‛an al-munkar although the verse does not contain any terms from this phrase. 
Q31:13, however, conveys the message that is at the core of al-amr bi al-ma‘rūf wa al-
nahy ‘an al-munkar, that is, Luqmān’s advice to his son not to commit shirk. Q31:17 
conveys Luqmān’s advise to his son to perform prayers, command tawḥīd and forbid 
shirk, and to be patient in enduring any hardship in doing so.976 Muqātil seems to suggest 
that Islam is the religion in which the performance of commanding right and forbidding 
wrong is actively carried out. Furthermore, he suggests that this doctrine distinguishes 
Muslim community and, at least, the other two religious communities of the Jews and 
Christians who, in his view, do not cherish this doctrine as much as the Muslim 
                                                        
974 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/295. 
975 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2/198-99. 
976 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/435. 
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community. In his legal commentary, as I discussed earlier in the previous chapter, 
Muqātil advocates the pacifist approach in carrying out this doctrine primarily because it 
is easily misunderstood as condoning the use of violence and thus abused and abusive. 
Muqātil’s non-violent approach in this respect is very important since, despite the content 
of the doctrine is of the ultimate significance to him, that is, the propagation of tawḥīḍ 
and the condemnation of shirk, he is not tempted to justify everything to achieve that end. 
Instead, he reverses the priority that the tradition-based, threefold attitude toward facing 
wrongdoings espouses, and recommends the bottom up approach, from the allegedly 
weakest manifestation of īmān, namely denial in one’s heart to speech and finally act. As 
long as his legal commentary is concerned, Muqātil’s starts the application of the doctrine 
commanding right and forbidding wrong from individuals before it is applied in society 
at large. What is fundamental in Muqātil’s framework is that every individual has access 
to good education so that he or she has a qualified knowledge of what is right and wrong 
and then lives accordingly. As such, Muqātil’s approach is more preventive than curative.   
The second meaning, al-amr bi ittibā‘ al-nabī SAW wa al-taṣdīq bihī wa al-nahy 
‘an al-takdhīb bihī (commanding the following and acceptance of the Prophet and 
forbidding the rejection of him) appears in Q3:113-114 and 9:71. Q3:113-114 describe 
two different groups of Jews, one which rejected Muhammad’s prophethood, and another 
which believed in Muhammad and followed him. The believers among the Jews were 
upright, and they recited God’s revelations during the night, bowed down in worship, 
believed in tawḥīd and the Last Day, commanded belief in Muhammad (īmānan bi 
Muḥammad SAW) forbade the rejection of him (takdhīb bi Muḥammad SAW), and were 
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quick to do good deeds. These people are among the righteous.977 Likewise, Q9:71 states 
that those who uphold tawḥīd, men and women, support each other, command belief in 
Muhammad and forbid the rejection of him, keep up their prayers, pay the prescribed 
alms, and obey God and His Messenger.978 The believers who commanded taṣdīq 
Muḥammad and forbade takdhīb Muḥammad are contrasted with the hypocrites 
(munāfiqūn) in Q9:67, whose identity Muqātil does not mention, who commanded 
takdhīb Muḥammad and forbade taṣdīq Muḥammad.979  
Thus, if the first meaning of al-amr bi al-ma‘rūf wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar is 
commanding tawhīd and forbidding shirk, the second meaning is commanding taṣdīq 
Muḥammad and forbidding takdhīb Muḥammad. The two meanings of al-amr bi al-
ma‘rūf wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar are the best representatation of Muqātil exegetical 
thrust and his tehological concerns that have undergirded his exegetical endeavors. 
Muqātil has oriented the whole interpretive enterprise that he carries out toward 
propagating īmān and condemnation of kufr, the two constituting elements of each of 
which have been well summarized by the two meanings of this doctrine which contrast 
tawḥīd and shirk, as well as taṣdīq and takdhīb. Once more, the oppositional entry very 
much vindicates Muqātil’s exegetical thrust and theological concerns in a way that is not 
achieved at through other entries. These oppositional entries best represents Muqātil’s 
much embraced binary opposition that tends to exhaust the two extreme positions to seek 
further possibilities that will overcome the stalemate that such opposition will likely face. 
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In other words, this binary opposition approach represents Muqātil’s uncompromising 
theological views with regard to the teachings that Muhammad and the Qur’an brought, 
as well as previous prophets and scriptures, against the alleged deviations perpetrated by 
the followers of the earlier prophets, such as Jews and Christians. His search for 
alternatives that go beyond such a binary opposition reflects Muqātil’s pragmatism with 
regard to legal decisions that will enable these different religious communities to coexist 
and build relationship. 
Derivative of al-amr bi al-ma‛rūf wa al-nahy ‛an al-munkar: al-amr and al-
ma‛rūf 
There are two other entries in Muqātil’s wujūh which share the same roots with 
some terms in the phrasal entry al-amr bi al-ma‛rūf wa al-nahy ‛an al-munkar, namely 
al-amr and al-ma‛rūf. Al-amr has thirteen meanings, some of which are indeed relevant 
to our discussion of Muqātil’s exegetical and theological concerns. On the other hand, al-
ma‛rūf, which has four meanings, offers no relevance at all.980 I will therefore deal only 
with the relevant meanings of al-amr in the following. 
The meanings of al-amr include: dīn al-islām (“the religion of Islam”), al-qawl 
(saying/speech), al-‛adhāb (punishment),‘Īsā ‛alayhi al-salām (Jesus), al-qatl bi Badr 
                                                        
980 The four meanings that Muqātil assigns to al-ma‘rūf are as follows: necessity (al-farḍ), that divorced 
women are allowed to wear make-up after the expiricy of her wating period to be married again (an 
tuzayyin al-mar’ah nafsahā ba‘d inqiḍā’ al-‘iddah), good promise/word (al-‘idah al-ḥasanah), and what is 
affordable (mā tayassara ‘alā al-insān). The first meaning is related to the poor guardian of orphans’ 
property who is allowed to take from that property only out of necessity (farḍ). The second to the fourth 
meanings of al-ma‘rūf are related to the divorce process between a man and a woman; the second meaning 
points to the time when a divorcee is allowed to beautify herself again, after her waiting period expires, in 
order to be married again; the third meaning is related to the divorcing husband who is commanded to treat 
his divorced wife with kindness and offer some material gifts affordable to him. See Muqātil, Wujūh, 75-6.  
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(the battle of Badr), fatḥ Makkah (the conquest of Mecca), qatl Banī Qurayẓah wa jalā’ 
ahl al-Naḍīr (the murder of (Jewish) Banū Qurayẓah and expulsion of (Jewish) people of 
al-Naḍīr [fromMedina]), al-qiyāmah (The End Day), al-qaḍā’ (God’s decision), al-waḥy 
(revelation), al-amr bi‛aynihī (matter), and al-dhanb (sin).981 Of these, the ones that are 
relevant to our discussion of Muqātil’s theology are: dīn al-islām, al-qatl bi Badr, and 
qatl Banī Qurayẓah wa jalā’ ahl al-Naḍīr. In general, the meanings of al-amr, especially 
exemplified here, provide an assertion of the imminent victory of Islam over its 
opponents, be they Meccan disbelievers, the Jews, or the hypocrites who refused to 
believe in Muhammad’s mission. Al-amr offers meanings that set up an argument for the 
truth of Islam against other religious traditions, which are basically the defiance of this 
primordial religion after people split it up into different sects. 
Dīn al-islām is implied as the meaning of al-amr in Q9:48, 23:53, and 21:93. 
Q9:48 discusses the attitude of the hypocrites who, in addition to their reluctance to 
participate in war with the Prophet, always attempted to stir up kufr (al-fitnah), especially 
when the mission of the Prophet and the Muslims did not work well, as in the case of the 
battle of Tābūk. The Qur’an asserts that these hypocrites, who are described in 9:44 as 
disbelieving in God and tawḥīd as well as the Day of Resurrection, will keep doing so 
until Islam is victorious.982 Q23:53 describes the people’s defiance of the true religion 
(islām), by splitting their community into sects, namely Judaism, Christianity, Sabean, 
Zoroastrianism, and many others.983 Q21:93 conveys a similar message as 22:53 in which 
                                                        
981 Muqātil, Wujūh, 198-200. 
982 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2/172-73. 
983 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/159. 
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people split their true religion (farraqū dīnahum al-islām alladī umirū bihī) into sects.984 
In this case, dīn al-islām is described as the primordial religion of total submission to 
God, taught to the all prophets and written in all scriptures, including Muhammad and the 
Qur’an. The reluctance of the hypocrites to trust and join the Prophetic cause suggests 
that they did not totally submit to God by following His prophet. The invention of 
sectarian religions, such as Judaism, Christianity, Sabeanism, Zoroastrianism, and others 
is a proof of people’s deviation from the teachings of early prophets and scriptures that 
commanded full submission to God. They have departed from the true, primordial 
religion God had sent them: dīn al-islām.985 In much of his criticism toward non-
Muslims, Muqātil has made it clear that these religious communities have been unfaithful 
to their own scriptures and to the teachings of their prophets, not only in terms of their 
committing shirk—such as divinizing ‘Uzayr and ‘Īsā—but also in their refusal to accept 
Muhammad’s prophethood (takdhīb), as well as their abandoning the some legal 
stipulations written in their scriptures, such as stoning (rajm) and blood feud money 
(diyah). 
Al-amr means al-qatl bi Badr (the battle of Badr) in Q40:78 and 8:44. Q40:78 
maintains that any prophets God had sent would not be able to provide evidence for their 
prophetic claims unless with God’s permission. Likewise, when the Meccan disbelievers 
asked Muhammad to perform a miracle, God told them the same thing. But God also told 
                                                        
984 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/92. 
985 I have discussed, in the second chapter on al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr, Muqātil’s reprimand toward the Jews and 
Christians, as well as other religious communities, for inventing Judaism and Christianity and other 
religions, which he actually considers to be satanic. The only true religion in Muqātil’s view is islām, 
propagated by all prophets and written in all scriptures. 
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them that the punishment for the Meccan disbelievers would soon be realized in the battle 
of Badr to invalidate their claim that there would be no such punishment for them in this 
world.986 Q8:44 maintains that God had preordained the small number of the armies in 
the two warring parties in the battle of Badr to raise the morale of the believers in their 
combat to facilitate the victory of Islam.987 The battle of Badr, unlike any other battles 
during Muhammad’s lifetime, occupies a very significant place in Muqātil’s theological 
framework. It is the worldly punishment that God had promised Muhammad’s opponents, 
when they believed that no such punishment would be inflicted upon them although they 
had frequently challenged Muhammad to send it. In Muqātil’s view, the battle of Badr is 
similar to the punishment inflicted upon the people of previous prophets after they 
rejected their prophetical mission. The battle of Badr, like other punishments meted out 
to bygone communities, is part of sunnat Allāh (“God’s custom”) in which divine 
punishment was sent to the prophet’s community because of their refusal to believe in 
their prophetical teachings, usually after the prophet left them and moved to a new place. 
In the case of Muhammad, the Meccan disbelievers were punished in the battle of Badr, 
in which they suffered a great loss, occurring after Muhammad’s migration to Medina. 
Muqātil’s belief that the battle of Badr was a divine punishment for disbelievers is 
because the conditions of the two armies were not balanced, with the enemy having more 
combatants as well as weaponry. The victory that Muhammad and his followers gained 
was a sort of miracle, and their enemy’s defeat was thus a punishment. 
                                                        
986 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 3/722. 
987 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2/117. 
  
345 
Al-amr means qatl Banī Qurayẓah wa jalā’ ahl al-Naḍīr (the killing of Banū 
Qurayẓah and the expulsion of people of Naḍīr) in Q2:109 and 5:52. Q2:109 was 
revealed in relation to the invitation of some of the Medinan Jews, following Muslim loss 
in the battle of Uḥud—to Ḥudhayfah and ‛Ammār to embrace Judaism back, claiming 
that it was better than the religion Muhammad brought. But Ḥudhayfah and ‛Ammār 
refused their invitation, and they instead reaffirmed their belief in Muhammad and his 
teachings. Q2:109 then advises the believers to avoid the Jews when they ask them to join 
their religion because God willl deal with them due to their rejection of Muhammad and 
Islam. The form of punishment that God would inflict upon the Jews, according to 
Muqātil, was the killing and capture of Banū Qurayẓāh, and the extradition of Banū al-
Naḍīr from Medina to Adhra‛āt and Arīḥā in Syria.988 Like the battle of Badr in relation 
the Meccan disbelievers, the killing of Banū Qurayẓāh and expulsion of Banū al-Naḍīr, 
for Muqātil, are forms of divine punishment to the Jews for their refusal to acknowledge 
Muhammad’s prophethood, in addition to their enmity to and conspiracy against him. 
Such punishment on opponents is an indication of the truth that Muhammad’s prophetical 
mission entailed. 
Interrreligious Words:  Shiya‛an, al-aḥzāb, al-jihād, al-ḥarb      
In this part, I will analyse Muqātil’s Wujūh based on a shared theme rather than its 
linguistic form and the interconnected meanings of the entries, as I have done prior to 
this. Since the major themes that I have decided to tackle in Muqātil’s other 
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commentaries are largely interreligious, I will do exactly the same here. There are four 
entries in Muqātil’s wujūh whose meanings are related directly to interreligious affairs, 
namely shiya‛an, al-aḥzāb, al-jihād, and al-ḥarb.  
The first two entries—namely shiya‛an and al-aḥzāb—are related to the 
fragmented socio-religious groups that Muqatil mentioned in his al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr, and 
with which I have dealt in my discussion of the commentary, especially when I was 
discussing Islam as the primordial religion. There, Muqatil argued that while humanity 
initially shared the same religion—namely islām—people had now fragmented into 
different religious groups: Jews, Christians, Ṣābi’īn, Majūs, and many others.989 The 
main characteristic that these groups shared with each other was the fact that they 
worshipped creations, without or along with their worshiping of God. They were proud of 
who they were and were in competition with one another. In his further explanation of the 
existence of six religious communities, Muqatil mentions that five of them—Jewish, 
Christian, Sabian, Magian, and Polytheist—are “satanic” and only one of them—Islam—
is the religion for God.990 Of the last two entries, al-jihād and al-ḥarb, I have dealt with 
the first in my discussion of Muqātil’s Tafsīr al-Khams Mi’at Āyah. In that legal 
commentary, Muqātil offers two sets of rulings on jihād based on the identity of the 
enemy among non-Muslims. If the enemy is People of Scripture, they have two options 
available, paying jizyah or fighting. However, if the enemy is polytheist, Arab polytheists 
specifically, the choice is to embrace Islam or be killed. In this respect, Muqātil is 
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consistent in stating that for the People of Scripture conversion was not required as long 
as they were willing to live peacefully politically under the Muslim government by 
paying jizyah, while they retained their own faiths. Conversely, the Arab polytheists had 
to convert if they did not want to fight.  
Shiya‘an and al-Aḥzāb 
There is a great similarity between the meanings of the term shiya’an and those of 
the term al-ahzab; they all bring forth negative images of groups that rejected 
Muhammad’s prophethood and fought against him. If the meanings of shiya’an point to 
the fact that these fragmented groups went astray and were therefore punished by God 
due to their acts, the meanings of al-aḥzāb further this negative image, arguing that these 
groups were not only led astray but also hostile to the prophets and their missions. But 
underlying the negative portrayal of these fragmented groups is their rejection of tawḥīd 
and taṣdīq. 
Shiya’an 
The term shiya’an is assigned five meanings, namely firaqan aḥzāban 
(fragmented groups), al-jins (race or stock), and al-millah (sect or denomination), 
tashayyu‛ or tafashshaw (spreading or circulating), and al-ahwā’ al-mukhtalifah (varied 
inclinations).991 Shiya‛an means fragmented groups (firaqan ahzaban) in Q6:159, 30:32, 
28:4, and 15:10.992 Q6:159, according to Muqātil, describes those who dissected the 
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primordial religion, al-islām, into different sects, such as Judaism and Christianity, that 
they later embraced, prior to the prophetic mission of Muhammad. Consequently, these 
people were fragmented—into Jewish, Christian, Sabian, and many other groups—and 
the Qur’an excludes Muhammad from either or all of them together.993 Q30:32, according 
to Muqātil, invited the Meccan disbelievers to uphold tawḥīd and not to be part of those 
who had split the primordial religion and become fragmented groups.994 Q28:4 provides a 
different picture of the fragmented groups created by Fir’aun in Egypt in which the 
Egyptians harassed the Jews by killing the latter’s male babies.995 Q15:10 tells 
Muhammad that the prophets before him were also sent to similar fragmented people of 
past nations.996  
The second meaning of shiya‛an is race or stock (al-jins), and it can be 
encountered in Q28:15. 997 The verse describes how Mūsā found two people, who came 
from different ethnic backgrounds, fighting. One of the two belonged to Mūsā’s own 
race, that is, of the Israelite descent, and the other was of the Coptic race.998 The third 
meaning is sect or denomination (al-millah).999 Such can be found in four different places 
in the Qur’an: Q54:51, 34:54, 19:69, and 37:83. Q54:51 reminds the people of Mecca that 
God had punished people like them in the past (‛adhdhabnā ikhwānakum ahla 
millatikum) because they rejected their prophets.1000 Q34:54 conveys a similar message 
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that the past nations had been punished due their disbelief.1001 19:69 predicts that the 
fragmented groups will be punished due to their disobedience.1002 Q37:83 offers a 
different kind of a group (shī‛ah), in a more positive tone, for Ibrāhīm was said to be of 
the same shī‛ah as Nūḥ, in the sense that Ibrāhīm embraced the same religion as did Nūḥ 
(Ibrāhīm ‛ala millat Nūḥ).1003 Thus, shiya‛an means al-millah in both positive and 
negative tones, pointing to the fact that these people were of the same religious faith. 
The fourth meaning of shiya‛an is spreading or circulating (tafasshaw).1004 Such 
is expressed in Q24:19. The verse, according to Muqātil, describes those who liked to 
spread indecency among the believers, especially in relation to their accusation of 
adultery between ‛Ā’ishah and Ṣafwān.1005 The fifth and last meaning is varied 
inclinations (al-ahwā’ al-mukhtalifah).1006 This can be found in Q6:65, which states that 
such varied inclinations are a symptom of discordant factions which accordingly lead to a 
violent conflict with one another.  In a way, the discordant factions that lead to conlict is 
a form of punishment from God.1007  
Thus, as mentioned above, the term shiya’an (sing. shī‛ah) points to five 
meanings: fragmented groups, human race/stock, sect/denomination, 
circulation/spreading, and varied inclinations. These senses in general, as far as the 
examples of Qur’anic uses that Muqātil mentioned are concerned, sustain a rather 
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negative connotation, not just difference or plurality of being. The entry shiya‛an points 
to competing religious factions, fighting human races, punished religious groups, and 
circulating indecency. There is a consistently negative tone in Muqatil’s explanations of 
the fragmented religious groups other than Islam in this entry. 
Al-Aḥzāb 
The term al-aḥzāb has four meanings.1008  First, it means the disbelievers of Banū 
Umayyah, Banū al-Mughīrah, Āl Abī Ṭalḥah, all of who were from the Quraysh tribe.1009 
Examples can be encountered in Q13:36, 11:17, and 38:11. Q13:36 describes two groups 
of people; the first was the believers of People of Scripture, such as ‛Abd Allāh ibn 
Salām and his companions, who rejoiced for the revelation of the Qur’an; second, was the 
so-called al-ahzāb, consisting of Ibn Umayyah, Ibn al-Mughīrah, Āl ibn Abī Ṭalḥah ibn 
al-‛Uzzā ibn Quṣay, who rejected al-Raḥmān, the Day of Resurrection, and Muhammad’s 
prophethood. It was to the second group that Muhammad was commanded to announce 
his mission for upholding tawḥīd and condemning shirk.1010 Q11:17 also mentions the 
same two groups of people, the believers among ahl al-Tawrāh who believed in the 
Qur’an, and the members of al-ahzāb who disbelieved in it. These disbelievers of the 
Quraish said that the Qur’an was not from God, but from Satan, called al-ray.1011 Q38:11 
states that the ahzāb is a weak alliance and will be crushed. Indeed, they were later 
defeated in the battle of Badr.1012 In this respect, al-ahzāb points to the Quraishī 
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disebelievers. 
 The second meaning of al-aḥzāb points to Christian sects (al-Naṣārā min al-
aḥzāb): Nestorian, Jacobite, and Melkite.1013 Instances can be found in Q19:37, and 
43:65. Q19:37 describes how the Christians formed factions around ‛Īsā (tahazzabū fī 
‛Īsā) and, in doing so, they disobeyed ‛Īsā’s command to uphold tawḥīd. The Nestorians 
said: ‛Isā is son of God (‛Īsā ibn Allāh).  The Mar-Jacobites said: ‛Īsa is God (‛Īsā huwa 
Allāh). The Melkites said: God is one of the three (inna Allāh thālith thalāthah).1014 
Q43:65 conveys a similar message in relation to these three factions of Christianity, but 
with a statement slightly different from that of the Mar-Jacobites. In his commentary on 
19:37, Muqātil describes the Mar-Jacobites as saying: ‛Isā is God (‛Īsā huwa Allāh), but 
in his commentary on 43:65, he describes them as saying: God is ‛Isā son of Maryam 
(inna Allāh ‛Īsā ibn Maryam).1015 In this regard, al-aḥzāb means that the Christian sects 
that had divinized ‘Īsā and deviated from his own teaching of tawḥīd. 
The third meaning of al-aḥzāb signifies the disbelievers of the people of Nūḥ, of 
‛Ā, of Thamūd, up to the people of Shu‛ayb.1016 This can found in Q38:12-13 and 40:30-
31. Q38:12-13 explained that of these past nations rejected their prophets, and therefore 
deserved punishment. This verse, according to Muqātil, was meant as a consolation for 
Muhammad who was facing the rejection of his own people so that he might be patient 
knowing that all prophets before him faced the same challenge (yu‛azī al-nabī li yaṣbira 
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‛ala takdhīb kuffār Makkah).1017 Q40:30-31 tell the story of a Coptic believer who, 
having hidden his belief for a century, told the Egyptians that he feared their rejection of 
Mūsā would lead to punishment inflicted upon the past nations (yawm al-aḥzāb).1018 In 
this respect, al-aḥzāb refers to bygone people who rejected their prophets, told in the 
Qur’an to offer solace for Muhammad that he was not alone in facing that rejection. 
Finally, the meaning of al-aḥzāb points to Abū Sufyān in relation to Arab and 
Jewish tribes, who teamed up against the Prophet in the Battle of Trench, in which they 
fought in three places.1019 This can be found in Q33:10 and 20. Q33:10 describes how the 
ahẓāb attacked the Prophet and believers during the Battle of Trench: a group attacked 
from the top of the valley in the east, under the command of Mālik ibn ‛Awf al-Naḍarī, 
‛Uyaynah ibn Ḥisn al-Fazārī (who brought a thousand people from Gaṭafān), Ṭulayḥah 
ibn Khuwaylid al-Asadī, Ḥuyay ibn Akhṭab from the Jewish Banū Qurayẓah, and  ‛Āmir 
ibn al-Ṭufayl who led people from Hawāzin. Another group attacked from the bottom of 
the valley on the west, led by Abū Sufyān who coordinated the Meccan people and Yazīd 
ibn Khulays who led the Quraish tribe, and another group, under the leadership of al-
A‛war al-Sulamī, attacked from the trench itself. This massive attack created some doubts 
among the believers.1020 Q33:20, however, describes how, due to God’s help by 
implanting fear in the hearts of the enemy and His sending of strong wind and an 
invisible troop of angels, the army of aḥzāb went back to Mecca, leaving the trench.1021 
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In this regard, al-aḥzāb means the joint forces of the Arab and Jewish tribes in fighting 
Muhammad and the believers during the Battle of Trench in Medina. 
Based on Muqatil’s explanation of the four senses of the term al-aḥzāb, as it is 
used in the Qur’an, the fragmented groups mentioned can be categorized into four kinds: 
the first is the Arab Quraishī disebelievers who rejected Muhammad’s teachings; the 
second is the Christian sects that had divinized ‘Īsā and deviated from his own teaching 
of tawḥīd; the third is bygone people who rejected their prophets and were punished for 
their rejection, and fourth is the joint forces of the Arab and Jewish tribes in fighting 
Muhammad and the believers during the battle of Trench in Medina, in which they 
suffered loss and the Jewish tribes received further consequences of their conspiracy.  
Al-Jihād and al-Ḥarb 
At first glance, despite its compactness, Muqatil’s discussion of jihād in this 
commentary appears to be more nuanced than that in Tafsīr al-Khams Mi’at Āyah. While 
in his legal commentary Muqātil seemed to subscribe to the physical jihād as warfare, 
albeit as a defensive measure, in this lexical commentary Muqātil suggests a varied 
interpretation of jihād as not merely physical warfare, but also as both a communicative 
and performative act. With regard to al-ḥarb, Muqatil interprets the term as either 
physical warfare or disbelief (kufr). As such, the term al-jihād and al-ḥarb coincides in 
the sense of physical warfare. Yet the two are different in that while the term al-jihād 
sustains a positive tone that underlies all of its three senses, the term al-ḥarb, on the 
contrary, points to a negative tone for, apart from pointing to violence, it is signifying 
denial of truth. 
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Al-Jihād 
The term al-jihād has three meanings. The first meaning is undertaking jihād 
through speech or communication (al-jihād bi al-qawl). This can be found in three places 
in the Qur’an: Q25:52, 9:73, and 66:9.1022 Q25:52 describes Muhammad as a messenger 
whom God told not to heed the Meccan disbelievers in their call for their ancestors’ 
religion; instead, Muhammad was commanded to undertake jihādan kabīran (great jihād) 
against them using the Qur’an.1023 Q9:73 orders the Prophet to launch jihād against both 
disbelievers and hypocrites. But if jihād against the Arab disbelievers (kuffār al-‛Arab) 
was undertaken with swords, that against the hypocrites was done with the tongue. This is 
irrespective of the fact that the two had been equally threatened in the Qur’an with the 
same punishment in Jahannam.1024 Q66:9 communicates a similar message as does 
Q9:73.1025 
The second meaning of al-jihād is waging war with weapons (al-qitāl bi al-silāḥ). 
This can be found in three different qur’anic passages, namely Q4:95, 9:73, and 66:9.1026 
Q4:94 explains that those who commit themselves and their possessions to striving in 
God’s way (al-mujāhidūn fī sabīl Allāh bi amwālihim wa anfusihim) are not equal to 
those who stay at home without a justifiable excuse (al-qā‛idūn ‛an al-ghazw bi lā 
‛udhrin). Altough the believers may stay at home with a justifiable excuse, God has 
ranked al-mujāhidūn fī sabīl Allāh higher, and even much higher—at about seventy 
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levels higher—than those who stay at home without an acceptable reason.1027 Those who 
strive in God’s way and those who stay at home with an acceptable reason, however, are 
equally promised paradise.1028 Q9:73 and 66:9, discussed earlier in the first meaning of 
al-jihād, order the war against the disbelievers with sword.1029 
The third meaning of al-jihād is action (al-‘amal). This can be found in three 
Qur’anic passages: Q29:6 and 69, and 22:78.1030 Q29:6 explains that those who do good 
deed do so for their own benefit (man ya‛mal al-khayra fa innamā ya‛malu linafsihī);1031 
Q29:69 states that those who do good deeds merely to serve God, He would surely guide 
them to His ways.1032  
Thus, according to Muqātil, jihād is not necessarily undertaken through warfare; it 
can also be done through normal life activities, such as through acts of communication 
and performing good deeds. Physical jihad as warfare, according to Muqātil, was to be 
waged only against the Arab disbelievers (kuffār al-‛Arab). Muqātil’s nuanced 
interpretation of jihād denies a tendency to generalize this concept as always pointing to 
war. If anything, in Muqātil’s perspective, underlying the idea of jihād is everything that 
one does in life for the sake of God’s cause. Muqātil has expressed this general view of 
jihād more explicitly in his major commentary and the Wujūh. He did not do so in his 
legal commentary because he put more attention to explaining the legal rulings on some 
aspects of historical jihād during the lifetime of the Prophet, including the rulings on 
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battlegain division, ratio of the combatants in warfare, etc. But since Muqātil primarily 
sees jihād as a defensive measure, not as offesinsive medium for expansion, what he 
underlines is not the physical warfare in the idea or practice of jihād, but its spirit as 
doing one’s best in God’s cause. In this last sense, jihād is not exclusively the property of 
war, but also that of normal life. As such, Muqātil is of the view that jihād can be 
undertaken bi al-qawl and bi al-‘amal. Consequently, jihād may permeates one’s whole 
life as long as it is intended for the sake of supporting God’s cause. Muqātil’s partially 
pacifist outlook on jihād vindicates even further his vision for peaceful coexistence with 
other people even in propagating what what he considers the fundamental teachings of 
Islam, namely tawḥīd and taṣdīq. 
Al-Ḥarb 
In Muqātil’s wujūh, al-ḥarb is assigned two meanings.1033 The first meaning is 
disbelief (kufr).1034 Examples can be found in Q2:278-9 and Q5:33. Q2:278-9 stresses 
that disobedience to the Prophet’s instruction is an act of disbelief against God and His 
Messenger.1035 In Q5:33, Muqātil understands the term muḥārabah as al-shirk or al-kufr 
ba‘d al-islām, that is, associating God with creation or disbelief after embracing 
Islam.1036  
The second meaning of al-ḥarb is physical warfare (al-qital). This can be found in 
two Qur’anic passages: Q8:57 and 5:64.1037 In both, the term ḥarb is interpreted as 
                                                        
1033 Muqātil, Wujūh, 150. 
1034 Muqātil, Wujūh, 150. 
1035 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/226-27. 
1036 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1/472. 
1037 Muqātil, Wujūh, 150. 
  
357 
warfare.1038 ‘If you meet them in battle,’ ya’ni in warfare, ‘make a fearsome example of 
them to those who come after them.’1039 ‘Whenever they kindle the fire of war, God will 
put it out,’ ya‘ni warfare to the Prophet.1040 
Thus, based on Muqatil’s exegesis, even the term al-ḥarb, which usually means 
fighting, warfare, or battle, offers another sense, depending upon the context within 
which it is used. In this respect, the term al-ḥarb means either physical warfare or 
disbelief (kufr), the latter of which suggests a general denial or rejection of the truth that 
God and His Prophet have invited people to embrace. In relation to the term jihād, the 
term al-ḥarb coincides with it in the sense of physical warfare. Yet the two are different 
in that while the term jihād sustains a positive tone that underlies all three senses, the 
term al-ḥarb, on the contrary, points to a negative tone, for apart from pointing to 
violence, it signifies denial of truth. But what is significant in Muqātil’s interpretation of 
the term al-ḥarb is the fact that he relates it to his theological concern, the propagation of 
īmān and the condemnation of kufr. Fighting against the prophet is not necessarily 
physical fighting, but may well be denying his teachings that centered around the 
upholding of īmān, especially in relation to tawḥīd and taṣdīq, and the abandoning of 
kufr, especially in relation to shirk and takdhīb. And in Muqātil’s exegetical and 
theological framework, facing such ḥarb must be undertaken peacefully using the best 
ethical ways; believers may resort to physical warfare only when they are attacked and 
hence have to defend themselves. 
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Concluding Remarks 
Muqātil’s entries in al-Wujūh wa al-Naẓā’ir communicate his exegetical thrust 
and theological concerns that revolve around the propagation of tawḥīd and taṣdīq and 
the condemnation of shirk and takdhīb. This is consistent with Muqātil’s other 
commentaries in which the opposition of this pair of principles loomed large. These 
exegetical and theological concerns have partly motivated his composition of the Wujūh-
—apart from educating his readers the presence of polysemy in the Qur’an—his selection 
of the entries, as well as his organization of those entries although it is very far from 
being systematic. Muqātil’s clever strategy in putting three of the most theologically 
loaded terms—al-hudā, al-kufr, and al-shirk—in the beginning of his Wujūh has provided 
his readers with an appropriate clue to his preoccupation with theology in this 
commentary. Furthermore, the absence of the two potentially most important terms from 
the commentary--namely al-islām and al-īmān, with their contradictory meanings as true 
and nominal submission, and true belief and insincere belief, respectively—may have 
been intentionally motivated by Muqātil’s theological concern that people would 
misunderstand them, by taking the idea of islām and īmān less seriously since they might 
think that any interpretation of the terms would be equally justified and applicable in life 
simply because of their status as polysemic terms. 
Particularly important in this commentary is the role that a context plays in 
determining word’s meanings.1041 In a way, meaning is the function of a context. Such a 
context may be verbal or linguistic, but it may also be non-linguistic. Linguistic or verbal 
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context is provided in the very utterances that are used to communicate messages. Non-
linguistic context includes the larger socio-cultural background whithin which the 
Qur’anic statements must be located. In Muqātil’s commentary, such a non-linguistic 
context is represented by asbān al-nuzūl reports that he uses to illuminate the 
understanding of Qur’anic verses. Since a lot of meanings that Muqātil’s entries bear are 
related to non-linguistic context, it is therefore insufficient, in order to understand 
polysemic words in the Qur’an, for his readers to rely solely on his al-Wujūh wa al-
Naẓā’ir alone. Instead, they would need to refer back to Muqātil’s al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr, in 
which he uses a great amount of asbāb al-nuzūl reports that help his readers understand 
better how these words came to be interpreted within the larger qur’anic discourse.
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
In the following I will highlight some of the major findings of my study and offer 
some recommendations for further research, especially in relation to Muqātil and his 
commentaries. 
Summary of Findings 
In his commentary on the whole Qur’an, al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr, Muqātil has made a 
great effort to clarify almost everything by paraphrasing qur’anic verses and providing 
clarifying statements (paraphrasing method), presenting narratives (narrative method), 
and also connecting relevant qur’anic verses with one another (crossreferencing method). 
Muqātil views the Qur’an as a complex text. Not only does the Qur’an contain a variety 
of themes with a diversity of conceptual classifications, but its utterances are also of 
different types, and some of its vocabularies bear multiple meanings depending on the 
context of their use. So complex are qur’anic utterances are that it is impossible to 
understand the Qur’an without interpretation (ta’wīl or tafsīr). To push even further, 
Muqātil argues that interpretation is an endless and ongoing process because every 
interpretation is subject to another (wa li al-tafsīr tafsīr). 
In his exegetical endeavor, Muqātil develops the hermeneutics by which he 
identifies the building blocks of the Qur’an, sets out the typology of qur’anic utterances, 
promotes qur’anic literacy, and advocates education that can sustain and disseminate such 
literacy. Understanding the meaning of the Qur’an is an individual obligation of all 
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believers, although the interpretive task is mandated only to those who possess the 
required abilities. That is why Muqātil envisions a system of education through which the 
attained meanings of the Qur’an, through various exegetical processes, can be 
disseminated from those who are able to directly participate in the pursuit of meaning to 
those who are merely consumers of the products of such an enterprise. The goal is to 
achieve the so-called qur’anic literacy that will lead believers to submit fully to divine 
dictate by understanding God’s commands, prohibitions, promises, threats, and the 
examples of past generations on which the believers must reflect. 
Throughout the commentaries, Muqātil’s exegetical thrust revolves around the 
propagation of belief (īmān), primarily by upholding the belief in one God (tawḥīd) and 
in Muhammad’s prophethood (taṣdīq). He has persistently opposed this to the 
condemnation of disbelief (kufr), primarily in its manifestation of polytheism (shirk) and 
of rejection of Muhammad’s prophethood (takdhīb). Furthermore, Muqātil understands 
Islam, the religion that Muhammad preached, to actually be the same religion that all 
prophets before him had preached. Therefore, the Qur’an calls all prophets as muslimūn. 
As such, Islam is the primordial religion. The thread that has united this primordial 
religion throughout history of prophetic lines and scriptural revelations is its core 
teaching of īmān manifested in tawḥīd and taṣdīq. The challenges that the prophets 
through whom this primordial religion is taught to human beings have faced are similar: 
the performance of kufr in the form of shirk and takdhīb. This perspective has 
accordingly shaped Muqātil’s attitudes in measuring people’s responses to Muhammad’s 
prophetic mission. 
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Since, in his understanding, Islam, the religion of submission to God, is the only 
true religion, Muqātil considers other religions to be human invention and hence, satanic. 
Interestingly, however, the Qur’an itself never mentions the religions it criticized as 
institutionalized entities. Rather, it mentioned Judaism or Christianity through their 
followers, namely yahūd or nasārā, respectively. Likewise, the Qur’an calls majūs and 
ṣābi’ūn as religious communities. Like the Qur’an, Muqātil only rarely mentioned 
religions other than Islam by proper names when he criticized the followers of these 
religions. Sometimes, when mentioning them on a positive note, Muqātil called the Jews 
“the People of the Torah” (ahl al-Tawrāh), and Christians “the People of the Gospel” 
(ahl al-Injīl), based on their affiliation with their scriptures. This suggests that Muqātil 
acknowledged the validity of their scriptures and that, as long as they followed the 
teaching of these scriptures, the Jews and Christians might remain in the true teachings of 
their prophets. If sometimes Muqātil makes a critical assessment of these religious 
communities by mentioning their affiliation with their scripture, for instance, by using the 
phrase al-munafiqūn min ahl al-Tawrāh (the hypocrites of the People of Scripture), he 
does this to distinguish between the pious among the people of the Bible and those who 
are not. But above all, Muqātil’s fierce criticism of non-Muslims, especially Jews and 
Christians, is due to their alleged disloyalty to the teaching of their own scriptures, 
primarily in their tainted monotheism and their rejection of Muhammad whom he 
believed had been prophezised in the Bible, but also in regard to some legal matters, such 
as stoning (rajm), blood money (diyah), and lex taliones (qiṣāṣ). Muqātil thus challenges 
non-Muslims to back to their scriptural basis and argues with them on this basis. It is as if 
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he saying that while belief is subjective, it can be made objective by confronting such 
belief with the very scripture upon which it is built. The interreligious relations that he 
envisions, and, for that matter, dialogue between religious communities, also appear to be 
largely scripture-based. The place of scripture is so important for Muqātil because it is 
the only way to validate whether a religious community is loyal to their scripture. 
Otherwise belief will be entirely subjective, if not whimsical. 
To Muqātil, and the Qur’an alike, God sends all these scriptures. Any tampering 
(taḥrīf) allegedly committed by the followers was committed in relation to their 
understanding or interpretation, and it therefore did not change the nature of these 
scriptures. This suggests that Muqātil acknowledges the validity of the Bible. 
Consequently, as long as the Jews and Christians upheld tawḥīd and acknowledged 
Muhammad’s prophethood, Muqātil did not see any necessity for them to convert to 
Islam. They could practice their religions and follow the teachings of their own 
scriptures, including practicing their own laws. If they decided to accept Islam, however, 
they would have to leave their old religions altogether and fully practice Islam. 
Conversion renders the teachings of their old religions outdated (sunnah māḍiyah), and 
they must therefore follow the updated version of them in the newly revealed scripture. In 
this respect, unlike the widely held view by both Muslims and non-Muslims, Muqātil is 
of the view that the Qur’an does not abrogate earlier scriptures outright. On the contrary, 
the Qur’an is to vindicate these previous scriptures, especially in fundamentals of the 
primordial religion, especially with regard to tawḥīd and taṣdīq. In fact, those early 
scriptures will forever divine and applicable if there are people who would follow their 
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teachings. It is only when one decides to be Muhammad’s follower that the teaching of 
his earlier scripture is rendered outdated, without changing his perception of the 
sacredness of that scripture as divinely sanctioned, if inapplicable. 
In terms of the Arab polytheists, Muqātil sees an entirely different treatment that 
the Qur’an offers. They were the only community upon whom Muhammad was allowed 
to impose Islam. The Arabs who had embraced the religions of People of Scripture, be 
they Jews or Christians, could remain so, such as in the case of the Christian of Najrān. 
After the submission of the polytheists, regardless of their sincerity, Muqātil argues that 
the principle “there is no compulsion in religion” must be upheld. Sociopolitical 
arrangement with regard to the People of Scripture living under the Muslim government 
is to be made separately, such as in the case of the duty to pay jizyah.  
In relation to the hypocrites, Muqātil addresses them with highly moralistic 
language, similar to how the Qur’an itself treats them. While admitting them as part of 
the believers, if reluctantly, Muqātil always treats them with harsh criticism as a result of 
their constant rebellious acts against the Prophet and the believers. So harsh is Muqātil’s 
view of the hypocrites that he often positions them on a par with disbelievers or even 
polytheists. Subsequently, however, Muqātil differentiates between how to treat 
disbelievers (kuffār) and hypocrites (munāfiqūn): the first is with the sword, and the 
second is with words. A disbeliever (kuffār) in Muqātil’s perspective is one who had 
initiated oppressive and violent measures against the early believers for practicing their 
belief, be they Arab or otherwise.  
  
365 
Muqātil’s exegetical thrust, which is highly theological, proves to be the guiding 
principle in his legal decisions as well. The opposition between īmān (belief) and kufr 
(disbelief), along with their two supporting principles tawḥīd and taṣdīq as opposed to 
shirk and takdhīb, constitutes the yardstick by which he derives laws from the Qur’an. 
Muqātil appears to argue that a correct theology is fundamental before anything else, 
including in making legal decisions. So paramount is theology in his framework that 
sometimes Muqātil’s judgment, as in the case of the hypocrites, was more theological 
than legal when he is supposed to talk about law. Muqātil’s theological preoccupation in 
doing law is more noticeable when his process of legal derivation is compared to the 
process by which the great jurist al-Shāfi‘ī, devised his legal decisions, despite the 
similarly theological inclinations of the two, such as in the case of defining the 
hypocrites. If Muqātil looks at the hypocrites in a largely moral or ethical way as sinners 
and rebels, al-Shāfi‘ī is more sober legally in that while he acknowledges that the 
hypocrites are insincere in their belief—and hence their hypocrisy—he considers them to 
be Muslims if they publicly announce themselves to be Muslims. Their religious sincerity 
is subject only to God’s judgement in the hereafter. In this world, the hypocrites are 
judged according to how they present themselves to be judged. 
While theologically uncompromising, Muqātil is, however, legally pragmatist. 
His strong vision for interreligious relations, for instance, has led him to allow a peace 
agreement to be made between the believers and disbelievers, and he counsels the 
Muslims to be loyal to such an agreement once it has been made with good intention. 
Furthermore, unlike al-Shāfi‘ī who limited the definition of People of Scripture ethnically 
  
366 
to the Israelites, Muqātil’s definition of the People of Scripture is much more inclusive, 
apply to as broad a group of people as possible so long as they have some sort of 
religious affiliation with the People of Scripture, regardless of their ethnicity, Arab or 
otherwise. Muqātil upholds the principle that there is no compulsion in religion after the 
forced submission of the Arab disbelievers or polytheists of Muhammad’s time, the only 
group of people upon whom Muhammad was allowed to impose Islam. Consequently, 
after their surrender to Muhammad, no other people, according to Muqātil, can be forced 
to embrace Islam. Furthermore, in his quest for a common ground for interreligious 
encounters, Muqātil pursues another effort that is fresh and inspiring by conceptualizing 
the muḥkamāt al-Qur’ān as the “Islamic Decalogue” which lays out not only perennial 
fundamentals with regard to divine-human relations but also interpersonal relations. The 
muḥkamāt al-Qur’ān, which refers to Q6 (al-An‘ām):151-3, is the perennially permanent 
message that all scriptures, especially that of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, shared. 
The permanent message that the mūhkamāt communicates is also written in the Protected 
Tablet (lauḥ maḥfūẓ) in heaven, as it is written in the scriptures of these three religious 
traditions. 
Interestingly, Muqātil has an unlikely combination of three properties in a person, 
namely being theologically uncompromising, legally pragmatist, and ethically pacifist. It 
is possible that his pacifism is the result of his legal pragmatism as much as the fruit of 
his theology. His theologically unwavering stance is a matter of principle in upholding 
what he considers correct and wrong. Theology is not to be compromised, but it also is 
subject only to God’s judgment in in the hereafter, and it therefore is not supposed to 
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hinder any pragmatical needs of this world, such as the need for coexistence amidst 
differences or the need to live a good and peaceful life. In this case, Muqātil seems to 
advocate for the idea that while conceptually uncompromising, his theology must be 
realized in a legally pragmatist and ethically pacifist way. This is demonstrated, for 
example, in his conception of commanding good and forbidding wrong (al-amr bi al-
ma‘rūf wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar) whose very essence is commanding tawḥīd and taṣdīq 
and forbidding shirk and takdhīb. The doctrine “commanding good and forbidding 
wrong” consists of the very theology that occupied Muqātil and became his exegetical 
thrust throughout his commentary. Yet in its performance, Muqātil does not condone any 
violence. Instead, his view of how to execute the doctrine is very idealist, if not utopist, 
by envisioning an environment in which every individual would have access to a good 
education to know what good and wrong are so that everyone may perform only good 
deeds and refrain from doing the contrary. There might be an impression of contradiction 
between Muqātil’s advocacy of peaceful undertaking of commanding right and 
forbidding wrong, on one hand, and his views with regard to jihād. But such a 
contradiction fades once it is understood that Muqātil considers jihād to be a defensive 
measure against the hostile enemy that has used different kinds of means, including 
violence, to prevent the early Muslims from practicing their faith. In other words, jihād is 
a qur’anic response in war or conflict situations that allows the believers to take a 
defensive measure against all kinds of oppression targeting their religious belief. On the 
other hand, Muqātil envisions the doctrine commanding right and forbidding wrong to be 
carried out in a normal situation and more as a preventive than curative measure. Thus, as 
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long as he can find scriptural justifications, Muqātil would likely attempt to find ways to 
create a normal life and peaceful coexistence, as he demonstrated in his views on 
interreligious relations and in his vision for a common ground with his Muḥkamāt as 
Islamic Decalogue.  
Likewise, Muqātil’s entries in al-Wujūh wa al-Naẓā’ir communicate further his 
exegetical thrust and theological concerns. In fact, these exegetical and theological 
concerns—apart from educating his readers the presence of polysemy in the Qur’an—  
may have partly motivated his composition of the Wujūh, his selection of the entries, as 
well as his organization of those entries, although it remains very far from being 
systematic. Muqātil’s clever strategy in putting three of the most theologically loaded 
terms—al-hudā, al-kufr, and al-shirk—in the beginning of his Wujūh has provided his 
readers with an appropriate clue to his preoccupation with theology in this commentary. 
Furthermore, the absence of the two potentially most important terms from the 
commentary--namely al-islām and al-īmān, with their contradictory meanings as true and 
nominal submission, and true belief and insincere belief, respectively—may have been 
intentional, motivated by Muqātil’s theological concern that people would misunderstand 
them, taking the idea of islām and īmān less seriously because they might believe that any 
meaning of the term can be equally justified and applicable in life simply because of their 
status as polysemic terms. His legal pragmatism and ethical pacifism are also maintained, 
for instance, in arguing for the “domestification” of the meaning of jihād, by suggesting 
that it does not merely point to physical fight, but also other civilized acts undertaken to 
support God’s cause.  
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Particularly important in Muqātil Wujūh is the role that a context plays in 
determining qur’anic word’s meanings. In a way, meaning is the function of a context. 
Such a context may be verbal or linguistic, but it may also be non-linguistic. Linguistic or 
verbal context is provided in the very utterances that are used to communicate messages. 
Non-linguistic context includes the larger socio-cultural background within which the 
Qur’anic statements must be located. In Muqātil’s commentary, such a non-linguistic 
context is represented by asbāb al-nuzūl reports that he uses to illuminate the 
understanding of qur’anic verses. Once more, the Wujūh reminds us of the necessity of 
interpretation in pursuing the intended meanings of qur’anic utterances. Muqātil teaches 
us that scripture is polyphonic.   
Recommendations 
After studying Muqātil and his commentaries on the Qur’an, I shall recommend 
some venues for further research, including the working of discursive community in 
orthodoxy making. In the case of Muqātil, it is still a mystery how it could have been 
possible for Muqātil to have been marginalized severely in the traditional Muslim 
scholarship by a number of accusations that are not entirely founded, at least on the basis 
of Muqātil’s extant works. What has led the majority of Muslim scholars throughout 
history to simply take anything other people said about Muqātil for granted without 
feeling the need to cross-check it, at least in Muqātil’s works?  
 Another venue that I shall recommend is to look more closely at the quality of 
traditions or ḥadīths that he uses in all of his commentaries relative to the well-accepted 
collections of sound traditions, such as the Bukhārī and Muslim collections. This will 
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enable not only the classification of traditions that he uses but also the distinction 
between ḥadīths proper and those later considered isrā’iliyyāt.  
Another venue is related to the extensive narratives that Muqātil employs in the 
commentaries. Reading Muqātil’s commentaries, especially his al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr and, to 
a lesser extent, his Khams Mi’at, the impression that it reads like story-book often 
emerges. This suggests that there is a combination of tafsīr and sīrah in his works that 
needs to be studied on its own, or perhaps to be compared to other independent sīrah 
works, such as that of Ibn Isḥāq. In fact, some scholars, such as Wansbrough, have 
noticed the similarity between Muqātil’s commentary and Ibn Isḥāq’s Sīrah. 
Another venue is to trace the socio-political and cultural background within which 
Muqātil had lived his life and produced his commentaries and to identify its influence on 
them. This invitation is justified because the circumstances that surrounds a person often 
makes indelible mark on his or her works. For instance, not all early scholars discussed 
jihād in their works or their expressed views. A scholar of Hijāz, for example, seems to 
be less knowledgeable about this subject matter when compared to other scholars who 
lived in frontier zone closer to encounter with Roman Empire, such as Syria, Spain, and 
Khūrāsān. Even Iraq is known as a place where its scholars were not fond of discussing 
jihād. Al-Shāfi‘ī, who began his legal career in ‘Irāq, however, devoted a great space for 
addressing jihād in his Umm. Is it because of his birth in Palestine, because of genealogy 
of learning, or because of something else entirely? 
Last but not least, practically I would like to see if Muqātil’s approach can be 
used in interreligious dialogue. It is a model pattered on honest theological discussion, 
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which is based on scripture and its interpretative tradition, legal pragmatism, and ethical 
pacifism. Wallāhu a‘lam
  
372 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Primary Sources: 
Muqātil ibn Sulaymān. Al-Wujūh wa al-Naẓā’ir fī al-Qur’ān al-Karīm. Edited by Ḥātim 
Ṣāliḥ al-Ḍāmin. Dubai: Markaz Jum‘at al-Mājid li al-Thaqāfah wa al-Turāth, 2006.  
Muqātil ibn Sulaymān. Kitāb Tafsīr al-Khams Mi’at Āyah min al-Qur’ān ‘an Muqātil ibn 
Sulaymān. Edited by Isaiah Goldfeld. Shfaram, Israel: al-Mashriq Press, 1980. 
Muqātil ibn Sulaymān. Tafsīr Muqātil ibn Sulaymān. Edited by ‘Abd Allāh Maḥmūd 
Shiḥātah. Beirūt-Lebanon: Dār Iḥyā’ al-Turāth al-‘Arabī, 2002. 
Arabic Sources: 
‛Awajān, Walid Humaymil. “Tafsīr Khams Mi’at Āyah min al-Qur’ān al-Karīm fī al-
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Muḥammad. Riyāḍ: Maktabat al-Rushd, 1989. 
Al-Shāfi‘ī, Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Muṭṭalibī al-Qurashī. Tafsīr al-Imām 
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Fahd li Ṭibā‛at al-Muṣḥaf al-Sharīf. 1426 H. 
Al-Suyūṭī, Jalāl al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Abū Bakr. Mu‛tarak al-Aqrān fī I‛jāz al-Qur’ān. 
Edited by Aḥmad Shams al-Dīn. Beirūt: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 1988. 
  
378 
Al-Suyuṭī, Jalāl al-Dīn. al-Durr al-Manthūr fī al-Tafsīr bi al-Ma’thūr. Edited by ‘Abd 
Allāh ibn ‘Abd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī. al-Muhandisīn: Markaz Hijr li al-Buḥūth wa al-
Dirāsāt al-‘Arabiyyah wa al-Islāmiyyah, 2003. 
Al-Ṭabarī, Abū Ja‘far Muḥammad ibn Jarīr. Jāmi‘ al-Bayān ‘an Ra’wīl Āy al-Qur’ān, ed. 
‘Abd Allāh ibn ‘Abd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī. n.p., Dār Hijr, n.y. 
Al-Ṭabarī, Abū Ja‛far Muḥammad ibn Jarīr. Jāmi‛ al-Bayān ‛an Ta’wīl Āy al-Qur’ān. 
Edited by Maḥmūd Muḥammad Shākir and Aḥmad Muḥammad Shākir. Cairo: 
Maktabah Ibn Taymiyyah, n. y. 
Al-Tha‘ālibī, ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad ibn Makhlūf Abū Zayd al-Mālikī. al-
Jawāhir al-Ḥisān fī Tafsīr al-Qur’ān (Tafsīr al-Tha‘ālibī). Edited by ‘Alī Muḥammad 
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